{"id":58615,"date":"2022-07-14T05:36:49","date_gmt":"2022-07-14T05:36:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-65\/"},"modified":"2022-07-15T07:37:49","modified_gmt":"2022-07-15T07:37:49","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-65","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-65\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 65"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The events of the fortnight covered in this new edition of Diari de les idees<\/em> have been marked by the NATO summit in Madrid at which the Atlantic Alliance defined its new strategic concept, the resignation of British Prime Minister and Brexit architect Boris Johnson after months of social, economic and political turbulence in the UK, the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinz\u014d Abe, and the first hunger riot caused by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine that has led to the resignation of the President and Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, Europe is bracing for a gas supply crisis that could freeze entire sectors of the EU economy as fears grow that the major pipeline carrying Russian gas in Europe may be shut down for good. Indeed, the scary scenario in which European countries would have to ration their energy use and shut down industries began to take shape a few days ago after the temporary shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline. The shutdown is part of a planned 10-day ‘technical’ interruption, but analysts and politicians fear that Russia’s Gazprom, which has already shut down or limited gas supplies in 12 EU countries, may choose not to reactivate the pipeline when maintenance work is completed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lengthening of the war in Ukraine, with the prospect of fighting continuing with advances and setbacks for both sides at least until next winter, does not prevent possible solutions to the conflict from being suggested, despite the impasse in which the diplomatic track seems to have reached. In The Washington Post<\/em><\/a> Michael O’Hanlon stresses that Ukraine itself would have to decide its future, not the US or its allies. In this context, he believes that the first scenario would have to be an armistice, although Russia would continue to control the territory occupied so far. However, Russia would still be subject to sanctions, in principle without a tightening of the embargo on Russian natural gas. Post-armistice international peace monitoring missions would also be key. Once the armistice is in place, talks and negotiations for a better solution could begin, albeit with much controversy if the thesis put forward by Henry Kissinger, among others that Ukraine would probably have to cede territory, prevails. This would entail – once a few years have passed – referendums to determine sovereignty over the disputed territories, although the status of Crimea would probably be left out of the equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wolfgang Streeck breaks in El Salto<\/em><\/a> the usual consensus on increasing defence spending and NATO enlargement stating that since the first day of the war Germany and other Western countries have been under insistent political pressure from the United States to increase their military spending in order to meet NATO’s long-standing goal that its member states spend 2% of their GDP on defence. At the NATO summit in Prague in 2002, the 2% spending target was discussed in the context of 9\/11, the incipient “War on Terror”, the impending second invasion of Iraq, the expansion of the Alliance’s mandate to conduct operations outside its traditional area of intervention and the decision to expand into Eastern European countries, starting with the Visegrad Group countries. The goal was finally formally adopted at the 2006 NATO summit in Riga. In 2008 Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy managed, at the last minute, to block a formal invitation to Ukraine and Georgia to join the Alliance, the third and final step in its expansion into Eastern Europe. In 2014, after the Maidan revolution that overthrew the pro-Russian Ukrainian president and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea, the commitment to the 2% goal was renewed. All indications are that the coming years will see a fierce struggle between Europe’s arms industries and the United States, which will compete for a share of the spending that will have to be made, especially by Germany. For its part, France will see the special fund as another opportunity to pursue a self-led industrial policy, applicable to the European defence industry and dedicated to the merger of French and German producers so that the new conglomerates become global players strong enough to compete with their US counterparts. In this context, Germany will also devote part of the spending to the new ECR (Electronic Combat Role) version of the Eurofighter and probably even more to FCAS, the Future Combat Air System, which combines satellites, drones and fighter-bombers. Ultimately, as terrible as it is for the Ukrainian people, the war is embedded in a context of much larger dimensions: that of the battle unfolding between a declining and a rising global hegemonic power, since an important function served by the current war is the consolidation of US control over its European allies, needed to support the ‘shift to Asia’ conceived by the US since the Obama presidency. Europe’s mission is thus to prevent Russia from taking advantage of the US turning its attention to other regions of the world and, if necessary, to join the US in its Asian expedition (for which the UK is already actively preparing).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For his part, Ali Ahmadi analyses in The Diplomat<\/em><\/a> the geo-economic consequences of the war in Asia. He argues that three interrelated trends are emerging, triggered by the Russian invasion and the unprecedented succession of Western sanctions imposed on Moscow, which are redrawing trade maps in Asia. The first two trends are closely related to the fact that the war in Ukraine and associated economic embargoes have created major blockages with respect to the New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB). While Beijing bases its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the mystique of the ancient Silk Road, its main land route to its target markets in Western Europe is via the NELB, which runs through Central Asia and Russia to the European continent. This route is so important that Chinese officials have been concerned for years about excessive dependence on Russia for logistical reasons. The second trend, also related to the NELB blockade, is the increased logistical activity of other Asian countries, especially in Central and South Asia, to reach their markets in the West via Iran. Over the past few weeks, there has been a flurry of activity around expanding commercial access involving Iran and the countries in its immediate vicinity. The third and perhaps least known trend is Russia’s strategy of opening up to the East with a view to mitigating the effects of sanctions and diversifying its trade away from Western economies. While Russia’s route to China or Central Asia is straightforward, its overland access route to India, a key trading partner that has refused to join the Western sanctions coalition, is much more complicated. India, surrounded by its adversaries Pakistan and China, has to be reached by sea, travelling through the Suez Canal; the absence of a more direct route can become a vulnerability, especially in the current political environment. This increases the importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which crosses the Caucasus to connect Russia with the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas in the Strait of Hormuz, from where a shorter sea route to India is available. This not only drastically reduces the transit time of goods between India and Russia, but also avoids sea routes that may be subject to political blockades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Economist<\/em><\/a> notes that the war in Ukraine is also significantly affecting Russia’s relations with its Arctic neighbours, even if the possibility of a confrontation on the ground is highly unlikely at present. Thus, on March 3, just a week after Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, seven of the eight permanent members of the Arctic Council, the region’s main intergovernmental organisation, announced that they would boycott future meetings. The eight states that make up the council are the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia, which currently holds the presidency until Norway takes over next year. In late June, the Russian foreign ministry announced retaliation against Norway for imposing sanctions blocking Russian goods destined for Svalbard, an Arctic archipelago. Although the territory belongs to Norway, a 1920 treaty gives Russia the right to exploit its natural resources and many of the settlements are populated by Russians. This in a context where rising temperatures and melting ice caps mean that polar sea routes are becoming easier to navigate, natural resources more accessible and borders more vulnerable. It should not be forgotten that Severomorsk, a Barents Sea port on the Arctic Circle, is the main base for Russia’s fleet in the territory, including nuclear-capable submarines. Russia has built at least 475 military constructions along its northern border in the last six years. In response, NATO organised the largest military exercises in three decades in Norway in March, and the US is considering renewing and expanding its armed forces in Alaska. At the same time, Western and Russian scientific cooperation has broken down because of the war and business relations have deteriorated. Russia has invested $300 billion to obtain oil and gas in the Arctic, while Western companies such as BP and Shell have withdrawn from the territory. This has opened the door to China, which, despite having no Arctic territory, has signed a 30-year contract with Russia to import gas from the Yamal fields in the Siberian Arctic via a common pipeline.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With respect to global affairs, the most relevant development is that NATO approved at the Madrid summit its new Strategic Concept<\/a>, the document that sets out the Alliance’s broad objectives and priorities and outlines the threats it may have to confront. The Concept has been updated nine times since NATO was founded in 1949. The new document seeks to adapt the Atlantic organisation to profound geopolitical change. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February put a definitive end to 25 years of peaceful coexistence between NATO and Russia, a situation that had already been badly damaged after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Alliance now singles out Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime as ‘the most significant and direct threat’. Moreover, the new Concept for the first time reflects the Alliance’s view of China, which is defined as a systemic challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In parallel, Paul McLeary stresses in Politico<\/em><\/a> five relevant aspects of the summit. First, the main focus on Russia as NATO does not ignore the threat posed by an unpredictable Russia. The alliance’s new strategic concept warns that the possibility of an attack on allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity by the Kremlin cannot be ruled out. Second, for the first time China has been put on the agenda, albeit in a rather blurred way, as China is now considered a problem but not yet a threat. Even so, NATO invited the leaders of Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia to the summit for the first time to begin consultations, a clear sign that it is looking beyond Russia in cataloguing military and economic threats. Third, the role of Turkey, which first declared itself absolutely against the accession of Finland and Sweden, until it changed its mind. Sweden and Finland have agreed to avoid relations with the PKK, the pro-independence Kurdish group fighting Turkish forces, and pledged to drop military sanctions imposed on Turkey for its invasion of Syria. The White House also publicly supported Turkey’s sale of F-16 modernisation kits, an agreement that was months overdue. Fourth, NATO’s Reaction Force, a 40,000-strong unit that can be deployed in 30 days, is destined to end up in the dustbin of history, though it is not yet clear when. It will be replaced by a stable contingent of 300,000 troops deployed across the continent as part of the biggest overhaul of collective defence and deterrence since the Cold War. Finally, Alliance leaders are concerned about arms control agreements that the United States abandoned under the Trump administration. Russia had been in breach of the Cold War-era Medium-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty for years, secretly testing banned cruise missiles. The Trump administration abandoned the pact in 2019, drawing criticism from Europe. In 2020, the US administration abandoned the Open Skies Treaty, a 34-nation agreement that allowed the US, Russia and others to fly their aircraft over each other’s territory to confirm military activities and maintain some transparency. Russia had long denied airspace over its Kaliningrad enclave and near its border with Georgia, prompting the US to withdraw. Russia formally left the agreement in 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Xulio R\u00edos points out in CTXT<\/em><\/a> China’s reaction to this strategic reorientation of the Atlantic Alliance and argues that China confirms its irreversible status as a global player not only in the field of economics or trade but also in the field of security, and makes some relevant observations. The first is that China is defined as a rival, not as a threat, a qualifier reserved only for Russia, although it would be appropriate to transcend the value of what is merely semantic; thus, in relation to China, the denomination established by the European Commission in 2019 would prevail. The second is that some countries, such as the United States, do openly consider it a threat, the greatest of all, although the level of strategic cohesion among all member states does not offer a similar characterisation. Third, it identifies the main problem areas (expansion and opacity, maritime and territorial conflicts, 5G, etc.) that would justify the alert that the Chinese emergency poses for NATO’s security interests. Naturally, China is concerned about this new scenario, both for its political implications (the actual scope of which will have to be clarified) and for security reasons, as the foreseeable deterioration of relations could affect the stability and viability of the road map drawn up for 2049, when the People’s Republic is expected to have completed its long process of modernisation. From the outset, China amends the logic that has inspired this summit, whereby the greater the uncertainty, the greater the need for NATO. Beijing is quick to point out that the alliance’s previous eastward expansions have failed to make Europe more secure. On the contrary. This would go to show that security has to be comprehensive and inclusive, not one at the expense of the other. From China’s perspective, the accumulation of contradictions could not be more eloquent: NATO is alarmingly rearming but it is China that is accused of worryingly increasing military spending; or the territorial integrity of member states is defended tooth and nail but at the same time Taiwan’s secessionism is openly encouraged, a “red line” for Beijing, which is aware that military and strategic pressure will increase and that it needs to improve and sharpen its response capacity. Given the rise of security in the West’s prioritisation of values and interests, it is also foreseeable that the same will happen in China, although without fundamentally altering the course followed so far. This means that China will avoid repeating the old Soviet mistake and falling into the trap of joining a suicidal arms race, that it will continue to establish and strengthen pragmatic partnership relations but not alliances in the strict sense, and that the logic of development will continue to prevail over any other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuing with China, Nosmot Gbadamosi warns in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> that while Europe and the United States focus their attention on Ukraine, China is positioning itself as a mediator in the conflicts in East Africa. China has organised a Conference on Peace, Governance and Development for the Horn of Africa in Addis Ababa, abandoning its traditional policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of third countries in order to gain influence where the United States is losing it. The region is of great significance for Chinese foreign policy: in Ethiopia China has completed major investments and maintains nearly 400 construction and manufacturing projects; in Sudan and South Sudan it controls the oil monopoly; and in Djibouti it has its only military base on the African continent. Thus, the Chinese envoy to the Horn of Africa insisted that they will make every effort to reach peace compromises for the ongoing conflicts in the region. The problem is not only about security, but also about a severe drought-induced food crisis that has left a third of Sudanese facing starvation, and four million South Sudanese living as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in their own country. Meanwhile, the US sees its envoys in the region rapidly succeeding each other without results and American influence fading as a result of sanctions imposed on Ethiopia for human rights violations in recent internal conflicts. For its part, China wants to maintain a position of dialogue with all parties involved to ensure that conflicts are resolved without Washington’s help, thus increasing its influence in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also referring to Africa, Philippe Leymarie points out in Le Monde Diplomatique<\/em><\/a> <\/em> that Israel was one of the stars of Eurosatory, an event dedicated to equipping soldiers from the ground forces (individual weapons, artillery, armoured vehicles, robots) to the aerial dimension (helicopters, missiles, drones), as well as the panoply of police and security forces. Its arms industry is strongly supported by the state, which sees the vitality of this sector as a condition for its survival. Elbit Company recorded an order book of $13.7 billion last year and achieved a turnover of more than $5 billion, a third of which was in the United States. Sales of arms produced in Israel reached a record $11.3bn in 2021 and sales have risen 55% in two years, driven by increased tension between Europeans and Russians; by the needs created by conflicts in the Middle East and Asia; and more recently by the prospects opened up by the Abraham Accords, and the open war on Ukraine. If Europe has traditionally been the main client of Israeli companies, in recent years security has again become an important focus of relations between Israel and the African continent. With the support of its cooperation agency, the Mashav, as well as private companies, Tel-Aviv offers a wide range of services: sales and deployment of weapons of all calibres, surveillance equipment, as well as military and police training modules, security advice and assistance, crisis management, etc. In recent years, it is indeed through the fight against terrorism that relations have gained strength with a number of African countries: Guinea, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Morocco have recently been added to long-standing partners such as Kenya and Uganda, to the point that Israel came close last year to regaining its observer status to the African Union, which the former OAU had withdrawn, although in the end Algeria and South Africa opposed this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To close this section on international politics, on the occasion of his recent assassination, David Frum notes in The Atlantic<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that Japanese leader Shinz\u014d Abe was the architect of a vital security alliance in the Indo-Pacific region and deserves to be remembered as one of the great internationalist politicians of his time, the principal architect of collective security in the Indo-Pacific region through the creation of alliances and institutions insofar as Abe laid the foundations through the creation in 2007 of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the European level, the resignation of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson after many months of political tension in the United Kingdom stands out. In The Atlantic<\/em><\/a>, Tom McTague highlights that Johnson’s final hours have been a sordid and quite extraordinary end to a sordid and quite extraordinary career, profoundly futile in one respect and incontestably historic in another. He is perhaps the worst prime minister in modern British history, but also the most consequential, leaving a most personal legacy – Brexit – that will outlast that of his recent predecessors. In the few years since the 2016 Brexit referendum, Johnson came, saw, conquered and then collapsed amid a constellation of scandals as many had already suspected would happen. Johnson’s departure will leave little trace of his brief hegemony over British politics. There will be too few Johnsonites in the Conservative Party to honour his legacy and call for a return to Johnsonist principles, as happened with Margaret Thatcher. Johnsonism, if it ever existed, will disappear almost as quickly as the prime minister himself. One reason for that is that, Brexit aside, Johnson is no radical. Unlike Thatcher, he has not wanted to reduce the size of the state, nor did he want to expand it. He wanted no revolution in either social attitudes or British foreign policy. His main policy agenda has been to “unite and level” the country, but that is not controversial. The best that can be said is that, much to his regret, his success has been to bring the issue of regional differences to the centre of British politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same vein, Simon Jenkins advocates in The Guardian<\/em><\/a> for the creation of a new British federation. In 2007, Scottish nationalists gained power in Edinburgh and have never lost it since. Although the popularity of independence among Scots has been fluctuating, voters under 50 are overwhelmingly in favour. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland, the chaos of Brexit has fuelled the expectation of a referendum on union with the south in the medium term. Even in Wales, the nationalist Plaid Cymru party has gained new vigour, and an independent Wales already has the support of between a quarter and a third of voters. Britain’s response to this outbreak of dissent has been inertia. Throughout Europe, nation-building has long been a complicated art. As political historian Linda Colley has shown, it has required respect for identity and ingenuity in finding formulas for autonomy. In the UK, by contrast, the now former prime minister described devolution in Scotland as a “disaster”. After Brexit, Johnson insisted that all EU powers and subsidies be returned not to the devolved governments but to London. Meanwhile, only one in five voters in England say they care if Scotland becomes independent. In this context, the formation of a federated United Kingdom of England, Scotland and Wales would benefit greatly from its diversity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another relevant issue is that the Visegrad Group (V4), which in the past had been united around broad political goals, has been divided by the invasion of Ukraine and Slovakia now wants to re-emphasise the group’s shared goals during its presidency. Peter Dlhopolec notes in Balkan Insight<\/em><\/a> that the four countries of the bloc – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – never developed a common foreign policy in the 31 years of its existence, which emerged in 1991 to help facilitate the region’s accession to NATO and the EU. Instead, especially at the EU level, it has tried to coordinate its positions on different EU-related issues. However, the Slovak foreign minister believes that Hungary, which held the presidency of the group until now, often wanted to give the impression of a common foreign policy. But now Hungary is becoming increasingly isolated in the EU due to its autocratic government and anti-EU policy driven by the Fidesz party, as well as Orb\u00e1n’s close relationship with President Vladimir Putin. The war has also turned Hungary into a V4 pariah. Before the invasion, it could count on Poland’s support in its various disputes with Brussels. Indeed, the European Commission remains concerned about the rule of law and democracy in both countries. In 2020, Poland and Hungary even tried to block the EU budget because it linked the transfer of funds to accession to the rule of law. Slovakia and its pro-European government, led by Eduard Heger, has pledged to adopt during its presidency a pragmatic approach and return the V4 to the roots of their cooperation based on respect for democracy and commitment to European integration. This also includes support for Ukraine and Moldova, which have already been granted candidate status in the EU, Georgia and the Western Balkans that are on their way to the EU, for example through the group’s only institutionalised body, the Visegrad International Fund.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nicoletta Pirozzi argues in Social Europe<\/em><\/a> that in order to mitigate the dysfunction of its foreign policy in the context of global geopolitical realignment, the EU must put an end to the principle of unanimity. Indeed, the war in Ukraine once again shows the limits of the functioning of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy. At the same time, the difficulties in adopting the sixth package of sanctions against Russia – and in particular those related to the import of Russian oil – shows the dysfunctions of an EU that retains a strong intergovernmental footprint, dominated by the logic of consensus and therefore by national executives and their priorities. In the past, these dysfunctions have already paralysed the EU in crises and conflicts such as those in Libya, the Sahel and the Middle East. Today it seems clear that if the EU is to survive in an environment characterised by increased geopolitical dynamism, both from its strategic rivals and its partners, it needs to put in place reforms that can provide it with an effective system of governance for foreign and security policy. A first element relates to more flexible operating mechanisms. A certain degree of differentiation has always been part of European integration, from the Eurozone to the Schengen area to defence. Models based on integration and flexible cooperation must also apply to the areas of foreign and security policy, as an antidote to the threat of fragmentation and even disintegration. Mechanisms such as constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation already exist in the treaties, but have hardly been used, with the notable exception of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in defence. A second element concerns the reform of decision-making rules, and in particular unanimity, which too often has led to inaction. In the past, overcoming unanimity has made it possible to unblock long periods of institutional deadlock, as in the case of the internal market in the 1980s. Similarly, the introduction of qualified majority voting could be highly beneficial for foreign policy. It would increase the EU’s capacity to act, not only because it would take more than one member state to block a decision, but also because member states in a minority would be stimulated to intensify negotiation efforts, build alliances and help reach an agreement. Finally, she argues that specific measures need to be introduced in the defence sector. In recent years, the EU has given much-needed political impetus to European cooperation in this area, but the time has come to produce tangible results, not least in order not to lose momentum. A systemic vision is therefore needed to provide a coherent overall framework between all initiatives, so that they reinforce, do not overlap or duplicate each other, and respect an appropriate balance between the intergovernmental and the EU dimension. This vision needs to be supported by a review of the overall institutional architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic sphere, Heather Grabbe states in Euractiv<\/em><\/a> that the recent G7 summit showed the dangers of short-term thinking. While leaders of the world’s richest countries touted quick fixes, disjointed commitments and contradictory messages, several parts of the world reached their highest temperatures, and others severe flooding. The climate emergency is exacerbated by a backdrop of inflation and food crisis and short-term decisions will not solve the problems. Grabbe argues that a shift to holistic thinking is needed, taking the example of the European Green Deal. Instead of creating new dependencies on fossil fuels and infrastructure, Europe needs to focus on renewables: circularity is resilience. An example of this could be to create incentives to persuade citizens to give up cars and individualised transport. In response, the automotive sector could offer citizens the mobility they need through shared services. Grabbe believes that Europe needs to move away from a system that links employment and growth to industrial production and overvalues consumerism. Instead, it should work towards an economic system that meets human needs through access to more durable, healthier and more efficient goods and services. An approach that puts needs at the centre is essential, rather than one that values GDP growth. A circular economy fuelled by renewables is far less dependent on imports of energy, raw materials and goods, which would reduce its vulnerability to autocrats like Putin when they suddenly decide to destabilise supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For his part, Renaud Lambert analyses in Le Monde Diplomatique<\/em><\/a> the IMF’s conflicting relations with countries around the world, as the rules seem to fluctuate: draconian austerity for some, unlimited generosity for others. The reforms it demands in exchange for its assistance – privatisation, deregulation, austerity, etc. – largely determine the living conditions of the populations concerned: will they be able to receive medical treatment, go to school, and feed themselves? In this context, the first type of assistance provided by the IMF to its members is of a technical nature. It often illustrates the delayed effects of colonisation: once independence is achieved, countries are sovereign, but without a state worthy of the name. Some officials explain that as part of their assistance missions to Africa, they have had to give English lessons to senior officials and that they sometimes find that certain countries do their national accounts with Excel. Others do not even have computers. But the main assistance the IMF offers its members takes the hard and fast form of a loan. Any member that faces a balance of payments problem can apply for financial assistance. This kind of difficulty means that the country no longer has the hard currency to repay its debt or import the food its population needs, as Sri Lanka does today. This is followed by a preliminary dialogue during which the Fund sets out the conditions under which it could envisage intervening, since the IMF only lends on the basis of an adjustment programme to resolve the problems that have led to the crisis. And, to ensure that the reform resolve of the country in difficulty does not diminish over time, IMF disbursements are made in instalments. In the event of non-compliance with commitments, payments cease. As Dominique Strauss-Kahn summed up when he was director, the institution is not meant for charity….<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In terms of sustainability and climate change, the European Parliament’s decision to endorse the European Commission’s proposal that gas and nuclear energy be considered green energies is a cause for concern, so that both energy sources will be put on a par with renewable energies in sustainable finance programmes, although experts and environmental groups consider that the measure will delay the European energy transition. Am\u00e9rica Hern\u00e1ndez points out in Politico<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that with this vote, Europe is modifying the regulation and allowing gas and nuclear power to compete with solar and wind energy, among other renewables, to receive subsidies for technologies that do not emit greenhouse gases. All nuclear power plants will also be considered green if they have a construction permit before 2045 and as long as they provide guarantees that they can treat radioactive waste. With regard to gas, it has been approved that plants must emit less than 270 kg of CO2 per KW\/h and have a construction permit before 2030. In the same vein, Svitlana Krakovska warns in The Guardian<\/em><\/a> that this change in the European green taxonomy is a real gift to Vladimir Putin as Russia’s war against Ukraine is a war paid for by climate-warming fossil fuels and now the European Parliament has just voted on a regulation that will increase Russia’s fossil gas funding by billions. Meanwhile, Russian energy minister Nikolai Shulginov, speaking on the website of Energy Intelligence<\/em><\/a> before the invasion of Ukraine, already said that the inclusion of natural gas in the green taxonomy was proof that the EU had realised that it had made a mistake in its energy transition concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Le Grand Continent, <\/em>Fatih Birol<\/a>, Director of the International Energy Agency, highlights several levers urgently need to be pushed to ensure that people are at the centre of the green transition on the African continent, as it is the region of the world most exposed to the effects of climate change, while its people have contributed the least. Despite the challenges this represents, the International Energy Agency’s Africa Energy Outlook 2022<\/em><\/a> notes the energy transition as holding great promise for the continent’s economic and social development. The global ambition to achieve zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 sets a new direction for the energy sector. This transition to global clean emissions is reducing the costs of clean technologies and changing global investment patterns. African countries are in a unique position to benefit from the technological improvements of these changes and attract increasing flows of green finance. In Africa, the transition opens up many opportunities. Solar energy access solutions are among the fastest growing in rural areas. Solar-powered irrigation pumps are less expensive than diesel-powered pumps and can improve food productivity and drought resilience. The assembly of these energy access solutions and the manufacture of key components are growing opportunities for African industry. However, these sectors will be largely overtaken by the growing opportunities for Africa to become a major player in the extraction and processing of critical minerals, essential for building batteries, hydrogen technologies and renewable energy from the future. Promising new developments have also been identified in green hydrogen, another area with great potential on the continent. However, Africa’s energy transformation can only succeed if it enjoys the support of the population and brings benefits to them. That is why the people have to be at the heart of the energy transition. Ultimately, COP27 in Egypt later this year will be an important platform for African leaders to work globally to identify ways to drive these transformations. The current decade is crucial, not only for global climate action, but also for accelerating the investments that will allow Africa, the continent that is home to the world’s youngest population, to thrive in the coming decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Climate change is also having an impact on geopolitical relations, as noted by Cristina Garc\u00eda Fern\u00e1ndez in The Conversation<\/em><\/a>. Indeed, climate change is influencing critical military capabilities and infrastructure, supply chains and the security environment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), not least because of the potential for new conflicts in many countries. The Alliance is aware that global warming will increasingly influence its activities. Therefore, on the occasion of the summit in Madrid, the organisation has presented a report<\/a> in which it identifies the main challenges in the face of climate change. The report makes clear the impacts that climate change will have on the institution: structural damage to critical infrastructure at military bases and training areas; increased demands on utilities, particularly energy and water to cope with harsher conditions; increased supply chain fragilities; increased health and security risks; and increased budgets for the maintenance and protection of bases, equipment, infrastructure and other assets. At the same time, there are indications that there will be more conflicts, requiring a sharper focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, to the possible detriment of those specifically dedicated to security and defence. In addition, NATO’s first climate goals have been announced. The most ambitious is the achievement of zero greenhouse emissions by 2050. This is in line with the European targets proposed at the last climate summits (COP25 and COP26). NATO needs to ensure that global warming does not continue at its current pace because it is putting the organisation’s operability at risk. If there is one thing NATO is particularly concerned about, it is that climate change is opening up new areas of strategic competition. The increased accessibility of trade channels through the Arctic because of the melting ice is opening up new routes and with them new possibilities for more profitable trade. The competition for natural resources (oil, gas and minerals) that the Arctic countries have long been contesting clearly affects the Alliance’s overall strategic environment. Countries such as Denmark (Greenland), the United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia and Norway find themselves in a real territorial conflict<\/a>. The five Arctic countries have already taken action, including military action, to claim territorial sovereignty and thereby gain access to these resources. China has also entered the game, not by disputing territory, but by doing business with Russia and Greenland, in this case because it has minerals that are widely used in the technology industry. Finally, it is clear that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has highlighted the need to seek alternative and reliable energy sources and to make a rapid energy transition that frees allied countries from dependence on Russia and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, in the field of new technologies, Gustau Camps-Valls points out in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that in the last decade, automatic methods based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) have improved enormously. Increased computational capacity, coupled with algorithmic improvements, has led to a technological revolution. AI is becoming more and more integrated into our lives and will become more and more so. Scientists such as Geoffrey Hinton, a Turing Award winner, have dared to predict that Deep Learning, a mathematical AI technique, will solve everything. But is it? AI is solving many predictive problems, but there is little evidence of the power of understanding and abstraction. Is Artificial Intelligence intelligent? In recent years we have come to realise that AI is not really very interpretable, nor explainable, nor does it respect the fundamental laws of physics, nor does it know about causality, abstraction, fairness or ethics. Deep learning-based models have been trained to predict with great accuracy, and now have so many parameters and are so complex that their decisions are often impossible to explain to a human. Gradually, that is changing. There are many initiatives, technical as well as regulatory and legislative, to ensure reliable AI that provides predictions that are explainable to the user. This field is called eXplainable AI (XAI). It focuses on analysing the models developed to identify the most relevant variables in a problem, provide confidence intervals on their predictions and offer explanations of what has been learned. In short, accountability. AI is not only solving problems, it is changing the way we do science and educate future generations. Today’s AI, while very useful in many fields, still struggles to understand scenarios, to communicate and explain its decisions to humans, to be consistent and plausible, and to distinguish between correlation and causation. Developing methods that incorporate a priori knowledge, study the plausibility of what they have learned, and solve causal questions will be key to a true revolution, which calls for interdisciplinary science and education.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arnau In\u00e9s, Xavier Company and Pau \u00c1lvarez, trainees at the CETC, took part in this edition of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The events of the fortnight covered in this new edition of Diari de les idees have been marked by the NATO summit in Madrid at which the Atlantic Alliance defined its new strategic concept, the resignation of British Prime Minister and Brexit architect Boris Johnson after months of social, economic and political turbulence in the UK, the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinz\u014d Abe, and the first hunger riot caused by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine that has led to the resignation of the President and Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. 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