As the conflict drags on with no prospect of a truce in the short to medium term, the geostrategic repercussions of the Israel-Hamas war are growing. Clearly, it is in the Middle East that the consequences are more acute. For years, Benjamin Netanyahu has lived on illusions that have now been shattered. Indeed, the expectation that Israel could normalise its relations with the Arab world without addressing the Palestinian issue, as if it did not exist, has failed, and regardless of the outcome of its Gaza offensive, Israel will have to rethink its strategy towards the Middle East peace process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the Arab and Muslim world, positions and interests vary despite the support expressed for the Palestinian cause. For Tehran, the crisis offers numerous opportunities. The Iranian regime is interested to see how some of the Arab countries that had been pondering normalisation of relations with Israel are backing down. The conflict has also highlighted Israel’s vulnerability, although the Israeli ground incursion into Gaza presents Tehran with a dilemma. If it pressures Hezbollah not to intervene, it will lose credibility with its local allies. However, if it encourages Hezbollah or other militias to intervene, this could lead Israel, with US support or direct assistance, to destroy Hezbollah’s military capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For its part, the Egyptian government has expressed concern about the possibility of Palestinians from Gaza arriving in the Sinai Peninsula through the Rafah crossing, either fleeing the conflict or expelled by Israel. Egypt has made it clear that it does not want to be a host for displaced Gazans, both for pragmatic and principled reasons. Cairo recalls what happened in 1948, when Gazans’ ancestors left or were forced to leave their villages, and fears that this pattern could repeat itself. Security in Sinai also explains Egypt’s position, as jihadist activity that has declined in recent months could resurge with the massive influx of refugees from Gaza, if members of Palestinian jihadist groups establish logistical, ideological and operational links with their co-religionists in Sinai.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Given the history of enmity between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon is the country most likely to be involved in a full-scale war. While the main political parties have expressed their desire for restrain in the conflict, Hezbollah always pursues its own political agenda without regard for Lebanese domestic political views or interests. Notably, Hezbollah’s recent statements that it has no intention of going to war with Israel do not fit the usual rhetoric of an organisation that, along with Hamas, considers itself a member of the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ against Israel and the US, which also includes Iran, Syria, Yemen’s Houthis and various groups operating in Iraq and Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Turkey’s case, immediately after the attacks Ankara initiated intense diplomatic activity to prevent an extension of the conflict, but in the wake of Israel’s escalating response, Turkey has become more critical and has denounced the disproportionate nature of the Israeli attacks. The war has cooled prospects for improving Turkish-Israeli relations, which had been fully restored a year ago after a decade of turmoil. The conflict also jeopardises Ankara’s attempts to normalise relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, countries with which it severed relations in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring. For the duration of this crisis, the Turkish regime will face three options: favouring its citizens’ support for the Palestinian cause, favouring alliances with Western countries, especially the United States and the European Union, or taking on a mediating role in an attempt to resolve the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Beyond the Middle East, the war is also having a major impact, and there is every indication that one of the biggest losers could be Ukraine, as the course of the war depends on the continued support of the international community and any distracting factor is bad news for Kiev. Moreover, if the Israel-Hamas war spreads to other parts of the region, the impact on oil prices could make maintaining Western sanctions against Russia more costly and reframe the situation. Not to mention problems with arms and ammunition supplies: Ukraine should share US military aid with Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
For its part, Russia seeks to leverage its privileged position in the Middle East through its structural links with all actors involved. For Moscow, it is a unique strategic opportunity as the war in Ukraine has taken a back seat and the Kremlin presents itself as a potential mediator between Israel and Hamas. This in a context of a backdrop of waning support for Ukraine, whether in Poland over the grain import dispute, in the US amid an institutional crisis in Congress, or in Central Europe, where Robert Fico’s victory in Slovakia is weakening the unity of an EU where there is already a sense of fatigue. Russia’s position in the Middle East is at a crossroads. It can be content to treat the current crisis as a diversionary factor and take advantage of the media respite and reduced diplomatic pressure to reinforce its positions in Ukraine. It can take up the challenge of rallying anti-Israeli actors in the Middle East, thereby widening the rift with a West mobilised in favour of Israel. Alternatively, it can explore the avenue of becoming a potential mediator after reducing tensions with Tel-Aviv.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Gaza crisis poses several challenges for Europe, as the war is fuelling division among some member states. For example, in the vote a few days ago on a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza, EU member states voted three different ways. On the threshold of a new institutional cycle and with the possibility of more members joining, it has become clear that the EU has a long way to go if it is to be a global actor with autonomy and leadership capacity. Indeed, the crisis has revealed the difficulty of reaching a common position, the limits of qualified majority voting, changes in the inter-institutional balance, and problems surrounding the legitimacy and politicization of the European project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As for China, unlike its policy of neutrality in the Ukrainian conflict, this time it has been quick to express support for the Palestinians in an attempt to strengthen its ties with the global South and to position itself as an alternative to the US-led world order. However, Beijing does not have sufficient capacity to project military power and diplomatic influence comparable to other actors such as the United States. Moreover, Chinese leaders are traditionally risk-averse and avoid engaging in potentially disruptive foreign policy conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war is also a blow to US policy on the status quo in the Middle East because it shows that Washington’s involvement with the unstable and illiberal regional order has been detrimental to both stability and US interests. The conflict has wrecked the US strategy of disengagement of the region at a time when the US was more determined than ever to push for a shift in the axis of its foreign policy from the Middle East to Asia. Biden seeks to balance support for Israel with calls for greater restraint in responding to the Hamas attack, and his decision to combine aid to Ukraine with support for Israel in a single national security package gives him a chance to overcome resistance from Republican congressional representatives and senators to further support for Ukraine. Still, the Israeli government’s repeated refusals to enact ceasefires or humanitarian pauses demonstrate the limits of US leverage over Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Finally, at the global level, the conflict creates a series of dangers that could have a major impact on the international community as a whole: economic fragility, greater political polarisation, new strategic challenges and the involvement of belligerent non-state actors. A recent report<\/a> of the World Bank warns that the conflict between Israel and Gaza could trigger a spike in oil prices to $150 a barrel and a massive food crisis due to rising food prices. The World Bank also points out that the crisis comes on the heels of the biggest shock to commodity markets since the 1970s due to the war in Ukraine. Thus, if the war drags on and spreads, the world economy would face for the first time in decades a double energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine and the crisis in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n