The international liberal order is in a process of severe erosion, the result of the unipolar era dominated by the United States. This order, based on free trade and the supremacy of liberal democracy, has been in crisis for years due to the rise of revisionist powers such as China and Russia, which challenge Western hegemony. Therefore, many states, because of geopolitical competition, have embarked on a process of de-globalisation that focuses on economic security. At the same time, multilateral institutions have less and less weight in global affairs to the detriment of strong states. In this context, Donald Trump’s return to the White House, as well as various conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and Gaza, is accelerating the end of this international order and a transition towards a more multipolar, militarised and unstable system. A new scenario takes shape with codes that definitively leave behind the distinctive features that defined – under US surveillance – the post-1945 world order. Confidence in the definitive victory of democracy, the Marshall Plan, the transformation of Western Europe into a showcase of social welfare to keep workers away from the Soviet temptation, the great social mobilisations and the great pacts that led to the creation of the EU among other supranational bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When talking about the end of the multilateral order, the focus is usually on Russia, and less so on China. However, not the United States, the power on which this post-World War II structure was built and therefore, in theory, its main defender. Yet it seems to have been an illusion. According to the declaration of intent of Donald Trump and his allies in the big tech companies, the US seems to want to proceed with a new reconfiguration of the world’s spheres of influence. A new Yalta, joining Russia and China’s expansionist whims, each in its own style: Putin by force of arms, Xi through commercial influence, Trump as a real estate agent who buys everything with dollars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Donald Trump’s expansionist ambition, conveyed by his allusions to Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico, signifies a return to one of the principles that has guided US geopolitics for much of its history: continued territorial expansion throughout the American continent as its area of influence and a retaining wall against hypothetical intervention by foreign powers. A return to the Monroe Doctrine: \u2018America for the Americans\u2019. It is worth noting that perhaps not coincidentally, other major powers of the new multipolar world use the national security justification. China and Russia have been trying for years to expand their influence, whether by building military bases on islets in the South China Sea, occupying Chechnya, Crimea, Luhansk or Donetsk, establishing uneven relations of economic dependence with neighbouring countries or interfering directly in their internal political debates. With the renewed Monroe Doctrine, Trump legitimises these behaviours contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, an intergovernmental organisation that has been unable to stop the annexation of territories by the great powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The US foreign policy centred on US national interests will define the new world order. In contrast to Biden’s more ideological approach, which favoured democracy and alliances, Trump will adopt a policy where the US will seek above all to gain economic and strategic advantage. His priority will be to maintain US global pre-eminence, contain China, rethink international alliances and strengthen natural resource extraction. All of this with the aim of preserving US hegemony and curbing the emergence of global rivals, especially China. It will also seek to reduce dependence on its allies, in particular by imposing tariffs and asking NATO countries to contribute more to its defence. It is also quite likely that the US will aim to revive fossil fuel extraction and secure vital resources, strengthening ties with oil- and gas-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, while seeking to secure essential high-tech raw materials such as cobalt and lithium.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One characteristic of the 21st century is that the world moves so fast that we metabolise reality without having time to understand and digest it. We have not yet decided whether a certain phenomenon is good or bad, whether it needs to be stopped or encouraged, we already have the next evolution on the table, and so the phenomenon in question is already incorporated into normality. History brings continuous novelties, and by the time we want to realise it, we face the fait accompli<\/em>. It happens with technology, with science, with social customs, and with politics. Alternatively, with everything at the same time when we see that Elon Musk has burst into UK domestic politics, calling for the resignation of the Labour government, openly campaigning for the far right in Germany, and in Italy, where the government is negotiating a 1.5 billion euro deal with SpaceX to use the Starlink satellite system for secure communications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These examples underline the connection between technological interests and the new political agenda of the illiberal right. Indeed, all the signs are that the big US tech companies have already chosen their side in anticipation of Trump’s return to power: Mark Zuckerberg has suspended any content control over Facebook while Jeff Bezos, owner of Amazon, has already imposed censorship on the Washington Post, which he owns. The big Silicon Valley companies, which have financed the new president’s campaign, are allergic to anything that might resemble regulation of their activities. Indeed, if on the one hand the pandemic irritated a section of the business world, which had to watch as the state imposed itself and ordered a slowdown in economic activity, on the other hand, the attempts by the Biden administration and the EU to regulate the new technologies sector also generated a lot of discontent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The year 2025 has begun with statements strongly connoted with the concept of empire and even lebensraum<\/em>, conveying Donald Trump’s plans for the hierarchical restructuring of the West where NATO could become something akin to what the Warsaw Pact was: a single commanding decision-making centre where all partners obey under threat of sanctions and retaliation. We are witnessing the delayed end of an era that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall and closed with Barack Obama’s presidency, characterised by a globalisation that seemed unstoppable, with a certain idea shared by everyone of how the US had to dominate and be in the world. Trump’s first victory in 2016 was therefore not an accident, but a symptom, the first warning, along with Brexit, of the wave of the new authoritarian right. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In short, some are already wondering whether the West as we have understood it until now is over, whether liberal democracy has lost the game, whether we are entering the second quarter of the 21st century with an era of global chaos and the dismantling of what remains of multilateralism. One thing is certain: Moscow and Beijing view with some enthusiasm, but also with concern, Trump’s entry into the Oval Office to preside over the world’s most powerful country. Paradoxically, the next US president could achieve what the revisionist powers have been trying to achieve for decades: the end of the US-led unipolar world order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Photography: Oleg Yunakov. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.<\/sub><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The international liberal order is in a process of severe erosion, the result of the unipolar era dominated by the United States. This order, based on free trade and the supremacy of liberal democracy, has been in crisis for years due to the rise of revisionist powers such as China and Russia, which challenge Western hegemony. Therefore, many states, because of geopolitical competition, have embarked on a process of de-globalisation that focuses on economic security. At the same time, multilateral institutions have less and less weight in global affairs to the detriment of strong states. In this context, Donald Trump’s\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":78192,"template":"","category_newspaper":[634],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-78204","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-634"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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