Since 2020 there have been seven coups in Africa (Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger and Gabon) and this veritable epidemic raises questions about the reasons for a phenomenon that marks the end of two stages. On the one hand, a decade of international management of the security crisis (fight against jihadism) by France and the United Nations, and on the other, the process of democratisation (generalisation of multipartyism) that began in the early 1990s. The rise of coups reflects global geopolitical trends, such as neo-sovereignism, the weakening of democracy, the challenges to multilateralism and the reconfiguration of international relations, while also highlighting the challenges raised by economic dependence on third countries, poverty, inequality and corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, it is important to note that not all coups are the same, as we can distinguish two types. First, those that occur when a country’s leaders do not respect the limitations of their mandate, as in the recent case of Gabon, and therefore the coup leaders try to legitimise themselves with the (fallacious) argument of correcting a democratic deficit. Second, those rooted in severe security crises such as in the cases of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, especially in the first two countries, where much of the territory is outside the control of the central government and dominated by jihadists. As a result, these countries have practically become failed states despite military support from France and Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As for France, the former colonial power (indeed except for Sudan, all these coups have taken place in Francophone Africa) has failed to renew its African policy and the neo-colonial framework in place until the 1980s – which allowed it to obtain strategic resources such as uranium from Niger in exchange for aid and stability. Thus, the so-called Fran\u00e7afrique<\/em>, the network of political, economic and military interests that France weaved with its former colonies after independence in the 1960s, is in its death throes. Not only because of the succession of coups, but also because of the anti-French resentment they fuelled, the rise of China and Russia’s intervention through the Wagner mercenary group. Its military presence has also become a political problem that is difficult to manage as it has been until now. France has bases in Senegal, Gabon, Chad, Niger and Djibouti, but has already had to abandon Mali, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic, and is now in danger in Niger, where a military junta that Paris does not recognise is in power, while in the case of Gabon military cooperation has been suspended pending clarification of the political situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, the current situation is also the result of Europe’s and the United States’ failed projects on the continent since, contrary to what happened during the Cold War period, there are now concrete alternatives. Russia’s security projects, China’s infrastructure networks, India’s new agricultural systems, or Turkey, which combines military (Ankara has become the largest supplier of drones) and economic cooperation with humanitarian, cultural and religious projects. Instead, for the past eighteen months the EU has focused its attention and efforts on the war in Ukraine and neglected the crucial Sahel. Therefore, the EU faces a difficult agenda in Africa, as it cannot militarise solutions because it does not have an army, and its relevance as a global actor is at stake if it does not manage to increase and extend its diplomatic potential by favouring political transitions so that the military returns power to civilians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So how should we understand the transformations currently taking place in Africa? What role do endogenous factors play in these mutations? What are the contradictions generated by the new political economy of the continent? The seizure of power by the military, as well as other more or less bloody conflicts in African territories formerly colonised by France, are only symptoms of a profound change hidden for a long time, and when formulating a policy for the future, it would be wrong to confuse these symptoms with their causes. Indeed, while recent developments are signs of the end of the long agony of the French model of incomplete decolonisation, endogenous forces were also at work. Africa has entered a new historical cycle in which the conflicts that pit Africans against each other on the one hand, and ruling classes against each other, and elites and their societies, on the other, will have a greater impact than any external factor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, the continent is undergoing multiple and simultaneous transformations that, on a variable scale, affect all levels of society and give rise to a chain of ruptures. From above, the ruling elites who have benefited from decolonisation are seeking to consolidate family fortunes and secure their hegemony by privatising the state. From below, we are witnessing an intensification of struggles for access to the means that guarantee greater well-being in a context of increasing inequalities and new conflicts, especially between genders and generations. In this sense, the emergence in the public space of those who were born in the years 1990-2000, and who grew up at a time of unprecedented economic crisis and insecurity, is a major development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This coincides with the continent’s technological awakening, the growing influence of diasporas, the acceleration of processes of artistic and cultural creativity, the intensification of mobility and circulation practices, and the search for alternative models of development drawing on the richness of local traditions. Because of the demographic fracture, demographic, socio-cultural, economic and political challenges now overlap, as shown by the contestation of political-institutional formats since the 1990s, changes in family authority, the silent rebellion of women and the worsening of generational conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, after every coup or major political crisis, the democratic system and its dysfunctions are questioned, but the problem is not democracy, but what Africans themselves have made of it. It is precisely because the guiding principles of democracy are infringed that the system does not work or does not work well enough on the continent. Democracy is not responsible for rigged elections, lack of independence of the judiciary, non-separation of powers, nepotism, politicisation of administrations, corruption, greed and illicit enrichment of the ruling classes (both in power and in opposition), contempt of the general interest, and the lack of the rule of law. Ultimately, there are other alternatives that do not simply boil down to the dichotomy between rejecting or copying the West: Africa needs new political ideas, solutions adapted to tomorrow’s world where it is clear that democracy is not the problem but the solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Photography: Adobe Stock<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Since 2020 there have been seven coups in Africa (Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger and Gabon) and this veritable epidemic raises questions about the reasons for a phenomenon that marks the end of two stages. On the one hand, a decade of international management of the security crisis (fight against jihadism) by France and the United Nations, and on the other, the process of democratisation (generalisation of multipartyism) that began in the early 1990s. The rise of coups reflects global geopolitical trends, such as neo-sovereignism, the weakening of democracy, the challenges to multilateralism and the reconfiguration of international\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":63967,"template":"","category_newspaper":[563],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-63980","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-563"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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