{"id":44176,"date":"2021-06-23T10:11:29","date_gmt":"2021-06-23T10:11:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-44-especial-xina\/"},"modified":"2021-06-29T10:43:52","modified_gmt":"2021-06-29T10:43:52","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-44-especial-xina","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-44-especial-xina\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 44 – China special issue"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As the editorial of the dossier China before a world in crisis<\/a> explains, in recent years the so-called ‘Land at the Centre’ has become a power that is unabashedly seeking a new global status commensurate with its economic weight. An economic and geopolitical power that places it at the forefront of the competition for global leadership. Today, everything that happens in China is analysed all over the world to interpret its impact and foresee future scenarios. From Diari de les idees<\/em> and coinciding with the aforementioned dossier, we have selected some fifty recent articles from international media that analyse the role of the Asian giant from different perspectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, trying to decipher the new global game board The Economist<\/em><\/a> it is stressed that if China and the United States share one thing, it is none other than their aspiration for global hegemony. In this context, China perceives itself as invincible in a head-to-head battle with its main opponent, although it is well aware that a grand coalition of Western democracies could interfere with its hegemonic ambitions. Thus, since the arrival of Joe Biden in the White House, many are betting on strengthening an alliance that would curb China’s aspirations. However, it is also worth noting that many European countries have positioned themselves as ambivalent players in this race for global leadership. Indeed, if, on the one hand, the major European powers dissociate themselves from any direct confrontation or attempt to hinder China’s rise, on the other, they have decided to implement a series of mechanisms to protect their economies from the ‘Chinese shark’. EU-China relations are one of the key elements to watch closely over the coming years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The trade agreement between the EU and China is the subject of extensive analysis in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> where Olivier Prost and Anna Dias highlight its main aspects. First, the success of the agreement depends on two unknowns: whether China will keep its commitments and whether European companies will be fully involved. Secondly, this sectoral agreement only affects part of the economic rebalancing needed in EU-China relations, which are hampered by the asymmetry between the Chinese and European systems, for example in terms of industrial subsidies and sustainable trade. Finally, in their relations with China, European companies should be strongly involved, together with the European Commission and the governments of their member states, in the implementation of the agreement in order to improve access to the Chinese market. In The Financial Times<\/em><\/a>, Michael Peel and Sam Fleming underline that the European Parliament has expressed strong opposition to the EU’s market access agreement with China, as MEPs voted overwhelmingly to stop ratification of the deal. This vote clearly reveals the existing obstacles to implementing the agreement, which requires the approval of the EU parliament, and also a shift in the capitals of member states who are against the deal that was agreed at the political level in December 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The freezing of the ratification of the EU-China investment agreement, just as it was about to materialise after seven years of negotiations between the European Commission and China, formally appears to be a retaliation to Chinese sanctions against Members of the European Parliament. However, it may also hide the Washington-led strategy of recruiting European countries to its global coalition against Russia and China. The European Parliament’s decision should therefore not be understood as just another episode in the sanctions war, but also in the broader framework of Biden’s new relationship with the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In parallel, from the pages of the think tank Voltaire<\/a>, Manlio Dinucci warns that the United States is progressively transforming the Atlantic Alliance into an organisation to fight China. Indeed, this is how one has to read the fact that at the end of May the European Parliament froze ratification of the EU-China Investment Agreement, concluded in December by the European Commission after seven years of negotiations, by an overwhelming majority of 599 votes in favour and only 30 against. The real motive behind the excuse of defending human rights in China lies in Washington’s strategy to enlist European countries in the coalition against Russia and China, taking advantage of the fact that 21 of the 27 EU countries are NATO members. In this context, the fact that Eastern European countries feel more tied to Washington than to Brussels reinforces US influence on EU foreign policy. However, not all allies are aligned in the same way: the EU’s two main allies, Germany and France, view the transatlantic relationship from the perspective of mutual convenience and are much more reluctant to join this coalition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the analysis of this struggle for hegemony, we enlight the vision of Limes<\/em><\/a>, one of the leading geopolitical magazines, which predicts that in 2028, five years earlier than expected, China will become the world’s most powerful economy, surpassing the United States. As China’s economy grows, military spending is also expected to increase, as well as research and development, especially investment in Artificial Intelligence and quantum technology. A whole arsenal of instruments that intensify the competition for world leadership, where China is beginning to count on an unexpected ally, Vladimir Putin’s Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

En un momento de crisis del modelo democr\u00e1tico, a lo largo de la \u00faltima d\u00e9cada se ha seen how most dictatorships and autocracies not only remained in power, but also strengthened and modernised their techniques of repression. Two paradigmatic examples are China and Russia, which have seen their political influence on the global strategic stage only increase. Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> argues that while democracies dealing with internal confrontations and contradictions, authoritarian regimes have been emerging as growing and active transnational alliances with a clear objective: to weaken democracies by interfering in their day-to-day affairs. We face a geopolitical struggle between different models of governance. In the same journal Andrea Kendall-Taylor y David Shullman<\/a> underline that the main objectives motivating China and Russia to complement each other’s strategies are military alliances – in China’s case, to make up for shortfalls, and in Russia’s case, to sell sophisticated weapons, and the acceleration of technological innovation in order to overtake the United States. At the same time, both countries also work to undermine liberal democracy, a system that the Beijing and Moscow regimes see as a direct threat to their political aspirations and systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond this, and as a complementary tool, China also bases a large part of its strategy on diplomatic and economic soft power. For example, in Open Democracy<\/a><\/em>, <\/em>Niva Yau notes that economic engagement with Central Asian countries has helped China to quell Uighur separatism in Xinjiang. At the same time, since 2013 Chinese embassies in Central Asia have strengthened their engagement with local civil societies through a two-pronged programme: stronger engagement with local ethnic minorities with ties to Chinese territory and promotion of the Chinese language in schools across the region, while Chinese diplomacy is focusing on local school systems by giving computers, music players and other equipment, thus ensuring the possibility of opening a free curriculum of Chinese language courses in these countries. In the same magazine, Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi<\/a> analyses this strategy of paradiplomacy in relations between China and the African continent where Beijing wants to further consolidate its influence through the empowerment of sympathetic media and the free or low-cost distribution of its vaccines against COVID-19.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To close this section, we highlight in Gramscian terms the importance of the concept of cultural hegemony in this clash between world powers, as pointed out by St\u00e9phane Aubouard in the journal Marianne<\/em><\/a>. Just as the Europe destroyed by the First World War gave way to American hegemony after 1918, it is now appropriate to ask whether, on a planet damaged by the combined effects of pandemics, climate change, political, economic and social crises, the US will be replaced by China as the hegemonic power. From an economic point of view, there is every reason to believe that this will be the case. IMF forecasts state that within two or three years the Chinese will have reached 20% of GDP. From a technological and scientific point of view as well. If jazz and the automobile were the first symbols of American cultural hegemony, the technological advances of today and tomorrow could have the same impact. Research laboratories replacing assembly lines, the Ford T replaced by the quantum computer that Beijing already claims to have built\u2026 The question is whether this heralds the emergence of a Made in China political and cultural hegemony in which China’s bet would be to export its model of state capitalism tinged with authoritarian socialism where the Western democratic model has failed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A struggle for world hegemony that must also be read in terms of domestic politics, as John Simpson points out in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> where he highlights the paradox that the Chinese Communist Party is now stronger than ever, precisely in the year of the centenary of its creation. A CCP study reveals that Soviet communism collapsed because of a lack of popular support and that weakening repression and permissiveness had allowed alternative centres of power to grow and flourish, which is exactly what President Xi wants to prevent. The Chinese can get rich, consume and travel abroad, but they are not allowed to have a political voice. Although polls show that the population generally approves of the way he is running the country, Xi Jinping cannot allow any alternative sources of power: no unauthorised religious leaders, no intellectuals capable of disseminating new views, no democratic politicians, not even real independence for Taiwan. In short, Xi’s is a fiercely illiberal regime that has enough power, money and technology at its disposal to impose its will on other countries, which makes for a moment of political splendour, and suggests that it will not abandon its one-party capitalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A strategy, then, based on tight ideological, social and political control combined with aggressive and dynamic state capitalism that, according to Audrye Wong in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> also faces challenges of its own. As China’s economy has moved up the value chain, Chinese companies have become powerful players in high-tech, value-added sectors – unfairly helped, competitors argue, by state subsidies. Because of this competition, foreign firms have had less incentive to pursue closer relations with Beijing. This is because the success of incentives depends largely on the political dynamics of the recipient countries. In short, while China’s leaders may believe that economic development naturally promotes gratitude among those who benefit from it, there is good reason to believe that this is not always the case and that China cannot rely on automatically and easily converting its growing economic weight into a new hegemonic geopolitical reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same journal, Elizabeth Economy<\/a> challenges the real effectiveness of the Chinese model. Despite the growth rates of recent years, the management of the COVID crisis19 and significant milestones such as the eradication of severe poverty, Chinese society is fracturing in a complex way: discrimination based on ethnicity, gender and religion remains worrying, while rural-urban inequality persists. Somehow, it is not daring to say that within China there are two countries where the richest 1% accumulate a greater proportion of wealth than the poorest 50%. It is therefore foreseeable that growing inequality, plus the costs of political and economic disenfranchisement of such large sections of the population, will have a major long-term impact. Moreover, the polarisation of the domestic situation in China also has implications abroad. Human rights and political abuses in Xinjiang or Hong Kong have had a range of repercussions: sanctions by the EU, Canada or the UK, the relocation of foreign multinationals to China’s competitors, such as Singapore, or the call for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics, among others. Ultimately, all these issues are not minor and call into question the real effectiveness and sustainability of the Chinese model in the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In connection with the future prospects of the Chinese model, an article published in The Economist<\/em><\/a> highlights the launch of the first trial of digitisation of the Chinese currency, called ecny, which shares most of the characteristics of the traditional currency, while still relying on the usual banking system. The only difference is that ecny is a digital currency used through a mobile application. Although China is not the first country to test this revolution in the world of currency, it has taken the helm and leadership in this sector. However, while China is looking for ways to spread its use in an international context, many experts are sceptical about the benefits of the new currency. While it is true that digital currency has a lot of potential, digitalisation is also considered as a reform that brings central planning back from Beijing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

China must therefore face the challenges posed by its own economic development, which is being obscured by growing international opposition to its repressive policies at home and abroad. Thus, Howard French denounces in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that Tibet is following the same path as the Xinjiang region: forced assimilation and the announcement that the CCP will oversee the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. An issue that also worries Kelsang Dolma, who in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> welcomes the Biden administration’s firmness in redefining Washington’s consensus on the Tibet-China conflict. Indeed, if many speculated that the US president would be accommodating towards China based on his record as a senator, a few months into his term, his resolve is quite clear, for example, in the fact that State Department reports on human rights abuses in China no longer mention Tibet as a region of China as previous reports did. In the same vein, and with regard to the repression of Uighurs in Xingjiang, The Independent<\/em><\/a> reveals that China has denounced plans to establish a people’s tribunal in Britain over charges of genocide against Uighurs and other Muslims. The tribunal, which has no government backing, will be chaired by leading lawyer Geoffrey Nice, who led the prosecution of former Serbian president Slobodan Milo\u0161evi\u0107 at the International Criminal Tribunal. Although the court’s ruling will not be binding on any government, the organisers hope that the process of public exposure of evidence will compel international action to combat Chinese repression in Xinjiang. Finally, Jessie Lau<\/a> notes in The New Statesman that the sanctions being applied to China for its repressive policy in Hong Kong have a practically irrelevant impact, despite the UK’s interesting initiative to make it easier for Hong Kong citizens to obtain British nationality through the British National Overseas, a system already adopted in different countries such as Taiwan, Australia and Canada.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, on sustainability issues, China is also one of the most relevant actors with respect to the future of the planet and Bill McKibben underlines in The New Yorker<\/em><\/a> that there is no way to solve the climate puzzle without the help of China, which is the world’s largest carbon emitter. Engaging with a partner of this magnitude would therefore have to be the cornerstone of any effective global climate policy, and it will not be easy: China is pioneering in some respects (installing cheap renewable energy at a breakneck pace) while continuing to build coal-fired power plants. Also Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> analyses China’s role in the fight against climate change, and the authors of the book China Goes Green (Polity, 2020) give their interpretation of the Chinese state’s green strategy. In their view, China is turning the environment into an instrument to strengthen its authoritarian control, which risks climate overshadowing other key social and ecological issues. Particularly interesting is the distinction they draw between ecological authoritarianism and authoritarian ecology, and how China’s climate policies have evolved. In this regard, they warn against Western admiration for China’s authoritarian and aggressive approaches to the environment because one might infer that if the goal of environmental sustainability is noble enough, then perhaps the means used, i.e. authoritarian attitudes of the state, can be justified.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel Collins argue in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that Chinese leaders should not be expected to curb carbon emissions at the same pace as developed countries, as one of the cornerstones of China’s economy remains its enormous capacity to build infrastructure, which relies on carbon-intensive energy-intensive industries. For example, in order to mitigate the effects of COVID-19, China has relied on coal-heavy industry to boost GDP growth. This is a view shared by Karl Mathiesen in Politico<\/em><\/a> where he points out that the G7 members have set themselves the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees, instead of the 2 degrees target of the Paris Agreement, and that this rectification has to be interpreted as a message in China, at a time when the data published by the organisation Carbon Brief<\/em><\/a> reveal that Chinese emissions have increased by 15% year-on-year in the last quarter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, a few notes on the technological competition in which China also stands out in the race for global hegemony. Yuan Yang reveals in The Financial Times<\/em><\/a> that one of the effects of COVID-19 has been the sharp increase in demand for all kinds of electronic devices, which has led to demand clearly outstripping supply in China, resulting in very long queues for any device requiring a chip. This situation has only underlined China’s need to develop its own chip industry, independent of its links with US manufacturers. In this context, the Taiwanese company Xiaomi’s expansion plans in China stand out, and while they are perceived by some as a threat to the Chinese industry, they are also seen as a benefit rather than direct competition, as the Chinese industry will have the opportunity to learn from the best and this will motivate the sector to differentiate itself and move towards a de-Americanised industry. Finally, in El Salto<\/em><\/a>, Eduardo Garc\u00eda Granado stresses that technological soft power is a fundamental aspect of today’s international relations. Initiatives such as Made in China 2025 and the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) are the spearhead of the Communist Party’s bid to place the country at the forefront of the development of Artificial Intelligence, the cloud, 5G, the Internet of Things and Big Data. Through these programmes, China aims to increase the presence of domestic production of basic materials to 70% by 2025 in areas such as aerospace, semiconductors and robotics. Moreover, the Chinese government envisages a future in which the country will no longer be dependent on the West for the supply of chips and hydrogen for vehicles, among other things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, with regard to the strategic policies of Artificial Intelligence and the geopolitical contest, we refer you to the article<\/a> by Yi Chang and Chengqi Zhang published in the IDEES magazine monograph on Artificial Intelligence. The authors highlight that the Chinese government proposes to innovate in an implementation model for the organisation of the main science and technology projects of the new AI generation. Since the State Council submitted the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan”, most provinces, ministries and institutions have responded by accelerating AI planning and drawing up scientific plans in this sector, most provinces, ministries and institutions have responded by accelerating AI planning and developing AI science plans.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As the editorial of the dossier China before a world in crisis explains, in recent years the so-called ‘Land at the Centre’ has become a power that is unabashedly seeking a new global status commensurate with its economic weight. An economic and geopolitical power that places it at the forefront of the competition for global leadership. Today, everything that happens in China is analysed all over the world to interpret its impact and foresee future scenarios. From Diari de les idees and coinciding with the aforementioned dossier, we have selected some fifty recent articles from international media that analyse the\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":77128,"template":"","category_newspaper":[320],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-44176","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-320"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 44 - China special issue – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-44-especial-xina\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 44 - China special issue – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"As the editorial of the dossier China before a world in crisis explains, in recent years the so-called ‘Land at the Centre’ has become a power that is unabashedly seeking a new global status commensurate with its economic weight. 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