{"id":62622,"date":"2023-02-24T09:30:00","date_gmt":"2023-02-24T07:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\/"},"modified":"2023-03-10T13:43:40","modified_gmt":"2023-03-10T11:43:40","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 78 \u2013 Special issue war in Ukraine: one year of an inconceivable event"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Diari de les idees<\/em> is back with a special issue about the first year of war in Ukraine; twelve months after what everyone considered to be an inconceivable event. Logically, the structure of this issue is different from the usual, and we focus our analysis on five areas: the valuation of a year of conflict; the prospective and possible future scenarios; the geostrategic consequences; the impact of war on Russia; the challenge of winning peace; and finally, the peace plan<\/a> proposed by People’s Republic of China, which was published the 24th<\/sup> of February, on the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On this one-year anniversary, the two main leaders of the opposing sides made statements within a few hours apart. The unexpected visit of the President of the United States to Kyiv is historic and, perhaps, defining. It is historic because it is the first time that an American president has visited Ukraine in office since George W. Bush in 2008, before the Russian annexation of Crimea. He has done so in a country at war in which no U.S. combat troops are deployed, that does not belong to NATO, with whom Washington has no formal mutual defence agreement. It is also defining since, beyond the new 500 million dollars package for Ukraine, Joe Biden has restated that the U.S. is prepared to go to any length necessary to achieve victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, Vladimir Putin announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly<\/a>, before the Duma, the suspension of Russia’s participation in the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START III<\/a>), signed with the U.S. in 2010, which limits the nuclear arsenal of both powers. He also recalled the legacy of the generation that fought against the Nazi invader, a common resource of Russian propaganda, and that step by step, they would achieve their goals. The Kremlin also denounced that Western countries do not hide their aim to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia; their intention to make a local conflict become a global confrontation, and accused them of having initiated hostilities. Finally, the Russian president referred to the alleged moral decadence of the West, again using his anti-LGBT discourse to justify the cultural war that, in his view, also confronts Russia and the West.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the valuation of the conflict, the annual balance<\/a> just published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies <\/em>(IISS<\/a>) reveals that Russia is resorting to old military equipment due to its significant material losses, while Kiev is compensating for the damage with modern armament provided by its Western allies. The balance highlights that the armed forces of both countries have suffered heavy wear since the beginning of the invasion: Russia has reportedly lost around 50% of its most sophisticated tanks, and has had to use older equipment. At the same time, the reinforcement of the front lines with soldiers recruited to make up for big combat losses has led to the influx of less experienced troops to the front lines. The report also pointed out that Moscow has lost about 8% of its aviation. Russia’s failure to achieve aerial superiority has meant that its troops have had to strike Ukrainian targets from long distance, with a massive use of land-attack cruise missiles and similar weapons. This has meant that Russia has taken advantage of close relations with Iran to provide itself with drones, other unmanned aerial vehicles and direct-attack munitions, which it has repeatedly used to bomb Ukrainian infrastructure. In contrast, Ukraine has taken advantage of Western support to begin a process of transformation of its weaponry, with increasing use of modern artillery, and armoured vehicles to replace older Soviet-era equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stephen Walt reviews for Foreign Policy<\/a><\/em> the five major lessons he believes can be drawn from this first year of war. First, it is obvious that Vladimir Putin was wrong when he assumed that Ukraine could not put up serious resistance. He miscalculated Russia’s military capability, Ukraine’s persistence, and Western Europe’s willingness to find alternative sources of energy. But Westerners also made mistakes: they dismissed the possibility of years of war, overestimated the impact of economic sanctions, and underestimated Russian opposition to Western efforts to bring Ukraine into their orbit. Second, the war reminds us that states in the international system often unite to resist acts of aggression. This is another lesson that Putin overlooked: besides believing that Ukraine would fall quickly, he seemed to believe that NATO would not respond as eagerly as it has. Thus, instead of fighting a weaker opponent, Russia is now fighting a war against a country supported by a coalition whose combined GDP is almost 20 times greater than its own. Third, wars are not won until they are over. After twelve months, the conventional forces of the two states are still fighting on the battlefield and looking for new ways to pressure the other side. When Russia’s initial attack failed and its forces suffered heavy losses, Ukraine and its supporters concluded that generous foreign aid, Ukrainian determination, and economic sanctions could inflict a decisive defeat on Russia, and perhaps even remove it from the ranks of the great powers. However, Russia remains a major power, with a population more than three times that of Ukraine, a large military-industrial base, and substantial reserves of military equipment. Fourth, the war favours extremists and therefore it becomes more difficult to discuss any kind of compromise, even when neither side has a clear path to victory. But one has to wonder whether the hawkish voices have thought that prolonging the war might lead to a worse outcome for Ukraine. There is a rather disturbing precedent: U.S. support for local forces in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan prolonged these wars, but these countries were no better off when the United States withdrew. Finally, this war would have been much less likely if the United States had adopted a strategy of foreign-policy constraint. If American and Western policymakers had heeded repeated warnings about the consequences of NATO’s eastward enlargement instead of trying to incorporate Ukraine into Western economic and security institutions, Russia’s encouragement to attack would have been much less. It is clear that Putin is the principal responsible for initiating a brutal and illegal war, but Biden\u2019s administration and its predecessors are not blameless either. Ultimately, Ukrainians are now suffering from Putin’s cruelty, but also from the arrogance and naivet\u00e9 of Western leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Euractiv<\/a><\/em> also assesses the material and human cost of the conflict. In terms of military losses, according to the latest Norwegian estimates, 180,000 Russian soldiers and 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed or wounded during the conflict. Other Western sources estimate that the war has claimed 150,000 lives on each side. By comparison, about 15,000 Soviet soldiers died in a decade of fighting in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. Everything indicates that the high casualty rate is due to the fact that most soldiers are poorly trained recruits; others are recruited from Russian prisons to enlarge the ranks of Wagner\u2019s paramilitary group and serve as cannon fodder. In terms of civilian losses, between 30,000 and 40,000 civilians have been killed across the country according to Western sources. On the other hand, it should also be noted that land mines will also be a major threat to civilians in the future since about 30% of Ukrainian territory has been contaminated. Human Rights Watch<\/a><\/em> also accuses Ukrainian troops of having laid banned anti-personnel mines in the eastern region of Izyum. Experts warn that demining operations could take decades. Another aspect is that of the war crimes committed, that were evident after AFP journalists entered Bucha on April 2nd<\/sup> of 2022, and found the streets full of civilian bodies, or when a missile hit the Kramatorsk railway station, causing numerous civilian casualties. About 65,000 alleged war crimes have been reported since the start of the war, according to EU commissioner for Justice Didier Reynders. UN investigators have accused Russia of committing war crimes on a massive scale: attacks, executions, torture, and sexual violence. Kiev also alleges that more than 16,000 children have been forcibly deported to Russia or areas controlled by separatists supported by Moscow. On the other hand, several NGOs have reported Ukraine for violating the rights of Russian war prisoners, but on a much smaller scale. In this regard, the International Criminal Court<\/a> opened an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity last year, despite the fact that it cannot prosecute either country for possible war crimes, as neither Russia nor Ukraine is a member of the Hague-based court. Instead, Kyiv is pushing for the creation of a special tribunal to judge Russian crimes. Economically, homes, shops, and factories have been destroyed in occupied areas. Nationally, Russia has repeatedly attacked key energy infrastructure, causing blackouts and leaving millions of people without heating during the winter. The World Bank announced in October that the country’s economy would shrink by 35% by 2022. The Kiev School of Economics estimated in January that rebuilding all the war-torn infrastructure would cost some 138 billion dollars. In a country famous for its grain and sunflower oil exports, the war has caused more than 34 billion dollars in economic losses in the agricultural sector. The reconstruction of Ukraine would cost some 349 billion dollars, according to a joint assessment by the Ukrainian government, the European Commission, and the World Bank. Nor can one forget the more than eight million Ukrainians who have been forced to scape Ukraine since the war broke out, according to the UN refugee agency, making this exodus the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the economic point of view, the effects of the war have taken their toll on families, companies, and states. Everything indicates that its consequences will continue to have an impact, at least throughout 2023 and 2024 in the form of high interest rates that will continue to affect the purchasing power, the investment, and the spending capacity of public budgets. The impact of the war on the European economy in general and the Catalan and Spanish economies in particular has led to higher energy and raw material prices. The rapid escalation of inflation has led to the greatest loss of purchasing power in the last 40 years and has forced states to commit significant amounts of public money to soothe the effects of rising prices. However, the measures taken by governments against inflation and Europe’s ability to cope with the block of Russian energy supplies, have made a rapid correction viable. In Spain, inflation has fallen from 10.8% in July last year to 5.9% in January this year, and in the Eurozone it has fallen from 10.6% in October to 8.5% in January. The Banco de Espa\u00f1a<\/em> forecasts that inflation will fall to an average of 4.9% in 2023 and 3.6% in 2024. We would have to wait until 2025 to see inflation below 1.8%, according to these forecasts. To stop inflation, central banks in the Eurozone, the U.S. and the UK have undertaken a major interest rate rise. In the Eurozone, the official price of money has risen from 0% to 3% in just seven months. Analysts anticipate that the official price of money could peak at around 4% by the middle of the year. Still, for the states, most of which are over-indebted after the pandemic, the rise in interest rates is perceived as an added risk to finances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for possible future scenarios, Owen Matthews in The Spectator<\/a><\/em> writes that a year into the conflict, Ukraine’s army is now better equipped than most NATO members, but it is still struggling to contain Russian advances into the Donbass, and could suffer badly from an early offensive in spring. Now that the West has crossed the Rubicon of tank supplies to Kyiv, Matthews believes it is worth to consider how to prevent the conflict from escalating into a world war. The scenario for Ukrainian victory is clear: expel Russian troops from all of its territory, including Crimea, and the self-proclaimed annexed Donbass republics. The situation in the rebel Donbass republics is less clear, especially because of the de facto<\/em> mass ethnic cleansing carried out by both sides that has caused up to two-thirds of the pre-war population of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics to leave. The fact that among the remaining population there is virtually no one who wants to join Ukraine, raises a very uncomfortable question: would the West agree to force citizens to join a nation they do not want to be part of? In Ukraine, the subject was taboo even before the war. Zelensky’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vadym Prystaiko, was dismissed after suggesting that the future of the Donbass should have to be decided by its inhabitants. The tragedy of this war is that there is no fair or safe solution for everyone. To formally ceding control of parts of Donbass and Crimea to Putin would reward aggression, leave Ukraine without a defensible natural border, and allow a regime dangerous to Kyiv and its neighbours to survive. On the contrary, allowing Ukraine to regain its 1991 borders would mean supporting what the local population would see as a coercive war of conquest. Putin, for his part, still has massive reserves of men and low-tech weapons, even though he is running out of arsenal of high-precision missiles. Matthews argues that, in a military contest between quality and quantity (Kiev’s superior morale, discipline, training, and equipment versus Moscow’s Soviet-style machine), there unfortunately comes a point where quantity eventually wins. That is why Putin is preparing a major offensive, probably from several directions, to take advantage of recent advances around Soledar and create a tactical advantage on the ground before Western tanks can be deployed. Thus, if Russia cannot hope to win this war, it still has a chance of not losing it. On the other hand, Zelensky is also in a far more uncertain position than his current popularity suggests. He has promised his people a total victory, and polls say that about 90% of Ukrainians believe him. If he fails, this would be politically fatal for him. So would the signing of any peace deal involving the loss of Ukrainian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military strategic specialist Edward Luttwak shares in UnHerd<\/a><\/em> that he sees only two possible important military movements now that the mobilisation of 300,000 reservists will add at least 150.000 useful soldiers to the Russian army; more than the total that took action in February last year. After a year of war, which is coming to a halt in spite of advances and relapses on both sides, Russia\u2019s new troops provide Putin with two possible strategies. First, new tropes could be used to continue fighting in an old-fashioned way, what at the moment means trying to expel the last Ukrainian forces out of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Now, Putin also has another path in front of him: let the troops from the secessionist republics of the Donetsk and Lugansk, the units of hired soldiers, and Wagner mercenaries to continue to push back the Ukrainians slowly. Also, with the new reservist units, their new troops transport vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and battle tanks, he could release a new offensive from Byelorussia that could completely change the terms of the war, since Russians could cut off every road and railroads carrying weapons, ammunitions, and civil supplies from Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, and the rest of the West. In this scenario, Luttwak considers that a victory, when it comes to an operational level that lets Russians to position on routs of important supplies for Ukrainians, could open a way to a diplomatic solution: the celebration of internationally supervised plebiscites in Donetsk and Luhansk in exchange for Russian withdrawal from all other areas in the south and southeast and, of course, the cessation of all fighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To evaluate how long Russia can contain its war effort, Max Seddon analyses in Financial Times<\/a><\/em> four key areas: the forces at battlefields; munition stock; the condition of the economy; and the attitude of the population towards the war. When it comes to munitions and military equipment, since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has lost at least 4,500 armoured vehicles, 63 fixed-wing aircraft, 70 helicopters, 150 unmanned aerial vehicles, 12 naval vessels and more that 600 artillery systems. Although Russia is currently deploying about 1,800 tanks and has 5,000 more reserved, most of them are equipment from the soviet era that were in bad conditions. When it comes to economy and finances, the GDP in Russia has fell by 2.1%, much less than the U.S. contraction during the financial crisis in 2007-2009, as the beneficial record of oil and gas of 11.6 million roubles (168 billion dollars) have helped the Kremlin to compensate Western efforts to shut Russia out of the global markets and supply chains. But the most recent data indicates that this can be a one-time situation: in January, the energy deposit fell 46% year-on-year, meanwhile the military spending has increased, and the deficit has shot up. In the matter of the availability of troops, before the beginning of war, the Russian army added between 740,000 and 780,000 forces, significantly less than the official data of 1.15 million. Russian forces deployed in Ukraine suffered heavy losses during the first weeks of the invasion and, by July, the U.S. estimated that more than 50,000 soldiers had been killed or wounded. Casualties have been especially relevant to elite units: by the end of the summer, up to 50% of Russia’s airborne force was out of the game. Now, Russia has a reserve of 30 million men of fighting age, between 18 and 50, although only 9 to 10 million have military experience. From a demographic point of view, Russia can continue to accumulate troops for much longer. Finally, as for popular support, the lack of popular enthusiasm indicates that Russian society remains very cautious. On the other hand, as censorship has effectively destroyed Russia’s independent media and has practically erased anti-war activism, it is difficult to know exactly what the population thinks beyond official polls (a poll conducted in November by a Kremlin-controlled company indicated that 60% of Russians believe Putin was right to start the war). In contrast, a poll<\/a>, published for the first time by independent journalists points to a growing generation gap: only 40% of Russians aged 18 to 45 think Russia was right to start the war versus 76% among those over 45. Finally, although Putin’s war machine is under enormous pressure it is still capable of launching new offensives as it still has enough resources to continue fighting in Ukraine for some time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to geostrategic consequences of the conflict, Luuk van de Middelaar states in El Pa\u00eds<\/a><\/em> that the strategic map of Europe has changed: borders are consolidating and power is shifting eastward. To understand what is happening, one has to see 2022 as a kind of \u2018mini 1989\u2019, since the invasion is the biggest geostrategic plundering to the European continent since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The first change caused by the invasion is the very concept of Europe: today, Russia is no longer Europe. Last March was an unmistakable symbol: Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe. A second change is the hardening of the borders: a clear demarcation line has re-emerged across the continent, like a new iron curtain, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and there is no longer any conceptual room for neutrality and non-alignment. Within the EU, the war plundering has altered many balances. Since the Russian invasion, the voices of Eastern Europeans have made themselves heard more loudly in public debates and at EU and NATO meetings. In particular, the Polish and the Baltics feel vindicated, since they have long been warning about Russia’s aggressive attitude and the naivety of Germany’s energy policy. The author also points out that with the interruption of Russian gas supplies, the Mediterranean countries suddenly find themselves in a new position of strength: hydrogen production from solar energy, imports from North Africa and Latin America, liquefied natural gas terminals from Barcelona to Sines (Portugal), and not forgetting Spain’s extraordinary regasification capacity. In conclusion, on the new Europe map, while the East is taking the lead in defence issues, the South is at the centre of the energy transition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile in the Financial Times<\/a><\/em>, Michael Scott presents a view of the invasion of Ukraine from the point of view of Latin American countries. Since the conflict began, several countries have intervened by sending military supplies to Ukraine, but Latin American countries have no intention of joining in. In fact, they have rejected Washington’s offer to give their Russian-made military equipment to Ukraine in exchange for receiving far superior and more modern U.S. weaponry. This has been evidenced by Brazil’s refusal to resell tanks to Berlin for their use in the conflict or Argentina’s refusal to contribute to the shipment of weapons. One of the reasons is because these countries understand the current war as a continuation of the old East-West conflict. They defend the need to reach a peaceful solution and argue that giving more military support in Ukraine will not lead to the end of the confrontation, but to its aggravation with the consequences that this would entail for all the states that are part of the international community. For this reason, Latin American political leaders are betting on a cease-fire without pre-established conditions. Thus, Latin America is somehow returning to the policy of non-interference and claiming its neutrality by not interfering in the affairs of others so as not to affect their future relations. Especially, they are aware that powers such as China or Russia may be sources of support in the near future and they do not want to alienate them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Along the same lines, a recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations<\/a><\/em> reveals Europeans and Americans agree on the total victory of Ukraine with the winning back of all the territories occupied by Russia. On the other hand, India, Turkey, Russia, and China citizens are mostly in favour of ending the war as soon as possible, even if this means ceding the Ukrainian territory. The survey<\/a> was also conducted among 19,000 people from new countries belonging to the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Turkey, Russia, and China, between December 2022 and January 2023. Survey respondents from non-Western countries consider that the emergence of a new multipolar world order after the war is more likely than the consolidation of a bipolar scenario. The authors suggest that the existence of such a marked difference of opinion between countries may be related to the way in which leaders in Europe and the United States have considered the war as a confrontation to defend democracy. If this rhetoric has served to unite the West, it has not had the same effect elsewhere, since for many survey respondents outside the West, their countries are also democracies, and perhaps even better than those in the West. On the other hand, in an increasingly fragmented and polarized world, countries like India and Turkey seem attracted to a free sovereignism, where every conflict between superpowers becomes an opportunity to show their relevance and ability to make sovereign decisions. In India, more than 80% survey respondents consider Russia, the U.S., the EU and the UK as allies or partners, while 76% see China as a rival or an adversary. The authors conclude that Ukraine’s victory in the war will be pivotal in determining the shape of the next European order but that it is highly unlikely that a US-led global liberal order will be re-established. Instead, the West will have to coexist in a multipolar world, with hostile dictatorships such as China and Russia, but also with independent great powers such as India and Turkey. Ultimately, this may turn out to be the major geopolitical turning point of the war: the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, Anders \u00c5slund analyses in La Vanguardia<\/a><\/em> the disastrous outcome of the invasion of Ukraine, and states that despite the fact that Russia has deployed 85% of its military power in Ukraine, it has only managed to take over an additional 11% of Ukrainian territory. He highlights that Putin has degraded, discredited and isolated Russia in such a way that it is difficult to describe the magnitude of the disaster he has brought to his country and the world. He has unleashed unjustified wars in Georgia and Ukraine; destroyed his own army; ended the freedom that begun under Gorbachev and Yeltsin service; isolated Russia from other developed countries; misused its economy; and paralyzed the country’s modernization. With his 2014 war against Ukraine, Putin isolated Russia from the U.S., Europe, and most of the former Soviet republics. He kept the third world and promoted the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). But now Brazil and South Africa have lost much of their appeal because of the economic halt caused by the end of the rise in raw material, and if India and China have not condemned Russia’s war, they have not supported it either. A few years ago, China surpassed Russia in GDP per capita in U.S. dollars, which means that its total GDP is ten times larger. Trade between Russia and China is taking a cleanly colonial appearance where China sells electronic components and other sophisticated manufactured goods to Russia, while buying oil and gas from Russia at low cost. Putin has thus been a catastrophe for the Russian economy. He inherited a reformed economy in 2000 and then enjoyed a decade-long rise in raw material, but the Russian economy came to a halt from 2014 onwards and, according to official statistics, Russia’s real disposable income fell by 10% between 2014 and 2020. On the other hand, Russia is a personal dictatorship with government institutions reduced to a minimum. \u00c5slund states that the three most common factors contributing to the fall of this type of regime are defeat in a war (which seems likely in Ukraine), social unrest (which has not yet manifested itself) or divisions among the security forces (so far not obvious). Finally, \u00c5slund considers that, whatever the evolution of events may be, it is difficult to imagine that Putin could survive a defeat in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Slate<\/a><\/em> magazine highlights, regarding a possible regime change in Moscow if Russia loses the war, that the history of Russian regimes is the history of their wars. They become more aggressive if they win; they falter or collapse if they lose. Thus, the Crimean War led to a lasting weakening of the Empire; the defeat against Japan led to the Battleship Potemkin riot; the First World War led to revolution and civil war, Afghanistan\u2019s led to the fall of the Soviet Union, and the second Chechen war allowed the rise to power of the current president. At a time when all scenarios are possible \u2013Ukrainian or Russian victory, standstill, peace process, division of the country\u2013 one thing is certain: everyone is already positioning themselves for the post-war period. The conflict has become the battleground between siloviki<\/em> (strong men), oligarchs and ultras, and what happens over the course of 2023 may decide not only the outcome of the war, but also the Kremlin\u2019s fate for the next ten years. Vladimir Putin relies above all on those close to him to make his decisions. These are the siloviki<\/em>, from the security agencies and the armed forces, often former colleagues of the KGB (Committee for State Security) in St. Petersburg. The second circle, unofficial and more heterogeneous, is mostly formed of oligarchs, and finally, there are the ultras, who do not belong to any circle. After months of fierce fighting around Bakhmut and Soledar, Wagner’s troops have won the first Russian victory in months, and the symbolic value should not be underestimated, since the ultras are ascending over the military. At the same time, however, if Putin gives permission to the ultras and their allies to contain the ambitions of his siloviki<\/em>, he also knows that he has to maintain his role as arbitrator between them. Thus, the day after Soledar’s capture, he named General Valeri Gerassimov, Chief of the General Staff, commander of Russian forces, with three objectives: to return the initiative to a conventional strategist in the face of the offensive planned for spring; to control the ego and ambitions of Yevgueni Prigozhin, Wagner’s boss; and to force the two sides, the conventional and the ultra, to work together. Finally, maintaining this balance between hostile factions is Putin’s best card to stay in power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Foreign Policy<\/a><\/em>, Alexey Kovalev questions what Russia is and states that not even Russians themselves can be sure what the borders of their country are. Recent published maps of Russia include regions of Ukraine that are not even controlled by the Kremlin’s army. Nor is there a definitive answer to the question of what kind of Russia is being fought for. In his latest state-of-the-nation speech<\/a>, Russian President Vladimir Putin provided no answers and merely delivered his usual string about the betrayal of the West, including its obsession with sexuality and gender. But the Russians’ confusion extends far beyond their national borders and war goals. The problem is much more existential: Russia does not know what it is and what its place in the world is. Therefore, this is the question of modern Russia. Is it an empire to be restored, as Putin seems to think? Is it destined to be an oligarchical autocracy, a kind of modern version of tsarism? Is it a post-Soviet society moving towards better infrastructure and perhaps even democracy? A former empire that wants to embrace a post-imperial future? Or something else entirely? These questions will be even more urgent to answer when the war is over, Putin’s influence over the country ends, and Russians try to build a common future within their borders. As the remnants of Russia’s imperial and post-imperial identity fade away, one has to wonder whether there will be anything left to form a Russian national idea, something the country has lacked since it emerged from the remnants of the Soviet Union in 1991. Putin’s answer has become quite clear to everyone. His national idea is openly imperialist: by invading Ukraine, he wants to restore the Kremlin’s control over a former Tsarist and Soviet colony, erasing its national identity and turning its inhabitants into Russians through repression and re-education. However, some Russians are beginning to contemplate an alternative vision of what a hypothetical democratization process might look like once Putin is no longer in power. A few days ago, Alexey Navalny outlined a 15-point plan<\/a> that starts with an obvious first point: recognize Putin’s criminal invasion, get out of Ukraine (including Crimea), pay reparations in Ukraine, and cooperate with international institutions to bring to justice those responsible for the war. He then, explicitly, points to Russian imperialism as the responsible: he claims that Russia is a huge country with a population that is decreasing, and therefore does not need more territory. He envisions Russia’s political future as a federal, parliamentary republic with authority delegated to the regions. Although Navalny’s proposals today still seem a very distant perspective, they are not inherently impractical. Just a generation ago, in the twilight years of the Soviet Union, Russian society emerged from more than seven decades of repression to hold its first semi-free elections in 1989, and in 1991 prevented a coup attempt by the most intransigent sectors of the CPSU. Even so, the Russian democrats finally failed and the two wars in Chechnya led to the emergence of the current regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, despite the dominant propaganda, some advocate to accept the challenge of winning peace. This is the case of the philosopher J\u00fcrgen Habermas who, in a long manifesto published in the S\u00fcddeutsche Zeitung<\/a><\/em>, raises issues such as the warlike tone of an almost uniform published opinion, the current weapons race, and when the military assistance provided by the West in Ukraine will no longer be considered as defensive by Russia. Habermas argues that the West has its legitimate interests and own obligations. Western governments operate in a broader geopolitical sphere and in this war they have to take into account interests other than those in Ukraine. They have legal obligations to the security needs of their citizens and also \u2013regardless of what the Ukrainian population thinks\u2013 a moral co-responsibility towards the victims and the destruction caused by the weapons coming from their countries. Therefore, they cannot transfer to the Ukrainian government the responsibility for the brutal consequences of a prolongation of hostilities that is only possible thanks to their military support. The fact that the West cannot avoid making its own important decisions and taking responsibility, also manifests itself in its main fear: a scenario in which Russian military superiority puts it in the choice of either submitting or becoming a belligerent party. Other more immediate reasons to quickly negotiate are the shortage of troops\u2019 reserves and necessary material resources for the war. Time also influences in the certainty and aptitudes of the Western population. Likewise, it is too easy to reduce the positions on the issue of the timetable for negotiations to a mere trade-off between morality and self-interest. The reasons for ending the war are above all moral. Habermas also criticizes the statement that Ukraine \u2018does not have to lose,\u2019 casts doubts on a friend or foe perspective that considers the warlike solution of international conflicts \u2018natural\u2019 and without alternative, even in the 21st century. A war, and considering the one initiated by Putin, is the symptom of a relapse in terms of civilized interaction between powers achieved throughout history; especially between powers that have learned the lesson of the two world wars. If the outbreak of armed conflict cannot be prevented with painful sanctions, even to the very defenders of international law, the necessary alternative is the investigation of bearable compromises. Habermas himself anticipates an obvious objection: for the time being there is no indication that Putin wants to start negotiations. It should be added, moreover, that Putin has taken decisions that make it almost impossible to start promising negotiations, since the annexation of the eastern provinces of Ukraine, he has created an unacceptable situation for the victims. At the same time, however, he also argues that this may have been an unfortunate response to the Western alliance’s mistake of deliberately leaving Russia in the dark since the beginning as regards to the military support, since this left open the perspective of a regime change, something unacceptable to Putin. In opposition, the stated goal of restoring the status quo prior to February 23rd, 2022 would perhaps have paved the way for negotiations later. But both sides wanted to demotivate the other by showing very ambitious and seemingly fixed positions. Finally, Habermas also raises other uncomfortable questions for the dominant narrative: will Ukraine alone decide the timing and purpose of hypothetical negotiations or will its European allies have a say? And what about the victims? If the war responds to a moral imperative, the casualties and destruction caused by Western weapons would also be part of our moral responsibility towards Ukraine. Habermas concludes that, from his point of view, these are main moral reasons that demand an end to the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An end to the war that is also desired by China, which has announced its willingness to present a peace plan coinciding with the first anniversary of the invasion. In Time<\/a><\/em> <\/em>magazine, Charlie Campbell states that China’s peace initiative represents a bold step that raises many questions. First, the timing of the plan. Historically, China has been involved several times in other conflicts, such as Korea\u2019s in 1950s and Vietnam\u2019s in 1970s, and perhaps being part of a peace factor in the war in Ukraine is its desire to demonstrate its relevance on the international scenario. Perhaps, the fact that the war is not going well for Russia, could have influenced. From China’s perspective, a quick victory for Putin would have been a humiliation for the U.S. and a sign of the West’s helplessness. However, the prolongation of the conflict has strengthened the EU and revived NATO. In this way, the longer the war drags on, the greater the chances that a military defeat will mean that Russia will not be able to maintain control over its territory. This would indicate a decline in its sphere of influence in Central Asia and a political vacuum along China’s northern border would be a significant security threat to Beijing. Another factor is that over the past twenty years, China has increased its contributions to international humanitarian efforts and is now the largest Security Council member contributing to UN peacekeeping forces. While Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has cautiously responded to the Chinese plan announcement. Whereas President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly ruled out an agreement that would involve giving up part of the territory, making it unclear how any compromise could be reached. However, a reasonable starting point might be to decree a ceasefire along the current frontlines to allow time to establish the appropriate mechanisms for future peace negotiations. Another motivation Beijing might have, would be to create disagreements between Kyiv and its Western allies. Certainly, as the war drags on, aid funding in Ukraine will become a potentially dividing factor between the U.S. and Europe. This in a context where China’s support and influence in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, the African Union and the Arab League is growing, indicating that Beijing is increasingly involved in the so-called Global South where, precisely, there are many voices disagree with the prevailing discourse on support to Ukraine. Finally, China’s presentation of its peace plan may take away from the United States the dominance of the moral discourse on commitment to peace and dialogue in a developing world. If China’s peace plan ends up being rejected by the West, it will surely affect strongly in developing countries, which are the ones that suffer the most from the consequences of war in terms of food and energy security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pilar Bonet argues in El Pa\u00eds<\/a><\/em> that one year after the beginning of the conflict, the idea that this absurd war will drag on indefinitely is reinforced. Russian attack is leaving a big European country in ruins and has already caused tens of thousands of deaths, perhaps hundreds of thousands, and millions of displaced people. Russia is destroying the Ukraine of today and also that of the future, attacking the civilian population and basic infrastructure, and its soldiers are torturing, sacking, plundering cultural heritage, and facilitating the deportation of children to be adopted and indoctrinated in Russia. The determination of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to continue to move forward, whatever the costs, without minding lives \u2013those of the Ukrainians and those of his mobilized fellow citizens\u2013 is opposed to President Volodymir Zelensky\u2019s and Ukrainians\u2019 courage to resist with the help of the weaponry provided by the West. In this context, Pilar Bonet states that neither side has enough forces to win, if there is such a concept nowadays. The NATO states are amazed to discover that their arsenal are not enough to keep the pace at which they are being spent in Ukraine, and Russia confirms that their armament is obsolete and has asked for help from countries such as Iran, with whom it is organizing the fabrication of drones. Both are increasing or are preparing to increase the capacity of their war industry. In Ukraine, the West is trying not to cross the red lines that could lead Russia to use the nuclear weapon. This danger has never ceased to exist, although it is not possible to determine the correlation between events on the battlefield and the likelihood that Vladimir Putin will push the button. Seemingly, as long as Russia has conventional weaponry and sufficient manpower, Putin will not resort to the last resource. The optimism that followed the Ukrainian offensive last autumn was infectious, but hasty. Western sanctions are damaging, but do not suffocate a Russia that finds its ways to avoid them; at the moment, Putin relies in a convinced, submissive, confused and frightened population that supports or resigns itself to the war. On the evolution of the war, several school of thoughts can be observed. Ukraine, some say, must be supported as much as it deems necessary to defeat Russia and expel it from its territory. Other say that Ukraine must accept territory losses in exchange for peace. The latter option is presented today with analogies such as the division of Korea or Germany, but Russia claims more than it already occupies and has inscribed in its Constitution Ukrainian territories which it does not even control. To attempt a ceasefire in Ukraine would require some intermediary structure made up by people or countries not involved neither in the war nor sanctions. In this sense, the initiative of the Brazilian president Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva to form a group of states that could intervene in the conflict may be interesting. Brazil, together with Russia, is a member of the so-called BRICS group, to which India, China and South Africa also belong. Behind the scenes, diplomatic groupings are already taking place between several countries and leaders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, William Partlett discuss in The Conversation<\/a><\/em> that in a situation where total victory for either side seems unlikely, there are many voices calling for a negotiated settlement to end the war. For example, China has already announced some details of a peace plan that intends to make public on the one-year anniversary of the start of the war. A critical underlying issue in any negotiated settlement is how the demands of both sides can be balanced to achieve a stable and lasting peace. The author finds that the answer often ignores an essential participant, the Ukrainian people. For both legal and political reasons, the Ukrainian constitutional democracy requires any peace agreement to be ratified by its people. If this is not taken into account, it is unlikely to reach a stable peace agreement. This entails a morale debate over whether Ukraine should be pushed to negotiate over the status of its sovereign territory, since a stable peace agreement cannot just be a diplomatic pact between Ukraine, Russia, China and the West. It also requires the support of the Ukrainian people for legal and political reasons. Actually, Ukraine is a constitutional democracy, which means that any formal transfer of part of Ukraine\u2019s territory (including Crimea) requires a constitutional change and, therefore, a referendum. In fact, article 156<\/a> of Ukraine\u2019s Constitution requires such changes to be submitted to a referendum in the whole Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the legal and political role of the Ukrainians was greatly ignored in the Minsk agreements prepared by Ukrainian, Russian, and European diplomats to try to solve the conflict that burst after the annexation of Crimea and the Russian-backed insurgency in Donbas in 2014. In this context, polls<\/a> show that 84% of Ukrainians reject any territorial concession to Russia.  Undoubtedly, popular opinion may change over time, especially if a peace agreement is prepared in a way that get the Ukrainians support. But the need for popular support will undoubtedly limit the number of concessions that Ukraine can make, and shape the details of any peace agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Photography: Adobe Stock images.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marc Espigares, Jiajin Angel Lin, Mar\u00eda Garc\u00eda and Anal\u00eda Cortez, trainees students at the CETC, have participated in this special issue of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Diari de les idees is back with a special issue about the first year of war in Ukraine; twelve months after what everyone considered to be an inconceivable event. Logically, the structure of this issue is different from the usual, and we focus our analysis on five areas: the valuation of a year of conflict; the prospective and possible future scenarios; the geostrategic consequences; the impact of war on Russia; the challenge of winning peace; and finally, the peace plan proposed by People’s Republic of China, which was published the 24th of February, on the official website of the Chinese\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":62246,"template":"","category_newspaper":[563],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-62622","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-563"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 78 \u2013 Special issue war in Ukraine: one year of an inconceivable event – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 78 \u2013 Special issue war in Ukraine: one year of an inconceivable event – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Diari de les idees is back with a special issue about the first year of war in Ukraine; twelve months after what everyone considered to be an inconceivable event. Logically, the structure of this issue is different from the usual, and we focus our analysis on five areas: the valuation of a year of conflict; the prospective and possible future scenarios; the geostrategic consequences; the impact of war on Russia; the challenge of winning peace; and finally, the peace plan proposed by People’s Republic of China, which was published the 24th of February, on the official website of the Chinese\u2026\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-03-10T11:43:40+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/02\/Diari-de-les-idees-especial-1-any-de-guerra-a-Ucraina.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1100\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"726\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"40 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/\",\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 78 \u2013 Special issue war in Ukraine: one year of an inconceivable event – IDEES\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/02\\\/Diari-de-les-idees-especial-1-any-de-guerra-a-Ucraina.jpg?fit=1100%2C726&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-02-24T07:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-03-10T11:43:40+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-78-especial-guerra-a-ucraina-un-any-despres-linimaginable-continua\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/02\\\/Diari-de-les-idees-especial-1-any-de-guerra-a-Ucraina.jpg?fit=1100%2C726&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/02\\\/Diari-de-les-idees-especial-1-any-de-guerra-a-Ucraina.jpg?fit=1100%2C726&ssl=1\",\"width\":1100,\"height\":726,\"caption\":\"Woman soldier. 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