The rise of China since 1978 has not only changed the global power balance as measurable in economic and security terms, but also in terms of its ability to define what is normal in the global political economy. In other words, to grasp the role of Global China today it is insufficient to only provide data on its economic growth, investment abroad, or the build-up of its military, illustrating the narrowing gap between Beijing and the West. The way China “extends the universe of what is thinkable, sayable and accepted as legitimate” on the world stage [1]1 — Anastas Vangeli, “Global China and Symbolic Power: The Case of 16+1 Cooperation”, Journal of Contemporary China, 27, 2018. Available online. , thereby effectively pluralizing and diversifying the global ideoscape, is an additional and particularly consequential aspect of China’s rise, which is often overlooked or misrecognized.
Historically, Europeans, along with Americans, have taken up the promotion of liberal democratic norms and values as their core global mission. In a manifestation of premature triumphalism in the late 1980s, Francis Fukuyama wrote about the end of history, an idea which was internalized by policy and intellectual establishments on both sides of the Atlantic in the aftermath of the Cold War. Yet, a string of unforeseen developments ever since –the rise of China among the central ones– have contributed to the emergence of a complex, and open-ended global constellation of diverging, if not contending ideas and normative blueprints of socio-political and economic development.
It is therefore impossible to discuss the evolution of the global ideoscape without taking in account the unlikely role of China. Rising China is itself increasingly being perceived as a symbol of an alternative, non-Western model of state-led economic development, coupled with a one-party political system. Its global pro-activity and the development of meaningful linkages with countries all over the world is conducive to the diffusion of its own developmentalist principles and governance philosophy. Even more significantly, as argued here, the adaptation of Western actors to a changing world in which China plays an ever more central role, has been accompanied with introspection and soul-searching, and redefining the ways in which adherents to the liberal script think not only about China, but also about themselves and their position in the world.
This article studies the intersection of the two process – of China becoming a normative power, and in the ways Europe has responded. It zooms in on the role of knowledge actors and networks (i.e. think tanks) in the process and considers the policy implications of a significant change of heart in Europe when it comes to Global China.
Global China and its normative power
Norms are of paramount significance for Europe’s identity and role in world politics. By promoting normative blueprints of how polities should be governed, and markets developed, that are perceived as universal in nature, the EU has sought to mold itself, its neighborhood and the world. China has been one of the targets of European normative power endeavors. Throughout the decades of engagement, aside from advancing commercial interests, the EU has also sought to nudge China towards embracing more liberal values and principles. However, in the quest to transform China, European normative power endeavors have failed short of their intended goals.
En route to becoming a global power, China has been an avid learner from examples from all over the world and has met some of the demands by external actors half-way. For instance, China did indeed pursue significant market reforms, which paved its way to membership in the WTO, and were welcomed by the EU. Yet, China has always drawn a clear line, preserving the principles of idiosyncrasy and authenticity of its own development trajectory, demonstrating resilience to external reform pressures and in particular, EU’s attempts at mainstreaming its values in China through dialogue [2]2 — Max Roger Taylor, “Assessing the Practical Implementation of the EU’s Values in EU–China Dialogues”, Asia Europe Journal, March 6, 2021. Available online. . Under Xi Jinping, China has strengthened both the rule of the party and its state capitalist model, and the nexus between the two, leading to the emergence of “CCP Inc.” [3]3 — Jude Blanchette, “From ‘China Inc.’ to ‘CCP Inc.’: A New Paradigm for Chinese State Capitalism”, China Leadership Monitor, no. 66, 2020. Available online. . It has also demonstrated a particularly resolute opposition to the import of potentially dangerous ideas from the West, as ideological purity has returned to the fore of Party work.
As China blazes its own trail and preserves the sanctity of its idiosyncratic model of development, its economic, technological and other successes have elucidated admiration abroad. In turn, the global debates saw the rise of concepts such as the “China Model” of development and the “Beijing Consensus” as an alternative to the Washington Consensus. These trends were accelerated as in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC), China abandoned the “low profile approach” associated with the earlier stages of the Reform and Opening Up. With the EU and the US mired in structural problems which last till the present day, China emerged out of GFC relatively well off, and assumed a pro-active role primarily as a partner of the Global South.
With the establishment of Chinese-led forums for international cooperation, it was inevitable that Chinese policymakers would become ideational entrepreneurs. They have cautiously avoided openly challenging the global order but have welcomed and taken advantage of the pluralization of the global debates on normative blueprints
In the 2010s, China stepped up its global pro-activity, building institutions such as the Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank and launching the Belt&Road Initiative, a vision for trans-regional economic integration. As such, it has emerged as a pro-active actor within Europe and in the European neighborhood not least through the launching of the 17+1 mechanism for cooperation with Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE), which is one of the vehicles for the implementation of the Belt&Road.
With the establishment of Chinese-led forums for international cooperation, it was inevitable that Chinese policymakers would become ideational entrepreneurs. They have cautiously avoided openly challenging the global order but have welcomed and taken advantage of the pluralization of the global debates on normative blueprints. As they have built partnerships and (quasi)institutions, they have also started talking about Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions to common policy problems. The COVID-19 pandemic took this trend up a notch, as Chinese diplomats promoted the Chinese-style battle with the virus as a global best practice. It is to be expected that in the post-pandemic world, China will increasingly assume the role of a normative power and diffuser of policy ideas.
Changing normative power balance
The enduring resilience of the rule of the Communist Party, and its pursuit of an ever more ambitious foreign policy, led to a significant role reversal in the Europe-China relationship: increasingly, China sets the agenda, while Europe adjusts and/or responds. The change in dynamics between the two does, however, is not only a result of China’s ascent, but also of EU’s shortcomings. The GFC, the migration crisis, and the rise of populism that led to the departure of the United Kingdom from the Union, made the EU inward-looking, and unconvincing when it comes to its normative power projection. The EU has struggled to uphold principles at home best seen in the rise of illiberalism in Hungary and Poland, and abroad, as seen all over its neighborhood and in the enlargement zone in the Balkans. Ever more often, talk of European norms and values has elucidates cynical responses. Juxtaposed against an ailing Union, China appears as much more resolute, future-oriented and optimistic global actor.
This change in the normative power balance has been further affected by the changing global role of the US. During the Trump presidency (2017-2020), the US has undermined the foundations of the liberal order it had once built. Undergoing a number of internal crises and divisions, American elites have blamed much of their problems on China and undertaken a heads-on confrontational approach. In the process, however, the nationalist approach has alienated America’s global partners, and managed to bring uncertainty to the Transatlantic partnership, too. This has created ever more favorable conditions for the flourishing of China’s normative power – Trump’s “America First” rhetoric has been met by Xi’s dedication to the construction of a global “Community of Shared Future”. The diverging normative logics of China, the EU and the US are of profound importance for the rest of humanity. Given the gravity of each of the different actors, what is at stake here is the vision for globalization, and the shaping of the global political and economic order.
Role of think tanks and epistemic communities
The dynamics of the global ideoscapes and normative power flows can be well illustrated by looking at the work and interaction of think tanks. Think tanks operate at the intersection between knowledge-production and policy, and help shape and disseminate ideas across different domains, and across national borders. While exempt from both the rigorous rules that govern academic publishing, and not part of the political decision-making process, think tanks impact both the academic and policy discourses; while not part of the media complex, they affect public opinion as well.
Think tanks have been an important part of China’s global pro-active strategy and have been entrusted with the task of both providing content to the generally loose frameworks (such as the one of the Belt&Road) and engaging their counterparts from all over the globe, including in Europe. In addition to establishing linkages with knowledge actors worldwide, Chinese think tanks have also initiated transnational knowledge networks. In Europe, they have built networks primarily under the framework of 17+1. These endeavors helped create context conducive to normative diffusion and mainstreaming of ideas associated with the Chinese developmental experience. However, these processes have had limited impact, not least because of a changing geopolitical context and the counter-mobilization of actors with greater leverage in the areas where China has ventured into [4]4 — Anastas Vangeli, “Diffusion of Ideas in the Era of the Belt and Road: Insights from China–CEE Think Tank Cooperation”, Asia Europe Journal, 17, no. 4. December 1, 2019. Available online. . The trends that have capped the normative flows from China to Europe, have in general inspired a shift in thinking all over the continent.
This process is greatly captured by Rogelja and Tsimonis, who focus on the role and impact of mainstream European think tanks –primarily from Western Europe– in shaping the European authoritative discourse on China [5]5 — Igor Rogelja and Konstantinos Tsimonis, “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13, no. 1, March 1, 2020: 103–33. Available online. . These think tanks have been engaged in a process of reframing Chinese economic presence in Europe as a national security threat, which rests on three pillars: first, the misconception of China as a monolith, overlooking the multitude of Chinese actors involved in relations with Europe, while also overlooking the agency of European actors; second, the exaggeration of intra-European differences on China, their wrongful attribution to China’s alleged “divide-and-conquer” strategy, and overlooking that differences are necessary part of European politics; and third, stereotyping and othering Chinese institutions, Chinese nationals and Europeans who have any link with China [6]6 — Igor Rogelja and Konstantinos Tsimonis, “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13, no. 1, March 1, 2020: 103–33. Available online. . These practices have not followed liberal normative rationality.
European think tanks have not been alone in this process in reproducing the China threat perception. In fact, they have merely followed a turn that was already initiated by key US think tanks, who have framed China with much more enmity. While US think tanks and foundations have been greatly shaping the trends in the English-language debate on China, they have further impacted the agenda of European think tanks through partnerships and promotion of research projects as well.
The European mainstream think tanks have been increasingly seeing China as a threat to the liberal set of values underpinning the European project
The cumulative effect of these processes has been the emergence of a rather vocal and prolific debate on China among European think tanks. While some of them have been actively partnering with their Chinese counterparts and promoted a more cooperative approach towards China, the European mainstream think tanks have been increasingly seeing China as a threat to the liberal set of values underpinning the European project, and calling for a tough response that has, just as the securitized discourse itself, not necessarily been rooted in those same values
European response and ramifications
The change in discourse visible at the level of think tanks has been also manifested on the level of policymaking. The swing in Europe has not been as dramatic as in the US where China has been singled out, along Russia, as a security threat [7]7 — Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. Executive Office of the President, 2017. Available online. . However, Europeans have also toughened up and changed both their rhetoric and practice. While previously seeing China as partner-cum-competitor, according to the EU-China Strategic Outlook of 2019, the EU now also acknowledges normative divergences and also calls China a “systemic rival” [8]8 — European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council, “EU-China – A Strategic Outlook”, March 2019. Available online. .
China has been swiftly moving up the policy agenda in Brussels and European capitals over the last few years. Endeavors such as the Belt&Road and 17+1, that had received very little attention at their beginnings, have over time started being perceived as major economic and normative challenges for the Union. European policymakers have been expressing ever more frustration and concern with China’s state capitalism but also the lack of reciprocity in trade and investment, making the latter a center-piece of relations with Beijing. China’s resilient authoritarianism, and in particular the crackdowns on minorities in Xinjiang and political opponents in Hong Kong have stoked fears about the human rights and liberties.
While political concerns are largely within the normative profile that the EU has established over the years, moves in the domain of geoeconomic competition have demonstrated normative bifurcation potential. The inflows of Chinese capital into Europe have raised security concerns that China may be acquiring strategic assets, but also that China is pushing for global leadership in advanced technology and innovation. The response has been the initiation of an EU-level investment screening mechanism in 2019 (in force since late 2020), which has been framed as a necessary detour from EU’s otherwise liberal approach, in order to be able to maintain EU’s openness to foreign investment [9]9 — Mathieu Duchâtel, “China Trends #5 – Living with the EU’s Investment Screening”. Institut Montaigne (blog), June 4, 2020. Available online. . Europeans have also followed the push by the US to restrict Chinese vendors from the construction of 5G telecommunication networks. The 5G case is quite illustrative of the normative shift in the Union: in 2015, the EU and China had signed a “key partnership” on 5G technology in order to utilize economic opportunities [10]10 — “The EU and China signed a key partnership on 5G, our tomorrow’s communication networks”. Press Release, European Commission, September 28, 2015. Available online. ; however, by 2020, 5G became increasingly seen through a security rather than through a business lens.
In addition to defensive measures, Europeans also embraced a more pro-active economic approach, open towards state (or supra-national) institutions playing a greater role in the economy. Exceptions to the staunch liberal blueprint have been justified in order to compete with China. A revived debate on industrial policy with economic nationalist overtones and proposals for state selection of priorities and provision of heavy subsidies, in part, has been inspired by the notion that China itself is an example to follow in terms of industrial policy [11]11 — Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “The Troubling Rise of Economic Nationalism in the European Union”, Peterson Institute for International Economics (blog), March 29, 2019. Available online. . Looking beyond its borders, the EU has also launched EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy to compete with China’s Belt&Road, fully embracing “brick-and-mortar” development, in yet another instance of unlikely normative flux.
Will the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) open a new chapter?
Over the last decade, the reality of Europe’s relations with China has profoundly changed. While China has indeed emerged as a formidable challenge, the EU has answered the calls for a tougher attitude towards Beijing. Yet, at the same time, as argued elsewhere, this has had unintended consequences for EU as a normative actor, whose global strategy is now increasingly defined by the “necessary exceptions” and realist deviations from its liberal blueprint. Having failed to change China, the EU has revised its approach in dealing with it, but in the process has also undergone a significant transformation itself. To understand the nature and scope of this transformation, we would need to answer the question to what extent have the normative shifts that have taken place in the EU as a response to the perceived China threat concern only Europe’s China relations and thus are extra-ordinary measures, and to what extent do they indicate a more thorough and lasting transformation that changes Europe’s identity, vision and mission at the world stage, and potentially suspends the liberal logic beyond EU-China relations.
The COVID-19 pandemic has, as in a number of other domains, amplified the ongoing trends. By the time the COVID-19 pandemic struck, China was the only significant actor on the world stage that has produced and has been actively pursuing a global vision. The relatively quick consolidation of the state after the initial fiasco in Wuhan, led to China getting out of the lock-down mode relatively quickly, and being the only major economy to note positive growth at the end of 2020. By offering a state-of-the art example in battling the pandemic, distributing protective equipment and pharmaceuticals over the globe, and finally, producing and globally distributing several vaccines against the virus, China has emerged as one of the major players in the global struggle against COVID-19. And while the US, after a disastrous first year of the pandemic, has managed to have a rather fast vaccination campaign that promises V-shaped economic recovery, EU’s internal issues have further slowed down its efforts to successfully handle the pandemic, with its recovery from being uncertain.
While significantly less confrontational than the Trump administration in the US, Europeans also voiced strong criticism of both the early handling of the outbreak in China, and in particular, of China’s endeavor to lead the global pandemic response. However, while relations were sharpening throughout 2020, at the end of the year a significant and unexpected breakthrough took place: EU and China in principle concluded the talks the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which had been a subject of previously unsuccessful negotiations for years.
Over the last decade, the reality of Europe’s relations with China has profoundly changed. Having failed to change China, the EU has revised its approach in dealing with it, but in the process has also undergone a significant transformation itself as a normative actor
Some have seen the trade truce as a product of the geopolitical logic of the EU and its quest for strategic autonomy, i.e. as a message to the incoming Biden administration in the US (given how much Americans objected to it). Others have seen it simply as a triumph of the German auto-industry complex, which was believed to have the highest stakes in reaching an agreement with China. The fact that CAI was decoupled from political demands (e.g. on human rights) is another point of criticism. Yet, at the official level the EU has framed the agreement as an incremental victory for its normative power endeavors, pointing that never has China before granted so much market access and level playing field to any trading partners, while also making substantial commitments on sustainability and other areas that EU considers a priority. And as we are waiting for CAI to be ratified (which will not go smoothly), we are seeing how pertinent normative rationality is to the European debates on China and will remain so in the foreseeable future.
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References
1 —Anastas Vangeli, “Global China and Symbolic Power: The Case of 16+1 Cooperation”, Journal of Contemporary China, 27, 2018. Available online.
2 —Max Roger Taylor, “Assessing the Practical Implementation of the EU’s Values in EU–China Dialogues”, Asia Europe Journal, March 6, 2021. Available online.
3 —Jude Blanchette, “From ‘China Inc.’ to ‘CCP Inc.’: A New Paradigm for Chinese State Capitalism”, China Leadership Monitor, no. 66, 2020. Available online.
4 —Anastas Vangeli, “Diffusion of Ideas in the Era of the Belt and Road: Insights from China–CEE Think Tank Cooperation”, Asia Europe Journal, 17, no. 4. December 1, 2019. Available online.
5 —Igor Rogelja and Konstantinos Tsimonis, “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13, no. 1, March 1, 2020: 103–33. Available online.
6 —Igor Rogelja and Konstantinos Tsimonis, “Narrating the China Threat: Securitising Chinese Economic Presence in Europe”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13, no. 1, March 1, 2020: 103–33. Available online.
7 —Donald J. Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. Executive Office of the President, 2017. Available online.
8 —European Commission and HR/VP contribution to the European Council, “EU-China – A Strategic Outlook”, March 2019. Available online.
9 —Mathieu Duchâtel, “China Trends #5 – Living with the EU’s Investment Screening”. Institut Montaigne (blog), June 4, 2020. Available online.
10 —“The EU and China signed a key partnership on 5G, our tomorrow’s communication networks”. Press Release, European Commission, September 28, 2015. Available online.
11 —Jeromin Zettelmeyer, “The Troubling Rise of Economic Nationalism in the European Union”, Peterson Institute for International Economics (blog), March 29, 2019. Available online.
Anastas Vangeli
Anastas Vangeli is a Visiting Professor at the School of Economics and Business from the University of Ljubljana. He is also a Research Fellow at the EU-Asia Institute at the ESSCA School of Management, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the ChinaMed Project of the Turin World Affairs Institute (T.wai). He has been teaching at ESSCA's Shanghai Campus and at the Department of Cultures, Politics and Society at the University of Turin. His research interests include the ideational impact of Global China, economic nationalism and the dynamics of globalization in the (post)COVID-19 era. His work has been published in Journal of Contemporary China, The China Journal, China & World Economy, Asia Europe Journal, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and Nationalities Papers. He holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the Graduate School of Social Research at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.
