As we approach the summer break, the war in Ukraine and its correlates remain in the spotlight. After long weeks of stalemate, it seems that – slowly and at great cost – Russian troops are managing to change the momentum of the conflict. At the same time, President Zelensky has scored a moral and diplomatic victory by obtaining the endorsement of the European Commission and the Council of Europe for EU membership, which has been interpreted negatively by the countries of the Western Balkans that have been on the waiting list for years. These developments practically coincide in time with the NATO summit in Madrid with the formulation of a new strategic concept as one of the central items on the agenda. Other issues we would like to highlight are the resurgence and intensification of inter-religious tensions and violence in Africa, the extension of Chinese power on the African continent and in the South China Sea, the British government’s threats to break the Northern Irish Brexit Protocol, the restructuring of supply chains and the environmental dangers of reducing CO2 emission technology to zero-carbon technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Four months after the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops and when it seems that the protraction of the conflict may be working in Vladimir Putin’s favour, Neil Hauer argues in The Atlantic<\/em><\/a> that the Russian president is implementing in the eastern regions of Ukraine a plan very similar to the one he imposed at the beginning of his term in another unruly territory: Chechnya, where Putin destroyed a sovereign state and subjugated its people in a conflict that lasted for years. This plan consists of well-established phases. The first is so-called “pacification”, quickly where it is possible, and slowly, by annihilation, where it is not. In Chechnya, rapid pacification took place mainly in peripheral areas. In the case of Ukraine, the southeast has been relatively easily overrun; open terrain and insufficient defences offered little resistance to the Russian advance that swept through cities such as Melitopol and Kherson during the first phase of the offensive. In other areas, the defenders resisted en masse, mainly when they were able to utilise the cover of large urban areas. This requires the application of another Russian tactic: systematic destruction. In the Chechen capital, Grozny, the bombardment to which the defenders were subjected from late 1999 to early 2000 was so intense that it destroyed almost every building in the city, to the point that the UN considered Grozny to be the most destroyed city on the planet. This is what is happening now in Severodonetsk and earlier in Mariupol. Once the conquest is complete, the next step is to find a satrap to rule the local populations. In Chechnya, this role has been played for years by Ramzan Kadyrov. In Ukraine, enough candidates have already been found in the occupied parts of Donetsk and Lugansk, and in other recently conquered regions. Finally, the last phase of the plan is the consolidation of the new order. During a transitional period the local populations are still repressed by the occupying forces, but gradually a new indigenous apparatus of domination is built up and takes responsibility for breaking down the resistance of its compatriots. Citizens traumatised by years of violence are taught a new version of their own history, explaining that vassalage to Russia is entirely voluntary and has saved them from falling into the hands of “radicals” and “terrorists”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this context, Ivan Krastev argues in The Financial Times<\/em><\/a> <\/u><\/em>that what is happening in Ukraine is nothing more than the certification of the end of the last European empire. The so-called russky mir,<\/em> or “Russian world”, understood as a culturally larger element than the Russian Federation, is being sacrificed by Putin on the altar of autocracy and Russian ethnicity. On the other hand, this vision does not appeal at all to universal values and lacks any appeal to Russia’s neighbours. Putin’s desperate attempt to seize Ukraine is a show of force that comes at the cost of destroying Moscow’s soft power as Russia’s ties with Europe have been severed. A recent report<\/a> from the European Council on Foreign Relationssuggests that the break with Russia is irreversible, at least in the short to medium term. Most Europeans have lost any illusions about Russia’s integration into the Western world. At the same time, while Western sanctions have so far failed to change Russian foreign policy, they have forced European governments to abandon the idea that Moscow can be a reliable partner. Thus, in terms of soft power, the invasion of Ukraine has, on the one hand, put an end to any possibility of the survival of a post-Soviet identity in the region and, on the other, Moscow’s perversion of the Soviet victory over Hitler as part of its national mythology and international reputation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In El Nacional<\/em><\/a>, Manuel Manonelles points out that once Ukraine’s application for EU membership has been accepted, time has come to deal with reality and in particular with a bleak short- and medium-term future for Ukraine. As the war progresses, and especially its global economic and food effects, Ukraine’s position weakens and Russia’s strengthens. This is provided Moscow can sustain the military, economic and political effort it is paying for the invasion, which at the moment – with the indirect support of China and other non-Western powers – seems to be the case. The pressure will therefore progressively fall mainly on Ukraine, and grow as the weeks and months go by. This is not only because we are facing a “perfect storm” with several simultaneous crises (reorganisation of the world hydrocarbon market, inflationary effects worldwide, threat to global food security, generalised increase in interest rates worldwide and consequently higher public debt) but also because of the effects of the calendar, since after the summer, autumn will come, and with it, an increase in demand for gas and electricity that will be difficult to cover even if the import of liquefied gas from the United States is increased. This is where the big question will arise, i.e. what price will people be willing to pay, and who, for peace? For surely the perspectives on this question will be very different depending on whether they are viewed through the prisms of Kiev, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Helsinki, Washington, the ECB, or the IMF. And, what is more, peace on the basis of what borders and conditions? We all know they will not be the borders of 23 February 2022, the day before the invasion. But will they be those imposed by the storm of fury and fire unleashed by the invasion the day after? That is, will Ukraine, or the Western international community, be willing to accept Putin’s annexation of a substantial part of Ukrainian territory? Because what we do know is that peace, even if it is still a long time coming, will in no case mean the total defeat of one of the two contenders and, by definition, it will be unfair to one of the two sides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, Fareed Zakaria provides a complementary point of view and argues in The Washington Post<\/em><\/a> that the current situation of a protracted war with slow but steady Russian advances forces Ukraine – and its allies – to try to find a coherent and consensual outcome in order to negotiate and gain maximum consensus in the eyes of the international community. Ukraine must focus its efforts on breaking the Russian blockade of Odessa in order to save as much of its economy as possible, which is estimated to fall by 45 percent, and to secure control over as much territory as possible. In the short term, Russia has managed to overcome – partially – the sanctions and its economy is estimated to fall by (only) 11%. Due to the lack of strong sanctions on the energy sector, its economy will still register gains over last year in terms of oil and gas. It is in the long term that the West can most condition Russia’s negotiating position, hence the insistence that Ukraine define a strong and consensual position with its allies in order to establish clear objectives for future peace negotiations. Zakaria argues that Ukrainian claims must be realistic and focused on securing the existence of an independent and sovereign state, with control over most pre-invasion territories and security commitments from the West. Otherwise, a war that benefits no one and may have an increasingly negative impact, not only for Ukrainians and Russians, but for the whole world, will drag on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In global affairs, Gustavo Petro’s victory in Colombia’s presidential elections, where for the first time a left-wing candidate has won, stands out. Santiago Castro-G\u00f3mez stresses in magazine Contexto<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that the changes taking place in Chile and Colombia do not signify the rebirth of the revolutionary left of the 20th century, but rather the emergence of a left that wants to harmonise society and the economy with the rule of law. In this sense, Gustavo Petro’s victory is unprecedented because he represents the voices of sectors that have traditionally been excluded from decision-making bodies, although in the past there had been leaders with a left-wing ideological bent, such as Alfonso L\u00f3pez Pumarejo. But the new president is the first to represent sectors that have traditionally shown opposition to the Colombian political and economic establishment. It is also noteworthy that the losing candidate Rodolfo Hern\u00e1ndez immediately recognised the results and offered his collaboration to Petro. With these gestures of democratic maturity, the country is spared the nightmare of endless vote countings, suspicions of fraud and the risk of mass protests in the streets. Petro’s undisputed and unchallenged victory strengthens democracy, because it puts to rest the idea of more radical sectors that the political exclusion that for years justified political violence and fed the imagination of Colombians who joined the guerrilla (including Petro himself) continues. In his victory speech, Petro defined the three main lines of his government: peace, social justice and environmental justice, with a strong emphasis on the issue of climate change, the umbrella under which he wants to promote the transformations of the economic model he promised. He also made it clear that his ambition will not be limited to Colombia, but that under the environmental umbrella he will try to project himself as a Latin American leader.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the African continent, there are concerns about rising religious tensions that threaten to destabilise two key countries, Nigeria and Ethiopia, and lead to humanitarian catastrophes, according to two articles by Louis-Marie Bonneau in magazine Conflits<\/em><\/a> <\/em>and Andrew DeCort in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a>. Nigeria is experiencing an upsurge in ethnic and religious attacks, especially in the north of the country. Throughout 2021, the NGO Open Doors<\/em><\/a> counted 4650 murders of Christians, while the International Society for Civil Liberties and the Rule of Law (Intersociety<\/a>) reported 3000 attacks on Christian schools. The situation of Christians in Nigeria seems to have deteriorated in recent years and the violence, initially localised in the north, is tending to spread to the south as well. Nigeria has 212 million inhabitants, 49.3% of whom are Christians and 48.8% Muslims and it is a country marked by violent conflicts that, according to the UN<\/a>, have already caused the deaths of 27,000 civilians over the last ten years. The explosion of population growth, which according to the United Nations is expected to reach 400 million by 2050, is breaking down the old balances between farming and pastoralist communities, aggravating existing tensions in a country marked by great poverty where the majority live on about two dollars a day. Indeed, the ethnic map overlaps with the religious map with a predominantly Muslim north and Christian south. Thus, Nigerians in the north can be thought of as seeing Christians as a demographic and economic threat. In the south, Christians enjoy freedom of worship, while in the north, where Sharia law is applied, they suffer persecution and are considered second-class citizens. The Islamisation of Nigerian territory through the adoption of Sharia law in 12 northern states does not help the situation and contributes to this increase in violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the case of Ethiopia, an ancient Christian imperialism is re-emerging under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who has a vision of unifying Ethiopia and restoring its divine glory. His core belief is that Ethiopia is a Christian nation created and destined by God for greatness under Christian leadership. Today, this conception of history is fuelling conflict and silencing critical voices calling for an end to war, genuine dialogue and an inclusive Ethiopia where citizens of different faiths can live together. In this sense, understanding Ethiopia’s religious history is crucial to understanding the complexity of today’s conflicts and prospects for peace. Analyses of Ethiopia often marginalise or ignore religion, when in fact 98% of Ethiopians say that religion is “very important” in their lives. The latest census indicates that 43.5% of Ethiopians identify themselves as Orthodox Christians, 33.9% as Muslims and 18.6% as Protestants. This being the case, ignoring the religious fact in Ethiopia makes it impossible to understand one of the most powerful sources of motivation and manipulation in Ethiopian society. Achieving peace will therefore require great moral courage and requires denouncing all forms of religious domination, disassociating oneself from the privileges and power of rulers, and rejecting allegiance to Abiy and other rulers who build their power on religious arrogance, conflict and violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Continuing with Africa, Selma Mihoubi warns in magazine Conflits<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that the gradual withdrawal of French forces from Mali has the effect of greatly diminishing Western influence in Africa. This decline leaves more space for the Russians and Chinese who have been trying to establish themselves on the continent for a decade. This influence, at least in the case of China, is not only economic and military, but also media-related. It is a phenomenon that is not very apparent, but which nevertheless explains the growth of anti-French sentiment throughout the region. Thus, over the past decade or so, China has increased its media presence in West Africa through China Radio International, China Global Television Network and Xinhua, the official news agency, which broadcasts in French. From the outset, China has sought to institutionalise its media presence by signing agreements with various states in the region, such as Senegal and Niger. These pacts involve the organisation of Sino-African media forums to promote China’s vision of journalism in West Africa. Beijing also organises training days for journalists in the region, with the aim of raising awareness of China and Chinese media. Apart from the institutional aspect, China has also built infrastructure for its media, such as FM repeaters in various cities in the region that allow China Radio International to broadcast its signal. In 2015, a building was inaugurated in Dakar to house the headquarters of Chinese media in West Africa, showing Beijing’s interest in the region. These media allow China to communicate with West African populations, to convey its view of international news and to try to compete with other international media. However, the media are not the only means of this strategy: China has a different conception of soft power than Europe, as it includes economic power. Thus, for Beijing, building infrastructure to assist the development of its West African partners is also understood as soft power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Chinese expansion that also extends to the South China Sea as noted by Katie Stallard in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a>. Military naval and air surveillance missions are a constant occurrence and clashes between the surveillance missions of other countries – usually US allies – are becoming recurrent. On 26 May, an Australian aircraft on a routine surveillance flight over the area was intercepted by a Chinese fighter jet. The dispute arose when the Chinese jet approached and before leaving the airspace released a special smoke blast in front of the Australian aircraft. The materials dropped by the Chinese fighter contain metals and aluminium, which are used by these aircraft as defensive measures to avoid radar and to flee. According to the Australian government, this was considered an act of aggression, which endangered the Australian crew, who had to return to base because these materials penetrate the engines and can damage them. For their part, Chinese authorities accuse Australia of violating Chinese sovereignty by flying over the Paracel Islands, whose sovereignty Beijing disputes with Vietnam. The South China Sea is of great importance in terms of trade and energy reserves. The conflict arises from multiple claims, especially China’s, which claims sovereignty over 90 percent of the area. In recent years, Beijing has been militarising the region, both on natural and newly created artificial islands. Meanwhile, countries allied with the United States use naval and air freedom of navigation to carry out monitoring missions to secure international rights of passage in the region and to respond to Beijing’s claims. In recent years, the Chinese military has been pursuing technological modernisation and the tone it is adopting in these confrontations is far from conciliatory, which is worsening the relationship with the US and its allies. The background warns that, should a major accident occur, the conflict could escalate very quickly. Especially in a context where the control of Taiwan by China or the United States would play a fundamental geopolitical role in a hypothetical war between the two powers. Indeed, beyond China’s claims of unification, Taiwan has an extremely important military value, as it is the gateway to the Indo-Pacific, where Japan, the Philippines and South Korea are the main US allies. China’s control of the island would allow it to control US military operations in the Sea of the Philippines and could block a vital supply route between Washington and its East Pacific allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We cannot conclude this section on global issues without referring to the US Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling that recognised the constitutional right to abortion and legalised it nationwide. With this decision, the Supreme Court justices open the door for each state to decide whether to allow or prohibit women to have abortions, ignoring the fact that constitutional rights – inherent in the Constitution, even if they are not explicit – are meaningless unless they are enforced nationwide. It is now expected that half of the fifty states that make up the United States will consider taking some form of restriction immediately. Thus, Missouri, Kentucky, Louisiana and South Dakota have already banned abortion immediately, while Idaho, Tennessee and Texas have also passed abortion bans, although, in this case, the ban will not take effect for thirty days. But as warned by Nina Brooks in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a>, the effect of this decision will not only be felt in the United States, but will also have a strong impact on third countries, especially where funding for abortion is provided through American aid.. Or as Diana Cariboni points out in Open Democracy<\/em><\/a>,US anti-abortion charity Heartbeat International is using the war in Ukraine to raise funds for crisis pregnancy centres for Ukrainian refugees by using its centres in Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and Romania to access vulnerable people and persuade them to continue with unwanted pregnancies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On a European level, but still in relation to the war on its eastern borders, the European Council has granted candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova. Ruth Ferrero stresses in El Peri\u00f3dico<\/em><\/a> <\/em>the speed with which these statuses have been granted as opposed to the long wait for the countries of the Western Balkans, all of which are an intrinsic part of the enlargement policy of the 1999 Thessaloniki Summit. The different yardsticks by which decisions have been taken in the field of enlargement policy, and especially what the real objectives of this policy, which has been stagnating for far too long, are, seem clear. The original idea of this strand of European foreign policy was based on the assumption that the creation of expectations of accession by the countries that would be part of this framework would accelerate the processes of Europeanisation and thus democratisation. The 1993 Copenhagen criteria set out the preconditions to be met by states wishing to join the EU. These were essentially three: to be a democracy and respect the rule of law, to be a market economy, and to incorporate the acquis communautaire<\/em> into their respective legislation in order to converge with the other partners. Even so, if one thing has been demonstrated in the years since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, it is that this policy has not achieved the objectives it set out to achieve. Just look at the state of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary, or the chaos of corruption in Bulgaria. In the case of the current candidates, there has not been much progress in the democratisation of these countries either, where what are known as “stabilocracies”, political regimes with autocratic biases that give stability to the region, have been installed with the consent of Brussels. The emergency acceptance of Ukraine’s candidacy is an important political gesture in that Kyiv could have much to gain in terms of momentum, morale and money, and the EU has much to lose if Ukrainian expectations are not matched by concrete progress. This credibility is already badly shaken in the Western Balkans, which sees this gesture as a clear comparative aggravation. From this stems the second risk facing the EU, as it must find a way out for these countries, which have been waiting for decades for a truly credible signal from Brussels, otherwise we could be facing turbulence in the region as well. Ultimately, without candidate status for Bosnia, visa liberalisation for Kosovo, and the opening of accession negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, the EU will not have sufficient legitimacy to offer credibility in its gesture towards Ukraine and Moldova.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, Luuk van Middelaar and Hans Kribbe question in The Economist<\/em><\/a> <\/em>this is the right moment for Ukraine to join the EU <\/em>They argue that a new security alliance would instead forge closer ties between the countries of Europe. They argue that EU membership makes no sense without NATO membership, which even President Zelensky accepts is unattainable today. Security is the most important thing, and the EU cannot offer it to Russia. EU member states are obliged to help each other in case of armed aggression “with all the means at their disposal”, but this form of solidarity, designed with terrorism or cyber warfare in mind, is not capable of deterring a nuclear power. This is why Poland and other former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO before joining the EU. For the same reason Finland and Sweden now seek NATO Article 5 protection. If Ukraine were to join the EU without this NATO deterrent, the risk of a future war between Russia and the EU would increase significantly. There are also other elements to consider, such as the fact that the EU should first become a geopolitical force, capable of working with the US to stabilise the region. But the accession of Ukraine, as well as states such as Russia’s ally Serbia, would risk further dividing the EU. In this sense, Macron’s proposal for a pan-European political community is more realistic than some of his critics suggest, provided it is conceived in the right way. In particular, this league of European states – called E40, after the motorway linking Calais to Ukraine – should exist outside EU structures and be truly intergovernmental, a bit like the G20. What Europe does not need is another waiting room for aspiring EU members, or a revisited version of the old two-speed Europe. Instead, the E40 should offer a security guarantee to its members – not with the full force of NATO membership, but with something beyond mere declarations. It could identify threats to common interests and values and formulate joint strategies in response, for example in the areas of energy security (interconnection of power grids), border disputes and cyber-attacks. Picking up on an idea in vogue in European circles since 2018, the E40 could create a kind of European Security Council with rotating and permanent members (France, Germany, Britain, as well as possibly Poland, Italy or Spain).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Catalan minister for Foreign Action and Open Government, Vict\u00f2ria Alsina points out in an op-ed published in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that the NATO summit will not be a conventional summit, since the madness and imperialist delusions of an autocrat have led to a war on European soil that has been going on for far too long. He argues that the illegal invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that the Atlantic Alliance is an irreplaceable actor in the continental security landscape, especially given the practical limitations of Europe’s so-called strategic autonomy. Peace-seeking Europeans should be clear that if Russia has not been tempted to attack Estonia or Latvia, with which it shares a border, it is largely because these countries are under NATO’s security umbrella. We are in the midst of what is known in public policy as a critical juncture. The step taken by Sweden and Finland can have a major impact on the position-setting, policy design and institutional direction of other actors and organisations. As the Government’s Minister for External Action, Alsina is convinced that this window of opportunity that is opening up should also be taken advantage of in Catalonia. In our country, by history and conviction, we are anti-militarists. Catalonia is a benchmark in the culture of peace, and we have a wide range of organisations that do a huge amount of work to raise awareness, defend and promote human rights. We are proud of this tradition and we are working, through the Government’s development cooperation policies, to strengthen it. But anti-militarism should not be confused with a na\u00efve conception of international relations and the balances of power determined by geopolitics. If the Swedes and Finns are overwhelmingly in favour of joining NATO in 2022; if Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, who governs with the Greens, argues that NATO membership would be a fundamental pillar of the security policies of an independent Scotland, why does it bother the Catalans so much to talk about the Atlantic Alliance and its primordial role in maintaining peace in Europe? Defending Catalonia’s right to become a state if that is what the Catalans want – and they have shown ample evidence of this in recent years – is an act of realism. Defending the Atlantic Alliance as a useful organisation is also an act of realism. Doing so reveals Catalonia as a reliable and responsible partner, committed to the common security of its allies. You don’t have to be a state to act with a state mentality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another sensitive issue in Europe is Northern Ireland following the British government’s decision to introduce a bill breaking with the Brexit Protocol. The Economist<\/em><\/a> considers this to be a very negative idea because the changes that are needed require pragmatism and not intransigence. That the Protocol must be adapted is undisputed as it imposes excessive bureaucracy on imports from the continent to Northern Ireland not only increases costs for businesses and consumers, but has also fuelled opposition from the main Unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which refuses to join the provincial executive until it is removed or radically changed. Although the majority of the province’s Assembly members want to maintain the Protocol, Northern Ireland’s political infrastructure requires nationalists and unionists to work together. The British government’s decision to legislate to dismantle parts of a treaty that Boris Johnson declared to be virtually perfect is toxic to its government’s reputation, self-defeating and risks causing further damage. The British government invokes “the doctrine of necessity” to justify the deletion of several sections of the Protocol. This doctrine allows states to derogate from their international obligations in situations of “grave and imminent danger” in order to protect their fundamental interests. But this is not the case: Northern Ireland’s political situation is fragile and complex, but the province has survived without a devolved government for almost three of the last five years. The government could have invoked Article 16 to suspend the operation of the Protocol. Instead, it plans a unilateral abrogation of a treaty commitment on fragile legal grounds. Johnson claims he wants to renegotiate the Protocol, but negotiations need the agreement of all parties involved. Rather than give in, the EU will harden its position: it already plans to take legal action against Britain for not complying with parts of the Protocol. The bill will also face domestic opposition from moderate Conservative MPs and the House of Lords, raising doubts as to whether it can actually pass. Finally, the EU is also partly to blame. If it has shown flexibility, for example by liberalising rules on medicines, it could do so again by relaxing customs rules for imports into Northern Ireland that are not destined for the EU. But the chances of a pragmatic solution have plummeted as a result of the UK government’s unilateral decision, and for this, the London government bears full responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the economic field, The Economist<\/em><\/a> stresses that the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have forced a reformulation of the concept of global capitalism. This new system of global supply chains prioritises not efficiency, but security. It prioritises doing business with countries that can be trusted. This could lead to protectionist policies and worsening inflation, or it could lead to improved resilience. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the main priority of globalisation was efficiency. Companies located production where costs were lowest and investors injected capital where returns were highest. Governments struck deals equally with companies that treated their workers well – or not – and with democracies or autocracies. This decision kept prices low and helped lift a billion people out of extreme poverty, while the emerging world, including China, industrialised. This very efficient globalisation also had problems, such as volatile capital flows that destabilised financial markets or an extreme dependence on autocracies, which abuse human rights and use trade as a means of coercion. One example is Russia’s gas and the West’s efforts to bring the West closer to Qatar. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping’s China has seven times the trade impact of Russia and the world depends on a wide range of its products. In the new context created by the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine, companies are now tending towards resilience, i.e. investing in their own country. One example is that the world’s top 3,000 companies have increased their weight in global GDP from 6% to 9%. Moreover, the pattern of multinational investment has reversed: 69% comes from local subsidiaries reinvesting locally rather than from parent companies sending capital abroad. However, governments must remember that resilience comes from diversification, not concentration. They should not indulge in unbridled protectionism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For their part, George Parker and Chris Giles point out in The Financial Times<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that six years after the Brexit referendum, the UK is not getting the results it had hoped for in leaving the EU. Political and economic instability continues unabated, and just recently Johnson has had to face a confidence motion that he narrowly passed. Thus, the main topic of debate in the UK is the economic consequences of the first years of Brexit, a taboo subject for former Leave supporters. First, British exports have fallen by as much as a third and the price of imports has risen. Second, business investment has failed to return to pre-Brexit levels, while in other European countries it has. Third, the pound has lost value and has also failed to return to its previous value. And finally, inflation caused by higher import prices has not been offset by higher wages, which has a negative impact on the British population’s standard of living. In the face of this poor economic performance, Johnson has tried to implement palliative measures, but they do not seem to be having the desired effect. Many pundits and politicians believe that the time has come to renegotiate agreements with Brussels, but the relationship is far from being at its best, due to the tensions created by Johnson himself over the border in Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the area of climate change and sustainability, Jamal Benonar highlights in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that despite efforts to take into account the threat posed by climate change, the countries of the Permanent Security Council are opposed to considering it as a priority issue, given that the five member countries are responsible for almost half of annual emissions. In Africa, the effects of drought, food shortages and desertification, coupled with weak governments with limited powers, and the proliferation of arms in the region, constitute a highly conflict-prone scenario where violent extremist groups can achieve their goals of destabilising states in the region. In this context, the UN should take steps to find a solution. Benonar argues that the only solution lies in preventing the growing desertification in the region. Projects such as the Great Green Wall could be a solution, but at the same time it is necessary to monitor the relationship between global warming and threats to peace in order to establish a certain stability in the most affected regions. A set of proposals that should be on the table at the COP27 meetings to be held in Sharm el-Sheikh at the end of the year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Timothy Laing warns in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that reducing CO2-emitting technology to zero-carbon technology also entails the destruction of the environmental ecosystem. An important feature of zero-emission green technology is that it uses much more varied materials than the technology it replaces. Wind turbines, for example, require iron and zinc for corrosion-proof steel and suitable motors. Electric vehicles require lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese for their batteries, plus neodymium and other rare minerals for their motors. Some of these materials come from recycling, but lithium, for example, does not, as it is not consumed enough today to be recycled. Building green technology will result in increased mining that will inevitably damage the ecosystem. The refining of aluminium, which is essential for making solar panels, currently accounts for 2% of all greenhouse emissions. Yet by 2050 these emissions are expected to be equivalent to twice the annual emissions from aircraft. For this reason, it is necessary to switch the energy source used to refine the material from fossil fuel to hydroelectricity. On the other hand, obtaining lithium in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile involves drilling large holes in the salt flats to bring salt water to the surface. Finally, cobalt, the basic material for batteries in electric vehicles, is mainly extracted from mines in the Congo, where children work in unsafe working conditions and exploitative labour contracts. For this reason, the solution to caring for the environment is not just to decarbonise technology, but to reduce our demand for energy by increasing efficiency. Without this, it will be almost impossible to make a green transition without damaging the environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, Oscar Williams discusses in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> <\/em>European initiatives to regulate and ensure the development of ethical Artificial Intelligence (AI). Indeed, there is concern in Europe that the AI market is so controlled by the United States and that is why an AI Law is being developed to protect consumers and society from possible malicious AI, to encourage innovation and to create common standards for the adoption of this technology that is increasingly present in our daily lives and that is emerging as a hopeful and necessary future for multiple functions. However, legislation seems to exclude a priori AI for general purposes – where big tech companies have invested a lot of money – and there is debate about whether it should be regulated. What the legislation wants to avoid is that models are not biased at the point of operation and that the first provider can be held accountable so that there can be inter-company accountability, responsibilities and a standardised process that clarifies the roles of each contributor in the development of AI. Finally, France has proposed more regulations and that in cases of high-risk AI, they should be able to be reconfigured or withdrawn from the market if they prove ineffective. Thus, the EU is preparing itself with this legislation for an issue of great importance that is gaining more and more ground, and also for a battle with the lobbies of the big tech corporations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, from the newspaper P\u00fablico<\/em><\/a> <\/em>David Bollero writes that the CyberPeace Institute<\/a> has just released the results of new research on the digital warfare that is taking place in parallel to the invasion of Ukraine. It is a combination of cyberthreats that weaponise data, whether to destroy, disrupt or misinform. The CyberPeace Institute warns that while such cyber-attacks against military and civilian targets are not new, the number of attacks on critical infrastructure is cause for alarm. Since the beginning of the conflict, there have already been some 226 cyber-attacks and operations in this area, an average of 9.8 attacks per week. Even before the war broke out on 24 February, cyber-attacks in Ukraine that could be closely related to the invasion have been recorded. These included denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on two major banks on 15 and 16 February, followed by attacks on 23 February on the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and interior. As detailed in the report, beyond cyber-attacks that consist of spreading disinformation and propaganda, attacks targeting communication services and power plants violate international humanitarian law. In addition, the energy, mining and financial sectors are also being targeted, both in Ukraine and Russia, as the number of sanctions imposed increases, such as the attack with the so-called wiper malware AcidRain on Viasat’s KA satellite network in Ukraine on the same day as the Russian invasion, which affected a major German energy company and resulted in the loss of remote monitoring access to more than 5,800 wind turbines. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Arnau In\u00e9s and Xavier Company, trainees at the CETC, have participated in this issue 64 of Diari de les idees<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" As we approach the summer break, the war in Ukraine and its correlates remain in the spotlight. After long weeks of stalemate, it seems that – slowly and at great cost – Russian troops are managing to change the momentum of the conflict. At the same time, President Zelensky has scored a moral and diplomatic victory by obtaining the endorsement of the European Commission and the Council of Europe for EU membership, which has been interpreted negatively by the countries of the Western Balkans that have been on the waiting list for years. These developments practically coincide in time with\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":77128,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-58284","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n