{"id":60689,"date":"2022-07-28T11:52:58","date_gmt":"2022-07-28T09:52:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-66\/"},"modified":"2022-12-29T12:36:51","modified_gmt":"2022-12-29T10:36:51","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-66","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-66\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 66"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This last issue of Diari de les idees<\/em> before the summer holidays coincides with the fifth month of war in Ukraine, where the fragile agreement to release the export of grain stands out, although the missile attacks on Odessa and Mykolaiv after the signing raise doubts about its medium-term viability. We also highlight the resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, not only because the call for early elections may lead to the formation of a government led by the far-right Fratelli d’Italia<\/em>, but also because of its impact on European foreign and energy policy. Together with Boris Johnson’s resignation, growing tensions within the coalition government in Germany, catastrophic polls for Biden ahead of the mid-term elections, and a French president without a majority in the National Assembly, everything seems to indicate that the major liberal democracies are entering a period of instability at a particularly delicate moment in the global geopolitical context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the war in Ukraine, Michel Goya writes in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> <\/em> an extensive assessment of these five months of conflict and explores some prospects for the future. For days now, on the various fronts, operations – mostly Russian – have been limited to reconnaissance battles and a few captures or recaptures of small positions. The vast majority of these small actions are taking place around the new Russian target area around Sloviansk. Russian forces also obtained a clear victory a few weeks ago by capturing the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area, and perhaps as important as the conquest itself, inflicted significant casualties on Ukrainian forces. Goya highlights the role of Western long-range artillery and in particular the HIMARS or M-270 multiple rocket launchers that enable the Ukrainians to hit Russian rear bases. Western artillery, combined with improved intelligence capabilities, now gives this advantage to the Ukrainians who can accurately attack half the area the Russians occupy in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Politically, however, there is some weariness in the camp of the Western allies. Hence, The Economist<\/em><\/a> points out that despite President Biden’s willingness to maintain support for Ukraine, growing pressure is arising from different political and economic sectors calling for a reduction. The US has sent Ukraine around 8 billion dollars in military aid alone (more than many European countries’ annual defence budgets) and this has not been enough to stop a war that seems to be going on for a long time. Nor does public opinion favour Biden, who is already more unpopular than Trump in the same stretch of his term, especially as a result of inflation and the crisis situation left by the pandemic. Thus, three major factors may condition US support for the Ukrainian resistance. First, the outcome of the mid-term elections, which are likely to hand control of both houses to the Republicans, leading to a parliamentary deadlock and probably preventing Biden from approving new aid packages. Second, what will be the position of European allies who, after all, are closest to Ukraine, receive the most refugees and have the Russian threat closest to their borders. Finally, what Ukraine’s military progress will be? If the Ukrainian army manages to regain ground and not just resist, this could favour the approval of new aid packages. Overall, nothing seems to bode well for a short war and many already consider a Ukrainian victory highly unlikely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For his part, Christoph Bluth stresses in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that for most former Soviet territories, the conflict in Ukraine has had the opposite effect to what Russia had hoped for it has accelerated their desire to reduce their dependence on Moscow. Many are taking steps to ensure they do not themselves become potential victims of Russian aggression. Thus, no Central Asian country supported Russia in the voting on UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the invasion. Notably, Kazakh President Tokayev, who in January called for Russian troops to help restore order to the country’s capital, refused to provide troops for the war in Ukraine. Together with Azerbaijan, it is also redirecting its energy exports away from Russian territory. Moldova and Georgia feel particularly threatened by Russia, as Russian forces have already occupied parts of their territories in the past. In Moldova, secessionist forces, with the support of the Russian 14th Army, started a conflict in 1990 that led to the creation of Transnistria. In 2008, there was a Russian military invasion of Georgia’s separatist regions, ostensibly to support the independence of the self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s goal, however, was clearly regime change in Georgia, as well as the independence of these two territories, but in the end, it merely recognised the two separatist regions. However, Russia’s loss of influence was already noticeable before the invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, only four countries of the former Soviet Union joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Only five states joined the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO): Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Finally, while some states of the former USSR are seeking closer relations with the West, and in particular with the European Union, others are looking for partners in other regions. Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are looking towards Turkey and Iran, while China, with its Belt and Road Initiative, is a promising source of capital investment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, Michael Goodier and Nicu Calcea in an interesting article in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> publish a series of ethno-linguistic maps of former Soviet republics that could serve as a pretext for Putin’s military actions. Indeed, the Kremlin has repeatedly used the defence of ethnic Russians as a pretext to attack Ukraine and to threaten other former Soviet countries. Most recently it has threatened Moldova, with a Russian commander claiming that gaining control of southern Ukraine would help Russia link up with the breakaway Transnistria region. Ukraine and Moldova, however, are not the only countries with large contingents of ethnic or linguistic Russians: Belarus and Kazakhstan have large Russian-speaking populations, and Latvia and Estonia, which are members of the EU and NATO, have more than 30 percent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the aftermath of the Madrid summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reviews in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> the doctrine that has guided his action since the beginning of his mandate as well as the new concept of strategic solidarity. As the Atlantic Alliance prepares to host Sweden and Finland, he assumes that it is also an arena for negotiations and a space for dissent, but calls, in the context of the war in Ukraine, for strategic solidarity among its members. Although wars are unpredictable and no one can know exactly how long the conflict will last, Stoltenberg says that the Allies are prepared to provide support in Ukraine for as long as it takes. He also stresses that the Alliance shares with the European Union the same neighbourhood, the same challenges and increasingly the same membership: with the accession of Finland and Sweden, 96 per cent of the Union’s population will live in a NATO member country. With respect to the new geopolitical order, he sees authoritarian powers such as China and Russia as challenging Western values more aggressively and both countries are working more closely than ever in the military sphere and have intensified their collaboration in the diplomatic area. While NATO unity remains a key issue in this global geopolitical context, Stoltenberg also warns that ideological divide between democracy and autocracy is also affecting the organisation, for example in the case of Turkey, Hungary and Poland. He also warns of disputes between members that threaten the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, such as the new tensions between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, Stoltenberg stresses that the war in Ukraine demonstrates the danger of excessive dependence on raw materials from authoritarian regimes. This underlines the importance of developing alternative sources for Europe’s energy supply. At the same time, it is crucial not to trade one dependency for another. Many new technologies and the rare minerals needed to produce them come from China. Therefore, energy sources and suppliers must be diversified. In NATO’s new Strategic Concept, the Allies have therefore agreed to strengthen energy security and to invest in stable and reliable energy supplies, suppliers and sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Five months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the international order that had been more or less successfully maintained since the end of World War II has collapsed. The great expectation caused by the NATO summit in Madrid has merely staged on the part of the US, as claimed Ruth Ferrero in Pol\u00edtica&Prosa<\/em><\/a>, the attempt to regain a global hegemony that Washington sees slipping away. The presence of Japan, South Korea and Australia intended to show the world the rebirth of a renewed Western front that is more powerful and unified than ever, a front that is also adding allies in the Asia-Pacific region. However, at the same time, it is a West that is more alone in the face of a South that is not too willing to follow it, with respect to not only Russia, but also to what truly defines the current times: the rise of China. In this regard, it is curious, to say the least, that the 24 June meeting of the BRICs, which make up 40 per cent of the world’s population and account for a quarter of global GDP, was barely reported in the Western media. Perhaps the reason is that the discourse of countries such as India, China, South Africa and Brazil breaks with the narrative of Russia’s isolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Andr\u00e9s Ortega argues in Fundaci\u00f3n Elcano<\/a> that although the West remains an enormous military power compared to the others, including China, and seeks to preserve this superiority, it is also true that it is losing the narrative to a South where there is a growing demand for a revision of the colonial and imperial past. A South deeply dissatisfied with some processes that have taken place in recent times. An example of this is what Joseph E. Stiglitz calls \u201cglobal vaccine apartheid\u201d in the face of COVID-19, where the rich got the doses they needed, while the people of poor countries were left to fend for themselves. Another source of discontent has been some of the sanctions taken by the West against Russia, because some countries in the South fear that they could also be applied to them. Especially the freezing of the Russian Central Bank’s deposits in the West and the exclusion from the SWIFT system of international payment control (which has already been applied to Iran for years). On the other hand, if for the West support for Ukraine is part of the war for democracy, Western democracies, starting with the largest of them, the US, are experiencing serious institutional problems stemming from their growing internal polarisation, which may have global consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A crisis of liberal democracies analysed by Benjamin Morel in Atlantico<\/em><\/a> where he considers that the malaise that seems to affect liberal democracies in general is due to a multiplicity of factors that are not always the same depending on the country. Some are conjectural, others more structural. The examples cited above seem to reflect this diversity. Johnson put in place an effective political programme in Britain, but has been a victim of both his personality and disastrous communication choices. Joe Biden is also a rather weak leader, whose reliability is being challenged because of his age and who pays the price for van erratic policy. The cases of Scholz and Draghi are explained by the fragility of coalitions tested by diplomatic issues in Italy and energy issues in Germany. The economic crisis, especially inflation, can also be an aggravating factor, but not necessarily a factor of political instability, since in times of crisis the electorate is rather legitimising, unless the leader is already discredited. For one must also refer to deeper structural factors. Morel argues that, compared to China or even Russia, liberal democracies have a certain difficulty in thinking about the world and establishing priorities and grand narratives. Certainly, shortcomings in elite formation play a role, but it is above all the way in which the media and social networks structure political activity that is at issue, as they operate by monothematic media streams; not on the most important issues, but on those most likely to be retweeted. Conceiving a vision of the world and the future and being elected on that basis is a political danger right now. That has an impact on both voter attachment to personalities and worldviews; on the selection of political staff who now have to be better communicators than visionaries; on programmes that no longer have to be coherent, but must contain a few attention-grabbing measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The editorial of Le Monde<\/em><\/a> reviews the US president’s recent tour of the Middle East, whose main objective was to reaffirm his commitment to a region where he continues to lose influence and states that the balance of this visit is a series of disappointments. The Israelis miss his predecessor, Donald Trump, who had aligned US diplomacy as never before with the positions of the Jewish state, while the Palestinians have deplored the absence of forceful gestures that could have translated Washington’s willingness to become again the mediator of an almost dead Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Regarding his meeting with Mohammed Ben Salman, when he was running as a Democratic candidate to the presidency, Joe Biden had promised not to deal with him because of his alleged involvement in the murder of dissident Jamal Khashoggi. Now, as president, he has resigned himself to meeting with him, hoping that the change of position will be followed by an increase in Saudi oil production, as a drop in gasoline prices has become imperative a few months before the midterm elections, which could turn into a resounding defeat for the Democrats. However, it should be borne in mind that Joe Biden has inherited a very complicated situation. In 2014, the last Democratic president, Barack Obama, paved the way for a major increase in Russia’s presence in the region when he refused to intervene in Syria at a time when Bashar Al-Assad’s dictatorship was faltering. His Republican successor further weakened US interests by withdrawing from the 2015 international agreement governing Iran’s nuclear programme. His policy of maximum pressure aimed at bringing the Iranian regime to its knees has only resulted in Tehran increasing its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and refusing to return to the status quo ante for the time being.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>E. Gyimah-Boadi warns the last two years, coup d’\u00e9tats have become a worrying trend in West Africa: one has taken place in Burkina Faso, another in Guinea, two in Mali and two failed coups in Guinea-Bissau and Niger are a few examples. In addition, three presidents have defied constitutional limits to renew their mandates in Togo, Ivory Coast and Guinea. This represents an erosion of democracy that weakens checks on the authorities and allows for the harassment and repression of political opposition. During the 1990s, West Africa democratised and most members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the main regional bloc, adopted more or less democratic constitutions, with bills of rights and some separation of powers. Democratisation brought peace to some of the region’s trouble spots: civil war ended in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and democratic order was restored in Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Mali. However, in the last five years these democracies have begun to falter. As West African governments grapple with economic malaise, persistent poverty, unemployment, inequality and corruption, they now also have to contend with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic impacts of the war in Ukraine and the consequences of climate change. At the same time, these countries have received infrastructure investment aid from autocratic regimes such as China, Russia and Turkey in exchange for natural resources, access to international markets and regional influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Guillem Colom analyzes in El Confidencial<\/em><\/a> Japan’s role in the new geostrategic environment rising in the Indo-Pacific region and Tokyo is now debating increasing its defence budget to 2% of its GDP in order to build up its defence capabilities. While many observers have focused on the Aukus alliance between Australia, the UK and the US to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific and contain Chinese expansion, Colom sees the region’s hottest spot as being between the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. In this area of growing Chinese influence, three actors – Taiwan, South Korea and Japan – try to maintain an increasingly challenged existing order. With the invasion of Ukraine, many analysts fear that, eventually, Taiwan could suffer the same fate, which, in addition to the strategic consequences, would have a direct impact on Japan, whose southernmost islands lie just a few kilometres from Formosa. Not only because Tokyo could be implicated in this conflict, but also because it would damage one of the linchpins of the Japanese and American defence system. Add to this the fact that Tokyo’s condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will prevent the resolution in the medium term of outstanding disputes over the Northern Territories (the Kuriles for Russia). Increased Chinese activities around the Senkaku Islands, increased North Korean missile launches and the possibility that Pyongyang will resume nuclear testing in the coming months, and it seems logical that Japan will have to rethink – as Germany is doing in Europe – its contribution to global security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, Uri Friedman argues in The Atlantic<\/em><\/a> that the UN Security Council is going through a delicate moment, as it has been unable to provide an effective response to recent conflicts and challenges facing the world. This is why the need for reform and the adoption of new mechanisms is being seriously considered lately so that it does not become an obsolete body. Thus, a change in its functioning is necessary so that it can recover from its current discredit and become a reference for the new challenges that the international community must face. Today, not only is it failing to respond to contemporary challenges, such as the climate crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic or new wars. It is also suffering a crisis of legitimacy because it no longer responds to the geopolitical balances of the post-war period when it was created with the intention of uniting the Allied powers that had defeated Nazism. Conflicts such as the one in Ukraine may serve to promote a change in the organisation, as the involvement of one of the permanent members, as an aggressor is a particularly sensitive development. Among the ideas proposed for reforming the Security Council is the elimination of the right of veto in cases of genocide and war crimes, climate emergencies, the danger of the use of nuclear weapons and pandemics. The idea would be to create a more representative Security Council to make it a more balanced and multilateral institution, where the General Assembly could act as a counterbalance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turning to European affairs, the resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi stands out, not only because the call for early elections could hand victory to the neo-fascists of Fratelli d’Italia<\/em> in coalition with Salvini’s Lega<\/em> and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia<\/em>, but also because of its impact on European politics. In La<\/em> Vanguardia<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>Enric Juliana claims that the technocratic solution has failed and that the Italian right and far right have ignored the pro-stability messages of most European leaders and US President Joe Biden in recent days. The reason is simple: the right has an overwhelming victory within its grasp in the September elections, unless there is an earthquake in Italian society that corrects the current trends in the polls. The objective is clear: to take control of European funds valued at around 200 billion euros, including direct subsidies and credits. A victory that could be facilitated by changes in the electoral law that establishes that 37% of deputies and senators will be chosen by the majority system in constituencies where only one seat is allocated, British-style. The coalition that obtains the most votes in the first round wins the seat. The remaining 61% of deputies and senators are chosen by the proportional method in territorial constituencies with several seats at stake, in a single round (the remaining 2% corresponds to Italians living abroad whose representatives are also chosen by proportional voting). Thus, the majority vote requires coalitions, and here the right has a clear advantage. Despite their disagreements, which are not few, the Lega<\/em>, Forza Italia<\/em> and Fratelli d’Italia<\/em> know how to occupy the territory: Salvini’s party is strong in the north and Meloni’s in the south, while Berlusconi’s party strengthens in both the north and south.  On the other hand, although the centre-left, represented by the Democratic Party (PD), to which most of the mayors of the country’s major cities belong, is the best articulated party in the territory, with many cadres in the administration, and could be the most voted in the proportional election, it needs allies to win in the majority vote and has been left without the support of a Cinque Stelle<\/em> Movement (MSE) in the process of disintegration. However, as Pancho Pardi argues in MicroMega<\/em><\/a>, the possible victory of the right could have another alarming consequence, the more than likely pro-Putin shift in Italian foreign policy. Indeed, if there was one positive aspect of the Draghi government’s foreign policy, it was its full support for Ukraine. In this sense, the fall of the government may not only mean the victory of the right and the far right in Italy, but a radical change in Italian foreign and energy policy. In short, in the European context, Draghi’s defeat is already a victory for Putin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In BalkanInsight<\/em><\/a>, <\/em>Madalin Necsutureveals that the latest report<\/a> of the European Commission on Rule of Law points to significant shortcomings on media freedom in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece, among others At the same time Med\u00eda Pluralism Monitor<\/em><\/a> classifies EU member states into five risk levels: Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania and Slovenia are considered the highest risk countries. The report is an overview of EU-wide trends examining developments in each member state since July 2021, thus including the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Commission states that transparency with regard to media ownership in Romania remains deficient. With regard to Bulgaria, the report notes the lack of a clear regulatory framework to ensure transparency in the allocation of state advertising, despite some measures taken to improve the process. The situation remains very negative with regard to media independence in Hungary and the EC recommends to Hungarian legislators mechanisms to improve the functional independence of the media regulatory authority, in line with European standards on media freedom. The report notes some improvements in Poland, but warns that recent developments in the area of operating licences show risks to media pluralism. In this regard, the introduction of the state of emergency in Poland negatively affected the right of access to information, in particular by humanitarian organisations and journalists. Finally, the report follows up on the challenges identified in previous reports and includes observations on issues such as public media, the use of spyware or the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Continuing with the Balkans, Andi Hoxhaj warns in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that rising tensions between Bosnians and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina favour Russia’s interference. Milorad Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska, has given his support to the recognition of the two pro-Russian separatist republics in Ukraine, aligning himself with Vladimir Putin. Analysts see Dodik’s move as worrying as it could threaten the fragile peace achieved after the end of the Balkan war in 1999. Russia on the other hand continues its plans to undermine the region’s political support for the EU and has already had some success in Serbia, where currently less than half of the population supports EU membership. Meanwhile, the Balkan countries are experiencing a major brain drain due to lack of economic growth and political instability, against a backdrop of disappointment with the EU as some countries began to consider EU membership in the mid-2000s and are still waiting. In addition, as the process has dragged on, Russia and China have increased their influence in the Balkans, while the lack of a concrete date for these candidate countries to join discourages the implementation of necessary reforms. In the same vein, Janine di Giovanni warns in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that Putin might intend to activate Dodik’s secession plan and send members of the Wagner Group, Russian paramilitaries already operating in Ukraine, to provoke possibly an armed conflict in Bosnia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic field, Branko Milanovi\u0107 argues in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that international financial organisations play a key role in international politics and are responsible for controlling the world economy. However, he points out that little is said about the biases of these institutions and that there are many cases in which organisations such as the IMF or the World Bank interfere in the sovereignty of states – often with the forced acquiescence of countries – in order to enforce certain standards of economic stability. The fact is that it is usually the states whose sovereignty is weakened that are already the weakest overall. Milanovi\u0107 therefore points out that these institutions often limit the sovereignty of countries in defence of private and external interests. Throughout the twentieth century, such behaviour has been repeated at different times and usually to the benefit of the West and the great powers of the North, which have used the rest of the world as a source of raw materials. Thus, although both the IMF and the World Bank recognise the equality of member countries, in practice they do not apply the same rules for everyone, and Western countries are generally the most reluctant to cede part of their sovereignty in order to apply the measures prescribed by these institutions. The creation of both the IMF and the World Bank came just after the end of World War II and has defined the world economic order ever since. Both organisations are particularly influenced by American interests, the superpower of the second half of the 20th century. In an increasingly globalised world, however, no country is hermetically sealed off any more, and economics is one of the factors that highlight the interplay between domestic and international politics. It is increasingly difficult to separate the one from the other, and Milanovi\u0107 therefore believes that these organisations should be concerned with minimising inequalities. Instead, they are often more concerned with favouring the interests of certain companies and the countries that contribute most to their functioning, i.e. those in the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The journal Euractiv<\/em><\/a> reveals that Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has doubled its imports of low-priced Russian oil in order to meet its domestic demand and sell its oil more expensively to Western countries. This poses a challenge for US President Joe Biden as his administration seeks to isolate Russia and reduce its energy export revenues. While many countries have banned or restricted purchases from Russia, China, India and several African and Middle Eastern nations have increased imports of Russian supplies. It is also striking that according to data obtained by the ship tracking software Refinitiv Eikon, between April and June Saudi Arabia imported 647,000 tonnes (48,000 barrels per day) of fuel oil from Russia via Russian\u2026 and Estonian ports.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chad de Guzm\u00e1n writes in Time<\/em><\/a> magazine that in June, wheat prices increased by 42% compared to January 2021 and corn prices by 47%. Most countries are experiencing food price inflation of over 5% caused by supply chain disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. However, he says climate change is also responsible. For example, Malaysia has imposed restrictions on chicken exports, as hens, in addition to suffering from feed shortages, tend to produce fewer eggs when temperatures soar. The recent ban on wheat exports from India, the world’s second largest producer, has also come in the wake of the extreme heat wave in March and April that reduced yields. Guzman believes that as climate change worsens, not only will these export bans increase, but there will also be a reordering of trade patterns between countries, increasingly prioritising national interest. Countries will enter into more regional trade agreements to compensate for any potential damage caused by disruptions to supply chains in distant countries. Economies will be inclined to buy imported goods from neighbouring countries rather than from other continents. Already in the weeks following the invasion of Ukraine, data<\/a> from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) showed an increase in food export restrictions in at least 23 countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the wake of the alarming political, social and economic situation in Sri Lanka, Philippe Stoop warns in Atlantico<\/em><\/a> about the shortcomings of the strategies undertaken in several regions in the transition to 100% organic farming. In April 2021, Sri Lanka was one of the first countries in the world to switch to 100% organic farming and banned the use of plant protection products and fertilisers in order to become the world’s largest producer of organic food. However, this strategy has ended in failure and the country is now the victim of hunger riots after the declaration of food emergency. Stoop points out that this organic revolution, as a transition strategy towards 100% organic has also been a failure in other countries such as Bhutan or the Indian state of Sikkim. He points out that in both cases the experience has led to a sharp drop in production, which has further aggravated the food deficit. He also stresses these are states or regions that have placed a great deal of emphasis on “luxury” tourism and higher value-added agricultural products, forgetting that their agriculture should also feed their own population. The difficulties of such a transition are manifold, but three main ones stand out. First, training needs: obtaining correct organic yields requires a great deal of technical expertise, and therefore time for farmers to acquire this knowledge. Second, the availability of organic fertilisers. Its main source, livestock manure, is difficult to collect, store and distribute, especially to countries where livestock farming is mainly practised in a traditional way, with animals only fertilising the land where they graze. Finally, even with good training of farmers and good availability of organic fertilisers, the shift to 100% organic means a significant loss of yields leading to an increase in imports, which in turn leads to higher food prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, in the field of science and innovation, Vida Krishnan points out in The Atlantic<\/em><\/a> that almost from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India and South Africa asked the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to release patent rights for vaccines, treatments and medicines until herd immunity was achieved. This initiative had a lot of support in developing countries and finally after two years of pandemic, the WTO has reached an agreement. However, it is a departure from the initial proposal and the response has been too slow in coming. The agreement only releases patents to manufacture vaccines for a period of only 5 years, does not include treatments or diagnostics and excludes RNA vaccines, which have been the most effective. All indications are that the negotiations were on unequal power, as Europeans and North Americans refused to review their proposals and some decisions were made without the agreement of developing countries. Some countries even received the documents through leaks rather than from official organisations, which raises suspicions of arbitrary decision-making and opaque negotiations. Moreover, this agreement is in nobody’s interest, as First World countries will continue to be exposed to the emergence of new variants from countries lacking vaccines, thus prolonging the pandemic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Vageesh Jain argues in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that this type of crisis goes beyond the health system and that a transversal response from governments is necessary, ratified and understood by society as a whole, since in these cases citizen collaboration is an essential requirement for the proper functioning of the measures. Jain presents the conclusions of a study<\/a> conducted to gauge the link between democracy and excess mortality during the pandemic and indicates that countries where democracy is stronger have had lower mortality. Excess mortality refers to the total number of deaths since the pandemic began compared to pre-pandemic levels, so as to take into account not only deaths directly caused by COVID but also those due to its indirect effects. Taking into account different indicators regarding democracy, policies and socio-economic levels, the study created regression models with different variables to understand the relationship between governance and its effect on excess mortality. Thus, it shows that, in the 78 countries studied, one more point in the democracy index means 2.18 fewer deaths per 100,000 people. By adding more variables, it was also possible to conclude that societies with more deliberative policies helped greatly to reduce mortality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arnau In\u00e9s, Xavier Company and Pau \u00c1lvarez, trainees at the CETC, took part in this issue of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This last issue of Diari de les idees before the summer holidays coincides with the fifth month of war in Ukraine, where the fragile agreement to release the export of grain stands out, although the missile attacks on Odessa and Mykolaiv after the signing raise doubts about its medium-term viability. We also highlight the resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, not only because the call for early elections may lead to the formation of a government led by the far-right Fratelli d’Italia, but also because of its impact on European foreign and energy policy. Together with Boris Johnson’s resignation,\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":58755,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-60689","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 66 – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-66\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 66 – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"This last issue of Diari de les idees before the summer holidays coincides with the fifth month of war in Ukraine, where the fragile agreement to release the export of grain stands out, although the missile attacks on Odessa and Mykolaiv after the signing raise doubts about its medium-term viability. We also highlight the resignation of Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, not only because the call for early elections may lead to the formation of a government led by the far-right Fratelli d’Italia, but also because of its impact on European foreign and energy policy. Together with Boris Johnson’s resignation,\u2026\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-66\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-12-29T10:36:51+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/07\/farsa.jpg?fit=2000%2C1310&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1310\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"25 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/\",\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 66 – IDEES\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/07\\\/farsa.jpg?fit=2000%2C1310&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2022-07-28T09:52:58+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-12-29T10:36:51+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/07\\\/farsa.jpg?fit=2000%2C1310&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2022\\\/07\\\/farsa.jpg?fit=2000%2C1310&ssl=1\",\"width\":2000,\"height\":1310},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-66\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Inici\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 66\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/\",\"name\":\"IDEES\",\"description\":\"Contemporary global issues\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Diari de les idees 66 – IDEES","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-66\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Diari de les idees 66 – IDEES","og_description":"This last issue of Diari de les idees before the summer holidays coincides with the fifth month of war in Ukraine, where the fragile agreement to release the export of grain stands out, although the missile attacks on Odessa and Mykolaiv after the signing raise doubts about its medium-term viability. 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