{"id":53415,"date":"2022-02-03T15:54:42","date_gmt":"2022-02-03T15:54:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/"},"modified":"2022-02-07T11:06:07","modified_gmt":"2022-02-07T11:06:07","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 54 – Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The increase in tensions on the eastern border of the European Union, with the possibility of a war escalation in Ukraine, and its political and economic repercussions, justify that the Diari de les idees<\/em> devotes a special monographic issue. Indeed, Russia’s attempts to reorder in its favor the geopolitical system inherited from the end of the Cold War, the manifest lack of strategic autonomy and unity of the EU, the loss of global influence of the United States and the lengthening shadow of China make up a scenario of a possible change of hegemony that is disturbing, since times of interregnum and transition are always confusing and conflictive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, Marina Snegovaya argues in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> <\/em> that it seems that Putin’s decision to concentrate troops on the borders with Ukraine responds to a multiplicity of factors. First, US and NATO military cooperation with Ukraine has increased significantly in recent years, while collaboration between Ukraine and the West has deepened in other areas such as anti-corruption and institution-building initiatives. Likewise, the current geopolitical situation offers Putin an ideal scenario to try to strengthen his influence in Ukraine. First, the European Union is very divided as regards the measures to be adopted. Although the new eastern members of the EU tend to support more forceful actions against Russia, on the other hand, the two main European powers, Germany and France, are more accommodating and are in favor of exhausting the diplomatic route. Second, after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the decline in the international influence of the United States and its change of priorities, now focused on the Indo-Pacific region, are an incentive for Putin to try to extend his influence on the eastern border of The EU. Finally, the increase in oil and gas revenues, as well as reforms of the banking system, have allowed Russia not only to increase military spending, but have also put it in a better position to resist possible sanctions than in 2014. after the annexation of Crimea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within this context, Alexis Rodr\u00edguez-Rata warns in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a> that the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance towards the East since the end of the Cold War is not the only factor that worries Russian President Vladimir Putin. Indeed, the fact that worries Russia is that NATO will consolidate a corridor of member states from north to south, from the Baltic republics to the Mediterranean. He is also concerned that NATO, 40 years after the fall of the communist bloc, remains the world’s largest military alliance. It started with 12 members, today there are 30 and it maintains relations with another forty countries. In addition, it is made up of the richest countries in the world, which generate 60% of the world’s total military spending, far ahead of Russia or China. At the same time, Russia does not look favorably on NATO carrying out operations in border territories such as Latvia, Lithuania, the Baltic Sea and Ukraine. Nor in the Balkans, a region traditionally linked to Russia. In addition, in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, its historical obsession as a key sea route for its merchant and war ships. Finally, it seems that Moscow wants to establish a new world order where a few great powers are the sovereign agents that decide the fate of the small states assigned to their respective spheres of influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A crisis, then, that may have repercussions in other scenarios depending on how the situation in Ukraine is resolved, as Manuel Manonelles points out in El Nacional<\/em><\/a>. Indeed, one cannot ignore the fact that tension is also growing in the Balkans, and in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the secessionist attitude of Mirolad Dodick, the leader of the Republika Srpska, is pushing the delicate institutional balance to the limit of the country, a structure resulting from the Dayton peace accords imposed by the United States in 1995. The other derivative is that of Taiwan. It is important to underline the fact that the crisis we are experiencing, with a tension that we have not experienced for a long time, is between the United States and Russia, that is, between the first and eleventh world economies. Therefore, what could happen if a similar situation were repeated between the first two powers? Between the United States and China? Because this is the great gift that Beijing is receiving from the Ukrainian crisis, an invaluable manual on how the Biden administration and its allies respond (although they now count rather little) in the face of a provocation and tension of the level that Russia is exerting. And everyone is aware of this, starting with Washington, continuing through all the European capitals, passing through Moscow, Beijing and ending in Taipei. That is why while the United States knows that the military option in Eastern Europe is nonsense, on the other hand it knows that it cannot show the slightest weakness, since it would open the door to an even more delicate and serious front for world stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the military aspects of the crisis, Brigadier General Jean-Vincent Brisset, director of research at the Institut de Relations Internationales et Strat\u00e9giques<\/em>, a French think tank specializing in geopolitical and strategic issues, points out in the magazine Atlantico<\/em><\/a> that the commanders of the Russian army have been involved in Syria in field operations for several years. Russia allocates some forty billion dollars a year to the defense budget, equivalent to 2.7% of GDP, that is, ten times more than what Ukraine spends on it (4,300 million dollars a year, 3% of GDP). For its part, Ukraine has an army of 210,000 men, of which 145,000 are in the army. These figures must be put into perspective in relation to the 110,000 Russian fighters, already prepared for the confrontation on the border, since the 145,000 troops of the ground army are spread throughout the country. The Ukrainian forces generally have the same type of equipment as the Russians, but older and much less well maintained. Thus, Brisset affirms that the place where the Russians could intervene seems to be the Donbass since, if the Russian forces entered this area, the Ukrainian troops would have to act in the midst of a population that would be relatively hostile to them. If the Russians want to annex Donbass as they did Crimea, they could do so very quickly, and the Ukrainians could do nothing but from guerrilla action and sabotage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the midst of the commotion caused by the possibility of a large-scale armed conflict at the gates of Europe, various media carry out a prospective exercise to establish their possible scenarios. The Financial Times<\/em><\/a> publishes an extensive dossier in which the main reasons that suggest a possible Russian offensive against Ukraine are collected. First, the main objective of Putin’s foreign policy has been to regain Russia’s sphere of influence by stopping NATO’s expansion in Ukraine. And as we have already mentioned, the international context favors his intentions: Europe does not have enough military power or diplomatic unity, and the United States is distracted by its race with China for world hegemony. Russia is also better prepared to deal with the sanctions that the West would impose if it invaded Ukraine, and it has a significant deterrent in that Russia supplies more than 40% of the gas that Europe needs. Finally, in terms of military capabilities, although it is true that the training and support provided by NATO have helped improve the Ukrainian army since 2014, Putin has a clear superiority that could be achieved through air strikes, missiles, heavy artillery and cyber-attacks and that it would not entail the need for a large-scale ground invasion to occupy a significant part of the Ukrainian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this sense, Dimitri Alperovitch warns in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that cyber operations may allow Moscow to access information on the deployments and defensive tactics of Ukrainian troops, and thus frustrate its military response. In turn, Russia could use cyberattacks to misinform Ukraine’s military and disrupt its operations and target air traffic and command networks, as well as logistics center databases. The Kremlin is also able to carry out psychological operations to sow confusion among the Ukrainian population, such as the spread of rumors on social networks, or attacks against the electricity grid and the financial system to erode the resistance capacity of the population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The magazine El salto diario<\/em><\/a> has also asked various specialists for their opinion. Fernando Aranc\u00f3n affirms that, if Russia annexes Donetsk and Lugansk, two relatively poor regions, the international community will apply very harsh sanctions and will tilt the balance of Ukraine towards the West. An unprofitable move as the cost to get two small and low value regions would be huge. For her part, Pilar Bonet believes that Putin needs, ahead of the 2024 elections, a new victory, which could be to annex a part of Ukraine in the name of the reunification of Russian lands, creating a corridor between Crimea and Donbass. Indeed, after the annexation of Crimea, Putin had a lot of popular support in Russia, a country with a very clear national consciousness that folds very well into authoritarian structures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For his part, Fred Kaplan clarifies in Slate<\/em><\/a> magazine the most alarmist positions and considers that it is most likely that Putin will continue to increase the pressure on Ukraine through cyberattacks or sending mercenaries to areas controlled by the rebels in the eastern provinces of the country, at the same time to test NATO’s unity by threatening to cut off energy supplies to Germany and other Western European countries. As for one of the main triggers of the crisis \u2013 Ukraine’s possible entry into NATO \u2013 he argues that it is very unlikely that Ukraine will do so in the short or medium term, that is if it ever ends up being accepted. Indeed, even in the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the flood of NATO applications from former Warsaw Pact states, Ukraine was always considered a special case. Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were an integral part of the Soviet Union. It was also understood that drawing Ukraine into a Western military alliance would be an extreme provocation towards Russia. Finally, unlike the Baltic countries (which were part of the Soviet Union but were still allowed to join NATO), Ukraine did not meet the necessary conditions for membership: a high degree of democratization, a low level of corruption, civilian control of the army. and the ability to integrate with the armies of other NATO countries. Although Ukraine has made progress in all these areas, it is still far from meeting the criteria required by NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the lack of strategic autonomy and the internal division determine Europe’s position as a secondary actor in the crisis, the role of China, not because it is discreet, is still very relevant. Thus, after weeks without officially showing a preference for either of the two parties, China positioned itself a few days ago in favor of Russia by urging the United States to provide a satisfactory solution to Moscow’s “legitimate security concerns” in the area. The Chinese position reflects the proximity of Beijing and Moscow, be it economically, diplomatically, technologically or in terms of security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a study<\/a> published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Chris Miller assesses China’s potential response to a Russian military escalation against Ukraine, noting that Beijing and Moscow have intensified their relations in recent years, and China is now deeply tied to Russia in trade and, to a lesser extent, in finance. It is estimated that, within three years, China will be the main consumer of Russian gas, ahead of Germany, and although Europe will continue to be Russia’s main commercial and financial partner for the next few years, its economic weight will not cease to recede, that both investments and the weight of European companies in Russia’s foreign trade are falling, a place that China is now about to occupy. For example, China represented in 2013 10.5% of Russian foreign trade. While in 2020, it had almost doubled that percentage to 18.3% and has continued to gain ground since then. Europe has gone from 49.4% to 38.5% in the same period. On the other hand, Russia is also the country in the world that has received the most credits from China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But China’s influence also extends to Ukraine, the other protagonist of the crisis. Nicolas Lecaussin, director of the Institute for Economic and Fiscal Research of France warns from the pages of Le Figaro<\/em><\/a> of the links between Ukraine and China in the framework of current tensions. Indeed, he points out that China is now, ahead of Russia, Ukraine’s main trading partner, with 14.4% of its imports and 15.3% of its exports. This strengthening of economic ties is especially in the field of agriculture, with a China that seeks to ensure a supply that meets its growing needs. Thus, data from the Ukrainian government shows that corn exports to China increased to 7.34 million tons for the period October-April 2020 while they were only 5.5 million for the entire previous year. Thus, these important economic links could put Ukraine in a delicate situation, forcing it to align itself with the Asian giant’s foreign policy positions, since otherwise it could be exposed to economic sanctions. On the other hand, Putin looks favorably on the Sino-Ukrainian rapprochement, which further endorses Kiev’s distancing from Europe and the West. For Ukraine, letting China corner its market and make it a major trading partner means ensuring the support of the Chinese authorities during multilateral negotiations and in case of conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The increase in tensions has logically brought about a series of economic repercussions and Bernardo de Miguel warns in El Pa\u00eds<\/em><\/a> that Putin has already managed to destabilize the economy of the neighboring country and has forced the Ukrainian government to ask for international financial aid. The economic vice president of the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, has promised an aid package of up to 1.4 billion euros. Still, Ukraine may need more aid of at least 4 billion euros to stabilize its economy and face payments of more than 13 billion euros on its debt. The Ukrainian economy was already in a difficult situation since the pandemic ended four consecutive years of growth. In May 2020, the European Union approved a macro-financial assistance program endowed with 1,200 million euros and the International Monetary Fund extended a line already underway that went from 5,500 million dollars to 10,000 million. Now the serious security crisis caused by the Kremlin has erased the chances of economic recovery and scares international investors and triggering the risk premium. In addition, Moscow has also reduced the supply of gas to Europe through the gas pipeline that crosses Ukrainian territory, which leaves Kiev without the millionaire commissions paid by the Russian company Gazprom<\/em> for this traffic (the IMF estimates that Ukraine entered some 2,500 million dollars per year for this concept).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Eva Hartog points out in Politico<\/em><\/a> that despite years of sanctions and the impact of the pandemic, the Russian economy is better prepared financially than in 2014 to withstand external economic shocks. Oil prices are high, Russia’s macroeconomic situation is good, and the budget is balanced. In addition, Russia has a sovereign wealth fund of nearly $200 billion, which could be tapped to help stabilize the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, even if inflation were to shoot up, we must bear in mind that Russia has a huge advantage over many other countries: if it raises interest rates, it will not have problems paying its sovereign debt. For its part, The Economist<\/em><\/a> calculates that a total interruption of the gas piped to Europe would cost Gazprom <\/em>between 203 and 228 million dollars a day in lost revenue. If this embargo were to last three months (dependence on Russian gas declines sharply in the spring, when gas demand falls to 60% of that in January), the losses would amount to some $20 billion. However, the Russian central bank today has reserves worth some 600 billion dollars and could easily withstand this time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Within this context, Enric Juliana reveals in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a> an important aspect for Catalonia, which is that in the port of Barcelona there is one of the largest regasification plants in Europe, equipped with six high-capacity tanks. Consequently, Barcelona could become one of the bridgeheads in the United States’ risky plan to deal with Russia with a massive export of liquefied natural gas to Europe if Vladimir Putin decides to turn off the tap in response to the sanctions planned by the West in case of war With eight regasification plants, the Iberian Peninsula as a whole would play a relevant role in the strategy announced at the end of January by Joe Biden and Ursula von der Leyen. However, the American plan is viewed skeptically by many specialists since, if Europe could find an alternative to Russian gas in liquefied gas, implementing this alternative in a few months seems very difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, the consequences of the massive importation of US liquefied gas could be a rise in prices, escalation of inflation, logistical imbalances, a possible rationing of gas at the most critical moments and a great deal of political tension between European countries not accustomed to a common energy policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, and beyond the political, strategic and economic analyses, it is also worth noting the historical and cultural factors that help explain the context of the crisis. Thus, from Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a>, Hans Kribbe analyzes the current situation in a context that, in his opinion, is in itself a Russian victory and affirms that the Kremlin’s movement to renew Europe’s security architecture comes at a good time for Russia. On the contrary, the moment is very bad for Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Challenged by China to the Pacific, the United States is less involved in European security than at any time since 1945. The Kremlin’s bet for history is simple. If the United States is forced to choose between its strategic interests in Europe and in the Pacific, it will favor the latter aspect of the issue and leave Russia with the room for maneuver it seeks to recover territories from what it considers its “near abroad”. Kribbe also asks what will happen if Xi, who is undoubtedly following developments with interest, decides that the time is right to confront Taiwan and if Iran itself sees an opportunity to advance its nuclear ambitions…<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Carmen Claud\u00edn affirms in the CIDOB<\/a> magazine that the Eastern European border \u2014the former Soviet republics, converted into new independent states\u2014 constitutes, for the Kremlin, the security belt, the sphere of vital interest, where the very subsistence of the State is at stake Russian and where lies the heart of the question of the European security architecture. In effect, Russia considers itself the only one entitled to act in this area while the ex-Soviet republics \u2013 that is, some 70 million people \u2013 cannot decide to free themselves from the post-colonial geopolitical condition imposed on them by the Kremlin. Now Moscow is demanding legal guarantees of NATO’s non-expansion to the East, following a reasoning that connects with the distribution in spheres of influence, signed in Yalta in 1945 between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The logic of the current policy of the Russian president is rooted in this historical reference. Stalin’s obsession was to make Churchill and Roosevelt accept the Soviet borders established by the distribution agreed with Nazi Germany in the secret protocols of the German-Soviet pact. And, like Stalin then, Putin wants the same. If Stalin’s obsession was with Poland, for Putin now it is Ukraine. For this reason, everything began in Ukraine, as Putin declared in June 2021 in the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit<\/em><\/a>,, in an article commemorating the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where he develops the thesis according to which Russia and Ukraine are the same people, invoking essentialist arguments as if they were objective data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lastly, David Pimenta underlines in the Portuguese newspaper P\u00fablico<\/em><\/a>  that the end of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a period in which several states began the construction of new narratives in the context of the construction and\/or consolidation of a national identity. In this sense, the original kingdom of Kiev came to be disputed by Russia and Ukraine as exclusive to one or the other narrative: for Russian nationalism, the kingdom is an integral part of Russian history; for Ukrainian nationalism, it is the first independent Ukrainian state that was formed before the existence of Russia itself. Therefore, in addition to the obvious geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is also a war of stories linked to national identities that, like other European conflicts, have their origin in the Middle Ages. Consequently, the resolution of the crisis between the two countries also requires in-depth knowledge and special sensitivity regarding the identity narratives in conflict. Thus, diplomatic negotiations should not be limited to issues of NATO’s area of influence or the control of natural gas. The effective mitigation of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine involves bringing to the negotiating table an understanding of the identity conflict of both nations, aware that to build the future it is necessary to understand the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Enric Brugu\u00e9s, Eva Lam, Ra\u00fcl Gil and Marian Moy\u00e0, trainees at the CETC, have contributed to this issue 54 of\u00a0Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The increase in tensions on the eastern border of the European Union, with the possibility of a war escalation in Ukraine, and its political and economic repercussions, justify that the Diari de les idees devotes a special monographic issue. Indeed, Russia’s attempts to reorder in its favor the geopolitical system inherited from the end of the Cold War, the manifest lack of strategic autonomy and unity of the EU, the loss of global influence of the United States and the lengthening shadow of China make up a scenario of a possible change of hegemony that is disturbing, since times of\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":77128,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-53415","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The increase in tensions on the eastern border of the European Union, with the possibility of a war escalation in Ukraine, and its political and economic repercussions, justify that the Diari de les idees devotes a special monographic issue. Indeed, Russia’s attempts to reorder in its favor the geopolitical system inherited from the end of the Cold War, the manifest lack of strategic autonomy and unity of the EU, the loss of global influence of the United States and the lengthening shadow of China make up a scenario of a possible change of hegemony that is disturbing, since times of\u2026\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-02-07T11:06:07+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/wargame.jpg?fit=926%2C618&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"926\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"618\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"20 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/\",\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/12\\\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2022-02-03T15:54:42+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-02-07T11:06:07+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/12\\\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/12\\\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1\",\"width\":607,\"height\":170},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Inici\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 54 – Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/\",\"name\":\"IDEES\",\"description\":\"Contemporary global issues\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Diari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Diari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES","og_description":"The increase in tensions on the eastern border of the European Union, with the possibility of a war escalation in Ukraine, and its political and economic repercussions, justify that the Diari de les idees devotes a special monographic issue. Indeed, Russia’s attempts to reorder in its favor the geopolitical system inherited from the end of the Cold War, the manifest lack of strategic autonomy and unity of the EU, the loss of global influence of the United States and the lengthening shadow of China make up a scenario of a possible change of hegemony that is disturbing, since times of\u2026","og_url":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/","og_site_name":"IDEES","article_modified_time":"2022-02-07T11:06:07+00:00","og_image":[{"width":926,"height":618,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/01\/wargame.jpg?fit=926%2C618&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Est. reading time":"20 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/","url":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/","name":"Diari de les idees 54 - Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis – IDEES","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1","datePublished":"2022-02-03T15:54:42+00:00","dateModified":"2022-02-07T11:06:07+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1","contentUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Idees-dactualitat.jpg?fit=607%2C170&ssl=1","width":607,"height":170},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-54-especial-russia-i-ucraina\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Inici","item":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Diari de les idees","item":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":3,"name":"Diari de les idees 54 – Special issue on the Russia-Ukraine crisis"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/#website","url":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/","name":"IDEES","description":"Contemporary global issues","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"}]}},"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/newspaper\/53415","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/newspaper"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/newspaper"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/newspaper\/53415\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":53427,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/newspaper\/53415\/revisions\/53427"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/77128"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53415"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category_newspaper","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/category_newspaper?post=53415"},{"taxonomy":"segment","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/segment?post=53415"},{"taxonomy":"subject","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/subject?post=53415"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}