{"id":64636,"date":"2023-10-11T08:11:09","date_gmt":"2023-10-11T06:11:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-nagorno-karabakh-i-els-canvis-dhegemonia-al-caucas\/"},"modified":"2023-11-09T12:25:23","modified_gmt":"2023-11-09T10:25:23","slug":"diari-de-les-idees-nagorno-karabakh-i-els-canvis-dhegemonia-al-caucas","status":"publish","type":"newspaper","link":"https:\/\/revistaidees.cat\/en\/analisis\/diari-de-les-idees\/diari-de-les-idees-nagorno-karabakh-i-els-canvis-dhegemonia-al-caucas\/","title":{"rendered":"Diari de les idees – Nagorno Karabakh and the shifting hegemonies in the Caucasus"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

As this new edition of the Diari de les idees goes to press, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas prompts us to devote an editorial preview, in which we analyse the causes and initial consequences of the conflict. You will find it at the end of the fortnightly editorial..<\/em><\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

The third Nagorno-Karabakh war has ended in less than 48 hours, with the Armenians capitulating to Azerbaijan’s military superiority and the passivity of Russia, the European Union and the United States. Although the conflict has its roots in the 1920s, since 2020 it has become an example of Russia’s rivalry with Turkey in the region and evidence of Moscow’s loss of influence in the Soviet space, now accentuated by the war in Ukraine. With almost 100,000 Armenians, more than 80 percent of the population, forced to begin their exile in Armenia, it is the end of a project born more than thirty years ago. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and taking advantage of the turmoil in Moscow, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh made the first attempt to throw off the Azeri tutelage, the fruit of the Stalinist legacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The origins of the conflict lie in the decision to include this region populated by a large Armenian majority in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Stalin’s decision to join Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 1921 must be seen in the context of cooperation between the new Soviet state and Turkey in order for the Bolsheviks to maintain their influence in the Caucasus after the long civil war that resulted in the deaths of more than 8 million people. It was also the result of a failed attempt to establish a Transcaucasian state uniting Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan that failed both because of internal dissension among the three partners and the geopolitical interests of the two regional great powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The three decades following the demise of the Soviet Union were marked by two wars, the first between 1988 and 1994 with more than 30,000 dead and victory of the Armenian troops, which was ended by the Bishkek Protocol<\/a>. Then came the blitzkrieg of 2020 in which Azerbaijan regained the lost territories and which ended with the signing of a tripartite ceasefire<\/a> between the two contenders and Russia. Since then, however, Baku has been in a position of strength and the blockade since December 2022 of the Lachin corridor, the only route linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, was a clear sign of Azeri determination to put an end to the Armenian presence in this territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What has changed to bring about this abrupt turn of events in what is often described as a frozen conflict? Firstly, the disinterest in this enclave by major powers with regional interests that could have maintained support for the self-proclaimed independent entity of Nagorno-Karabakh and its parent state, Armenia. France, the United States and Russia, as co-chairs of the Minsk<\/a> Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been disengaging from the conflict without having achieved substantial progress in its political and diplomatic resolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A second element stems from the geopolitical and strategic consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, since 1988, the Soviet and then Russian armed forces had carried out an interposition mission in the framework of peacekeeping operations. Progressively, however, Vladimir Putin’s “fluid” diplomacy with Erdogan’s Turkey – the main regional power that unconditionally supports Azerbaijan – and disagreements with Armenia’s prime minister have meant that the 2,000-strong Russian contingent deployed as a peacekeeping force has now refrained from intervening despite its mission to ensure compliance with the 2020 agreements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The third variable is the evolution of Armenia’s domestic politics and its external projection. Last year Putin began to repeatedly ignore Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s requests for help in retaliation for the reception of tens of thousands of young Russians fleeing the decreed mobilisation. Hence, Armenia began a shift towards a variable geometry foreign policy and a rapprochement with the European Union and the United States, with which it has even carried out joint military manoeuvres, further straining relations with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fourth factor is Azerbaijan’s spectacular economic and military development. Energy wealth and hydrocarbon exports have led to the creation of modern armed forces equipped with sophisticated equipment purchased from Israel, Russia and Turkey. Moreover, since 2017, Baku has been producing its own kamikaze drone and equipping its infantry and aviation with a view to the full occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan has been the object of attention from all sides, becoming one of the major beneficiaries of the war. On a visit to Baku last year, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen called autocrat Ilham Aliyev a reliable energy partner for the EU, announced an agreement with Baku to increase supplies from the pipeline carrying Caspian Sea gas to Europe, and pointed out that Azerbaijan has huge potential in offshore wind and green hydrogen renewable energy. Not a word about attacks on human rights or the regime’s widespread corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it is not only the EU that is interested in strengthening relations with this oil- and gas-rich country, located at a strategic crossroads between Russia, Iran, Armenia, Georgia and the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan’s growing importance is revealed by the increase of foreign diplomatic missions: from two dozen in 2005, there are now 85. For Ankara and Beijing, too, eager to expand their influence into Central Asia, Azerbaijan is a key player in energy projects, as well as in the development of new railway networks and infrastructure and connectivity projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For its part, thanks to close linguistic, religious and cultural ties – often described by Turkish leaders as ‘one nation, two states’ – Turkey has been Azerbaijan’s main regional ally since gaining independence, although Baku has always sought to maintain good relations with all key players in the region, be it the EU, Turkey, China or Russia. Azerbaijan has been able to maintain a balance with this very diverse set of countries – ensuring that there will be no serious repercussions after this latest military incursion – because none of them wants to give advantage to their geopolitical rivals and upset the fragile balance in the Caucasus and Central Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, it should be underlined that the current tension between Russia and Armenia could increase after the Yerevan Parliament ratified a few days ago the Rome<\/a> Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court, which last March issued a warrant for the Russian president’s arrest for alleged war crimes. Although Yerevan has stated that it intends to denounce war crimes committed by Azerbaijan in the various conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, the news has been widely interpreted in Moscow as a further sign of its loss of influence in a geopolitically strategic region for its interests. Indeed, with the final resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (it is likely that the Armenians will never return there), Moscow not only loses its leverage over Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also shows its weakness vis-\u00e0-vis Turkey, which – despite alliances of circumstance – is its great regional rival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Editorial preview. From Yom Kippur to Sukkot. 50 years of geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Fifty years after the Yom Kippur War and coinciding with the celebration of the festival of Sukkot, which commemorates the vicissitudes of the people of Israel in the desert after leaving Egypt, Hamas’s massive attacks against Israel are no coincidence. The reality is that Hamas was running out of narrative in a geopolitical context in which its claims and above all the attention it received from the international community were at an impasse. It therefore needed a strong dose of attention, not only to justify its internal relevance, but also to try to divide public opinion and the leadership of Muslim countries that have moved closer or were in the process of moving closer to Israel, such as Morocco, the United Arab Emirates (since the Abraham Accords), or Saudi Arabia, for example. It is no wonder that the Iranian-funded Hezbollah’s communiqu\u00e9 of support states that “[The attack] constitutes a message to the Arab and Muslim world, as well as to the international community, especially to those who seek to normalise relations with the enemy”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, this is not simply a terrorist attack but an offensive of a scope, intensity and level of strategic and logistical preparation that amplifies the fundamental changes that are shaking the global geopolitical chessboard (see editorial on Nagorno-Karabakh).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The worrying thing right now is that the losers will be the usual losers. On the one hand, the Palestinians, orphaned of their own leadership, subjected to the corrupt government despised by Israel of Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank and the Islamists in Gaza. On the other, the Israeli people, subjected to the manoeuvres of a prime minister allied with the extreme right and the most radical religious parties, besieged by civil society, but capable of anything to stay in power. At a time when Netanyahu was fragile due to massive opposition to his attempts to dismantle the rule of law, this Hamas offensive is a real lifeline, as the opposition has already proposed a holy union to win the battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In future issues of Diari de les idees<\/em> we will have the opportunity to analyse the different variables of this attack, which could turn into a conflict on a larger scale and on different fronts, as we cannot rule out attacks launched from southern Lebanon by Hezbollah. These include the colossal failure of the Shin Bet’s intelligence system, which many are already calling Israel’s 9\/11, while surveillance of Palestinian society is as sophisticated as it is invasive, and the monitoring of Hamas activities is one of the main tasks of Israeli security. All indications are that technological security systems have distanced Israeli security agencies from the reality on the ground and that they have lost sight of the human factor (infiltration and intelligence gathering from primary sources). Leaving everything in the hands of hyper-sophisticated technology was a key factor that made this massive surprise attack possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

Photography: Adobe Stock.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Flavia Villanueva, trainee student at the CETC, has participated in this issue of Diari de les idees<\/em>.<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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