{"id":60728,"date":"2022-10-06T05:35:00","date_gmt":"2022-10-06T03:35:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-69\/"},"modified":"2022-12-29T13:35:02","modified_gmt":"2022-12-29T11:35:02","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-69","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-69\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 69"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia despite the successful counteroffensive, the over representation of ethnic minorities, the partial mobilization acted by Putin, and the Nord Stream sabotage are some of the latest developments of the war in Ukraine.  Diari de les idees<\/em> also analyses, in this edition, the electoral processes that took place these last weeks in Sweden and Italy, and will take place in Brazil. These processes have common features such as the increase and even triumph of far right and its great resilience, in Brazil. Other important topics are the future possible scenarios in the reorganization of NATO, the increasing influence of China in central Asia, the necessity of applying a common European energy policy, the challenges for the upcoming COP27 in Sharm Sheikh or even the increasing tension between blocks after decades of cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding international relations, Stephen Walt outlines in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> the development of NATO since its foundation. The alliance has been incorporating new members, such as Greece and Turkey in 1952 or Spain in 1982. At the same time, the military and budgetary burdens have also changed after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decrease in military spending by Europe. Simultaneously, different NATO doctrines have been in place and that is why it is relevant to ask ourselves which form and mission it should have in a future. Walt stablishes four possible evolution paths. Firstly, there is the status quo. Maintaining NATO focused on European security and the US being its main leader. However, this is tough for the US since its major strategic challenge is in Southeast Asia, and status quo limits its resources. The second model would be a division between autocracies and democracies with a global agenda. This is very problematic since it would difficult relations with some strategic partners who are autocracies, and would make autocracies to bond together even more. Thirdly, there is the possibility to stablish a \u201cGlobalization vs. China\u201d model. This, very similar to the last one, would try to make Europe join the American efforts to contain China.  Finally, there is the possibility for Europe to assume the responsibility of its defence so the US can focus on the Indo-Pacific. The US would then become the last resort of European security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the magazine Conflits<\/em><\/a>, Joe Webster claims that the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization held at the end of September in Samarkand revealed the decline of Moscow’s regional role and the rise of China in Central Asia. However, although Moscow’s already eroded influence in Central Asia is expected to diminish in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, China is still somewhat reluctant to assume regional hegemony. Still, Xi Jinping’s recent visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s most populous and resource-rich countries, and other Chinese initiatives suggest Beijing is increasingly willing to broaden its regional interests. China is also likely to fill the vacuum left by Moscow in terms of security and defence in the medium term. Despite, he Asian power has the second most powerful army in the world and has the ability to guarantee security in Central Asia, for now everything indicates that it will try not to increase his role for political reasons. Indeed, Beijing still sees Moscow as a useful partner in its competition with the West, especially the United States, and will try to maintain, even symbolically, the power status of the Kremlin, given Russia’s historical role in the region. Moreover, Central Asia is only the third priority for Beijing, which has greater ambitions regarding Taiwan and Southeast Asia. However, it has significant and growing economic interests in the region since bilateral trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian countries reaches $48 billion last year. In addition, Central Asia also has good potential for solar and wind energy, which could be a priority market for Chinese manufacturers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Happymon Jacob argues in Foreign Affairs<\/em><\/a> that since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Western countries have pressured India to condemn Russian actions, both in its statements and in UN resolutions. However, India has maintained a neutral position that some see as an implicit aid to Russia or, at the very least, a lack of commitment to the democratic values \u200b\u200bthat the country had always defended. The Indian government, on the other hand, maintains that it is conducting a political realism exercise like all nations do. It is balancing its relations with their two main partners: the United States and Russia. Even so, India is increasingly moving away from Russia and closer to the Western bloc led by the United States. Firstly, because the old Indian elites, more pro-Russian, are being substituted by new leaderships more aware of the geopolitical situation and, secondly, because the weakening of Russia and the growth of China are causing a rapprochement between the two powers that could leave Russia under China’s influence, with which it would cease to be the main defender of India in the United Nations Security Council, to become subordinate to Chinese foreign policy. On the other hand, although Russia remains India\u2019s main supplier, India has been diversifying its arms purchases for years, mainly with important purchases from the USA and France. Finally, the author highlights the differences in terms of India’s diplomatic position between the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another prominent issue in international politics is the presidential elections in Brazil. Facing almost all the institutions of the rule of law and the media, and isolated internationally, Bolsonaro has managed to convince more than 50 million Brazilians with a far-right militaristic discourse, riddled with conspiracy theories and attacks on minorities and invented enemies. At the same time, the victories of senators and governors linked to the far-right and evangelical conservatism have shown a conservative strength in Brazil that all polls had underestimated. Indeed, the Workers’ Party (PT) bid to forge a broad front against Bolsonaro (Lula has even chosen as vice president Geraldo Alckmin, a neoliberal banker linked to Opus Dei) in defense of Brazilian democracy, using the disdain of the still president for the rule of law  and institutions such as the Supreme Court, has not served to guarantee victory in the first round. Lula has managed to reduce the votes of the two minor candidates: the centre-left nationalist Ciro Gomes and the centrist Simone Tebet close to the agri-food lobby. However, this has not seemed to have benefited Lula but Bolsonaro. In addittion, the support for Bolsonaro and his allies, especially in the states of enormous weight, such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, has surprised the analysts of the big polling companies. Once again, the PT depends on the northeastern states of the country, which are poorer than the rest, to ensure its victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this sense, the data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics<\/a> are illuminating: from 2003 to 2011 (Lula’s presidency), the GDP at market prices went from 3.6 million real to 6.6 million (1 euro= 5.10 real), with a decrease in unemployment and poverty. Bolsonaro inherited a GDP of 4.1 million, an unemployment rate of 11.9% and 26.8% of the population in poverty. The most recent data (2nd quarter 2022) points to a GDP of 2.6M, unemployment at 9.3% and nationally, people with incomes up to 50% below the median per capita were 22 .2% In this context, the differences between regions are closely related to electoral preferences. Considering only the last indicator, the North and the Northeast (PT strongholds) have poverty rates of 34.2% and 37, 5%, respectively, while the Southeast, South and Central West (Bolsonaro strongholds) 14.9%, 11.1% and 15.1%, respectively. On the other hand, another constant is that ethnic minorities are approximately twice as poor as white people, a difference that has been widening during Bolsonaro’s presidency. The same goes for unemployment, which ranges from 12.7% in the Northeast to 5.6% in the South. In summary, the PT voter is a woman, poor and mostly mestizo or black and Bolsonaro’s is a man, rich, white and educated. In short, Lula’s campaign team set a very ambitious goal of defeating an incumbent president in the first round, which has never happened, since the most normal thing is that even the outgoing president succeeds the re-election In short, in an increasingly polarized country, the elections have become a contest of hatred, which will not be won by the most loved candidate, but by the least hated one. And here Lula may have an advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alejandro Tena argues at P\u00fablico<\/em><\/a> that the world order is changing with the way international conflicts unfold on the map. Wars do not only come with tanks and guns, but are articulated in a hybrid format in which conventional weapons are combined with new ones. A report recently published by CIDOB on the way offensive weapons are diversified between countries emphasizes disinformation strategies, the use of economics and geo-economics or migrations used in conflicts. The concept of hybrid warfare is not new. It became popular in the early 21st century in Iraq and Afghanistan and became visible in the way violence was unleashed, alternating traditional methods with those of disinformation, kidnapping and even Al-Qaida terrorism. Now, hybrid conflicts are proliferating at a time when the hegemony of the West is being contested and international norms are being eroded. The current conflict between Russia and Europe, after the invasion of Ukraine, is leaving clear examples of these hybrid threats. Moscow is making using energy resources to blackmail Europe by taking advantage of their dependence. In addition, there is intervention by private powers too. These, act sometimes act in such an ambiguous way that it is difficult to assess whether they do so on the sidelines of governments or at their behest. The case of large technology companies is the most obvious, with companies such as Google, which stopped showing real traffic information on its mapping service to prevent Russia from obtaining additional information during the first weeks of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline is one of the most serious events linked to the war in Ukraine that have taken place outside the strict battlefield. The war in Ukraine is the war of energy and the battlefield goes far beyond the grain fields near the Black Sea. The decommissioning of the two large Baltic gas pipelines coincides in time with Russia’s annexation of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces after fraudulent referendums, activated immediately after the unexpected defeat of Russian troops in the east of the country. Now, no one has irrefutable evidence on the authorship of these acts of sabotage, which require a high degree of training in submarine combat techniques. It is not easy to drill a four-centimetre-thick steel pipe, covered with an anti-corrosion layer of another four centimetres, at the same time protected by an 11-centimeter concrete lining. Powerful explosives had to be used at a depth of about a hundred meters. For now, Russia cannot be singled out as the author of the sabotage, despite the fact that the action fits its current tactical interests: to undermine Germany’s morale, to warn Europe that the winter can be very harsh, to accentuate the contradictions between European countries in the face of the difficulties ahead, harden a possible negotiation on the future of Ukraine and sow confusion, accusing the United States of sabotage, as the Europeans will depend more on imports of liquefied natural gas from North America. On the other hand, it is contradictory that Russia could be behind the sabotage of an infrastructure that has cost it billions. Therefore, it will be necessary to be very attentive on the results of the ongoing investigations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding the war in Ukraine, Amy Mckinnon emphasizes in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> that the intensity of the mobilization campaign in Buryatia (the same goes for Yakutia and Dagestan) fuels even more suspicions on the recruitment of ethnic minorities as being disproportionate to its weight in the general population. Although the Russian authorities keep in secret the exact number of casualties since the beginning of the war, US intelligence services claim that it could reach 20,000 dead while the Ukrainians consider that the number could be more than double. In this context, activist groups and some local media suspect that casualties among ethnic minorities are also disproportionately high. The BBC’s Russian Service examined reports of more than 6,000 confirmed battlefield casualties and found that by early September, troops from Dagestan, Buryatia and the Krasnodar region in southern Russia made up the bulk of losses. One reason for the higher enlistment rate is that the peripheral regions of Russia are significantly poorer than the western regions and in Buryatia, where the average monthly wage is one-third that of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the military offers a stable salary.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is confirmed by Shaun Walker in The Guardian<\/em><\/a> with the example of the Crimean Tatars. Human rights activists say Russia-ordered mobilization on the annexed peninsula disproportionately affects Crimean Tatars, an ethnic group that has largely opposed Russian rule since the annexation in 2014. The Tatars of Crimea, mostly Muslims, represent around 13% of the population and although there is no official list with the breakdown of who has been mobilized, Crimea SOS, a Ukrainian human rights organization, estimates that 90% of the mobilization notices have been delivered to Crimean Tatars. The Tatars became a minority after Russia took over the region in the 18th century under Catherine the Great. Later, Stalin deported the entire population to Central Asia during the Second World War, falsely claiming that they were collaborators with the Nazis, and most were only able to return to the peninsula in the 1980s. This long experience of persecution led many Crimean Tatars to be extremely hostile to the Russian annexation in 2014. Russian authorities subsequently tried to co-opt Crimean Tatar leaders, but most refused to cooperate. A campaign of harassment and persecution began against active leaders of the community, and Russia outlawed the Mejlis, the representative body of the Crimean Tatars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The results of the so-called independence referendums in the occupied Ukrainian regions, which have had no legal or procedural guarantees, have come as no surprise: the annexation option has won by a large majority. The holding of these consultations should not be read as an isolated event. The order to go ahead with the referendums was given in parallel with the partial mobilization decree in the context of a Ukrainian counter-offensive that has set off all the alarms around the Kremlin. These two orders, along with the reform of the Penal Code increasing the penalties for deserters, also coincided in time with the growing discomfort that Moscow’s main partners, China and India, have expressed during the summit held in Samarkand in end of September. In this context, Ruth Ferrero points out to El Pa\u00eds<\/em><\/a> <\/em>the three strategic objectives that the Russian president wants to achieve through these annexations. The first is to be able to show public opinion the achievement, at least partially, of one of the objectives of this military campaign, the reconstruction of Novorossiya<\/em>, the recovery of the imperial idea of \u200b\u200bCatherine the Great to incorporate into Russia nation the eastern and southern territories of Ukraine. The second is to focus on the risk of nuclear escalation, since Russian military doctrine covers the use of nuclear weapons in the event that part of its territory is attacked and this includes the regions that have been incorporated recently. Finally, the third involves freezing the conflict, which would allow Russia to gain time to rebuild its forces and capabilities. Ultimately, however, what Putin has already achieved is the chronology and prolongation of the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the same vein, Xos\u00e9 M. N\u00fa\u00f1ez Seixas<\/a> also argues in El Pa\u00eds that the annexation of the territories of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia constitutes another perversion of the principle of national self-determination and is a rude caricature of that Wilsonian spirit of 1917-18. It also seems to invoke the Soviet doctrine of the right to self-determination, even if Putin renounces the Bolshevik heritage, for being divisive and for having “invented” a Ukrainian nation, which\u2014 according to him and much of Russian nationalism\u2014 is artificial. We can consider that, with this move, Putin’s Russia intends to pressure Ukraine to accept something like a territorial peace. Get the exhausted contender, stronger, more motivated and better armed than thought seven months ago, to give in as Finnish Marshal Mannerheim did in 1940: sit down at a table and agree that it is worth losing some ground to guarantee the territorial integrity of the majority of the country. And that the West will get tired of paying the bill for the war, in the form of a General Winter that will make millions of European citizens tremble because of the lack of gas supply. But at the same time, it is a move that closes any door to a negotiation in the short or medium term, and generates a new escalation since, following the annexation, Russia sees itself as self-legitimized to defend itself against any attack with the weapon nuclear. In addition, another intention is uncovered which consists not only of “liberating” Donetsk and Lugansk, the former secessionist republics, but also of annexing other territories with a Russian-speaking majority, but not pro-Russian. In short, from the Kremlin’s point of view, it is a war of conquest and reconstruction of the site of the old imperial Russia and its area of \u200b\u200binfluence, in front of a West guilty of all the misfortunes of the country and its subsequent decline from 1991.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding European affairs, although the result of the legislative elections in Italy had been predicted by all the polls, the sweeping victory of the right-wing coalition led by the post-fascists Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is warning: for the first time since the creation of the Italian Republic (1946) and the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), a political force that has its origins in fascism and refractory to Europeanism will head the government of one of the founding countries of the European Union and third economy of the continent. With practically 44% of the votes, the coalition that unites FdI, Forza Italia and the Lega has obtained 59% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 57.5% in the Senate, thanks to the majority bias of the electoral law. Thus, the right has won comfortably thanks to its ability to unite in a coalition, while the great mistake of the Partito Democratico (PD) has been to remain isolated after rejecting an alliance \u2013 albeit problematic \u2013 with the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S). The three key points of this election have been first the ability of FdI to capture the right-wing electorate at the expense of the Lega, which has fallen below 9%, thus revealing that the communicating vessels within the coalition have been severely penalized the erratic strategies of Salvini. Second, the reconversion of the M5S into a populist force leaning towards the left, which has been able to subtract votes from the PD, especially in the south. Finally, the growth of the appeal of the only party that was not integrated into the majority of the national unit of the Draghi government, FdI. In a way, the results reveal the division that continues to exist in the country between the real political dynamic and its perception: on the one hand, a Draghi at the peak of national popularity and international prestige, and on the other, the success of the parties most opposed to his executive. The short election campaign defined the priorities of the Italians: the credibility of the ruling class, the economy and security. Neither the danger of fascism, nor civil rights, nor the so-called Draghi Agenda (the set of reforms proposed by the former prime minister) have had an impact on the mobilization of a large part of the electorate. The victory of FdI also means the definitive political normalization of the extreme right in Italy and in Europe. In this sense, we cannot forget the recent election results in Sweden where the extreme right has become the second party and will in all probability form part of the new government. At the same time, the fact that more and more media refer to the future Italian government as centre-right clearly shows this normalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many analysts predict a short-lived government due to the differences between the political forces of the coalition, especially on foreign policy, relations with Europe and fiscal policy. It is also necessary to assess the position of the three leaders after the elections: Salvini has been greatly weakened by the bad result that has turned his formation into a residual force. For his part, Silvio Berlusconi, despite having the key to governability with his deputies and his claim to become president of the Senate, is 86 years old and in a very precarious state of health. Nor can it be ignored that the international context, inflation and the energy crisis will also play a fundamental role in the stability of a government in a country where the average duration of executives since 1946 is 18 months. One of the important challenges, and a point of disagreement with the other coalition partners, is Europe and the war in Ukraine. Meloni has positioned himself unequivocally against Putin and in favor of supporting, even militarily, Ukraine. More ambiguous are the positions of Salvini and Berlusconi, closer to Russia’s arguments. On the other hand, FdI wants to change the position of Italy in Europe and demands an increase in the defense of the national interest. Another controversial point is the reform of the state and the Constitution that Meloni wants to carry out. Such as  the direct election of the President of the Republic, since he considers this to be the system most capable of guaranteeing the will of the popular vote. However, since they have not obtained a two-thirds majority, any reform will have to be approved in a referendum (the PD has already announced that it would oppose any reform in this regard, while Matteo Renzi has opened up to dialogue). However, there is no doubt that, at least in the short and medium term, the indisputable victory of FdI will allow Giorgia Meloni to impose her criteria, especially if consider the good relationship she maintains with Mario Draghi (whom some believe could become the “Lord Protector” of Meloni), who expressed in the middle of the campaign his confidence in the future government “whatever its color”, thus dealing a definitive blow to Enrico Letta’s PD. Thus, with his schedule of contacts in Brussels and Washington, the former president of the European Central Bank can allow a soft landing of the new government in international relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Niccol\u00f2 Locatelli  states at the Italian magazine specialized in geopolitics Limes<\/em><\/a>  that the new government had to reassure the United States and the probable future prime minister has not only guaranteed continuity with Draghi’s foreign policy but also has spoken in favor of Taiwan and against the renewal of the memorandum of understanding on the new Silk Road signed by the first Conte Government in 2019. Other good news for Washington are the poor results of the parties led by the most close to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Matteo Salvini’s Lega and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, which reduce their ability to influence issues such as sanctions against Moscow and arms shipments to Kyiv. Regarding the relations in Europe, the situation is more complex. Meloni is close to the governments of Hungary and Poland, which are no longer countries of secondary importance for Italy compared to France and Germany. Despite of Rome sharing with Warsaw and Budapest an industrial system close to the German geo-economic sphere, they are separated by the Italian specific and by geography, which leads Italy to focus on the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Italy’s priority now is to ensure that the flow of money from the EU recovery fund is not interrupted. Consequently, Meloni will have to quickly find a modus operandi with Berlin, Paris and all the capitals (of northern Europe) that had shortly put aside their traditional skepticism towards Italy just because Mario Draghi was its prime minister. Another priority will be to prevent the tensions \u2014geopolitical, economic, and migratory\u2014 that accumulate on the southern shore of the Mediterranean to ompact Italy. In this sense, Turkey, whose president Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan maintains excellent relations with Berlusconi, could be an ally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fran\u00e7ois Hublet analyzes in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> <\/em>the reasons why, after the elections of 11 September in Sweden, the far-right party led by Jimmie \u00c5kesson has become the second political force in country and the author proposes a series of clues to understand the emergency and the nationalist ideology with populist aspirations of the Sweden Democrats (SD). Firstly, the SD is a party that has its historical roots in Swedish far-right circles. When the party was founded in 1988, a significant part of its members came from the racist and nationalist movement Bevara Sverige Svenskt (\u201cKeep Sweden Swedish\u201d). From 1995, however, there was a change in direction for the party, which tried to distance itself from the neo-Nazi imagery (uniforms, torch symbol) that had accompanied it until then, and reformed its program to attract to a wider audience. Second, SD presents a constantly rising electoral trajectory since its creation, but only from 2010 did the results reach a level sufficient to break the “Swedish exception”. Since then, the trend has never reversed. Third, the role of Jimmie \u00c5kesson, historical leader of the party. A member of SD since he was a teenager, \u00c5kesson took over as party leader in 2005, aged just 26. Since then, he has carried out a policy of modernizing the image of the movement, in the construction of which his own personality plays a central role. Fourth, an ideology marked by nationalism and the rejection of Islam, something common amongst the radical, populist, nativist and neoconservative right. Fifth, a political program focused on security and the welfare state. Beyond security issues, the SD devotes special attention to social policy, which allows them to reach a large part of the electorate. The party has thus seized the issue of pensions, which wants to increase. The family, an area in which proposes to pay pregnant women a subsidy during pregnancy and extend the duration of paternity leave. Healthcare, for which he wants greater centralization and the limitation of the right of foreigners to access the healthcare system. And mobility, defending a limitation of the price of petrol and diesel. Sixth, an increase in votes caused by fear of immigration and economic difficulties. While SD voters come from all social groups, the party’s electoral share among disadvantaged populations is higher than average. Seventh, the sanitary cordon created by the other parties was largely broken after the political crisis of 2021. Eighth, the election on September 11, 2022 meant that the SD came in second place with 20.5% and 73 seats; the centre-right (19.1%), the Christian Democrats (5.3%) and the Liberals (4.6%) share the remaining 103 seats. Given the parliamentary cooperation that has already started since 2021 between SD and the centre-right, everything indicates that a coalition government could be formed between the right and the extreme right. Ninth, however, their participation in the government is not guaranteed either, since the negotiations between the four parties involved have not led to the signing of any coalition agreement yet. Finally, SD’s success may mark a watershed moment for the new generation of European conservatives and reformists, as in the European Parliament, SD are part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group instead of the traditional extreme group Right of Identity and Democracy (ID). Ultimately, its inclusion in the heart of the European right through the interaction of alliances constitutes an important development; the fact that this evolution occurs simultaneously in Italy and Sweden, political spaces with institutional cultural practices that seem opposed, confirms the continental nature of the phenomenon. The normalization of the European extreme right therefore seems to be entering a new era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic field, Ben McWilliams states in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> that the energy crisis that Europe is experiencing is of a similar scale to that of the oil shock in the 70s. To overcome it, a new energy policy is proposed on a European scale. So far, the political response to Europe’s energy crisis has focused too much on national directives and could end up jeopardizing the goals of easing energy markets and meeting ambitious decarbonisation targets. On the other hand, Russia’s manipulation of the natural gas markets since the summer of 2021, taking advantage of its significant market share, has aggravated the situation. Finally, events such as the low French nuclear production and the current drought, which has reduced hydroelectric production, have also had a negative impact on the general situation. By subsidizing energy consumption rather than reducing demand, European governments risk falling into unsustainability, eroding confidence in energy markets, slowing sanctions action against Russia and increasing the cost of the transition to net carbon emissions. Therefore, McWilliams argues that the leaders of the European Union must agree on a large energy market based on four principles: 1) states must show maximum flexibility in terms of supply; 2) considerable efforts are needed to reduce demand; 3) political commitment must be guaranteed to maintain energy markets and cross-border flows; and 4) compensation must be put in place for the most vulnerable consumers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the newspaper El Salto<\/em><\/a>, Jaume Portell outlines that 70% of the gas consumption in the EU comes from gas pipelines and the rest from liquefied natural gas (LNG). In front of the danger of a total closure from Moscow, the EU has been increasing its purchases of GNL from abroad. The GNL, is natural gas that has been converted into liquid. For the process to be successful three actors are needed: selling countries, transport and purchasing countries. The selling countries need to convert the gas into liquid for it to be transported by vessels. The transport must have incorporated the capabilities to reconvert the liquid into gas in order to introduce it again to the system. These vessels have become very important since only 700 exist. 10% of them are property of the enterprise Nakilat from Qatar. This Gulf country, together with the US and Australia, will have, thus, a major role in the resolution of the energetic crisis in Europe since these three countries represent a 60% of the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding sustainability and climate change, the Financial Times<\/em><\/a> <\/em>warns that droughts, fires and heat waves have already become part of our everyday life. These effects, caused by climate change, threaten key infrastructures for humanity, whether economic or vital, such as food or water. The dimension of these effects will be greater if the emission reduction targets set out in the Paris Agreement of 2015 are not achieved. In addition, this impact will have even more negative consequences in developing countries, which, not only will be more affected, but will also have fewer resources to deal with the consequences. Consequently, resilience and adaptation should be two of the key concepts for the COP27 to be held at the end of the year in Sharm El Sheikh. Some progress is already being made, such as the preparation of adaptation plans specially designed for the local specificities of each country or region. At the same time, some companies are starting to analyze their vulnerabilities and act accordingly. Creating adaptation plans is particularly complicated for three reasons. First, understanding the risks of climate change is a complex task, as not only are its effects variable, but the combinations of its consequences are difficult to predict. Secondly, the amount of data available on climate change and how to combat it is immense and there is great difficulty in coordinating the different government branches that have competences in often interrelated areas. Finally, adaptation and resilience projects have difficulty obtaining funds, as they do not offer short-term returns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Simultaneously, in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> <\/em>Bruno Ma\u00e7\u00e3es argues that European countries are starting to realize that thegreen transition does not consist of making small changes, but of completely changing the operating system. The change of geopolitical actors and the diversification of the economy are essential to contribute to this energetic revolution. The increasingly necessary need for change in a very tense global context has its impact on large fossil energy exporters such as Venezuela, Russia or Iran, which are increasingly concerned. For Europe, this transition is particularly delicate as it continues to depend on global flows of fossil fuels and, since the Suez crisis in 1956, is no longer in a position to control them. As for renewable energy, its limits have become clear in the current crisis: this summer, 12% of electricity in the EU was generated from solar energy, a lower figure than the 16% generated by coal in the same period. The need for this revolution is unquestionable, and Ma\u00e7\u00e3es believes that energy can even replace work and capital as the only engine of production, since all kinds of machines can be built and run in a world of energy abundance if the transition were to be successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the pages of Social Europe<\/em><\/a>, Mariana Mazzucato warns us that the pandemic is not over yet and that new ones may come. While the summer of 2022 has been much easier than that of 2020 in Europe, 15,000 people still die every week due to COVID-19, and the arrival of a new pandemic is becoming more and more likely. For these reasons, the leaders of the G20 agreed to promote a financing instrument that is responsible for the preparation and response to a new pandemic (PPR<\/a>). This instrument, promoted by the World Bank and the WHO, is set to have an annual budget of 10.5 billion within the framework of the Intermediate Financing Fund (FIF). As a financing instrument, the FIF has been criticized by many of the developing countries for its decision-making system based on the contribution of the donors. Mazzucato, instead, argues in favor of a more inclusive governance where all countries are part of the decision-making. In this way, common goods such as health or the climate could be managed differently. Although it seems that progress is being made in this direction, the FIF budget is insufficient to meet the challenges ahead, as the World Bank<\/a> itself estimates that it represents only one tenth of the necessary budget. In addition, there is no guarantee that the FIF will last over time as has happened previously with funds intended to prepare long-term challenges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, Miquel Sureda argues in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that, after decades of collaboration between nations in space programs, tensions are resurfacing between blocs with conflicting interests. Although it is too early to think that a new space race is being launched and it is difficult to predict where the complex world equilibrium will take us, the situation is still worrying. Thus, shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, the European Space Agency (ESA) announced the suspension of the main joint missions with Roscosmos,<\/em> the Russian Space Agency. In April, Dmitry Rogozin, then director of Roscosmos<\/em>, declared that Russia would end its participation in the International Space Station (ISS) if economic and trade sanctions imposed on Moscow were not lifted. For decades, Russia has collaborated in space with NASA and ESA, regardless of the various episodes of confrontation experienced on Earth. Because of this collaboration, the ISS was launched in 1998, with a Russian segment, an American segment and the participation of ESA, Japan and Canada. International cooperation, sustained for more than 20 years at the ISS, made us think that international relations had certain rules on Earth and different rules in space. However, this paradigm is no longer useful. Now, Roscosmos<\/em> officials have expressed their intention to develop their own space station by 2025 and have announced plans to build a lunar research station together with China, which, for its part, is the new power to consider in space. In recent years, its ambitious space program has achieved many successes, such as deploying a satellite navigation system, collecting lunar samples, landing a robot on Mars or sending astronauts to its own Spatial Station. In addition, Beijing has announced plans for a manned mission to the moon this decade. At the same time, the growing number of countries and companies operating in Earth and beyond has raised alarms about a possible militarization of space. So far, only Russia, China, the US and India have anti-satellite weapons, designed to disable or destroy satellites for strategic military purposes, but the Pentagon believes more countries, including Iran and Israel, are already developing them. Faced with a possible militarization of space, added to the race for the exploitation of space resources, it is necessary to see what role does international legislation plays. However, unfortunately, most of the regulation is based on international treaties that were approved many decades ago. Rules have become obsolete in face of current problems and it is essential to update them. Ultimately, only by ensuring control of the use of weapons in space and sustainable models of exploitation will the growing tension on Earth be prevented from having catastrophic consequences in space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Illustration: <\/strong>Diana Machulina, “Adieu aux armes”, 2009<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Montserrat Viv\u00f3 and Mart\u00ed Serra, trainee students at the CETC, participated in this issue of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia despite the successful counteroffensive, the over representation of ethnic minorities, the partial mobilization acted by Putin, and the Nord Stream sabotage are some of the latest developments of the war in Ukraine.  Diari de les idees also analyses, in this edition, the electoral processes that took place these last weeks in Sweden and Italy, and will take place in Brazil. These processes have common features such as the increase and even triumph of far right and its great resilience, in Brazil. Other important topics are the future possible scenarios in the reorganization of\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":60719,"template":"","category_newspaper":[454],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-60728","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-454"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 69 – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-69\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 69 – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia despite the successful counteroffensive, the over representation of ethnic minorities, the partial mobilization acted by Putin, and the Nord Stream sabotage are some of the latest developments of the war in Ukraine.  Diari de les idees also analyses, in this edition, the electoral processes that took place these last weeks in Sweden and Italy, and will take place in Brazil. 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