{"id":60716,"date":"2022-09-22T12:41:57","date_gmt":"2022-09-22T10:41:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-68\/"},"modified":"2023-01-30T11:49:01","modified_gmt":"2023-01-30T09:49:01","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-68","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-68\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 68"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The war in Ukraine seems to have entered a new phase with the success of the Ukrainian counter-offensive that has forced Russian troops to retreat in many areas in the northeast of the country, even endangering Russian control over the Luhansk region. This issue of Diari de les idees<\/em> analyses this new scenario in which Russia’s defeats have an impact on Russia itself – where Putin is openly criticised by the most nationalist sectors and even by a sector of the political class – and on its alliance policy, as India and China are progressively distancing themselves. As we go to press, Vladimir Putin has announced a partial mobilisation of reservists (some 300,000 men), mainly those with combat experience, and an increase in arms production. He has also warned that Russia will use all available resources at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. In parallel, the Zaporizhzhia on their incorporation into the Russian Federation poses a huge risk of escalation as Putin would consider any attack on these regions as an attack on Russia’s territorial integrity and could justify a formal declaration of war. In addition, Russia’s lower house of parliament has approved amendments to the Criminal Code to toughen prison sentences for acts committed during wartime, including surrender, desertion and looting. The draft, which includes the concepts of “mobilisation”, “martial law” and “wartime”, will be reviewed later this week by the upper house for approval and ratification by the President of the Federation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We also outline the consequences for the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of the death of Queen Elizabeth II. Indeed, this represents a severing of the living connection with a historical reality – that of the British Empire – at once defunct and, at the same time, defining of Britain today and uncertainties about its future in the world. Other issues highlighted include concerns about the possible entry of the extreme right into the next Swedish government after the victory of right-wing parties in the legislative elections. The possible victory of the post-fascist Fratelli d’Italia<\/em> party in next Sunday’s elections, the necessary reorganization of the European electricity market in the current context of energy crisis, the role of nuclear energy in the ecological transition or the need for a sustainable approach to guarantee and improve the cybersecurity of the digital world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the field of international politics, Richard Haass notes in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that the world is in the midst of an era of accelerating change. As has happened at other moments of historical change, the danger comes from a severe disruption of the global order. But more than at any other recent time, this disruption is especially pronounced because of the confluence of old and new threats that have begun to emerge at a time when the United States is not well positioned to deal with them. On the one hand, we are witnessing a resurgence of some of the worst aspects of traditional geopolitics: great power competition, imperial ambitions, resource struggles. Russia has become an autocracy intent on recreating a sphere of influence and perhaps even a Russian empire. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is realising a project of regional and potentially global primacy, which can only provoke further competition or even confrontation with the United States. However, these more traditional geopolitical risks overlap with new complex challenges of the contemporary era, such as climate change, pandemics and nuclear proliferation. Further complicating the picture is the fact that American democracy and political cohesion are at risk in a way not seen since the mid-19th century, contributing to a weakening of the American leadership on which the international order of the past 75 years has been based.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same journal, Dani Rodrik y Stephen M. Walt<\/a> argue that repeated financial crises, rising inequality, new protectionist impulses, the COVID-19 pandemic and the growing impact of economic sanctions imposed on Russia have brought the post-Cold War era of hyper-globalisation to an end. Likewise, the changing priorities of many states and increasingly competitive geopolitics have stalled the drive towards greater economic integration and blocked collective efforts to address global dangers. The new international order that will emerge from this new geopolitical configuration is impossible to predict. We can imagine a less prosperous and more dangerous world, with the United States and China increasingly at odds, a Europe increasing its defence budgets, regional economic blocs oriented towards more local markets, a digital world divided along geopolitical lines, and the increasing use of economic relations for strategic purposes. But we can also envision a more peaceful order in which the United States, China and other powers compete in some areas, cooperate in others, and follow new, more flexible rules of conduct to preserve the core elements of an economically open world and prevent armed conflict and allow countries more room for manoeuvre to address domestic economic and social priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These are therefore some of the challenges that will have to be discussed in the 77th session<\/a> The UN General Assembly, which brings together world leaders in person for the first time since the pandemic began. Since their last meeting, the world seems to have taken steps backwards. Global inequalities have deepened tensions and mistrust between the US and China have increased because of disputes over the origins of COVID-19, and tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea. China’s position in the war in Ukraine has cemented the image of a world divided into two camps, with NATO and the West on one side and Russia, China and allies on the other. The fact that the UN can be seen either as the seat of the liberal international order or, in Putin’s conception, as a set of universal rules to constrain Western prerogatives, reminds us that the institution is in need of reinvention in the context of a changing world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this increasingly complex scenario, Jean-Luc Maurer explains in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> <\/em>how to defend effectively Taiwanese democracy against totalitarian China. He argues that more emphasis should be placed on the argument that if the legitimacy of international law is on Beijing’s side, what is derived from history is, by contrast, much more questionable, contrary to what the People’s Republic’s official propaganda claims. Maurer stresses that, in this time of widespread democratic backsliding, Taiwan is an exception to the rule that deserves to be pointed out. Since the beginning of the country’s democratisation in the late 1980s, it has gradually established itself as the most democratic country in the whole of Asia and even in the non-Western world. According to the annual ranking of the Economist Intelligence<\/em><\/a> Unit<\/em>, in 2020 Taiwan was among the very small group of the twenty full democracies and ranked 8th in the world in 2021, with a score of 8.99 out of 10. Taiwan has thus become in thirty years an exemplary democracy in the face of a China that wants to impose the same fate on it as Hong Kong. As for the historical background as an argument for the island’s independence, one only has to look at how it has remained completely independent for hundreds of years. It was only briefly occupied by Portuguese colonisers for 80 years and Dutch colonisers for 20 years; dominated by the Manchus in a very superficial way for two centuries and then by the Japanese for 50 years. The historical legitimacy of Beijing’s claim that Taiwan belongs to it is therefore not borne out. Ultimately, it is this argument that must be insisted upon to defend Taiwan’s democracy and its people’s right to self-determination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Switching continents, all polls predict that Jair Bolsonaro is likely to lose the presidential election, the first round of which will be held on 2 October. But the incumbent says he will accept the result as long as it is “clean and transparent”, The Economist<\/em><\/a> warns that Bolsonaro continues to insist that the polls are wrong, that he has every chance of winning and hints that the election could be rigged. All indications are that he is laying the rhetorical groundwork to denounce alleged electoral fraud in order to incite his supporters to a possible insurrection like the one that took place in the US on 6 January 2021. In this regard, there are concerns that Brazil’s system of checks and balances is less robust than the US’s, as well as the fact that the military historically has many connections in the government and has already challenged the voting system several times. Moreover, whatever the outcome of the election, Bolsonaro and his movement will not disappear, and he could become the most influential opposition politician in Brazil. His base – evangelical Christians, gun owners and rural landowners – could remain loyal to him, convinced that he is the legitimate president of Brazil, and hinder the Lula government’s room for manoeuvre, turning Brazil into an increasingly divided country. The best outcome, therefore, would be for Bolsonaro to lose by such a wide margin that he could not claim to have won, in the first round on either 2 October or (more likely) in the second round on 30 October.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the war in Ukraine, Skander Ounaies argues in Conflits<\/em><\/a> that the conflict is causing a number of ruptures, especially strategic and economic ones, and that by destabilising Europe it is changing the international order. In his view, this is the result of a long process, marked by disagreements and misunderstandings between the US and the EU on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Thus, a number of extremely negative signals from Russia have been misinterpreted, such as the second war in Chechnya (1999-2009), Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the war in Syria, or the increase of Russian influence in Sudan, and especially in Mali. For its part, Russia is also subject to internal and external tensions, the impact of which has not been sufficiently appreciated by the EU. Internally, two factors have had a considerable effect on Russia’s evolution in recent years. At the social level, the growing influence of a nationalist ideological current theorised in 2012 by the philosopher Alexander Duguin, which feeds Vladimir Putin’s vision of Russian-European relations. At the economic level, Russia has been hit by the failure of the reform policy initiated by Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, and then by the implementation of a policy of economic liberalisation, in a context of total collapse of the Soviet economy until early 1996, which has led to the emergence of a class of oligarchs on the one hand, and on the other to a decline in the standard of living of the majority of the population due to the collapse of public services such as health care. Ultimately, these disagreements and misunderstandings are part of an end-of-cycle dynamic characterised by the decline of the supremacy of the West, and especially the United States, in the conduct of world affairs, the rise of China and its growing influence in the Indo-Pacific area, the various financial and economic crises, migration crises, populist waves, the digital revolution and, finally, the global health crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sergei Kuznetvov says in Politico<\/em><\/a> that the Russian army’s withdrawal after Ukraine’s counter-offensive in the north-eastern region of Kharkiv poses both a political and military problem for President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin’s efforts to generate a propagandistic narrative about its war in Ukraine have been badly bruised, as more and more bloggers, pundits, advisers and even politicians begin to raise uncomfortable questions about the defeats on the frontline. For the moment, their discontent is directed exclusively at the military high command, but Putin will need to keep a close eye on this unusual outbreak of dissent. For example, Alexei Chadayev, a member of a think tank close to the Kremlin, argues that the Russian military in its current form has a limited aptitude for modern warfare. He points out that the key shortcomings lie not in the ability to muster troops, supplies, weapons, or even management as such, but in the level of strategic thinking, the quality of understanding the rhythm and logic of combat, which would explain the fiasco in the face of the Ukrainian counter-offensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alexey Kovalev points out in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> that a new protest movement is emerging, made up of the most radical supporters of the invasion, increasingly frustrated by the military disaster in a war that has been going on for six months. They want Putin to escalate the war, use more devastating weapons and hit Ukrainian civilians even harder. They openly criticise Russia’s military and political leadership, although they rarely mention Putin by name. Their demands for war escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons, are dangerous in themselves, but by creating a fantasy world in which a supposedly all-powerful Russian army is being defeated by internal enemies, this movement has potentially disturbing post-war implications. Indeed, its narrative closely resembles the Dolchstosslegende<\/em>, the “stab-in-the-back” theory that blamed Germany’s defeat in World War I on internal enemies, mainly socialists and Jews. And this narrative became an integral part of the propaganda that brought the Nazis to power. The promoters of the Russian stab-in-the-back myth are not a single party, movement or group. Rather, they are a coalition of scattered elements, mostly very active on social media, far-right ideologues, militant extremists, veterans of the 2014 Donbas war, Wagner Group mercenaries, bloggers, war journalists who have their own Telegram channels, and Russian state media personnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For its part, the Financial Times<\/em><\/a> editorial board reviews Putin’s accumulation of miscalculations. First, the Ukrainian counteroffensive shows that the Russian president was wrong to think that Russia’s theoretical military superiority would be enough to win the war. However, neither the number of troops deployed nor the supposed sympathy of the Russian-speaking population towards their Russian ‘liberators’ has yielded the expected results. Second, Putin believed that the Western bloc would not be as forceful in its defence of Ukraine and that the impact of the war on their economies would lead them to force Ukraine into negotiations. Third, Putin hoped that Western opposition would strengthen his relations with China and countries that want to challenge the Western system. At first, it is true that he obtained a commitment from those countries that did not join the sanctions, but this support has gradually diminished. A few days ago, President Xi Jinping clearly revealed his doubts and concerns about the conflict. At the same time, Xi has also reaffirmed his support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, in what appears to be a warning to Putin. But it is not only Beijing that is showing misgivings about Russian foreign policy; Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also publicly stated that this is not a time for war but for diplomacy, a significant warning coming from one of Russia’s main trading partners in the purchase of energy and military supplies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A final point to note is that Russia has formally disassociated itself from the European Convention on Human Rights and, by extension, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Council of Europe decided to withdraw Russia in mid-March in retaliation for its invasion of Ukraine, but a six-month deadline was set for Russia’s final exit from the Convention. Thus, more than 140 million Russian citizens are left without the protection of the European human rights framework and Russia is further isolated from the democratic world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In European affairs, the State of the Union address delivered by the President of the Commission to the European Parliament a few days ago stands out. In Euractiv<\/em><\/a>, Alexandra Brzozowski stresses that von der Leyen acknowledged an inescapable reality that the overall context has changed: the European construction that had begun in a continent at peace must now continue in the midst of a protracted war that spills over its borders. Yet, in a speech intended to serve as a political compass for the next 12 months, the Commission President did not make any substantial policy announcements. For example, defence, usually a strong point of the former German defence minister’s speech, was largely absent, which is surprising given the considerable progress made in European defence. On the other hand, new European climate and environmental legislation, currently being negotiated in the European Parliament, has been overshadowed by the urgent need to address the energy crisis. Although he mentioned zero emissions in passing, von der Leyen did not comment that the EU aims to achieve them by 2050, nor did he allude to Europe’s 2030 emissions reduction target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> Floriant Louis reflects on the future of Europe’s geopolitical transition as 2022 has been a litmus test for the EU, which now shows and embraces the ambition to think and act geopolitically. Marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February and a sudden increase in tension over Taiwan in July, the international context has forced European leaders to move more quickly than they would no doubt have wished in reorienting their geostrategic policy. Indeed, while the ecological transition has been the subject of considerable theoretical work for many years, the same has not been true of the geopolitical transition, which, presented as urgent and necessary for the Union, remains difficult to visualise. Nevertheless, reaching a consensus on the nature, the opportunities, but also the dangers of this transition is essential if we hope to succeed and not sacrifice Europe’s cosmopolitical heritage on the altar of its new geopolitical ambitions. Just as the European Union has been able for decades to successfully put its economic power at the service of the global diffusion of its rules, it must consider putting its incipient geopolitical power at the service of the diffusion of its cosmopolitical capacity on a planetary scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jeremy Cliffe discusses in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> the future of the British monarchy and the United Kingdom after the death of Elizabeth II and stresses that the long duration of her reign has meant that the Queen has been a link between the old imperial Britain and the present. In addition, in this sense, her death represents a severing of the living connection with a historical reality – that of the British Empire – at once defunct and, at the same time, defining of Britain today and the uncertainties of its future in the world. Indeed, along with his reign, the last living link with the country’s imperial past, with the Britain of Churchill and Baldwin, Lascelles and Orwell, has also disappeared. It seems almost too obvious to note that his death coincides with a period of uncertainty about what the country’s place in the world is and should be, its economic model, its future identity and constitution, and also about the future of the monarchy itself in some of its constituent nations and the Commonwealth. We are thus witnessing the end of an era that has been slowly fading away for decades. With the tributes, funeral and coronation over, the reign of King Charles III will have to be a time of reassessment and national readjustment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A few days before the elections in Italy, which could give victory to the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and the post-fascists of Fratelli d’Italia, Lorenzo Castellani and Giovanni Orsina raise in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> <\/em>different post-election scenarios. Indeed, although the polls corroborate this possibility day after day, they argue that Italian politics is accustomed to unexpected twists and turns, sudden judicial investigations and the breaking of alliances in the process of forming governments. Not to mention the economic and international context in which the elections are taking place: the energy crisis, galloping inflation, the war in Ukraine, the de-globalisation of the economy, the deterioration of relations with China, the inevitable rise in interest rates and the increase in debt. Against this backdrop, three possible scenarios emerge. First, the most likely scenario is the one everyone takes for granted: an absolute majority for the centre-right, with Fratelli d’Italia as the most voted party and also the leader in seats, and the formation of a government in which Giorgia Meloni would become President of the Council. The second scenario envisages that divisions within the winning centre-right coalition will begin to appear as soon as the new government is formed. It is not impossible, for example, that Salvini and Berlusconi will try to block Meloni by proposing someone else as Council president. In this case, the initiative would fall to the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, who could either let Meloni negotiate with his coalition partners to reach an agreement, or find an alternative to lead a centre-right majority. Finally, the third scenario would contemplate a narrow victory for the centre-right, with a very slim absolute majority, or even no majority in one of the two chambers – probably the Senate. In this case, Fratelli d’Italia would be the leading party of the centre-right coalition in votes, but not in absolute terms as the Democratic Party would probably overtake it. The head of state would then have two options: to favour the creation of a centre-right executive, albeit a weak one, or to move again towards a grand coalition, with the right as the main core of the majority, but including the centrists and, probably, the Democratic Party. In this case, the president of the Council would be a technician or a super-party personality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results of the legislative elections in Sweden seem to mean the end of the Swedish model of Scandinavian democracy, as for the first time power will be exercised by a bloc that includes the radical right, embodied by the Sweden Democrats party, a formation born out of an openly neo-Nazi party. Le Monde<\/em><\/a> notes that in little more than ten years, this radically anti-immigration party has quadrupled its representation from 5.7 per cent to 20.6 per cent of the vote, making it Sweden’s second largest political force. Immigration and insecurity, its preferred issues, have dominated the legislative campaign at the expense of others such as the fight against climate change. It is worrying that Sweden’s example of the trivialisation of the more radical right is not an isolated case, as Finland and Denmark have previously paved the way for the far right by further tightening their migration policies, including by social democratic governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic field, Le Monde<\/em><\/a> points to the need to refound the European electricity market in the current context of an energy crisis that is indicative of a system that may have had certain virtues in the past, but is now obsolete. More concerned with the liberalisation of its internal market than with its energy sovereignty issues, the EU finds itself trapped in mechanisms designed in a political framework that is now showing its limits. The way electricity prices are set in Europe depends heavily on the price of gas, despite the fact that several European countries, including France, do not produce most of their electricity from gas. The logic is based on one principle: prices depend on the cost of running the power plants that have to meet peak demand on the grid. If coal or gas-fired plants are involved, electricity prices will be indexed accordingly. The dramatic rise in gas prices has caused electricity prices to rise to unprecedented levels, providing Vladimir Putin with a powerful means of pressure. New guidelines are therefore needed and electricity needs to be defined as a “common good”, protected from the sometimes artificial competition that favours short-termism. Finally, the new electricity market has to be aligned with the EU’s climate objectives towards decarbonisation of energy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sarah Schiffling and Nikolaos Valantasis Kanellos stress in The Conversation<\/em><\/a>  five supply chain issues that could affect us during the coming winter. First, the rising cost of living means that consumers will have to cut back severely on spending and this makes it difficult for supply chain planners to accurately estimate the quantities and types of goods that consumers will need. Second, rising inflation will cause workers to ask for wage increases to offset the impact on their daily lives. Third, inflation is not only a problem for food prices, but also for energy costs. Rising gas prices and reduced Russian supplies are forcing European companies to look for alternative energy sources such as coal, and a  report<\/a> of the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce reveals that 16% of its companies will have to reduce production or partially discontinue business operations. Fourth, geopolitical uncertainty as the invasion of Ukraine is not only the main cause of much of the energy and food price inflation, but has disrupted supply chains, creating a global food crisis. Elsewhere in the world, tensions between China and the US have continued and any further escalation could disrupt, for example, semiconductor supply chains. Finally, the impact of climate change is also a major issue for supply chains. This year, drought has caused water levels to drop around the world, affecting major river supply routes. This means that ships can only carry a fraction of their usual cargo to minimise the risk of grounding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On climate change and sustainability, Philippa Nuttall reflects in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> on the role of nuclear energy in the ecological transition. Before the Fukushima incident in 2011, Japan had planned to increase its reliance on nuclear power, with half of the country’s electricity expected to come from nuclear power by 2030, up from only a third in 2010. However, after Fukushima, the Japanese government shut down the country’s 54 nuclear power plants for safety checks. By 2012, the share of nuclear power in the country’s electricity supply had fallen to 14% and by 2020 it was down to less than 5%. Other countries, such as Germany, opted to phase out nuclear power completely after the disaster. Currently, new nuclear construction projects are scarce, even in countries such as France and the US where energy systems rely heavily on nuclear power, the number of operating reactors is declining. At the same time, the production and storage costs of solar and wind power continue to fall, and global renewable electricity capacity is projected to increase by more than 60% by 2026, to a level that would equal the current total global energy capacity of fossil fuels and nuclear combined, according to the IEA. While some argue that nuclear power can be a clean security option when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining, other options already exist, such as large-scale storage and interconnections between different countries. Ultimately, there is every indication that if governments had devoted half the attention given to nuclear power to improving building insulation, energy efficiency and smart storage technologies, we would probably be in a better position to address today’s energy challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, Adam Morton provides in The Guardian<\/em><\/a> an optimistic note about climate change and notes that action to combat the climate crisis is accelerating and that some positive aspects should be highlighted. For example, China, the world’s biggest polluter, recorded an 8% drop in CO2 emissions in June and a 3% year-on-year cut. According to a report by Carbon Brief<\/em><\/a>, the drop compared to the same period in 2021 was 230 million tonnes, equivalent to almost half of Australia’s annual emissions, the largest reduction in Chinese carbon pollution in at least a decade. On the other hand, a report<\/a> of International Energy Agency’s (IEA) report shows that more people are working in clean energy industries than in the fossil fuel industry. Investment in clean energy has grown by 12% annually since 2020, partly thanks to increased public and private support for sustainable financing, especially in rich countries. Renewables, new grids and energy storage account for more than 80% of total power sector investment. The IEA<\/a> also estimates that spending on solar, batteries and electric vehicles is growing at a rate consistent with achieving global zero emissions by 2050. With respect to Europe, the think tank Ember<\/a> estimates that the record level of solar power has resulted in the continent saving 29 billion euros in gas. In the 27 EU countries, renewables now provide 35% of electricity compared to 16% for coal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, in the field of new technologies The Economist<\/em><\/a> looks at the winners of the changes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic in this sector. For the first few months, the technology industry experienced a sense of euphoria. With billions of people confined, many expected the new normal to trigger huge productivity gains as companies went digital and workers spent less time in transport. Two years later the boom triggered by the confinements has deflated: Netflix, Peloton, a maker of luxury exercise bikes, Robinhood, a stock trading app, Shopify, an e-commerce platform, or even Zoom, have fallen more than 80% from their all-time high, This situation is due to the fact that much of the initial enthusiasm was focused on the wrong types of company, as the shift towards greater digitisation continues. Only the real winners are not the consumer technology companies, but those that provide the infrastructures that enable this shift. And indeed, the market for infrastructure technology that underpins people’s daily lives, such as cloud computing, cybersecurity and digital payments, is thriving. The cloud computing industry is expected to grow to nearly $500bn this year, up from $243bn in 2019. Amazon’s cloud offering, the world’s largest, continues to grow 33% each year. Its most direct rivals are cloud services from Microsoft and Google, whose annual sales are growing 40% and 36%, respectively. The cloud has created new demands for cybersecurity, another technological winner. The combined revenues of the big three publicly traded cybersecurity companies have almost doubled since the start of the pandemic and their market capitalisation has tripled. Digital payments are another area of growth, thanks to confinement and social distancing. Three quarters of iPhone owners use Apple Pay and nine out of ten American retailers now accept it as a payment method. Nearly 200 million people in India and China have used some form of digital payment for the first time since the start of COVID. One third of adults in sub-Saharan Africa now have a mobile money account. Ultimately, the technologies that are less attractive to the general public but provide the underlying infrastructure for digital change are the real beneficiaries of COVID.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In The Conversation, <\/em>Olivier Meier<\/a> and Jeanne Le Roy warn that the sources of digital insecurity today are particularly related to the interconnectedness of millions of devices that make up the Internet of Things. This interconnectedness can become a ticking time bomb, diminishing the trust of users (businesses and consumers) and affecting the modern economy and even democratic institutions. If the worst is to be avoided, a sustainable approach to cybersecurity must be adopted. Indeed, the potential of technology is often hindered by external factors. The internet was not built with security in mind; as a result, a large part of global data flows are exchanged over public networks that are vulnerable to attack. Failure to ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity or availability of information, i.e. cybersecurity, can therefore lead to critical errors. In this sense, the transition towards a sustainability-based approach to cybersecurity requires all stakeholders to become actors in the defence of this ecosystem. Companies need to review their management methods, in order to better allocate investment strategies and evaluate cost-effectiveness measures (internalisation of externalities); governments need to commit to developing coherent national strategies; insurers need to change incentives through new underwriting parameters; educational institutions need to modernise curricula; and consumers need to learn the relevant elements of cyber security and integrate them into their daily lives. Through sustainable cybersecurity practices, all stakeholders will be able to participate in and contribute to the modern economy, whether by developing products and services, running a household, operating critical infrastructures or developing national policies. Through this collective effort, all stakeholders can be more confident that ICTs fully and securely support current and future innovations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Xavier Company and Montserrat Viv\u00f3, trainees at the CETC, took part in this issue of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The war in Ukraine seems to have entered a new phase with the success of the Ukrainian counter-offensive that has forced Russian troops to retreat in many areas in the northeast of the country, even endangering Russian control over the Luhansk region. This issue of Diari de les idees analyses this new scenario in which Russia’s defeats have an impact on Russia itself – where Putin is openly criticised by the most nationalist sectors and even by a sector of the political class – and on its alliance policy, as India and China are progressively distancing themselves. As we go\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":70789,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-60716","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 68 – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-68\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 68 – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The war in Ukraine seems to have entered a new phase with the success of the Ukrainian counter-offensive that has forced Russian troops to retreat in many areas in the northeast of the country, even endangering Russian control over the Luhansk region. This issue of Diari de les idees analyses this new scenario in which Russia’s defeats have an impact on Russia itself – where Putin is openly criticised by the most nationalist sectors and even by a sector of the political class – and on its alliance policy, as India and China are progressively distancing themselves. 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