{"id":62921,"date":"2023-03-23T08:41:45","date_gmt":"2023-03-23T06:41:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-80\/"},"modified":"2023-03-24T13:45:42","modified_gmt":"2023-03-24T11:45:42","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-80","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-80\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees 80"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This new issue of Diari de les Idees<\/em>, that coincides with Pau Mas Codina\u2019s incorporation as the new director of the Centre for Contemporary Studies, highlights the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Russian President Vladimir Putin; China\u2019s growing role in the international diplomatic scene as shown in its mediator role between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the growing social and political instability in France following the pension reform project; the new turmoil affecting the international bank system as a result of simultaneous crises in Silicon Valley Bank<\/em> and the Credit Suisse<\/em>; the approval of the Oceans Treaty to guarantee the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in international waters; and the impact of new Artificial Intelligence applications in Global South.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In international matters, Amitav Archarya highlights in La Vanguardia<\/em><\/a> three events that question the world order as we have kwon it so far; the COVID pandemic, the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China, and the war between Russia and Ukraine. These challenges have added new pressures on the Global South and some analysts consider a return to the bipolar Cold War world, with a West led by the U.S. on the one hand, and a bloc led by Russia and China on the other. In this context, the countries of the Global South are trying to acquire more autonomy and status in the international system, with the possibility of reviving or reactivating the Non-Aligned Movement with the aim of finding a common voice and offering a third path in the construction of the world order. COVID made it clear that the global south does not feel close to either of the two great powers. Both responded to the pandemic in very different ways. The United States took an isolationist stance under the slogan “America First” while China initiated a very active foreign policy that defended globalisation and increased claims to leadership in global governance. Nevertheless, in the end, neither power managed to project a positive image of global leadership. In terms of the war in Ukraine, the attitude of the Global South has been ambivalent, as the conflict has damaged much of the attractiveness of the West, and especially Europe, as a model of peace and prosperity. Most countries in the global South do not see Russia as a threat and are not interested in taking sides in the ideological competition and military rivalry between NATO and Russia or between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. They see the Russia-Ukraine war as a European and transatlantic problem, of which they are the first victims since they bear a huge share of the cost of rising energy and food prices and the interruption of supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The world’s major powers are involved in an increasingly fierce technological race, which is affecting key areas such as Artificial Intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnologies, clean energy, aerospace and telecommunications. A study<\/a> published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute<\/em> underlines that Western democracies are losing the global technology race, especially to China. This study focuses on a very important parameter, the publication of influential studies in 44 critical technology sectors, considering in each the decile of most referenced publications. The result is that China leads 37 of the 44 sections, while the United States dominates the other seven. Among European countries, the UK, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy and France stand out. Among the Asians, India, Japan and South Korea. Technological progress has historically been a decisive factor in determining balances of power between nations, and today it is more so than ever, in view of the rapid pace, extent, and significance of innovation in strategic sectors. The task of balancing forces in the technology sector is an extremely complex one, but even so, a set of data allows a general judgement to be made, even if it is not accurately measurable. Studies and analyses by industry experts sketch an area of consensus that can be summarised in this way: the United States has enjoyed decades of total supremacy and remains dominant in key sectors. However, the rise of China is very strong and has been steadily closing the gap, in some cases surpassing the U.S., and in others already positioning itself as a dangerous competitor. Europe has significant capabilities in some areas, for example, semiconductor design machines, 5G equipment or software design, but in the big picture, it is not comparable with its two major rivals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, China, which for years had a policy of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, has begun to assume a more active role as a major global actor, as evidenced by its successful mediation in stablishing diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This represents a major realignment of Beijing\u2019s foreign policy at a time when distrust of Washington has reached an all-time high and China is under Western suspicion over its role in the war in Ukraine. In this sense, the think tank<\/em> Middle East Institute<\/a> highlights timing of the announcement of the pact between the two Persian Gulf enemies, coinciding with Xi Jinping’s official inauguration for a third presidential run, amid intensifying strategic competition with the United States, and staged to emphasise that China is a peace-making power, while the U.S. is portrayed as a warmonger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, Michael Schuman states in The Atlantic<\/em><\/a> <\/em>that the surprise Iran-Saudi Arabia deal has important implications for Washington’s efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear programme and for its already strained relations with Riyadh. However, the most important and lasting impact of the deal could be China’s new role. In a rare diplomatic incursion far from home, Beijing has managed to bring the Middle East’s two great adversaries together at a time when the world needs more such initiatives. The Iran-Saudi Arabia pact could thus be the beginning of a new trend in Chinese foreign policy, in which Beijing pursues more active diplomacy in regions where it has exercised limited power so far. This could prove highly beneficial in that China has enormous economic and political influence in many countries, which its leaders could use to resolve disputes and reduce tensions. However, the agreement between China and Saudi Arabia cannot be understood outside of the growing competition against the United States, as it is part of a campaign to weaken North American power and to challenge the global order, which has two lessons for North American policy-makers. First, the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement reveals the growing influence of China in regions of the world where the U.S. was traditionally hegemonic. Second, as this influence expands, China could reshape the geopolitical map of the world. While some countries that have historically been wary of Washington may move closer to the United States because of China’s growing influence, such as India, others that have so far been aligned with Washington, may lean in the opposite direction as their interests and economic relations change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the war in Ukraine, breaking news is that the International Criminal Court<\/a> (ICC) issued an arrest warrant a week ago for alleged war crimes in Ukraine against Russian President Vladimir Putin for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children. This is an historic step, as it is the first time that this court has requested the arrest of a head of state in office. It is also the first time in history that the ICC has called for the arrest of the president of one of the five veto powers on the UN Security Council. The question now is whether it is actually viable to see the Russian president arrested and subsequently judged. In fact, the Rome Statute<\/a>, the cornerstone of the ICC, stipulates that it cannot judge anyone accused in absentia, and the ICC does not have an institution capable of executing detention, so it depends on member states. Currently, 123 countries have signed the Rome Statute, but these do not include Russia and some of its allies such as China and Belarus, or neutral countries such as India, where the G20 summit is due to take place in September. Moreover, although countries that have signed the Rome Statute are under the obligation to execute arrest warrants issued by the ICC, although it would not be the first time that a country has dodged this order. For example, in 2015 South Africa avoided arresting the then president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, because he had immunity to attend the African Union<\/a> summit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stefan Wolff points out in The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that one of the consequences of Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine is the fact that that the Kremlin has lost much of its influence in the former Soviet republics. This provides opportunities to limit Moscow’s ability to further its war aims. However, it also means that Russia is likely to try to increase tensions and confrontation in the region and in recent weeks Moldova has been at the centre of these destabilising efforts, where Russia has long been involved in actions aimed at undermining the pro-Western government of Maya Sandu and frustrate the country’s ambitions to join the EU. Russia’s efforts to create instability in Moldova and the separatist region of Transnistria are based primarily on disinformation, by spreading rumours that Moldova and Ukraine are conspiring to invade Transnistria. The Kremlin has also taken advantage of the economic crisis in Moldova \u2013triggered by rising inflation caused by the war in Ukraine\u2013 to question the government\u2019s competence and legitimacy of its pro-European course. At the same time, there is also the danger that Russia’s military forces positioned in Transnistria could be used to set up a second front in the war against Ukraine. While this is unlikely, it has forced Ukraine to concentrate some of its forces to the Transnistrian border. At the very least, this also entails the danger of an inadvertent escalation that could quickly involve Transnistria and Moldova, and drag in neighbouring Romania, a NATO member and key ally of the Sandu government. This therefore is not a good sign for countries that are economically or militarily dependent on Russia, such as Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, nor for countries with significant ethnic Russian communities, such as Kazakhstan, or even NATO members Latvia and Estonia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One year after the invasion, four experts analyse in Le Grand Continent<\/em><\/a> how the war has redrawn the world map and what trends could determine the second year of the conflict. The war is back in Europe and there is a kind of disappointment in seeing how the rest of the world is not surprised. Currently, there are about 30 wars, a few countries that are constantly at war, others that only get out of it with brief truces and ceasefires, and others that fall back into it immediately. The war situation has become something usual for many people of the world. In this sense, we have to remember that the Balkan conflict in the 1990s was perceived as strictly peripheral when in fact it was already a war in the very centre of the continent. After the Cold War, some had also announced the end of territories as objects of conflict, but the war in Ukraine is also a war on a territory, for a territory. Territory has not disappeared, it remains a capital interest, and this is another lesson that can be learnt from this war. The question of geopolitical fragmentation must also be considered with three emerging blocs: a first Western bloc led by the United States, a second bloc led by China, in a context of direct confrontation between the United States and China, and a third bloc made up mainly of emerging countries. The question is with which countries will these latter align with. We must also ask ourselves whether the European Union will achieve a certain degree of autonomy, especially in the financial area, in order to establish another independent bloc. On the other hand, there is also economic fragmentation of raw materials because the G7 and the European Union have restricted the price of Russian oil exports. Therefore, we have today several competing oil markets: a first market for Russian oil, a second for oil from other countries. There is also a disengagement of supply chains with Russia’s production of energy, but also of raw materials such as gold, cereals, fertilisers and metals. Obviously, there is also a geopolitical fragmentation and the breakdown of multilateralism, as the UN is unfortunately not a major participant in the Ukraine issue, just as WHO was not a major participant in the coronavirus issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, the European Union is seeing a growing strategic divergence. On the one hand, those who support a total Ukrainian victory and the shipment of more powerful and sophisticated weapons. On the other hand, those who believe that the Russian factor must always be considered in the European security architecture of the future. Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond the war to define the EU’s strategic vision and interests. In CIDOB<\/a>, Pol Morillas states that the first point of view, shared mainly by the Central and Eastern European and Baltic states, is not exempt from risks such as the escalation of the war, even risking a cornered Putin resorting to nuclear weapons. On the other side of the debate, there are those who believe that there is a need to be realistic about supporting Ukraine, whether in terms of the extent of military assistance or the possibilities of speeded-up EU membership. As the social and economic repercussions increase, in the form of higher energy and food prices, so do voices demanding a more comprehensive approach to stopping the war. However, the risks of a strategic vision that prioritises European stability through dialogue with Russia are also considerable. To break unity with Washington would mean that Europe would distance itself from the country that remains the main source of its security, while reinforcing the Russia-China revisionist discourse at a time when the division between the West and the rest of the world is widening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the European field, Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Lebaron states in Le Monde Diplomatique<\/em><\/a> that a year after the outbreak of the war, the new European ideological scenario is taking shape. The aggression led by the Kremlin and the commitment of the political authorities and the media of the Old World in support of the Ukrainian government have surfaced a common intellectual background, until then hidden behind the strict formulas of the leaders of the Eurocracy advocating multilateralism and the defence of human rights. The military and budgetary mobilisation without precedents since the end of the Cold War, decided by all European countries, coincide with an objective declared by the president of the European Commission: to establish a ‘pact for the defence of democracy’ against the authoritarian powers of Russia and China. In von der Leyen’s perspective, the war in Ukraine is an attack on Europe’s energy, economy, values and future. In short, it is a war between autocracy and democracy. Hence, the outlines of the new European ideology of moral neo-nationalism and an assertion of sovereignty, paradoxically marked by increased dependence on the United States, are clear. The three dimensions \u2013economic, politics and ethnoreligious\u2013 of the new European nationalism actually form a system. The old Europe, a colonial power and the source of economic imperialism, presented itself before the world as a civilising force bringing human progress and salvation of souls. Now Europe, committed to an extraordinary military effort, wants to be a power on a global scale and a moral or even spiritual force in face of the world’s turmoil.  The European Union’s proclamation of a progressive discourse is accompanied in contrast by a permanent work of ideological distinction. It is partly ethno-religious in nature: the Russian world (post-Soviet and post-imperial, thus doubly condemned), the Islamic world (source of terrorism), China (at the same time or alternatively imperialist capitalist and communist). All three united under the hashtag “authoritarian”, are constructed with discourses in which otherness is always disturbing and hostile. Finally, Lebaron asks what course should be taken between the defence of national sovereignty, the investigation of solidarity and local alternatives to globalisation and transnational elites, and the urgency of a global response to a global, ecological, economic and political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In France, after having to withdraw from submitting his controversial pension reform to a vote in the National Assembly and to implement it with Article 49.3 of the Constitution, which allows laws by decree of the Council of Ministers, political pressure and dissatisfaction in the streets are becoming a dangerous pressure on Emmanuel Macron. The French president, isolated and weakened, without a majority in the National Assembly and without firm allies, is proving to be incapable of building consensus around his projects. To approve the pension reform by decree is meant to be a blow of authority, but in reality, it is a demonstration of weakness and powerlessness. Everything indicates that this unstable and tense situation will prolong, conditioning the four long years that Macron has left in office. Thus, it will be very difficult for him to carry out other projects such as, for example, the new immigration law or his institutional reform project. The head of State would always have the option of dissolving the Assembly, even if it does not guarantee him a more favourable distribution of forces, quite the contrary. Another intermediate solution would be to proceed to a change of government, given that some of the current ministers have burned themselves out in the fight for pensions, especially the Prime Minister, Elisabeth Borne, and the Minister of Labour, Olivier Dussopt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the economic field, the main topic is the financial turmoil caused by the crises at Silicon Valley Bank <\/em>(SVB) and Credit Suisse<\/em>. The Economist<\/em><\/a> analyses the situation and highlights that the SVB crisis led to the disappearance of 42 billion dollars\u2019 worth of deposits flee in a single day; SVB is just one of the three American lenders to collapse in a week. Since early March, about 229 billion dollars have disappeared from U.S. banks, which represents a fall of 17%. Credit Suisse, meanwhile, has seen its shares fall by 24% and has sought liquidity support from the Swiss National Bank. Fourteen years after the financial crisis, there are questions about the fragility of banks and if the situation has taken regulators by surprise. Many years if low inflation and low interest rates meant that few thought about the problems banks might face if the world changed and long-term bonds lost value. This vulnerability worsened during the pandemic, when deposits flooded banks and the Federal Reserve\u2019s stimulus inserted cash into the system. Many banks used the deposits to by long-term bonds and government-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. The other big problem is that, if another crisis occurs, it is more than likely that deposits run away to other entities, forcing the bank to cover deposit losses by selling assets. The Economist<\/em> therefore believes that regulators need to take advantage of this new crisis to make the system safer and that a first step should be to remove many of the strange exemptions that apply to medium-sized banks, some due to pressure groups that succeeded in 2018 and 2019 in overturning post-crisis rules. Regulators would also need to create a regime that recognises the risks arising from increasing interest rates. In a crisis, a bank with unrealised losses will be at greater risk of failure than a bank that has none. Still, this difference is not reflected in capital requirements. One possibility would be to perform stress tests to see what would happen to a bank’s safety reserve if portfolios of stocks are valued at market prices and if rates continue to rise. This would allow policy makers to consider whether, based on the outcome, the system has enough capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

German Zarate highlights at The Conversation<\/em><\/a> that trade between China and Latin American-Caribbean (LAC) region has considerably sped up over the past twenty years. One of the key moments was the forum that took place in Pekin in 2017 when the LAC was incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI<\/a>), which was later joined by twenty countries, leaving Brazil and Mexico as the only two major economies in the region without a formal memorandum of understanding. As a result, in recent years, some Latin American countries have cut diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to attract investment from Beijing. The Latin America and Caribbean region is an attractive investment area because of its abundance of natural resources and raw materials (oil, iron, and copper), as well as agriculture products (soya bean and oilseeds). In comparison to Africa, Latin America also can offer a more stable investment environment, a more trustworthy judicial system, and a great market for Chinese products. Trade relations multiplied by up to 18 between 2000 and 2016, especially thanks to the rise of raw materials. During this period, Chinese state-owned banks such as China Development Bank<\/em> (CDB) and Export-Import Bank of China <\/em>(ExImBank) signed new agreements with LAC countries. The growing economic relationship between China and LAC is not limited to trade. The second aspect of these relations is foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 2000 and 2020, Chinese companies invested about 160 billion dollars in 480 deals, mainly through unions and acquisitions, but also by new projects. The third strand of this relationship is lending. Since 2005, the China\u2019s two main banks (mentioned previously) have granted more than 141 billion dollars in loans to Latin American countries and state-owned companies, more than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank or the Development Bank of Latin America. Chinese lending in LAC is concentrated in four countries: Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil, which have received around 93% of the loans. Moreover, loans are concentrated in energy (69%) and infrastructure (19%) sectors. China now bets on new infrastructures: 5G, electric power transmission, high-speed railway, electric vehicles, data centres, and Artificial Intelligence. There are also perspectives for the development of additional links with student exchanges, tourism, and cooperation in fields of health, science and technology. In this way, the relationship could also become truly win-win strategic sectors other than resources. If the governments of LAC success in addressing the challenges and developing the opportunities at hand, the LAC-China relationship will be more beneficial for the whole region. However, Latin American countries will have to be wary of the \u2018debt-trap\u2019, since China, for example, already holds 11% of Ecuador\u2019s total external debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As for sustainability, the approval of the Treaty of the High Seas<\/a> or the BBNJ Treaty (Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction<\/em>) stands out. This was first discussed at the Union Nations in 2006 to guarantee the conservation and the sustainable use in marine biodiversity in the areas located outside national jurisdictions (beyond the 200 nautical miles). After more than 16 years of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached in early March. The treaty includes four principal sections. First, marine protected areas (MPA). A global network of MPA network covering 30% of the global ocean by 2023 (30×30 goal, agreed at COP on Biodiversity<\/a>), representative of key ecosystems and that are connected, is envisioned. They would be marine sanctuaries to protect habitats and species, restore biodiversity and maintain ecosystem services. Second, marine genetic resources. These are the potential patentable genes of marine species discovered or to be discovered, that can have a variety of uses for different industries (pharmaceutical, cosmetic, food, energy, etc.) and represent significant economic benefits. One of the objectives of this treaty is the equal and fair sharing of genetic information and benefits. So far, the ownership of these genetic resources in international waters was not regulated under any the legal framework, making the patenting of these genes subject to the technological skills of countries and companies. A study published in Science<\/em><\/a>, more than 10 years ago already showed that ten countries own 90% of the patents on marine genes, despite the fact that these countries have only 20% of the world\u2019s coastline. Only three countries are responsible for 70%: the United States, Germany, and Japan. Third, the environmental impact assessments. Up to now, there has been no competent authority to regulate and control assessments in international waters. This treaty is intended to make it mandatory to assess the environmental impact of economic activities that can pollute or produce significant and damaging changes in the marine environment, as well as to stablish required thresholds and factors. Lastly, capacity development and transfer of marine technology. The treaty aims to strengthen the capacities of countries in development, including the transfer of marine technology from more developed countries and scientific cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, on innovation and new technologies, Robert Muggah claims in Project Syndicate<\/em><\/a> that the adoption of new natural language processing and generative AI will not be limited to rich countries and the companies such as Google, Meta, and Microsoft that have pioneered their creation. These technologies are already being introduced in low- and middle-income contexts, where predictive analytics, from reducing urban inequality to addressing food security, are a significant assistance to cash-strapped governments, businesses, and NGOs seeking to improve efficiency and unlock the social economy. However, the problem is that not enough attention has been given to the potential side effects of these technologies, as predictive tools can, for example, strengthen the monitoring capabilities of authoritarian regimes. Similarly, even when used by democratic governments, social impact-focused companies and progressive non-profit organisations, predictive tools can produce negative results. Design flaws in the underlying algorithms and biased data sets can result in privacy violations and identity discrimination. Muggah believes that developing the right frameworks will require reaching consensus on the basic principles that should inform the design and use of predictive AI tools. Fortunately, the race for AI has resulted in a surge of research papers, initiatives, institutes and ethical networks jobs. And while civil society has taken the lead, intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD and UNESCO are also involved. So far, this debate has focused mainly on North America and Western Europe. However, low- and middle-income countries have their own basic needs, concerns and social inequalities that need to be considered. In this context, numerous studies reveal that technologies developed by and for markets in advanced economies are often inappropriate for less developed economies. If new AI tools are simply imported and widely used before the necessary regulatory frameworks are in place, they could do more damage than they do good. All of these concerns need to be addressed if one wants to define truly universal principles for the regulation of AI. Aware of these gaps, the think tanks Igarap\u00e9 Institute<\/a> and New America<\/a> have recently created a working group on predictive security and development analytics with the aim of defining first principles for the use of predictive technologies in public security and sustainable development in the Global South. The main challenge will be to mobilise the international, national and regional collaboration and coordination needed to implement them in law and practice. In conclusion, in the global race to develop and deploy new predictive AI tools, harm prevention frameworks are essential to ensure a safe, prosperous, sustainable and human-centred future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Photography: Pavel Nikolayevich Filonov, “La formule du printemps et les forces en action”, 1928.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marc Espigares, Jiajin Angel Lin, Mar\u00eda Garc\u00eda and Anal\u00eda Cortez, trainee students at the CETC, have participated in this Diari de les idees<\/em> issue.<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This new issue of Diari de les Idees, that coincides with Pau Mas Codina\u2019s incorporation as the new director of the Centre for Contemporary Studies, highlights the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Russian President Vladimir Putin; China\u2019s growing role in the international diplomatic scene as shown in its mediator role between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the growing social and political instability in France following the pension reform project; the new turmoil affecting the international bank system as a result of simultaneous crises in Silicon Valley Bank and the Credit Suisse; the approval of the Oceans Treaty\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":76588,"template":"","category_newspaper":[563],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-62921","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-563"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nDiari de les idees 80 – IDEES<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-80\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Diari de les idees 80 – IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"This new issue of Diari de les Idees, that coincides with Pau Mas Codina\u2019s incorporation as the new director of the Centre for Contemporary Studies, highlights the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Russian President Vladimir Putin; China\u2019s growing role in the international diplomatic scene as shown in its mediator role between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the growing social and political instability in France following the pension reform project; the new turmoil affecting the international bank system as a result of simultaneous crises in Silicon Valley Bank and the Credit Suisse; the approval of the Oceans Treaty\u2026\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-80\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"IDEES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-03-24T11:45:42+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/filonov.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"842\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"632\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"25 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/\",\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 80 – IDEES\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/03\\\/Putin_war_Graffiti_Ptz_2023_near.jpg?fit=4032%2C3024&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2023-03-23T06:41:45+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2023-03-24T11:45:42+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/03\\\/Putin_war_Graffiti_Ptz_2023_near.jpg?fit=4032%2C3024&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/i0.wp.com\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2023\\\/03\\\/Putin_war_Graffiti_Ptz_2023_near.jpg?fit=4032%2C3024&ssl=1\",\"width\":4032,\"height\":3024},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/diari-de-les-idees-80\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Inici\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/en\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/analisis\\\/diari-de-les-idees\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":3,\"name\":\"Diari de les idees 80\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/\",\"name\":\"IDEES\",\"description\":\"Contemporary global issues\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/revistaidees.cat\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Diari de les idees 80 – IDEES","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-80\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Diari de les idees 80 – IDEES","og_description":"This new issue of Diari de les Idees, that coincides with Pau Mas Codina\u2019s incorporation as the new director of the Centre for Contemporary Studies, highlights the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against Russian President Vladimir Putin; 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