{"id":56259,"date":"2022-03-22T10:54:00","date_gmt":"2022-03-22T10:54:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-57\/"},"modified":"2022-03-29T06:28:57","modified_gmt":"2022-03-29T06:28:57","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-57","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-57\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 57"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Once again this <em>Diari de les idees<\/em> edition is inevitably marked by the war in Ukraine. After nearly a month of invasion, the military situation has seemingly reached an impasse whose aftermath is the bursting of increasing violence against civilians as we could see these last days in Mariupol and Mykolaiv. However, we cannot disregard other relevant matters such as the&nbsp;&nbsp; expectations aroused in Latin America by Gabriel Boric\u2019s presidency in Chile or other ongoing armed conflicts in Africa or Asia. We also wanted to dedicate a part of our analysis to the role of the European Union within this new geostrategic context, the threats of instability in the Balkans, the consequences of the conflict in Ukraine on the supply of raw materials or the significant role of new technologies in this war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In terms of geostrategy, Olivier Roqueplo&#8217;s article in the magazine<em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.revueconflits.com\/guerre-dukraine-2022-ce-nest-pas-vladimir-poutine-qui-est-a-la-manoeuvre-cest-pierre-le-grand\/\">Conflit<\/a><\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.revueconflits.com\/guerre-dukraine-2022-ce-nest-pas-vladimir-poutine-qui-est-a-la-manoeuvre-cest-pierre-le-grand\/\"><em>s<\/em><\/a> stands out. He considers essential to determine in which geopolitical and geohistorical context the events we are living nowadays take place, and he affirms that we are in a much older configuration of the geopolitical history of Russia than that of the Second World War or the Cold War. He argues that the current Russia Federation is a geopolitical reincarnation of what Russia used to be in the 18<sup>th<\/sup> century, between 1709 and 1783, that is to say, a geopolitical ensemble that included Moscow, Siberia ant the Arctic, with access to the Pacific Ocean and particularly to the Baltic and the Black Sea. This geopolitical identity is also reinforced by the geocultural behaviour of the Russian Federation since 1991, for it has repeatedly tried to get closer to Western Europe, and specially to Germany, with very little success because of its non-negotiable sovereignty position and the liberal-globalism of its western representatives. The geopolitical definition of Russian territory also implies a series of geopolitical logics and dynamics. Both the 18<sup>th<\/sup> century Russia and the current Federation advocate for the relative withdrawal from the continental orthodox territories and the conquest of the coastlines near Europe like Scandinavia or Turkey with the aim of a connection to Germany, the Balkans, Italy or the outer oceans. Still, the regions of the Russian Federation have their own geopolitical dynamic as well. The Russian Kuban is historically a part of the Crimean Tatar\u2019s Khanate. Hence, since 1992, a dynamic of geopolitical reunification with Crimea led in 2014 to the reannexation of the latter by Russia. However, the geopolitical dynamics also work in the opposite direction: nationalist Ukraine can claim not only Crimea, but also all of Russian Kuban (including the large Eurasian Port of Novorossiysk) and the territory of the Don Cossacks (including Rostov). In this context, the drastic sanctions decided by NATO and the EU and a possible imminent economic war will force the Russia of 2022 to a major and even radical political change. Taking into account the new global geopolitical and geoeconomic situation, it can be assumed that this time the new Russian regime will be based on a China-inspired reform. As for the territory of the Russian Federation, its geopolitical dynamics would aim to lead, at the end of the war and perhaps even independently of it, to the approximate restoration in federative form of the Russian borders of 1792, that is with Kiev, Odessa and all the territories to the East of the Dnieper, which in fact seems to be in progress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In a long interview published in<em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newyorker.com\/news\/q-and-a\/stephen-kotkin-putin-russia-ukraine-stalin\">The New Yorker<\/a><\/em>, Soviet Russia and Stalinism specialist Stephen Kotkin points out that what we have in Russia today is not a surprise, it is not some kind of deviation from a historical pattern. Long before NATO existed \u2014in the 19th century\u2014 Russia already looked like this: there was an autocrat, there was repression, there was militarism, it was wary of foreigners and the West. This is a Russia we have always known, not a Russia born yesterday or in the nineties. It is not a Russia born as a response to the actions of the West. Kotkin declares that there are internal processes in Russia that explain where we are today. For half a millennium, Russian foreign policy has been defined by growing ambitions that have exceeded the country&#8217;s capabilities. Since the reign of Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century, Russia managed to expand and eventually cover one-sixth of the landmass. There are three high points in this process: the reign of Peter the Great, the victory of Alexander I over Napoleon and Stalin&#8217;s victory over Hitler. But aside from these three moments, Russia has almost always been a relatively weak great power. Russia is a remarkable civilization in the arts, music, literature, dance and cinema. It is more a civilization than just a country. At the same time, Russia considers that it has a special place in the world, a special mission. And it desires to stand out as a great power. Its problem is that its competences have never matched its aspirations. It is always struggling to meet these aspirations but it cannot, because the West has always been more powerful. The worst part of this dynamic in Russian history is the unification of the Russian state under a single leader. Instead of getting the strong state it longs for, in order to manage the gap with the West and bring Russia to the top, it always ends up having a personalist regime, a dictatorship that usually becomes despotic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the <a href=\"https:\/\/uscnpm.org\/2022\/03\/12\/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice\/\"><em>US-China Perception Monitor<\/em><\/a>, Hu Wei, president of the Shanghai Public Policy Research Association, states that the Russian-Ukrainian war is the most serious geopolitical conflict since World War II and that it will have far greater global consequences than the 9\/11 attacks. At this critical time, he says that China needs to accurately analyse and assess the direction of the war and its potential impact on the international arena. At the same time, in order to fight for a quite favourable external environment, China has to react flexibly and make strategic decisions according to its long-term interests. He points to different scenarios where the US would regain the leadership of a more united Western world and where the indefinite shelving of Nord Stream 2 would substantially increase Europe&#8217;s dependence on US natural gas. In this context, a new iron curtain could be established, no longer between socialism and capitalism, but between the defenders and the enemies of Western democracy, which would consolidate the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States. Another consequence could be that the West would increase its hegemony, both in terms of military power and in terms of values and institutions. In this assumed scenario, China will be more isolated and if it did not take proactive measures to respond, it would face greater contention from the United States and the West. Not only would it be militarily surrounded by the United States, NATO, QSD and AUKUS, but it would also confront the Western values and systems on its own. So, in this context, Hu Wei argues that China has to break its ties with Putin and give up neutrality in order to build a positive international image that eases its relationship with the United States and the West. In his view, the theory that a geopolitical conflict in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will significantly delay the strategic reorientation of the United States towards the Indo-Pacific region does not have much sense. Indeed, voices are already being raised in the United States to say that Europe is important, but China is more important, and that the main objective of the United States is to prevent China from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under these circumstances, China&#8217;s top priority is to make the right strategic adjustments, change hostile North American attitudes and escape from isolation. Wei asserts that China is the only country in the world with the ability to stop Putin and it has to make the most of this advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From a global strategic analysis point of view, Lorenzo Castellani points out in <a href=\"https:\/\/legrandcontinent.eu\/fr\/2022\/03\/15\/un-nouveau-brouillard-de-guerre\/\"><em>Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> that the invasion of Ukraine brings us closer to the end of a world and distances us from the end of the current interregnum, while the new order continues to take an increasingly disturbing shape, as the world has slowly and surreptitiously entered a new Cold War. He believes that the roots of change are to be sought in the protectionist policies of the United States introduced by Obama and continued with more vigour during the hectic presidency of Donald Trump. On the one hand, to cope with the development of China&#8217;s economic and technological power and, on the other hand, to respond to domestic pressures arising from deindustrialisation. This strategy directed against China has also had effects at the European level, where the State has become increasingly interventionist in three areas: monetary and economic, to revive growth; security, to control the rise of Chinese influence; and social, to appease public opinion, exhausted by socio-economic stagnation and seduced by populist, anti-establishment and nationalist voices. In Europe, this has led to the strengthening of the EU&#8217;s institutions, which have emerged more centralized in economic and public policy terms. At the national level, states have been forced to adopt detailed and far-reaching regulations to deal with the pandemic. Restrictions, prohibitions and new governmental powers were legitimized by the fear of the disease. Therefore, public opinion and institutionalized political power seem already prepared to withstand a security shock linked to the deterioration of international relations. Castellani states that in the face of the Ukrainian crisis, political discipline within states will intensify: political parties or leaders with pro-Russian or pro-Chinese sympathies or NATO sceptical will find it more difficult to enter the government. At the same time, moderate, pro-European and Atlanticist political elites will tend to be more united and the spaces for pluralism will almost inevitably shrink, at least as long as there is a threatening enemy at the doorstep. At a global level, the crisis in supply chains and the difficulties in obtaining raw materials due to increased demand and geopolitical tensions will force national economies to shrink. They will no longer be totally global, but regional. Some sectors, especially in Europe, will be fated to shrink or be transformed. Energy supply will progressively diversify, but it will require the support of the state. The world will be gradually reduced to blocs, to supranational regional aggregations. Finally, the era of optimism that culturally structured the 90s, and which saw automatic and apolitical mechanisms as a guarantee of creating progress, order and security, seems to be coming to an end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Beyond the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Danilo Albin re-examines in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.publico.es\/politica\/guerra-rusia-ucrania-mundo-guerra-alla-ucrania-veintena-conflictos-abiertos-olvido-comunidad-internacional.html\"><em>P\u00fablico<\/em><\/a> the twenty or so active conflicts in the world today, mainly in Africa and Asia. Thus, the data of the School of Culture of Peace (ECP) review the conflict in Cameroon, where the two English-speaking regions continue to be affected by the serious atmosphere of violence resulting from the actions of secessionist armed actors, as well as from the excessive use of force and counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Armed Forces and local militias. Cameroon has been experiencing the most serious secessionist conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa for years. The two English-speaking regions in the south and west of the territory have been demanding independence from the rest of the French-speaking country for a long time. Cultural and linguistic differences are at the root of the English speakers\u2019 protests and have turned into an attempt of generalized rebellion that has recently been getting a civil war nature. Likewise, the Ethiopian region of Tigray was affected last year by an escalation of tension with the federal government that led to a warlike confrontation with serious consequences. On November 4th 2021, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed ordered the launch of a military operation against the authorities in this region bordering Eritrea. The offensive was followed by intense clashes and an escalation of the conflict, which led to the displacement of thousands of civilians. The province of Cabo Delgado, in northern Mozambique, has been suffering since the end of 2017 from an armed conflict led by the self-designated Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ). Since then, Cabo Delgado has been the epicentre of increased violent activity in the country. As for Asia, military operations in Myanmar have been constant and have been directed especially against the civilian population, with the aim of eliminating the bases of armed groups and causing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The number of internally displaced persons to Myanmar since the military&#8217;s new seizure of power in 2021 is higher than half a million people, according to a UNHCR report published on March 1st. Finally, Yemen is also enduring a severe humanitarian crisis caused by war. Since March 2015, a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has been bombing areas of the country controlled by Houthi rebels and more than 80% of the country is in need of urgent humanitarian aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We also highlight Alexis Cortes&#8217; analysis in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.opendemocracy.net\/es\/nuevo-gobierno-de-boric-en-chile-un-laboratorio-de-cambio-social\/\"><em>Open Democracy<\/em><\/a> on the impact that Gabriel Boric&#8217;s new presidency in Chile may have on Latin America as a whole insomuch as the future of the Latin American left wing will be largely defined by the success or failure of Boric&#8217;s government. The new government intends to overcome the neoliberal cycle by forming an ecofeminist executive inspired by Allende&#8217;s democratic socialism and the social revolts that broke out 10 years ago. The Chilean neoliberal model, usually held up as an example of economic openness and stability, was strongly contested in the wake of the social outburst that began in 2019 when student mobilizations condemned the commercialization of social rights that began with the Pinochet dictatorship. As a result, Boric has been able to gather the support of the main anti-establishment collectives: the anti-extractivist environmental movement, feminism and indigenous groups, such as the Mapuche. However, in order to carry out the key proposals of his mandate (tax, pension and health reform) Boric will have to find the balance between the old centre-left, still under neoliberal logics, and the social movements that strengthened him. The interdependence between the social movements and the new government will not exclude tensions and contradictions, but it can become the renewing impulse to carry out the necessary deep reforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As far as Spanish foreign policy is concerned, although it is still too early to assess its impact and consequences in the medium and long term, the sudden and radical change of the Spanish government with regard to the Western Sahara issue stands out. In the midst of a confusing episode \u2014leaking by the King of Morocco included \u2014 and siding with Germany and the United States (the plan now proposed was supported by Donald Trump), the Spanish government has modified its traditional public equidistance in defence of a political, fair, lasting and mutually agreed solution within the framework of the United Nations and has now decided to support the Moroccan proposal to perpetuate the occupation of the former Spanish province. This is framed in a context of geopolitical and energy crisis where Germany (which had already supported Morocco&#8217;s autonomy plan earlier in the year) is keenly interested in renewable energy projects and plans for green hydrogen production in the Maghreb. Indeed, Germany has set as a priority a stronger political, economic and technological presence in the region as it needs new energy corridors to become less dependent on Russia. After the outbreak of war, this option has become a top priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At the European level, the editorial of the magazine <a href=\"https:\/\/politicaprosa.com\/europa-de-nou-a-prova\/\"><em>Pol\u00edtica&amp;Prosa<\/em><\/a> affirms that the continent moves forward when it reacts to unexpected political crises. It has had to do so in recent years with the euro crisis, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the migratory avalanche, Brexit, the election of Donald Trump or the COVID-19 pandemic. Because of crises, the Union had to clarify who decides and how it is decided to exercise its power and to mark the difference between its collective interests and the national interests of its members. It now has to face the Ukraine crisis in very difficult circumstances indeed. In the midst of an internal debate on its strategic autonomy, with discordant perceptions and interests among member states. With the transatlantic link seriously deteriorated after Trump\u2019s presidency and Brexit, but paradoxically with its collective security dependent on a NATO that has changed from being extremist to being resuscitated thanks to Putin. It also experiences the weakness of its energy dependence, exacerbated in the Central European countries by direct dependence on Russian gas supplies. In this context, the editorial considers that perhaps it is time to learn the lesson and change the na\u00efve look on the Russian Federation \u2014and incidentally on the People&#8217;s Republic of China\u2014 and the strategy of a contemporizing approach hoping a democratic evolution that is not in Vladimir Putin&#8217;s intentions. This would be a first step towards the implementation of the aspiration for strategic autonomy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moreover, Mujtaba Rahman argues in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newstatesman.com\/international-politics\/2022\/03\/europe-enters-a-brave-new-world\"><em>The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> that, through his invasion of Ukraine, Putin may have awakened the sleeping giant that the European Union had become and definitively prompted the debate on the need to have its own strategic autonomy. Indeed, now the EU cannot continue with its eyes shut and will have to adapt its policies and institutions to the new context of global crisis, especially in matters such as security, defence, foreign affairs or fiscal policy. In a context of generalized crisis, not relying on others means relying on oneself, and the EU emphasizes the great internal solidarity that the Recovery Fund represents. The EU will also have to rebalance itself internally to create a common front so that refugee crises or the energy crisis do not isolate any country, but enjoy the support of all members. Faced with the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, the EU believes in the possibility of crossing two seemingly contradictory impulses: to rely more on the US as a priority partner of NATO, and for the EU to start thinking strategically in the long term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this context, the seriousness of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/politics\/short_news\/russian-ambassador-says-bih-can-join-nato-but-moscow-will-react\/\"><em>threats<\/em><\/a> made by the Russian ambassador, Igor Kalabukhov, to Bosnia and Herzegovina must be assessed. He has warned that the Kremlin will respond if the Balkan country decides to move towards NATO membership. The debate over NATO membership has been at the centre of tensions in Bosnia for years, a country still politically and socially divided among Croats, Bosnians and Bosnian Serbs. The Serb side, which controls the Republic of Srpska, is aligned with the interests of Belgrade and is strongly opposed to the country&#8217;s entry into NATO. In recent years, its leader Milorad Dodik has encouraged the narrative that Bosnia is a failed state, leading to an acceleration of the attempt to separate the Srpska Republic from the rest of the country. A ploy that has counted on the connivance of Moscow. The situation keeps in tension the precarious balance amongst nations in the Balkans, where not only are there still international troops present after the wars of the 90&#8217;s but also, after the invasion of Ukraine, EUFOR has reinforced its military presence. The project of joining NATO has been perceived in part of the Bosnian society as a guarantee of territorial integrity, while the Republic of Srpska, on the other hand, has adopted a resolution on military neutrality in which it specifically declares that it does not want to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani warns in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/by-invitation\/2022\/03\/14\/the-president-of-kosovo-warns-against-the-appeasement-of-autocrats\"><em>The Economist<\/em><\/a> that in recent years, and especially since the annexation of Crimea, Putin has also intensified efforts to destabilize Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro through Serbia, and Russian support for leaders such as Vucic in Serbia is no secret. Russian destabilization and interference in the region thus constitutes a major threat to European stability and especially to the Kosovar state. Osmani warns that events like those in Ukraine remind us that we never have to remain indifferent to autocracy or threats to our values and allies. It is a reminder that a threat to democracy in one territory is a threat to all the rest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In such an unstable and uncertain context, the relationship between the EU and NATO acquires a special relevance, as Sven Biscop points out in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lavanguardia.com\/internacional\/vanguardia-dossier\/revista\/20220317\/8007666\/convergencia-ue-otan.html\"><em>La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a>. He emphasizes that at the end of 2020, the European Union initiated the drafting of a Strategic Guidance for its defence and security policy. In June 2021, the NATO summit in Brussels agreed to examine the Strategic Concept. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, both the Guidance and the Concept were to be released in mid-2022. Biscop suggests the need for an overall agreement consisting of three dimensions: territorial defence and resilience; expeditionary operations; and defence planning and capability development. If the US continually exhorts its European allies to do more, it pulls them back when it feels that a European initiative could threaten its leadership. At the same time, without a UN mandate, the EU has to limit itself to diplomatic and economic instruments of crisis management and indirect military measures such as sanctions and support to local and regional actors. Despite the obvious drawbacks of the current arrangement, it seems unlikely that there will be a breakthrough leading to an effective overall agreement between the European Union and NATO. The major states, on both sides of the Atlantic, which continue to tolerate this situation, must be held accountable. However, there is a more fundamental reason for the current impasse. On the one hand, Atlanticist dogmatism refuses to remove the old ways and adapt NATO to the emergence of the European Union, as though the defence arrangements of 1950 would fit in today&#8217;s world. On the other hand, European idealism continues to preach that European defence will bring salvation, without taking any real steps to achieve it. Dogmatism and idealism are enemies of a proper strategy that has to be based on reason. Even if there is no overall agreement between the European Union and NATO, the EU could still keep its side of the bargain and adopt an ambitious Strategic Guidance regulating what member states have to do in terms of defence and deterrence, and forcing them to comply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From a more cultural approach, Henrique Raposo publishes an interesting article in the Portuguese newspaper <a href=\"https:\/\/expresso.pt\/guerra-na-ucrania\/2022-03-03-Ler-Gogol-para-perceber-o-odio-de-Putin-3ced4334\"><em>P\u00fablico<\/em><\/a>, where he considers that a reading of Gogol, especially of the novel <em>Tar\u00e0s Bulba<\/em>, facilitates an understanding of the events unfolding in Ukraine. Romantic and nationalist, Gogol glorifies the extreme violence of the Cossacks in the name of the true faith and the great Russian nation, which emerges with a special destiny among nations. Gogol promotes the idea that the Slavic soul is special: <em>&#8220;Only Slavic nature is capable of this; broad and powerful Slavic soul, a sea in comparison to other cultures, simple streams.&#8221;<\/em> This Pan-Slavism of Slavic land, blood and language is at the heart of Putin&#8217;s vision and bears great similarities to old Pan-Germanism. In fact, if we use the language of the pre-fascist Germanic vitalists, we have a case of defending the <em>gemeinschaft<\/em> (community of historical ties, blood and language ties where the individual exists only as an insignificant part of this organic nation) against the <em>gesellschaft<\/em> (the moral and political principle is the person and not the nation). Gogol tells us that foreigners are also children of God, but that, after all, only Slavs are special, Slavs united by the sacred mantle of Pan-Slavism, that is, the Russian soul. &#8220;<em>No one can love like this<\/em>,&#8221; he says. Who brags about being special in love, inevitably ends up being extremely special in hatred and war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the economic section, Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Lemaire analyses in <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.monde-diplomatique.fr\/2022\/03\/LEMAIRE\/64440\">Le Monde Diplomatique<\/a> <\/em>the current situation of inflation and scarcity of raw materials. The general rise in prices was expected to be temporary, but everything indicates that it will continue in the coming months, according to the latest forecasts of the European Central Bank (ECB). Because of the crisis in Ukraine, inflation, so far largely attributable to the health crisis, would have to remain above 3% during 2022. And with it, a recurring dilemma in the history of monetary policies: should we flood the markets with liquidity to float them or close the taps and risk plunging the euro zone back into a deep crisis? In this context, the author points out that central banks are stuck. On the one hand, the various cautionary measures to limit the inflationary danger, motivated by ideology or by electoral concerns since, on the eve of important elections on both sides of the Atlantic, price increases could fuel popular anger. On the other hand, the urgency to rebuild a weakened world economy and, on the European side, to ensure the cohesion of a monetary bloc whose deep-seated dysfunctions have not disappeared, even if they are concealed by the torrent of liquidity provided by the ECB. Even so, a drastic tightening of monetary policy would contribute to a slowdown in economic activity \u2014a very unattractive option for political leaders \u2014 and could trigger serious tensions in financial, real estate and cryptocurrency markets driven by interest rates so low that they have made them fall into dependency. A risk that reveals the danger of another form of inflation that, even so, remains under the radar of consumer price index: financial inflation, which forms stock market bubbles, sources of speculative enrichment, inequalities and crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Nicu Calcea alerts in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newstatesman.com\/chart-of-the-day\/2022\/03\/war-in-ukraine-threatens-to-create-a-global-food-crisis\"><em>The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> to the consequences of the war in Ukraine in the face of a global food crisis. Ukraine and Russia supply almost a third of the world&#8217;s wheat, as well as being major exporters of other cereals. The war will also affect food growing in the UK and other locations because Russia is the world&#8217;s largest exporter of fertilizer (nitrogen fertilizer is made from natural gas, of which Russia is a major source). Trade blocs around the Black Sea and sanctions against Russia have forced importers to seek alternative suppliers of food and fertilizer. This has only exacerbated preexisting problems of stock shortages due to bad weather and supply chain disruption. As stocks run out, many countries have imposed restrictions on exports of certain crops, putting many developing countries at risk of food shortages, especially those in North Africa and the Middle East, which are more dependent on exports from Ukraine and Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As for the climate crisis, the editorial in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/idees\/article\/2022\/03\/01\/lutter-contre-le-rechauffement-une-question-de-survie_6115699_3232.html\"><em>Le Monde<\/em><\/a> alerts to the fact that the war in Ukraine has completely overshadowed the latest <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ipcc.ch\/report\/ar6\/wg2\/\">report<\/a> of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published at the end of February. If in 2014 the IPCC concluded that there was a simple increase in the probability of serious, widespread and irreversible damages caused by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, now it judges that global warming, by causing the multiplication of extreme weather phenomena (hurricanes, floods, droughts, etc.), has already caused widespread negative effects and irreversible damage to all societies and to nature. These worrying prospects are coupled with a fundamental injustice: although they only contribute marginally to global warming, poor countries are and will be the most affected, because they lack the means to mitigate the consequences or to adapt. Rich countries must urgently fulfil their 2009 pledge to mobilize $100 billion a year to help developing countries. The irreversible damage already caused by droughts, floods and other climatic cataclysms must be the subject of specific financial compensation \u2014so far refused \u2014 for poor countries. Simply juxtaposed to the vagaries of current events, the return of war and the IPCC&#8217;s new warning on climate change are not, however, two unconnected events. Climate change-induced shortages, impoverishment, famines and forced population displacements can only provoke tensions, even conflict. The urgency of measures to fight global warming is therefore a matter of survival and peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In this regard, a study carried out by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/sponsored-content\/drive-sustainable-progress-the-seeds-of-change\/\"><em>Politico<\/em><\/a> magazine reveals that the EU&#8217;s ambitious plans to reduce deforestation worldwide will have to focus on the human impact if they are to be truly sustainable and count on the cooperation of private companies. The world&#8217;s population is growing fast and it is a problem that affects almost every area of global policy, especially with climate change as the background, and requires sustainable and innovative solutions. The EU recognizes the important role of forests in climate change mitigation. That is why combating deforestation is one of the stated objectives of the EU&#8217;s Green Pact, which in November announced the adoption of new proposals to stop deforestation and pursue a broader commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. For the initiative to succeed, it will be necessary to ensure that any impacts for people living in other countries are managed and to ensure that progress in the EU does not come at the expense of sustainable development elsewhere. Collaboration is key, which is why many globally active companies are already making efforts to combat deforestation with millionaire investments. Close collaboration between them and policy makers and NGOs, as well as knowledge sharing between the parties, can be an effective way to accelerate progress. A good example of one such partnership is the coalition &#8220;Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance&#8221; (LEAF), which includes both the private and public sectors and aims to provide financial support to countries committed to increasing protection of tropical and subtropical forests and reducing deforestation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Finally, in the field of new technologies, Andr\u00e9s Mart\u00ednez points out in <a href=\"https:\/\/slate.com\/technology\/2022\/03\/future-tense-newsletter-keep-russia-online.html\"><em>Slate<\/em><\/a> magazine that cutting off Russia&#8217;s access to the Internet may be a perfect example of a wrong good idea. Many companies have voluntarily shut down their business in Russia. But, what about technology companies whose platforms connect people to one another and to information? An isolation that may be satisfactory and beneficial for Putin but which also closes autonomous spaces for Russian citizens to communicate with each other and share news and information outside the total control of the Kremlin. In this sense, the editor of Holod Media, Taisia Bekbulatova, has stated that removing all platforms from Russia would only do the Kremlin a favour because local social networking alternatives are under government control. Finally, <a href=\"https:\/\/slate.com\/technology\/2022\/03\/future-tense-newsletter-keep-russia-online.html\">Andrea Peterson<\/a> points out that while the armed conflict is becoming increasingly violent, Ukraine&#8217;s sophisticated cyber infrastructure has allowed the country to withstand the Russian onslaught in the digital field, even though some basic services, such as the maintenance of hospitals, have been affected and degraded since the beginning of the war. The main disruptions to the country&#8217;s networks have been attributed to the second round of Russian cyber-attacks, aimed at disrupting information networks and leaving citizens unable to communicate. Ukrtelecom, the main Ukrainian telecommunications provider, has had problems and suffered numerous attacks in most regions, but has been able to restore service in almost all cases quite successfully.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Illustration: &#8220;Red Cavalry&#8221;, Kazimir Malevich, 1932<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Ra\u00fcl Gil, Eva Lam, Raquel Garc\u00eda and Pilar Querol, trainees at the CETC, have contributed to this issue 57 of <em>Diari de les idees<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Once again this Diari de les idees edition is inevitably marked by the war in Ukraine. After nearly a month of invasion, the military situation has seemingly reached an impasse whose aftermath is the bursting of increasing violence against civilians as we could see these last days in Mariupol and Mykolaiv. However, we cannot disregard other relevant matters such as the&nbsp;&nbsp; expectations aroused in Latin America by Gabriel Boric\u2019s presidency in Chile or other ongoing armed conflicts in Africa or Asia. We also wanted to dedicate a part of our analysis to the role of the European Union within this\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":54959,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-56259","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Diari de les idees 57 &#8211; IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-57\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 57 &#8211; IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Once again this Diari de les idees edition is inevitably marked by the war in Ukraine. After nearly a month of invasion, the military situation has seemingly reached an impasse whose aftermath is the bursting of increasing violence against civilians as we could see these last days in Mariupol and Mykolaiv. However, we cannot disregard other relevant matters such as the&nbsp;&nbsp; expectations aroused in Latin America by Gabriel Boric\u2019s presidency in Chile or other ongoing armed conflicts in Africa or Asia. We also wanted to dedicate a part of our analysis to the role of the European Union within this\u2026\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-57\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-03-29T06:28:57+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/03\/malevich-red-cavalry-1932.jpg?fit=800%2C525&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"800\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"525\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"29 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/\",\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 57 &#8211; IDEES\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/03\\\/malevich-red-cavalry-1932.jpg?fit=800%2C525&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2022-03-22T10:54:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-03-29T06:28:57+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/03\\\/malevich-red-cavalry-1932.jpg?fit=800%2C525&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/03\\\/malevich-red-cavalry-1932.jpg?fit=800%2C525&ssl=1\",\"width\":800,\"height\":525},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-57\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Inici\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 57\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/\",\"name\":\"IDEES\",\"description\":\"Contemporary global issues\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Diari de les idees 57 &#8211; IDEES","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-57\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Diari de les idees 57 &#8211; IDEES","og_description":"Once again this Diari de les idees edition is inevitably marked by the war in Ukraine. After nearly a month of invasion, the military situation has seemingly reached an impasse whose aftermath is the bursting of increasing violence against civilians as we could see these last days in Mariupol and Mykolaiv. However, we cannot disregard other relevant matters such as the&nbsp;&nbsp; expectations aroused in Latin America by Gabriel Boric\u2019s presidency in Chile or other ongoing armed conflicts in Africa or Asia. 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