{"id":54671,"date":"2022-03-03T11:47:19","date_gmt":"2022-03-03T11:47:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-56-ucraina-limpossible-sha-fet-possible\/"},"modified":"2022-03-08T08:03:16","modified_gmt":"2022-03-08T08:03:16","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-56-ucraina-limpossible-sha-fet-possible","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-56-ucraina-limpossible-sha-fet-possible\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 56 – Ukraine: The impossibe became possible"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

One week ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an invasion of Ukraine, unleashing an unprecedented crisis in Europe since the end of World War II. Despite the changing current of a war scenario with still uncertain results, we present a special issue of the Diari de les idees<\/em> with the aim of proceeding with an analysis with a certain perspective further away from the din of battle for try to understand and explain the motivations and repercussions of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slate<\/em><\/a> magazine publishes a first assessment of the first week of the war and points out in the first place that this time, American intelligence has read Putin’s game perfectly. Convinced for several months that the invasion was inevitable, they used the information to pressure Putin and eliminate the surprise factor. Thanks to the NSA’s electronic surveillance capabilities, troop and material movements have been tracked. The plans for the false flags were then exposed, undermining the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts. A second element of the article is that Putin has carried out his campaign of reconquest by diverting attention, by surprise, acting where it was least expected, but now he must end the war he has started. Sanctions, the effects of which will take months to make a significant impact, will not change his mind. At the very least, he will want to take Kharkiv and Kyiv, get rid of the Ukrainian government and build a land corridor from the Crimea to the Donbass. The next step would be to get the West to accept the idea of \u200b\u200ba “Belarusian-style” Ukraine ruled by a puppet government, or, if things go wrong, it will propose the partition of Ukraine along the Dnieper, with a demilitarized government in the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Or perhaps try to control Moldova from Transnistria while seeking to transform Serbia into a satellite state. The article also points to the failure of the Merkel doctrine. The sixteen-year strategy of appeasing the Russian president by strengthening economic ties between the two countries and hundreds of billions of investments in the Russian Federation have just blown up. In four days, the new chancellor Olaf Scholz, pushed by the events, has just broken three taboos: he has canceled the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, agreed to hand over defensive weapons to the Ukrainians and has just decreed a complete overhaul of the military budget until 100 billion euros. The article concludes by pointing out that the West can now choose between two strategies. A strategy of appeasement: financing the so-called economic prosperity through “peace dividends”, accepting the lasting fall in military spending, negotiating with Putin, obtaining guarantees of non-aggression, limiting stationed NATO troops in Eastern countries to continue to feed the peoples of Europe with the hope that war is a thing of the past. The report argues that this strategy would certainly lead to a war in a period of one to ten years. The second strategy would aim to correct twenty years of catastrophic defense policies by European governments: the German chief of staff recently admitted that his army was “naked”, British army figures at the lowest for 200 years; for the French, between one-third and one-half of the tanks, planes, helicopters, and so on. would not be operational in the event of a high-intensity conflict. The report concludes that it is urgent to act to avoid an already well-known scenario, as only this approach will provide the necessary negotiating mechanisms to prevent further wars in Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Paul Poast, a professor of international politics at the University of Chicago, points out to The Atlantic<\/em><\/a>  several possible future scenarios: 1) a withdrawal from Russia; 2) a change of regime in Kyiv; 3) the complete occupation of Ukraine; 4) the beginning of a new Russian empire; and 5) widespread conflict. Scenario 1 shows that the war is turning into a dead end for Russia, with protests across the country; the Russian stock market and the ruble have sunk, and that could only be the beginning. This could lead to Putin’s decision to step back and order his troops to leave Ukraine. Scenario 2 would mean a regime change with the removal of the current government and the replacement of a friendly government by Russia, turning Ukraine into what is now Belarus, a vassal state. Scenario 3 would lead to the disappearance of the Ukrainian state, beyond the regime change brought about by the previous scenario. In this case, Russia’s goal is not just to establish a new government, but to seize the whole country and make Ukraine part of Russia. Scenario 4 would respond to the desire to recreate the Soviet Union in a new way. It can be deduced from Putin’s recent speeches that this would not end Ukraine and that the conflict could spread to former Soviet republics such as Moldova, Belarus and Georgia, a country that Russia had already invaded in 2008. Finally, scenario 5 would be an extension to the former to the former Soviet republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – which are now part of NATO. If this were to happen, Article 5 would automatically be activated, the mutual defense clause stating that an attack on a Member State would be an attack on the Alliance as a whole, and other NATO countries would come in defense of the of the attacked countries, which would de facto be a war between the United States and Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, one of the main immediate consequences of the invasion of Ukraine is undoubtedly the resurgence of NATO as a major player on the international stage, after successive crises that questioned its usefulness in a new multipolar international order. Now, the war against Ukraine enshrines the Russian threat against which the Alliance was created in 1949. Thus, Le Monde Diplomatique<\/em><\/a>  states in its editorial that, paradoxically, the decision taken by the Russian president to attack Ukraine will involve a strengthening of the Western military alliance at the very gates of his country. Like the illegal invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003, also against the backdrop of false propaganda broadcast by the media, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia opens a new dangerous chapter in international relations. It will have a negative effect on political life and the world economy. On the other hand, ecological and social emergencies are also at risk of being relegated to the background as this war in Europe will lead to an escalation of military budgets that has been going on for several years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ruth Ferrero tells Jot Down<\/em><\/a>  magazine that she is waiting to see how the conflict evolves, but it can be said that this move means the death of the Minsk Accords, the only diplomatic tool available to try to resolve them, at least partially, the source of the tension in the region. From now on, nothing will be the same for Russia, Ukraine, or the rest of the world. Ferrero argues that the Russian invasion will have consequences for geopolitical reorganization in Europe, but also beyond. What is important is that the new geopolitical context that is taking shape at this time, where China is playing an essential role, will depend on how the conflict in Ukraine is resolved, as China’s behavior in its area of \u200b\u200binfluence will depend on it , specifically in Taiwan. Ultimately, Ukraine is a test, a challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this sense, from the pages of El Temps<\/em><\/a>, Abel Riu states that the most obvious failure is the impossibility of having to implement the Minsk agreements, which were in response to a treaty signed by Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine in early 2015. The Minsk Accords were a legal basis on which to act, because it was recognized by all parties, with a political solution that provided for the recognition by Kyiv of a political autonomy of the areas under the control of the pro-Russian rebels, as part of its reintegration into the Ukrainian state. But Ukraine has resisted such implementation. Volodymyr Zelensky came to the presidency of Ukraine in 2019 with a less nationalist and more conciliatory disposition than his predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, and seemed determined to resolve the conflict, and in 2019, he met with Emmanuel Macron, Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel, among other state leaders. But there has been a lot of internal resistance from the most nationalist sectors in Ukraine, and this has exhausted Russia’s patience, which has resulted in the progressive militarization of the borders, which was a sign that situation could end like this. It is, therefore, a failure on all sides, a multilateral failure. The responsibility for the war lies with Russia, of course. But how did you get here? We could talk about the expansion of NATO, the deployed anti-missile shields that have aroused fear on the Russian side and the many maneuvers in this regard that have raised alarms in Putin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Vladimir Putin whose long-term goal, according to Jean-Robert Raviot in Conflits<\/em><\/a> magazine, was to achieve a neutral Ukraine, then open a major negotiation with the United States and its NATO allies for a complete review security architecture of the European continent. In this context, he considers it plausible that it was the United States’ refusal to go into negotiations with Moscow based on the two draft treaties submitted by Russia on December 17, 2021, that accelerated the development of the invasion launched on February 24. To find out the causes that led Putin to plan and then decide to implement an operation of this magnitude, it is necessary to analyze his intentions through the fabric of official discourse, trying to glimpse the mental universe that has shaped this decision. In his view, two discursive registers allow us to draw two chains of causality, closely linked together. The first is of a political and geopolitical nature of the new Cold War. The New Cold War is not a continuation, but rather a resurgence of the Cold War itself, which took place in the 2000s as a reaction to the post-Cold War of the 1990s and a new Russian desire to revise order. European. Russia believes that the latter was built without it and even against it, taking advantage of its weakness in the 1990s. In this sense, a key figure in the Cold War, the American diplomat George Kennan, inventor of the concept of containment, already warned in 1997 that the decision to admit NATO to the former satellites of the USSR in Eastern Europe it was a \u201cfatal error<\/a>\u201c.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this first chain of geopolitical causality is grafted a second of a civil and cultural order, by virtue of which Russia is a state carrying a civilization – the Russian world – threatened in its very existence by a latent and diffuse Western Russophobia – which leads leaders to want to seize their natural resources, control the logistics corridors of the Eurasian continent, even today, to better contain China. According to this culturalist view, which we find, for example, in the thought of Alexander Solzhenitsyn (Comment r\u00e9am\u00e9nager notre Russie?<\/em> Fayard, 1990), Ukraine is not a nation, but the branch of a great Russian people. Therefore, Russia has the mission to bring together in a single Moscow-led political entity Russia itself, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russians living in the neighboring states (North Kazakhstan). Today, continuing this logic of thinking, Ukraine would have become the weak link in the Russian world, because somehow it would have lost its identity consciousness under the influence of a revengeful Ukrainian nationalism (even \u201cneo-Nazi\u201d in Putin\u2019s words) manipulated from the outside. This view of the Russian president’s own world was also anticipated by Kennan in The Sources of Soviet Conduct<\/em><\/a>  in which he set out the thesis that the foreign policy of the USSR was determined by ideology and circumstances. Soviet leaders were the heirs of Marxism-Leninism, but it is not necessary to look for a handbook in this ideology, but to consider that leaders move according to necessarily changing circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same vein, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s national security adviser, already announced in a famous 1992 article in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West should support the transition with a commitment guided by a far-reaching geopolitical vision in order to achieve two interrelated goals: the emergence of a truly post-imperial Russia that could occupy its rightful place in the concert of the world’s major democratic nations; and the stable consolidation of the newly independent non-Russian states, some of which were then only in the early stages of building their own nation, in order to create a lasting geopolitical context that would in itself reinforce Russia’s transformation into a post-imperial state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, Brzezinski stressed above all that, from a geopolitical point of view, it was essential for Ukraine to be able to stabilize itself as a secure and independent state. This would automatically increase the chances of Russia evolving as a post-imperial democratizing and increasingly European state. Consequently, a critical component of Western strategy had to be a deliberate effort – not only economic but also political – to consolidate a stable and sovereign Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the messianic and imperialist view underlying the decision made by Russian President Jo\u00e3o Pinheiro da Silva and Scott B. Nelson, they argue in the Observador<\/em><\/a> newspaper that the attack on Ukraine is only the latest development in a strategy soaked in a very specific view of the world and of history. In his book The Road to Unfreedom<\/em> (Random House, 2018), American historian Timothy Snyder argues that Putin’s Russia is a perfect example of the “politics of eternity.” According to Snyder, eternity places a nation at the center of a cyclical history of victimization. Time is no longer a straight line to the future, but a cycle that constantly revives the threats of the past. The mastermind behind Putin’s “politics of eternity” is Ivan Ilyin, a relatively unknown Russian philosopher who is often described as an ideologue of Russian fascism following the publication of his book Foundations of Struggle for the National Russia<\/em> (1938). Putin is considered one of his great theoretical and spiritual references. This is because Ilyin’s philosophy was deeply shaped by the Bolshevik revolution, more specifically, as a counter-revolutionary response to the events of 1917. Ilyin became an advocate of violent methods against the revolution and, over time, the author of a Christian fascism destined to overcome Bolshevism. Already in exile in Berlin, Ilyin formulated his writings as a guideline for future Russian leaders who would come to power after the end of the Soviet Union. In this sense, Ilyin is vindicated as a guide to modern Russian nationalism in the face of the liberal revolution that the US government seeks to impose through mass culture, economic dependence, and identity homogenization, especially beginning with what are considered Western countries. colonized. Once we understand Ilyin’s profound influence on the current Kremlin administration, the importance of Ukraine for Putin’s political project becomes clearer. After all, Putin’s policy responds to the saying that “St. Petersburg is the head of Russia, Moscow is the heart, and Kyiv is the mother.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, as Xavier Mas de Xax\u00e0s points out in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a>, Putin’s decision is part of the imperial logic of a Russia that feels insecure on its borders and has been underestimated since the disappearance of the Union Soviet. Putin intends to reunite territories he has always considered part of Russia or its sphere of influence (remember that the dismemberment of the USSR left some 25 million Russians outside its borders). Thus, in addition to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia (2008) and Crimea and the Donbass in 2014, Moldova is in the spotlight, where the separatist region of Transnistria called for its integration into Russia in 2014. An integration that is already taking place in Belarus with the merger of the army, politics, and finance, President Lukashenko resisted the democratic uprising of 2020 with the support of Putin and has owed him his political survival ever since. The same dependency has the Kazakh leader Tokayev, who last January needed Russian security forces to crush another pro-democracy movement. Putin knows that he does not need a clear and definitive victory in these territories to achieve his goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia and Ukraine, for example, will not join NATO because they cannot guarantee that they will return the territories that Russia has segregated. At the risk of losing them permanently, they remain outside the Alliance, and the Kremlin thus retains a strategic advantage over NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Highlighting the dangers of a possible future spread of the conflict in the Balkans, Ian Bancroft told Open Democracy<\/em><\/a>  that the region remains very vulnerable to the contagion of the ongoing crises on Europe’s eastern borders, and believes that otherwise act soon neglected problems will get complicated and mutate until it is too late. As Russia accelerates its invasion of Ukraine, concerns are growing about other challenges to a security architecture that, while imperfect, has largely stabilized a key region of Europe. As with Ukraine, the European Union’s indifference to the dangers facing the Balkans has only undermined the hitherto indisputable confidence in its policies that the candidates for accession had almost dogmatically defended. Today, Bosnia and Herzegovina are facing a resurgence of secessionist tendencies, while attempts to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo have failed. Although the prospect of secession from Republika Srpska remains slim, Dodik’s provocative actions are a direct challenge to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Possible clashes – for example, if there were attempts to withdraw the country’s armed forces from the territory of the entity, as proposed – would create a series of security dilemmas that could further increase tensions. Enlargement has become an empty promise, even if the Union continues to invest considerable political and financial capital in the Balkans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Daniel Boffey told The Guardian<\/em><\/a>  about the chances of Volodymyr Zelensky’s bid for Ukraine’s accession to the EU. In addition to MEPs, the governments of the Baltic states, as well as other countries, including Greece, have expressed their support. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, replied that Ukraine was “one of us and we want them in the EU”. But in other EU capitals, the request has caused a great deal of concern because it is an emotional reaction that will surely lead to disappointment and bitterness in the next few months. In addition, Albania, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey are currently the candidate countries, but Emmanuel Macron, the French president, has stressed that given the EU’s failure to respond adequately to the democratic deficit. of Poland and Hungary, or to find a way to have a coordinated foreign policy, there can be no enlargement until treaty reforms have been made. On the other hand, according to Transparency International<\/em><\/a> corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine is the second most corrupt country in Europe, ahead of Russia. She is currently embroiled in a war and her future boundaries are unclear. So, bottom line is that we’re really looking forward to it. If the Council of the European Union agrees, the European Commission will be asked to give its opinion, and this process can take up to 18 months. Ukraine will then have to integrate EU legislation for an indefinite transitional period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a>  is wondering whether the invasion of Ukraine represents a key moment in the geopolitical awakening of the Union and how the measures taken on a continental scale should be understood this weekend. To analyze the surprising scope of the European response, both in its economic and military aid aspects, the journal, together with the Geopolitical Studies Group, proposes a map and a table that analyze the position of each state. member. While the Ukrainian war seems to be entering a new stage, Josep Borrell announced on February 27 the allocation of aid – financed under the European Peace Fund – up to 450 million euros for the sending military assistance to Kyiv, as well as 50 million euros for the supply of fuel, protective materials, and emergency medical assistance. In addition, the Commission has announced a \u20ac 90 million humanitarian aid fund – a much more classic form of commitment – for emergency aid programs aimed at supporting civilians affected by the war. As part of the Civil Protection Mechanism, 8 million essential health care items will be delivered to Ukraine. At Member State level, aid follows two modalities which draw a map of seemingly minimal divergences in the context of a convergence whose speed has surprised most observers, but which deserves close study. The presence of Finland and Sweden stands out, two neutral countries that have decided to offer military aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the position of another major player in the crisis, although behind the scenes, Stuart Lau points out to Politico<\/em><\/a>  that Putin’s war against Ukraine is putting Beijing in a very awkward position. On the one hand, China’s official position is to make vague statements in favor of the Kremlin, criticizing NATO and Washington, while complaining about Western aggression and the dangers of a new Cold War. On the other hand, the fundamental geopolitical dynamic underlying the invasion of Ukraine is very uncomfortable for Beijing, which is obsessed with territorial sovereignty. The idea that a particular region or ethnic group could claim independence and be recognized by a nuclear superpower is a real nightmare for China, which is constantly worried about dissent in regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. In short, this is not the way Beijing wants international diplomacy to be conducted. On the other hand, China also does not want its growing strategic ties with Putin to hamper its trade relations with Western economies, which have been unexpectedly unanimous in their opposition to Putin’s campaign in Ukraine. At the same time, from the pages of SupChina<\/em><\/a>, Maria Repnikova analyzes the continuations and differences with the 2014 statements on the annexation of Crimea. The similarities are basically that China still has a neutral and vague approach to this crisis. There is no explicit criticism in Russia, but the general feeling is that this crisis should be resolved peacefully, and that both sides should try to resolve it through diplomacy. As for the differences, Repnikova considers that there is a greater emphasis on considering the United States as a negative actor and triggering this crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another crisis unleashed by the war in Ukraine is that of refugees, according to The Economist<\/em><\/a>. Indeed, after a week of invasion, nearly a million people have fled Ukraine, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. About half have entered the EU on the border with Poland, while Hungary, Moldova, Romania, and Slovakia are secondary crossings. The commissioner in charge of crisis management says that the war could force 4 million people to flee Ukraine, while a few million more will take refuge in the west of the country, still considered a relatively safe area. So, the EU\u2019s borders, which have been increasingly closed to most refugees since the large influx from Syria and Afghanistan in 2015, are opening up to Ukrainians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Poland, which already hosts about 1.5 million Ukrainians, some of whom have been displaced by Russia’s previous aggression on the Donbass, says it will offer refugee and assistance to all Ukrainian refugees. Another noteworthy fact is that unlike in 2015, when four-fifths of adult migrants from Syria and Afghanistan were men, Ukrainian refugees are almost exclusively women and children, since Ukrainian men between 18 and 60 years are subject to compulsory military service and are prohibited from leaving the country. Another difference is that from 2017, Ukrainians can travel without a visa for the EU for 90 days, which means they do not have to apply for asylum in the first EU country where they enter. Thus, the task of hosting them will be distributed among countries, while in 2015 the burden fell disproportionately on Greece and Italy, due to geographical reasons, and on Germany and Sweden, which were the most receptive countries to open. its doors. But perhaps the biggest difference is how this new refugee flow will be received. Many Ukrainians are already living in the European Union, many are helping their compatriots when they arrive, offering shelter and advice on how to survive. If they end up staying, these ties will help them integrate. For governments, accepting migrants with the support of citizens is much easier than having to organize their installation against the will of the people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, David Frum points out to The Atlantic<\/em><\/a>  some of the keys to the economic and financial impact of the invasion and states that the current situation is analogous to the 1979 crisis when The Middle East caused rising energy prices and Western economies collapsed. Russia is the world’s third largest oil exporter and the second largest exporter of natural gas. Now that Western countries have responded to the invasion by imposing harsh sanctions on Russia, Putin is likely to counterattack by retaliating by lowering fuel sales. So, the state of the energy market provides much of the answer to why Putin has decided to attack now. According to Frum, the real explanation lies in the weakness of the global energy market in the late 2010s, and its new strength in the 2020s. From mid-2014 to the start of the global pandemic in 2020, Russian gas sold for less than $ 10 per million British metric thermal units, often for less than $ 5. But the gas market is inevitably cyclical and the low prices of the 2010s discouraged investment in new supply and set the conditions for rising prices during the 2020s. As the world economy has, the price of gas has also begun to recover from the pandemic. The price of Russian gas in spot markets exceeded $ 10 per million metric BTU in June 2021, then 15 and then 20. The day Putin announced the invasion of Ukraine was about $ 30\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, Brenda Schaffer warns Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a>\u00a0 that since Russia attacked Ukraine a week ago, the price of crude oil has skyrocketed to $ 105 a barrel, a price that was last reached in 2014 as a result. of the annexation of Crimea. The author believes that things could get much worse from here, because if the current sanctions imposed on Russia do not explicitly target the energy trade, sanctions on banks and other entities will prevent exports of oil, natural gas, and coal, wreaking havoc on global energy markets. In addition, the dangers for oil tankers traveling to the Black Sea will lead to a decline in oil reaching world markets, including the maritime supplies of non-Russian producers such as Kazakhstan. The cut in the supply of Russian oil and natural gas to the markets will have contagious effects and will further increase the prices of coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG), which will also have a negative impact on inflation. As was the case with the 1973 oil crisis, the current energy crisis is taking place at a time when energy markets are already particularly tense. Indeed, in terms of demand, world oil consumption has returned to pre-pandemic rates, and is likely to continue to rise, especially once the volume of international travel grows again. At the same time, the pandemic has also led to increased demand for basic oil as it has increased the use of plastics due to the increasing use of masks, disposable items, and various consumer items and that the use of public transport has been reduced to the benefit of travel by car. Meeting this increase in demand without raising prices requires producing more oil, which few Western governments have openly admitted. And one of the only countries with a large capacity for underutilized oil production is the United States, precisely at a time when President Joe Biden’s policies and the sentiments of his political base against fossil fuels are important factors that have prevented new ones. investments in U.S. oil production.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

English translation: Marian Moy\u00e0, trainee student at the CETC<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Photo: Map of Ukraine painted on a wall of Maiorsk in the Donetsk region.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a9 Ingebj\u00f8rg K\u00e5rstad\/Norwegian Refugee Council<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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