We are living in a historic moment that is difficult to define precisely because it has not yet concluded. For years there has been talk of the decline of the liberal order, the return of geopolitics, multipolarity or a policrisis characterized by the overlapping of conflicts. However, perhaps the most distinctive feature of our time is another: the simultaneous renegotiation of the rules that have organized international politics, economies, democracies and societies in recent decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We are not simply witnessing a shift in the balance of power between the United States, China, Russia or Europe. What is at stake is the set of agreements \u2013 explicit and implicit \u2013 that defined the world that emerged after the Second World War and, especially, after the end of the Cold War. The feeling of uncertainty that hits societies does not derive solely from the accumulation of wars, economic crises, technological disruptions or extreme weather events. It responds, above all, to the perception that the known rules no longer offer sufficient answers, while the new ones are still far from being consolidated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The transatlantic relationship is perhaps the clearest example of this transformation. For decades it was the axis around which European security and much of the liberal international order were articulated. Today this link has not disappeared, but it has ceased to be an unquestionable certainty to become a space for permanent negotiation. The United States is redefining its strategic priorities and demanding greater responsibility from its European allies. Europe, for its part, discovers that strategic autonomy can no longer be understood as a rhetorical concept, but as a political and economic necessity. The question is no longer to replace the Atlantic alliance, but to redefine its internal balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This same logic is reproduced in other scenarios. The war in Ukraine has ceased to be interpreted exclusively as a territorial confrontation to become a laboratory where new balances between deterrence, negotiation, industrial capacities and social resistance are tested. In the Middle East, the conflicts in Gaza, Iran and Lebanon also reflect the limits of strategies based solely on military superiority. The Arctic, until recently considered a peripheral space, is emerging as a new scenario of strategic competition where European, Asian and North American interests converge. Even the relationship with China evolves from expectations of economic integration towards a coexistence marked by competition, interdependence and the management of disagreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Europe occupies a unique position in this process. Never before has there been such a broad consensus on the need to strengthen its defence capabilities, protect critical infrastructures, reduce strategic dependencies or develop an industrial policy capable of competing in decisive sectors. However, this consensus coexists with profound uncertainties about the political and social costs of this transformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The European debate no longer revolves solely around the volume of defence spending. It also affects the model of society that is to be preserved. How to strengthen security without eroding the welfare state? How can we boost competitiveness without sacrificing social cohesion? How can we increase strategic autonomy without renouncing the economic openness that has characterized the European project? These questions do not admit simple answers because they confront different but equally legitimate priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The technological transition introduces an additional dimension to this change of era. Artificial intelligence is not just a far-reaching economic innovation. It also constitutes a new infrastructure of power. Technological competition forces democracies to balance objectives that are difficult to reconcile: fostering innovation, preserving fundamental rights and maintaining international competitiveness. The well-known trilemma between democracy, control and competitiveness sums up well a tension that is likely to mark the next decade. In the same way that the industrial revolution transformed the relations between the State, the market and citizens, the digital revolution today redefines the very conditions of democratic governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Economic transformations also participate in this general renegotiation. The growing concentration of capital, the debate on new forms of redistribution of wealth generated by automation or the discussion on proposals such as universal basic capital reflect a shared concern: how to rebuild a social contract adapted to economies that are increasingly intensive in knowledge and technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The climate crisis completes this panorama. For years it was considered an essentially environmental challenge. Today it is clear that it is also a geopolitical and strategic issue. The energy transition affects security of supply, industrial competitiveness, trade relations and the political autonomy of States. Decisions on energy infrastructures, critical minerals or electricity networks are already part of the architecture of international power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This renegotiation process is not without risks. In the absence of new shared rules, there is an increasing temptation to replace cooperation with power relations, multilateralism with ad hoc agreements and institutions with unilateral decisions. The appeal of speeches that promise simple answers to extraordinarily complex problems is also growing. Uncertainty fosters polarisation, erodes trust in democratic institutions and feeds the perception that effectiveness can justify the reduction of guarantees and rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, it is also advisable to avoid an exclusively pessimistic reading. Moments of transition also open up spaces for institutional and political innovation. History shows that the great international orders did not arise spontaneously, but as a response to previous deep crises. The decisive question is not whether the world is changing \u2013 this evidence is already indisputable \u2013 but who will participate in defining the new rules and with what principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Europe faces a unique responsibility here. Its main challenge is not only to adapt to a more competitive and insecure environment, but to demonstrate that it is possible to combine security with democracy, autonomy with cooperation and competitiveness with social cohesion. In other words, to preserve what has historically constituted its main source of legitimacy: the ability to manage conflicts based on common norms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Perhaps this is the true task of our time. It is not a question of restoring an international order that will hardly exist again, nor of resigning ourselves to a world governed exclusively by the rivalry between great powers. The challenge is to build a new governance framework capable of responding to the transformations of the twenty-first century without renouncing the principles that made decades of stability, prosperity and democratic progress possible. Because the future will not depend solely on how the distribution of global power evolves, but on our collective ability to renegotiate the rules that allow this power to be exercised in a legitimate and sustainable way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Photography: At the crossroads of a new order. Generated with AI.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" We are living in a historic moment that is difficult to define precisely because it has not yet concluded. For years there has been talk of the decline of the liberal order, the return of geopolitics, multipolarity or a policrisis characterized by the overlapping of conflicts. However, perhaps the most distinctive feature of our time is another: the simultaneous renegotiation of the rules that have organized international politics, economies, democracies and societies in recent decades. We are not simply witnessing a shift in the balance of power between the United States, China, Russia or Europe. What is at stake is\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":84571,"template":"","category_newspaper":[679],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-84579","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-679"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n