{"id":62711,"date":"2023-03-09T08:39:04","date_gmt":"2023-03-09T06:39:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-79\/"},"modified":"2023-03-20T10:09:00","modified_gmt":"2023-03-20T08:09:00","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-79","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-79\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 79"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After the special issue focused on the first year of war in Ukraine, the Diari de les Idees<\/em> magazine takes back its analysis of the most relevant issues on the international scenario. We focus on the strategic changes in Japan\u2019s and Germany\u2019s defence policies as a consequence of the Russian invasion; Russia’s positioning in the Sahel as one of the key elements to pressuring the West; the need for Europe to design a new strategy for its North-South axis; the new agreement between the UK and the EU in attempt to fix the problem caused by Brexit in the Northern Ireland Protocol; the effectiveness and convenience of the application of economic sanctions to maintain geopolitical balances; the use of hydrogen as the future response to climate emergency: and the impact of AI in urban environments to predict demand for certain services, anticipate problems, and improve decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Slate<\/em><\/a>, Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Pennel points out that the rise in geopolitical dangers is braking the taboo on the war that has existed for almost 80 years in the German and Japanese communities. After the Second World War, both countries were demilitarised, rebuilt, and focused on economy and trade. This was a success, as Germany turned into the European driving force and Japan stood out in economic performance and modern technology, and was a role model for all of Asia. However, as a result of the Cold War, both demilitarised countries had to think about re-establishing their military. The Korean War exposed Japan to the communist advancement and in 1954 Washington encouraged Japan to found the Self-Defence Forces, and not an army, as this would have been unconstitutional and unpopular. Germany went in the same direction, with a major difference: the army with which the FRG was equipped was a real army. The Cold War had placed the country in a strategic position, and the U.S. encouraged its rearmament, At this time, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has awakened Germany from its pacifist dream and has made way for what Olaf Scholz summarised as Zeitenwende: <\/em>the change of era that implies a massive rearmament. The breakup has been more radical in Japan despite the fact that pacifism is deeply rooted. Thus, in solidarity with the Western camp, the Japanese have sent body armour and medical equipment to Ukraine. The shock wave of this conflict has also sensitise the Japanese population living near the geopolitical delicate areas such as North Korea, the Senkaku archipelago, where Japan has to face Chinese expansionism claiming sovereignty and Taiwan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Enric Juliana points out in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a> that Russia has obtained Mali’s favourable vote at the General Assembly of the United Nations and warns that Putin’s regime has conquered one of the largest countries in the Sahel. In fact, Mali is twice the size of Ukraine and has 22 million inhabitants, in the southern region, between the Niger and Senegal rivers. A very arid country in the north, with hidden treasures such as gold mines. Everyone has known this since Wagner\u2019s merchants took the place of French soldiers, and the UN vote has just confirmed it. The Bamako junta as paid for the lendable services, without being able to abstain as it did last year. The next country to fall will be Burkina Faso, a smaller but proportionally more populated country to the south of Mali, now governed by a military junta that has just imposed the withdrawal of the French Special Forces. Everything indicates that Wagner will not take long to arrive there. In the meantime, France has withdrawn to Niger, where it has vital interests such as the uranium deposits, essential for its nuclear power plants. The future of France\u2019s powerful nuclear plant (56 reactors and 14 under construction) depends on ensuring that the same thing does not happen in Niger as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. The French withdrawal has triggered the alarm among those in the European Union who do not exclusively think of the war in Ukraine, and Emmanuel Macron has just presented a reorganisation plan<\/a> of the French presence in Africa. In this way, Le Monde<\/em><\/a> editorial states that France must not abandon Africa, at a time in which both the great powers of the Cold War (Russia, U.S.) and new powerful participants such as China, India, the Emirates and Turkey are increasing their presence in this continent, which is crucial for the future of this world, in a context where anti-French sentiment is growing, fed by the colonial heritage, political atrocities, the demagogy of coup armies and Russian propaganda. In conclusion, Russia is trying to connect two fronts: Donbas and Sahel\u2019s. If Russia can threaten Europe from Africa, it will find easier to negotiate Ukraine\u2019s fate when the massacre and destruction become unbearable to everyone. It can do so by rationing control over jihadist groups and facilitating roads for mafias that traffic immigration. From the Sahel it can destabilise the entire Maghreb, where the state has already collapsed in Libya and is turning in dictatorship in Tunisia, where Algeria is rearming and Morocco is fortifying itself in the Sahara with Israeli drones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for the war in Ukraine, Wolfgang M\u00fcnchau states in The New Statesman<\/em><\/a> that ambiguity has so far held Kyiv\u2019s allies together, but will divide them as the final stages of the conflict approach. Recently, there has been a shift in opinions in Western capitals. The agreed expectative in Washington, Berlin and London right now is that the war will continue for years, since neither side has the superiority in terms of soldiers and equipment to inflict a decisive defeat on the adversary. The main reason why Western expectations have changed has been the failure to agree on shared war goals. First, the main goal is the regime change. However, the fact of bringing Putin to the Hague-based Court would not be easy to achieve. Even the creation of a special war crimes tribunal would require a coup in Moscow and a new Russian government willing to extradite him. Second, an even more ambitious but less radical goal would be to expel Russia from all occupied Ukrainian territories, including Crimea. Third, a more limited goal would be a return to the borders of 23 February 2022. Finally, the West has red lines. The main one is that it does not want to have a direct conflict with Russia. The U.S., UK, and Germany do not want to send fighter aircrafts for this reason, as they need support crew who would have to operate from Ukrainian air bases; in this case, the West would take a step closer to direct military conflict with Russia. This being the case, M\u00fcnchau claims that trench warfare will continue and that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will succeed, but only partially. The unity of a West affected by the attention deficit will be broken by the force of domestic politics in each state (for example, in 2024 there are presidential elections in the U.S.). Pressure will increase for a peace agreement that guarantees Ukraine’s independence and the restitution of most, but not all, of its territories. Ukraine will not become a NATO member, and the EU will help rebuild Ukraine and offer it a partnership relationship without full membership. Putin will remain in power in Moscow. There will be no war crimes tribunal. Sanctions will be lifted, but then Russia and China will have formed a strategic economic and military alliance. Finally, Putin will go ahead with his next project, the annexation of Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A year after the war began, it is clear that if the coalition of Western allies is still very strong, it has failed to convince the rest of the world of the need to isolate Russia, and the world is more fragmented. Many countries see Russia\u2019s invasion as a European and American problem, and try to protect their own interests amid the economic and geopolitical unrest caused by the war. This scenario reminds us of neutral states during the Cold War, but now the world is more interconnected than before, and the scale and complexity of global communications, the economic links, and the security ties offer far more opportunities so West\u2019s rivals gain more strength. In a context where China, South-Africa, India and many countries of the global South keep abstaining from voting at the United Nations, Josh Holder analyses in The New York Times<\/em><\/a> how Russia takes benefit from this fragmentation to avoid sanctions, as a handful of countries \u2013with China and Turkey in the lead\u2013 have filled the void, increasing exports to Russia to a much higher level than before the war. In this way, even though Russia\u2019s economy has been damaged, is still strong enough to maintain the war effort. The International Monetary Fund predicted a few weeks ago that the Russian economy would grow by 0.3% this year, contrary to a previous estimate that forecasted a contraction of 2.3%. Second, as regards to the purchasing of weapons and components, the effort to take the military equipment from Russia has been less successful than expected, as it appears that North Korea has supplied Russia with a significant number of artillery shells and Iran has provide unmanned \u2018kamikaze\u2019 drones that have allowed to attack civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. In contrast, other countries, including China, have continued to supply Russia with dual-use goods such as microchips that can be used in military equipment. Third, in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East, many governments with strong links to the United States and Europe do not see the war as a global threat. Instead, has positioned themselves as neutral spectators or arbiters. Hence, the reaction to the invasion was appeased in Asia, where more than a third of countries refused to condemn Russia in the initial UN vote. As for the Gulf countries, Dubai has turn into a hub for oligarchs and pro-Kremlin elites where Western sanctions cannot affect them, while Saudi Arabia considers that it must pursue its own interests, even if this causes friction in its relationship with the United States. Nearly half of African countries abstained or were absent in the voting to condemn Russia, which suggested a growing reluctance to accept the American narrative of a war between good and bad. In South Africa, where its ties with Russia go back to Soviet support for ending apartheid, its leaders have seen the war as an opportunity to fill trade gaps left by Europe and the United States. In Latin America, although most countries have voted to condemn Russia, the first cracks have begun to show. Colombia recently refused to supply weapons to Ukraine, and Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva declined to provide explicit support to Ukraine. Consequently, as we enter the second year of war, Russia\u2019s strategy is clear: to extend the conflict until Western unit breaks down. Putin bets that European countries worried about the impact of the war on their economies will stop supporting sanctions and the supply of weapons. Even the United States, with a presidential election next year, could get tired of the war and pressure Ukraine for some kind of negotiated agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fred Kaplan discuss in Slate<\/em><\/a> that, even if it an Ukraine victory could be inevitable, both sides are in a standstill, and the war is likely to drag on, as each side has reasons to believe they can win, or at least that the other can lose. Putin hopes to exhaust Ukraine by throwing enough cannon fodder at its front lines and bombing its cities. Zelensky is confident that his troops and the population will hold out long enough for the next round of U.S. and NATO weapons to arrive: the more powerful tanks, combat vehicles, missiles, drones and air defence systems that could enable Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive that could turn the tide of the war. Kaplan therefore considers how the war might end and considers it most likely to end the way most wars in history have ended: through a diplomatic settlement. This is likely to shape in some way the fate of Crimea and the Donbas region, the disputed and annexed territories in Russia where this war began in 2014, with several possible scenarios: internationally supervised referendums in the affected regions; a great deal where Russia retains Crimea and Donbas but Ukraine joins NATO and the European Union; or a mixture of the previous, with Crimea and Donbas as demilitarised zones controlled by international peacekeepers. Right now all this is no more than speculation because there can be no diplomatic solution as long as both sides consider that they have more to gain by continuing fighting than by not negotiating. The most likely scenario is that in February 2024 will mark the second anniversary of this war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On European matters, Andr\u00e9 Gattolin and Thibault Muzergues claim in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> that for four decades, Europe has relied on stability and predictability in its political strategy, but now this framework has broken down and it is necessary to consider how to provide itself with a political framework in the face of Russia’s hybrid war. The authors believe that the key to this crisis lies in the Mediterranean, and Putin knows this. Based on these assumptions, it is urgent to design a new strategy on the North-South European axis, thinking in a regional rather than a neighbourhood context. To allege Vladimir Putin’s so-called unpredictability and irrationality, as we also do to justify our repeated past misjudgements, is more of a way out than an argument. One of the major flaws of this strategic compass is that at no point does it fail to question the geostrategic implications of trade policy, the Union’s main source of power in relation to third countries. The myth of a localised conflict does not explain Moscow’s growing involvement in the Middle East and Africa: otherwise, how could we explain all the pawns Russia has been placing in the Eastern Mediterranean, from Syria to Libya via Cyprus? This is because the diversity of Russia’s narratives in Ukraine, Europe, the Middle East and Africa is the justification of a war against the West, supposedly the source of all ills in these regions of the world. This conflict with the collective West also allows for the rehabilitation of Islam (including political Islam) among Russia’s leaders, to the point where it is now an important part of their crusade against the West. The recent approach in Iran for weapons deliveries is a good illustration of this investment. In order to carry out its strategy of suffocating Europe, Russia now intends to reinforce its military and political presence throughout the eastern Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East, because it is the Gordian Knot of strategic flows, whether food, migration or energy, that impact on Europe. In this context, the weakness of Europe, a neighbour of the Mediterranean and geographically close to both the Middle East and Africa, raises questions. The authors claim that the problem lies in the fact that the European Neighbourhood Policy has essentially been articulated around a West-East axis, without worrying about the strategic profoundness of the EU’s internal North-South axis. Because, if it is true that the EU has to face a direct threat from the East, it is also true that it is bordered by a particularly unstable South from which most of its raw material will come in the future and where its possible agricultural excesses could find an exit. All in all, the war in Ukraine shows the extent to which Europe needs a new foreign policy: first in a West-East direction that is not limited to its immediate vicinity but also reaches out to the whole of Eurasia, Turkey, part of the Middle East and to some extent Iran. At the same time, it also needs to develop a new strategy on its North-South axis, thinking of the Europe\/Middle East\/Africa region as a whole and not just as separate regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 27th<\/sup> of February agreement sees Rishi Sunak turns the page on the chaotic history of Brexit and seems to break with Boris Johnson’s strategy; the political project of which seemed to be reduced to a never-ending confrontation with the United Kingdom’s twenty-seven neighbours. The content of the agreement focuses on Northern Ireland and aims to resolve the row between London and Brussels coming from the implementation, in this UK province, of the Brexit treaty signed at the end of 2019. In order to avoid the return of a barrier between the two parts of Ireland, the treaty kept Northern Ireland in the European single market of goods. As a result, goods transiting the Irish Sea are subjected to custom controls that obstruct trade and anger Northern Irish unionists who see any EU intervention as a threat to their membership in the UK. Le Monde<\/em><\/a>\u2019s editorial states that the new agreement should facilitate the passage of goods by exempting goods destined for Northern Ireland, and not the Republic of Ireland, an EU member. The text also foresees that the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Assembly can oppose changes to European rules that affect the province. However, the issue of the agreement goes far beyond the Irish framework. It represents for Rishi Sunak a bold bet: to get out of the fight against the EU at a time when most Brits have become aware of the damaging consequences of Brexit and claim to regret the outcome of the 2016 referendum. Besides trying to ease the economic damages, the British prime minister is also seeking to free his country from a certain isolation. This reciprocal desire of London and the EU-27 to normalise their relationships, after a tempestuous divorce, is a positive development. Finally, Le Monde<\/em> considers that the return of war to Europe and the geopolitical and climatic threats require the British and the EU to speak and act with a single voice, diplomatically, energetically and militarily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hamza Kar\u010di\u0107 warns in Foreign Policy<\/em><\/a> that various pro-Russian actors threaten to derail Bosnia’s future by preventing its accession into NATO. In early February, Russia’s ambassador in Bosnia addressed a vague threat should the country decide to continue its accession to the North Atlantic Alliance. Since the end of the war in 1995, EU and NATO membership has been Bosnia’s main strategic goal. The country’s recent history, marked by internal secession and external interference from neighbours Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s, is a constant reminder of the need for a security umbrella. By sabotaging Bosnia’s functioning, anti-NATO forces are working to ensure that the country remains fragile and does not qualify for full Alliance membership. Kar\u010di\u0107 claims that this sabotage is facilitated by the country’s political system, one of the most complex in the world. Indeed, Bosnia \u2013with a population of less than 3 million inhabitants\u2013 has multiple levels of government: the state level, entities, cantons, and municipalities. As a result of the complex power-sharing arrangement, there is a series of institutional vetoes integrated into it that make it difficult to make efficient decisions. In a country with a rapidly decreasing population, Bosnia has an extraordinarily high number of politicians:  three co-presidents, 14 parliaments, more than 130 ministers, and at least 70 political parties. This system causes governments at different levels to take months to form, and around 10 of the country’s major political parties are in power and, simultaneously, in opposition on different levels. This, together with politics and ethnic-based vetoes, prevents effective changes, and so since independence, Bosnia has faced institutional blockage, secessionism, unrestrained corruption and intrusion from other countries in what has turned out to be a decade and a half of extended instability. With two influential political parties advocating pro-Russian positions in the new coalition government at the state level, alarms are now ringing for Bosnian Muslims. The latest census conducted in 2013 found that Bosnian Muslims made up 50.1% of the population. While Bosnian Serbs and Croats have their related states in neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, this is not the case for Bosnians. They have no alternative homeland. For Bosnian Muslims, institution-building in the country and NATO membership are therefore crucial to ensure their security. On the other hand, the instability promoted by pro-Russian actors also has a reach beyond the country’s borders, as a destabilisation of Bosnia could easily spread to NATO member states Croatia and Montenegro. However, the good news is that polls show that support for NATO membership is still very popular. A poll<\/a> conducted by the International Republican Institute <\/em>last year revealed that 69% of Bosnian Muslims and 77% of Bosnian Croats support NATO membership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic sphere, Marc Besson discusses in The Conversation<\/a><\/em> the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on third parties by the so-called “international community” (which in fact is a little more than the United States and its allies). As Agathe Demarais points out in her book Backfire. How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests <\/em>(Columbia University Press, 2022) American policy-makers are trained to operate unilaterally to defend their national interests and warns that despite continued use of sanctions, the results of U.S. policies have often been counterproductive. Certainly, the unilateral and arbitrary use of sanctions has not only undermined the international position of the U.S., but has had unfortunate material consequences. Sanctions are designed to bring economic, financial and social pain to a country in order to change its behaviour. Theoretically, when successfully applied, they can result in non-violent conflict resolutions, stop human rights violations or any other action that does not please the sanctioning countries. Practically speaking, successes, such as the UN-ordered sanctions against Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya in the 1990s, are rather rare. In most cases, sanctions do not work and can sometimes even backfire and harm U.S. self-interests.  Demarais examines the use of so-called secondary sanctions: the threat of denying access to the American financial system and the use of the dollar if countries or companies contradict American interests. For instance, the French energy company Total abandoned major investments in Iran rather than risk being sanctioned by the U.S. This episode not only soured the United States\u2019 relationship with France and the European Union, but actually strengthened the influence of hardliners in Iran. In the current European context, Russia has effectively disarmed the threat of American sanctions, leaving Washington with little influence in negotiations with Moscow. Furthermore, the challenge from China must be taken into account, as the reality is that the American economic primacy has been eroding, especially because of the rise of China, which is not only rapidly becoming its main strategic competitor, but could soon overtake the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy. In response, the eventual response of the US has been very different from the old system of sanctions applied to minor powers. ‘Decoupling’ has entered the political economy lexicon as a synthesis of policies designed to restrict China’s access to American technology. Although key manufacturing centres are in Taiwan and South Korea, the U.S. remains a major actor in global microchip production, providing vital software and equipment for companies. Consequently, export controls limiting access to innovative technology are the key elements of the updated U.S. toolkit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the other hand, an article published in Time News<\/em><\/a> reveals how Xi Jinping is working on a revolution in the foreign aid system in order to maintain and increase Chinese influence though the loan system. Since 1999, Chinese banks have been financing everything from the La Mecca metro (which costs 16.5 billon dollars) to the early works on Bandar, a new urban project in the Malaysian state of Johor, in attempt to compete against Singapore. At the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the world owed the eight main Chinese state-owned banks at least 1.6 billion dollars, nearly the equivalent of 2% of global GDP. Critics accused China of luring poor countries intro debt tramps through loans and geopolitical policies. Technocrats worried about how China would fit into the structures that the rich world used for relieving the debt of poor countries. The Chinese government, meanwhile, was increasingly afraid that a large number of projects would not be profitable. Now that the pandemic is over, Chinese banks are once again lending, China is reorienting itself, and the emerging system is more agile and sophisticated. Chinese overseas lenders, including the two main ones, Exim and China Development Bank, are state-owned, blurring the boundaries between for-profit lending and international aid. While Western lenders release credits to borrowers or charities in receiving countries, almost all of China’s loans are used to finance infrastructure built by Chinese state-owned enterprises, which means that money never actually leaves the country. The shape of this new twist is starting to show. In 2020, authorities informed construction companies that future Belt & Road Initiative<\/em> projects had to follow meticulous plans and not grant any more loans to countries already heavily indebted to China. Chinese policy makers are also assuming more control over spending. Before the pandemic, equity funds owned by ministries, official lenders and other official sectors were the fastest growing source of foreign funding, according to Boston University data. These funds allow government agents to direct money where they fly, without having to go through state-owned construction companies. Some funds are partnerships between China and Gulf countries; others act similarly to private capital funds. So far they have chosen to invest in financial and green technology. In time, China may even use these conduits to make investments in wealthy countries unwilling to take on debt. Many of the new generation projects are in places with an abundance of raw materials that are crucial for the ecological transition. China’s manufacturing industry used to require a lot of oil and iron ore. It now makes more electric vehicles than any other country in the world, and needs huge amounts of cobalt, copper and lithium. Between 2018 and 2021, even as state-owned banks stopped lending in other countries, billions of dollars were sent to partnerships between Chinese state-owned enterprises and local metals mining operations in Latin America. In this new, more agile and centralised system, the money is directed to two types of borrowers: those who stand a good chance of paying it back (because the projects are likely to generate profits or because the governments are quite wealthy) or those with whom any loss of money is a price worth paying in exchange for diplomatic or military advantages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On sustainability, Cl\u00e1r N\u00ed Chonghaile questions the use of hydrogen as the future answer to the climatic emergency in The New European<\/em><\/a>. Historically, hydrogen as a fuel has had a bad reputation following the Hindenburg airship disaster in 1937. The truth lies somewhere in between: hydrogen is an important element in the decarbonisation puzzle, together with renewables and carbon capture techniques. That is, if the hydrogen used is green, if cost reductions are achieved and if the regulation of its use is transparent. Green hydrogen is produced when renewable energy is used to split water into hydrogen and oxygen through electrolysis. However, so far, most of the hydrogen used in industrial processes \u2013such as oil refining, steel making or fertiliser manufacture\u2013 is the so-called grey hydrogen, generated by burning natural gas, which emits CO2 <\/sub>into the atmosphere.  As the International Energy Agency (IEA<\/a>) reports, natural gas represented around 60% of hydrogen production in 2021, while coal represented around 20%. The same year, hydrogen demand reached 94 million tonnes (Mt) while low-emission hydrogen represented only 1Mt. It is therefore essential to massively increase the production of green hydrogen, since in addition to its value in heavy industries, it is a vital complement to renewable energies that can be volatile depending on climatic conditions. Patrick Molloy, analyst at the sustainability thinktank Rocky Mountain Institute<\/em><\/a>, who researches about sustainability, stated that the main role that green hydrogen has to play is to replace fossil fuels in sectors that are difficult to electrify or have difficulties in reducing carbon emissions. In this way, if shipping fuels, steel and chemicals are decarbonised, the volumes of emissions would be astronomically reduced. Investors have already started to take interest, for example the Chinese company Sinopec<\/a>, which has huge facilities for hydrogen production from renewable sources in the north-western region of Xinjiang, and plans to produce 20,000 tonnes of green hydrogen per year using solar panels. In addition, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, has announced the launch in autumn this year of the European Hydrogen Bank<\/a>, with 3 billion euros to encourage demand using cash from the EU innovation Fund. The EU has committed to produce 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen each year by 2030 and to import 10 million tonnes. Nonetheless, the author also points out that different researches published last year warned of the dangers of hydrogen leaks that accelerates global warming. For this reason, the lack of technology to control leakage urgently needs to be rectified before companies embark on new projects. For its part, the European Commission has initiated its own studies on the effect of leaks and has introduced a set of policies designed to support the creation of efficient infrastructures and markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, in terms of innovation and new technologies, Marta Galcer\u00e1n-Vechter points out in CIDOB<\/a> magazine that artificial intelligence (AI) ceased to evoke a science fiction future long before the current debates on the potential of the ChatGPT system entered our lives. Indeed, as with electricity and Internet back in the day, AI promises to be one of the most transformative technologies of our time, with the potential to transform all industries and economic sectors. Its applications are countless: algorithmic decision-making, massive processing of massive amounts of data, natural language and voice processing systems, prediction of risk situations, or even the controversial biometric recognition. Most of these applications are already used on a regular basis in diverse sectors such as justice, human resource management, financial services, mobility, healthcare, and the supply of public services. It is no coincidence that investment in AI has increased around the world, nor that we find the concept more and more in the national security strategies of many governments. Neither would it be surprising that the competitive dynamics to dominate the development of AI have sped up in a kind of global race in which both major powers and major technology platforms are explicitly involved. Whoever masters Artificial Intelligence will dominate the world, warned Vladimir Putin<\/a> in 2017, and since then, this global race has only accelerated. AI promises benefits at all levels, but it is in cities where it is being experimented the most, combined in most cases with other technologies such as the Internet of other devices, 5G or Big Data. Urban environments are also where its impact is most noticeable. Nowadays, many local governments already regularly use AI to predict demand for certain services, anticipate problems, communicate more quickly with citizens through chatbots<\/em>, improve decision-making or move towards sustainability objectives, especially in areas such as air quality or mobility. However, this growing use of AI in urban environments is not exempt from challenges, especially in terms of the skills cities require to realise the full potential. In addition, there is the necessity to ensure that the use of AI-based solutions meets the standards of security and responsibility, protecting the digital rights of citizens. The response to these challenges requires actions that go far beyond the legislative capacity of local governments. However, in the face of a fragmented global policy context and the existence of significant legal gaps, cities are positioning themselves as essential policy actors, either individually through the development of local standards, or collectively in the framework of city alliances and networks. In the area of collective action by cities, the work of the Cities Coalition for Digital Rights<\/a>, an initiative launched in November 2018 by the cities of Barcelona, Amsterdam, and New York, which is supported by UN-Habitat<\/a> and whose mission is to promote and defend digital rights in urban environments, is a must. Conceived as a pragmatic, principle-based alliance, its member cities (currently around 50) share best practices and expertise to address common challenges related to digital rights-based policymaking. It is also a coalition that works to develop legal, ethical and operational framework to help cities promote human rights in digital environments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Photography: Roy Scott, Ikon Images.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marc Espigares, Jiajin Angel Lin, Mar\u00eda Garc\u00eda and Anal\u00eda Cortez, trainee students at the CETC have participated in this Diari de les idees<\/em> issue.<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After the special issue focused on the first year of war in Ukraine, the Diari de les Idees magazine takes back its analysis of the most relevant issues on the international scenario. 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