“We were in the water for 13 hours. They [my wife Shifaa, 30, and our two children, 9-month-old Asem and 5-year-old Abdulwahab] were alive with me right up to the last hour. After that, I could do no more. Can you imagine that they died while I was holding them? I don’t understand why I didn’t die with them.” [1]1 — Mohamed’s testimony is available on the  norwegian TV2 website. The General Court confirmed that Frontex is not accountable for deadly push-backs: Case T-600/21 WS and Others v. Frontex ECLI:EU:T:2023:492. .

Sounding the alarm

The EU and its Member States are the architects of a barbaric system of intolerable violence spreading all across the Mediterranean Sea and generously paid for with European money. This system runs on lawlessness law: the deployment of rule of law arguments to void the law of any substance and render rights that are unusable – sometimes unthinkable – in practice, [2]2 — For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see: Kochenov, D.; S. Ganty, S (2023). “EU Lawlessness Law: Europe’s Passport Apartheid from Indifference – to Torture and Killing”. Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU Law School), núm. 2/2022. and emerges as one of the main features of what the Union is about today.

With the death toll into the tens of thousands, and hundreds of thousands more suffering unbearable abuse as a direct result of the successful implementation of EU policies, sometimes very far from EU borders, the Union and its Member States are colluding in the ongoing destruction of lives, dignity and hope on an immense scale. These policies are rooted in the general proceduralization of the EU’s mission, the radical dismissal of non-citizens as potential bearers of core rights stemming from EU law, beginning with the very first steps in European integration and a dangerous abuse of the very mission of the law, which has evolved from a means of empowering individuals and tempering power within the EU into a legalistic toolbox for whitewashing crimes and justifying abuse. Countless people in the third world perceive the EU as evil, since it invests enormous amounts of money and effort into placing the innocent in mortal danger, all the while ensuring that any accountability for such policies is absent. European Union law, on this count, is a textbook example of evil law: [3]3 — Lukina, A. (2023). “The Paradox of Evil Law”, a: Tushnet, M.; Kochenov, D. (eds). Research Handbook on the Politics of Constitutional Law. Edward Elgar. – our “agreement with Hell”, in the words of Jack Balkin. [4]4 — Balkin, J. M. (1997). “Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith”. Fordham L Rev, 65, p. 1703.

The increasing legalistic bluntness of the outright dismissal of any rights of some categories of the non-citizen ‘others’ that we observe today was absolutely unheard of before. The EU is starting to deliver on Gráinne de Búrca’s fear: it is too important not to be also an agent of injustice. [5]5 — De Búrca, G. (2015). “Conclusion”. In Kochenov et al. (eds). Europe’s Justice Deficit? Hart. The same emerges from other recent key revelations, including, the Court’s denial of own structural independence displaying the acuteness of the justice deficit by design [6]6 — Representatives of their governments, and thus collectively exercising the powers of the Member States, are not subject to judicial review by the courts of the Union’, we learn from the Vice President, is also applied to following the clear procedures and guarantees against overreach established in primary law, creating a veritable cacophony. See: Kochenov, D.; Bárd, P. (2022). “Kirchberg Salami Lost in Bosphorus”. JCMS, 60, p. 150. plaguing the EU at the most fundamental level. Such deficit could seem surprising, given that the Lenaerts’ Court officially champions Rule of Law. [7]7 — Lenaerts, K. (2020). “New Horizons for the Rule of Law within the EU”. German LJ, 21, p 29. Kochenov, D. (2023, pròximament), “Dialogical Rule of Law in the Hands of the Court of Justice: Analysis and Critique”. CYELS.

From human rights ideals to the killing machine

With the Court ducking, while the Commission views its role as the facilitator in the Member States’ assaults on the rights of the racialized migrants, the EU is far from not only the ethical and moral, but also from the minimal legal ideals of Rule of Law and human rights protection, emerging as a killing machine. It now kills racialized others with the help of FRONTEX and the lavishly funded thugs at its borders in denying the racialized others any humanity by default. [11]11 — The racist spill-over touches EU citizens: Brito, R. (2022). “From Turkish jail, French woman accuses Greece of «pushback»”. AP News. Available online. The Turkish ethnicity of the victim is an important part of the story showcasing the racialized nature of the crime. The policy, which emerges from criminal collusion between the EU and the Member States, seems to consist of recurrent attempts to deter people mostly from the former colonies on which the Empires preyed from coming to Europe by threatening to kill them – either directly, or by proxies. The EU today is very much about EU-sponsored war on the racialized victims of citizenship [12]12 — The holders of the worst nationalities in the world are not entitled to a right to life either in the Mediterranean or back home. Kochenov, D. (2023). “The Victims of Citizenship: Feudal Statuses for Sale in the Hypocrisy Republic”. A: Kochenov, D.; Surak, K. (eds). Residence and Citizenship Sales. Cambridge. (no reports on white people dying in the Mediterranean among dozens of thousands of Asians and Africans are known). From the Mediterranean to the Belarussian forest, the EU has been steadily solidifying its place among the most notable enemies of human rights in the world, while the Commission’s propaganda goes out of the way to rehearse the Rule of Law and rights narrative about the EU.

In the real world, meanwhile, the Union is now all about arming thugs for the passport poor in lawless spaces such as post-conflict Libya and weak former colonies further afield. [13]13 — The OLAF final report on Frontex, Case No.  OC/2021/0451/A1. Available online. For a summary of the report, see: Izuzquiza, L.; Deleja-Hotko, V.; Semsrott, A. (2022). Revealed: The OLAF report on Frontex, FragDenStaat, 13 October 2022. Also Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker, 28 November 2021. This conscious policy has claimed more than 25,000 non-white lives over the last eight years [14]14 — In 2022, the death toll had reached 1200 by September alone. Sunderland, J. (2022). “Endless Tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea. Europe’s Commitment to Rescue Would Save Lives”, Human Rights Watch, 13 September 2022. Available online. For more data, see the web Missing Migrants Project. and left more than 100,000 innocent people captured and imprisoned in anticipation of ransoms to be paid, or enslaved and sold by EU-equipped criminal militias using Frontex – once again – as their air force. [15]15 — See I. Urbina’s talk on EU Citizenship Apartheid at Yale Law School European Law Association on 29 April 2022, with reference to the air power wielded by Libyan thugs. The recording is available online. Frontex drones help EU Member States decide who to save and who to “redirect” to the criminals on the other side of the sea, using saving those in distress as a pretext to kidnap and enslave with a full mandate from the EU and at the EU’s request.

Count the deaths: Ms von der Leyen and her friends in Member States’ governments, as well as criminal Libyan mercenaries acting under EU instruction and on Frontex intelligence, have killed more people in the Mediterranean than Putin and his criminals in Ukraine. [16]16 — At the time of writing, the civilian death toll in Ukraine stands at slightly under 10,000 victims – more than two times less than the number of those who have lost their lives in the Mediterranean. See Sommerville, Q. (2023). “«Dying by the Dozens Every Day» – Ukrainian Losses Climb”. BBC, 29 August 2023. Available online. Many deaths are unaccounted for, while countless dead remain unidentified: the EU appears not proud of its killings. [17]17 — Okeowo, A. (2023). “The Crisis of Missing Migrants: What Has Become of the Tens of Thousands of People Who Have Disappeared on Their Way to Europe?”. New Yorker, 9 January 2023. While the International Criminal Court has been notified, [18]18 — Shatz, O.; Branco, J. (2019) Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014–2019). Available online. much time will pass before we see behind bars for these well-documented crimes, [19]19 — Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker (28 November 2021). all those who designed a policy whereby non-white people in the sea are kidnapped by EU-funded criminals, under the pretext of saving lives, and tortured in generously funded EU prisons outside the law. [20]20 — Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker (28 November 2021). Sir Francis Jacobs was right, as long ago as the 1970s, when he said that the EU is about the individual. This individual today, in the 21st century, is the racialized other who is to be either killed or kidnapped, tortured and sold as slave to deter other potential migrants. The law is not on the side of such individuals. The threat of death while being “rescued” by criminals acting under EU instruction is not a deterrent in the world of passport apartheid.

Lawlessness law as a tool of choice

Lawlessness law is highly complex in its operation and is marked by a radical departure from the core values on which the Union and the Member States are said to be built, in particular the rule of law. [22]22 — Grabowska-Moroz, B.; Kochenov, D. (2022). “The Loss of Face for All Those Concerned: EU Rule of Law in the Context of the «Migration Crisis»”. A: Stoyanova, V.; Smet, S. (eds.), Migrants’ Rights, Populism and Legal Resilience in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It operates through different tools, from moving the EU’s agreements with principled human rights implications outside the scope of EU law, [23]23 — For example: Arribas, G. F. (2016). “The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem”. European Papers, 1(3), p. 1097.   Lehner, R. (2018). “The EU-Turkey-«deal»: Legal Challenges and Pitfalls”. International Migration, 57(2), p. 176.   Kassoti, E.; Carrozzini, A. (2022). “One Instrument in Search of an Author: Revisiting the Authorship and Legal Nature of the EU-Turkey Statement”. A: Kassoti, E.; Idriz, N. (eds.). The Informalisation of the EU’s External Action in the Field of Migration and Asylum. Asser Press/Springer, p. 237. to setting up enormous intrusive and unaccountable funding schemes – as demonstrated by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – to establish, preserve and sponsor the export of rights violations outside the EU’s borders, [24]24 — See: Castillejo, C. (2017). “The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: What Implications for Future EU Development Policy?”. Briefing Paper 5/2017 (German Development Institute).   Oxfam (2020). “The EU Trust Fund for Africa Trapped between aid policy and migration politics”. Oxfam Briefing Note. Available online.   Molinari, C. (2021). “Digging a Moat around Fortress Europe: EU Funding as an Instrument of Exclusion”. A: De Lange, T.; Maas, W.; Schrauwen, A. (eds.). Money Matters in Migration: Policy, Participation, and Citizenship. Cambridge University Press.   See also Urbina in New Yorker. as well as deploying Frontex, an EU agency, [25]25 — See: Fink, M. (2019). Frontex and human rights: responsibility in ‘multi-actor situations’ under the ECHR and EU Public Liability Law. Oxford University Press, p. 3-4. For a lengthy discussion of the question of responsibility of multi-actor situation involving Frontex, and joint operations more specifically.   Mugianu, R. (2016). Frontex and Non-Refoulement. The International Responsibility of the EU. Cambridge University Press.   Kalkman, J. P. (2021). “FRONTEX: A Literature Review”. International Migration, 59(1).   Gkliati, M.; Kilpatrick, J. (2021). “Crying Wolf Too Many Times: The Impact of the Emergency Narrative on Transparency in Frontex Joint Operations”. Utrecht Law Review, 17(4), p. 57.   See also the contributions in the Verfassungsblog’s current debate on Frontex and the Rule of Law, available on-line. to commit and cover up crimes, break the law and share vital intelligence with EU-sponsored thugs hunting down the passport poor on the Union’s behalf. [26]26 — See: Joint investigation conducted by Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, ARD i TV Asahi: Bellingcat et al. (2020). “Frontex at Fault: European Border Force Complicit in «Illegal» Pushbacks”, 23 October 2020. Available online.   Lüdke, S. (2022). “Classified Report Reveals full Extent of Frontex Scandal”. OLAF, 29 July 2022.   Statewatch (2021). “Border surveillance, drones and militarisation of the Mediterranean”. Available online.   Sunderland, J.; Pezzani, L. (2022). EU’s Drone is Another Threat to Migrants and Refugees. Human Rights Watch. Available online.   Rijpma, J.; Vermeulen, M. (2015). “EUROSUR: saving lives or building borders?”. European Security, 24(3), p. 454.   See also, crucially, the OLAF final report on Frontex, note 7 Torture, pushbacks and the killing of thousands of innocent people – either directly or via proxies – take place in an atmosphere of near total unaccountability and seemingly beyond the reach of EU law. It is evident that the EU acts in concert with its Member States, rather than alone: while it seems that the EU and its Member States need each other to commit mass crimes at EU borders, the national aspect of the story should not be forgotten. [27]27 — The first of such studies are already being published. See, for example: Baranowska, G. (2021). “Pushbacks in Poland: Grounding the Practice in Domestic Law in 2021”. XLI Polish Yearbook of International Law.

The mildest and most constitutionally far-reaching form of lawlessness law is what could be described as the EU’s disappearing act: like a rabbit in the top hat of a street clown, the EU as such tends to evaporate when a non-EU citizen enters the scene. It is the only “citizens only” constitutional system in the contemporary world. “Thou shalt not oppress the stranger” [28]28 — Èxode 23:9. emerges as the opposite of the EU’s core values. The story is not new in itself, but the intensity of this Balibarian “apartheid européen”, [29]29 — Balibar, É. (2001). Nous, citoyens d’Europe ?: les frontières, l’État, le peuple. París: La Découverte, p. 192. has grown significantly since J. H. H. Weiler bemoaned the first seeds being sown in the EU. [30]30 — Weiler, J. H. H. (1992). “Thou shalt not oppress a stranger: on the judicial protection of the human rights of non-EC nationals – a critique”. European Journal of International Law, 3, p. 651. The EU simply does not exist for non-citizens, be it the sacred freedom of movement or non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. Even when they dare to bring a complaint of racial discrimination because of humiliating mistreatment, non-citizens are reminded of their rank of third-rate citizen: protection against racial discrimination remains non-existent for those who hold the wrong passport. [31]31 — See: Ganty, S.; de Vries, K. (2023). “Non-discrimination in European social security law: exploring safeguards against gender and racial discrimination”. A: Vonk, G.; Pennings, F. (eds.) Research Handbook on European Social Security Law. Edward Elgar.   Ganty, S. (2021). “Silence is not (Always) Golden. A Criticism of the ECJ’s Approach towards Integration Conditions for Family Reunification”. European Journal of Migration and Law, 23(2). The fruit of the active cooperation between the Member States and the institutions, with particular emphasis on the Commission and the CJEU’s initiation and rubberstamping of lawlessness, and ensuring the secure and unaccountable flow of funds, is the lawlessness law that determines the rightless position of the foreigner in the EU’s legal system.

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The author thanks Sarah Ganty for her help in the preparation of this article.

• Referències i notes

  1 —

  Mohamed’s testimony is available on the  norwegian TV2 website. The General Court confirmed that Frontex is not accountable for deadly push-backs: Case T-600/21 WS and Others v. Frontex ECLI:EU:T:2023:492.

  2 —

  For a more detailed presentation of this argument, see: Kochenov, D.; S. Ganty, S (2023). “EU Lawlessness Law: Europe’s Passport Apartheid from Indifference – to Torture and Killing”. Jean Monnet Working Paper (NYU Law School), núm. 2/2022.

  3 —

  Lukina, A. (2023). “The Paradox of Evil Law”, a: Tushnet, M.; Kochenov, D. (eds). Research Handbook on the Politics of Constitutional Law. Edward Elgar.

  4 —

  Balkin, J. M. (1997). “Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith”. Fordham L Rev, 65, p. 1703.

  5 —

  De Búrca, G. (2015). “Conclusion”. In Kochenov et al. (eds). Europe’s Justice Deficit? Hart.

  6 —

  Representatives of their governments, and thus collectively exercising the powers of the Member States, are not subject to judicial review by the courts of the Union’, we learn from the Vice President, is also applied to following the clear procedures and guarantees against overreach established in primary law, creating a veritable cacophony. See: Kochenov, D.; Bárd, P. (2022). “Kirchberg Salami Lost in Bosphorus”. JCMS, 60, p. 150.

  7 —

  Lenaerts, K. (2020). “New Horizons for the Rule of Law within the EU”. German LJ, 21, p 29. Kochenov, D. (2023, pròximament), “Dialogical Rule of Law in the Hands of the Court of Justice: Analysis and Critique”. CYELS.

  8 —

  Kochenov, D.; Butler, G. (2021). “Independence of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Unchecked Member States Power after the Sharpston Affair”. ELJ, 27, p. 292. For the only respectable document authored by the ECJ in this context, see Eleanor Sharpston v Council of the European Union and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States. Order of the Judge Hearing Applications for Interim Measures.

  9 —

  Kochenov, D. (2015). “EU Law without the Rule of Law: Is the Veneration of Autonomy Worth It?”. 34 Yearbook of European Law, p. 74; Eeckhout, P. (2015). “Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR and judicial dialogue—autonomy or autarky?”. Fordham Int’l LJ, 38, p. 955.

  10 —

  Krygier, M. (2016). “Tempering Power”. A: Adams, M., et al. (eds.). Bridging Idealism and Realism in Constitutionalism and Rule of Law. Cambridge University Press. ). On the Court’s curious position in the EU, see, e.g.: Davies, G. (2014). “Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice”. CMLRev, 51, p. 1579; Bengoetxea, J. (2010). “Reasoning from Consequences from Luxembourg”. A: Koch, H., et al. (eds). Europe. The New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen. Djøf Publishing.

  11 —

  The racist spill-over touches EU citizens: Brito, R. (2022). “From Turkish jail, French woman accuses Greece of «pushback»”. AP News. Available online. The Turkish ethnicity of the victim is an important part of the story showcasing the racialized nature of the crime.

  12 —

  The holders of the worst nationalities in the world are not entitled to a right to life either in the Mediterranean or back home. Kochenov, D. (2023). “The Victims of Citizenship: Feudal Statuses for Sale in the Hypocrisy Republic”. A: Kochenov, D.; Surak, K. (eds). Residence and Citizenship Sales. Cambridge.

  13 —

  The OLAF final report on Frontex, Case No.  OC/2021/0451/A1. Available online. For a summary of the report, see: Izuzquiza, L.; Deleja-Hotko, V.; Semsrott, A. (2022). Revealed: The OLAF report on Frontex, FragDenStaat, 13 October 2022. Also Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker, 28 November 2021.

  14 —

  In 2022, the death toll had reached 1200 by September alone. Sunderland, J. (2022). “Endless Tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea. Europe’s Commitment to Rescue Would Save Lives”, Human Rights Watch, 13 September 2022. Available online. For more data, see the web Missing Migrants Project.

  15 —

  See I. Urbina’s talk on EU Citizenship Apartheid at Yale Law School European Law Association on 29 April 2022, with reference to the air power wielded by Libyan thugs. The recording is available online.

  16 —

  At the time of writing, the civilian death toll in Ukraine stands at slightly under 10,000 victims – more than two times less than the number of those who have lost their lives in the Mediterranean. See Sommerville, Q. (2023). “«Dying by the Dozens Every Day» – Ukrainian Losses Climb”. BBC, 29 August 2023. Available online.

  17 —

  Okeowo, A. (2023). “The Crisis of Missing Migrants: What Has Become of the Tens of Thousands of People Who Have Disappeared on Their Way to Europe?”. New Yorker, 9 January 2023.

  18 —

  Shatz, O.; Branco, J. (2019) Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on EU Migration Policies in the Central Mediterranean and Libya (2014–2019). Available online.

  19 —

  Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker (28 November 2021).

  20 —

  Urbina, I. (2021). “The secretive prisons that keep migrants out of Europe”. New Yorker (28 November 2021).

  21 —

  Lukina, A. (2023). “The Paradox of Evil Law”. A: Tushnet, M.; Kochenov, D. (eds.). Research Handbook on the Politics of Constitutional Law. Edward Elgar.

  22 —

  Grabowska-Moroz, B.; Kochenov, D. (2022). “The Loss of Face for All Those Concerned: EU Rule of Law in the Context of the «Migration Crisis»”. A: Stoyanova, V.; Smet, S. (eds.), Migrants’ Rights, Populism and Legal Resilience in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  23 —

  For example:

  • Arribas, G. F. (2016). “The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem”. European Papers, 1(3), p. 1097.

   

  • Lehner, R. (2018). “The EU-Turkey-«deal»: Legal Challenges and Pitfalls”. International Migration, 57(2), p. 176.

   

  • Kassoti, E.; Carrozzini, A. (2022). “One Instrument in Search of an Author: Revisiting the Authorship and Legal Nature of the EU-Turkey Statement”. A: Kassoti, E.; Idriz, N. (eds.). The Informalisation of the EU’s External Action in the Field of Migration and Asylum. Asser Press/Springer, p. 237.
  24 —

  See:

  • Castillejo, C. (2017). “The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: What Implications for Future EU Development Policy?”. Briefing Paper 5/2017 (German Development Institute).

   

  • Oxfam (2020). “The EU Trust Fund for Africa Trapped between aid policy and migration politics”. Oxfam Briefing Note. Available online.

   

  • Molinari, C. (2021). “Digging a Moat around Fortress Europe: EU Funding as an Instrument of Exclusion”. A: De Lange, T.; Maas, W.; Schrauwen, A. (eds.). Money Matters in Migration: Policy, Participation, and Citizenship. Cambridge University Press.

   

  • See also Urbina in New Yorker.
  25 —

  See:

  • Fink, M. (2019). Frontex and human rights: responsibility in ‘multi-actor situations’ under the ECHR and EU Public Liability Law. Oxford University Press, p. 3-4. For a lengthy discussion of the question of responsibility of multi-actor situation involving Frontex, and joint operations more specifically.

   

  • Mugianu, R. (2016). Frontex and Non-Refoulement. The International Responsibility of the EU. Cambridge University Press.

   

  • Kalkman, J. P. (2021). “FRONTEX: A Literature Review”. International Migration, 59(1).

   

  • Gkliati, M.; Kilpatrick, J. (2021). “Crying Wolf Too Many Times: The Impact of the Emergency Narrative on Transparency in Frontex Joint Operations”. Utrecht Law Review, 17(4), p. 57.

   

  • See also the contributions in the Verfassungsblog’s current debate on Frontex and the Rule of Law, available on-line.
  26 —

  See:

  • Joint investigation conducted by Bellingcat, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, ARD i TV Asahi: Bellingcat et al. (2020). “Frontex at Fault: European Border Force Complicit in «Illegal» Pushbacks”, 23 October 2020. Available online.

   

  • Lüdke, S. (2022). “Classified Report Reveals full Extent of Frontex Scandal”. OLAF, 29 July 2022.

   

  • Statewatch (2021). “Border surveillance, drones and militarisation of the Mediterranean”. Available online.

   

  • Sunderland, J.; Pezzani, L. (2022). EU’s Drone is Another Threat to Migrants and Refugees. Human Rights Watch. Available online.

   

  • Rijpma, J.; Vermeulen, M. (2015). “EUROSUR: saving lives or building borders?”. European Security, 24(3), p. 454.

   

  • See also, crucially, the OLAF final report on Frontex, note 7
  27 —

  The first of such studies are already being published. See, for example: Baranowska, G. (2021). “Pushbacks in Poland: Grounding the Practice in Domestic Law in 2021”. XLI Polish Yearbook of International Law.

  28 —

  Èxode 23:9.

  29 —

  Balibar, É. (2001). Nous, citoyens d’Europe ?: les frontières, l’État, le peuple. París: La Découverte, p. 192.

  30 —

  Weiler, J. H. H. (1992). “Thou shalt not oppress a stranger: on the judicial protection of the human rights of non-EC nationals – a critique”. European Journal of International Law, 3, p. 651.

  31 —

  See:

  • Ganty, S.; de Vries, K. (2023). “Non-discrimination in European social security law: exploring safeguards against gender and racial discrimination”. A: Vonk, G.; Pennings, F. (eds.) Research Handbook on European Social Security Law. Edward Elgar.

   

  • Ganty, S. (2021). “Silence is not (Always) Golden. A Criticism of the ECJ’s Approach towards Integration Conditions for Family Reunification”. European Journal of Migration and Law, 23(2).