What has happened in Ceuta in recent weeks cannot be understood simply as another episode in the migration crisis. The human and social dimension of the mass arrival of people is, of course, central. But limiting the analysis to border management would be a mistake. Ceuta has once again demonstrated the extent to which migration can be politically instrumentalised and how, in an increasingly complex international environment, tanks and formal declarations of war are no longer necessary to shift balances, reshape political agendas or test a state’s sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Before drawing geopolitical conclusions, however, it is important to distinguish between three possible scenarios. A mass arrival of people may be a spontaneous crisis, with no political direction behind it. It may also be a crisis that is subsequently instrumentalised by an actor who did not cause it but chooses to exploit its consequences. Finally, it may form part of a deliberate operation designed to generate political or strategic pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We do not yet know which of these scenarios best explains what happened in Ceuta, and it would be irresponsible to present as fact what still requires evidence. A mass arrival of people does not prove the existence of a planned operation. But caution must not become blindness. Precisely because attribution can be difficult, states need the capacity to identify evidence, cross-check information and respond proportionately to each of these possible scenarios.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is where the concept of the grey zone becomes relevant. It does not necessarily imply covert warfare, but rather a space of competition between diplomatic normality and conventional confrontation. In this space, migration, economic, informational, legal and security instruments can be combined to exert pressure without necessarily triggering a forceful response. Their main advantage is ambiguity: they force the targeted state to decide how to respond without necessarily having all the information it needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A migration crisis, a dispute over maritime areas, a territorial claim or a campaign designed to shape the international narrative may appear to be separate issues. But when they are deliberately and cumulatively exploited, they can gradually narrow an adversary’s room for manoeuvre. This is the logic of incremental pressure: gaining small advantages without clearly crossing the threshold that would trigger open confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The challenge is to determine when a series of incidents ceases to be a succession of unrelated problems and becomes part of a broader strategic dynamic. Here, too, prudence is essential. It is not necessary to prove the existence of a single “master plan” to recognise that certain vulnerabilities can be exploited for political purposes. The strategic challenge is to identify these patterns before their cumulative effect begins to reduce the available options for responding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This vulnerability is also part of a broader European structural weakness. Ceuta is Spanish territory, but it is also part of the European Union’s external border. Yet when a crisis occurs, it is the Spanish authorities, public services, security forces and local population who must absorb the immediate pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This raises a fundamental question: can a border be European when it comes to protecting it, but essentially national when it comes to bearing the consequences of a crisis? If Ceuta and Melilla form part of Europe’s external border, their resilience cannot depend almost entirely on Spain’s resources and political capacity. Brussels should not become visible only once a crisis is already under way. Protecting an external border also means sharing early-warning capabilities, operational and financial resources, logistical support and rapid-response mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A divided Europe is potentially more vulnerable to third actors that may use the control\u2014or relaxation\u2014of migration flows as an instrument of negotiation or political pressure. Approaching the Ceuta issue from a European perspective does not simply mean asking Brussels for more resources. It means recognising that protecting a common border also requires internal political cohesion and a willingness to share the consequences of a crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nor can Ceuta be analysed in isolation from the broader geopolitical environment of North Africa. Ceuta, Melilla, the Canary Islands, disputed maritime areas, energy and mineral resources, and Western Sahara do not necessarily form part of a single strategy. But they belong to the same competitive environment, in which different issues can reinforce one another even in the absence of perfect coordination. Maritime disputes and competition over resources, for example, can acquire a geopolitical dimension that makes any change to the status quo more costly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The struggle is also being fought in the realm of perceptions. Building a favourable international narrative, placing issues on the European agenda and shaping diplomatic positions are all part of this new form of geopolitical competition. The contest is no longer confined to diplomatic circles or physical borders; it is also being fought through the media, international institutions and the digital sphere. Whoever succeeds in defining the terms of the debate can significantly influence which solutions are subsequently regarded as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Against this backdrop, Spain needs more than a temporary response to each successive crisis. It needs a long-term state policy towards Morocco that combines firmness, cooperation, diplomacy and strategic perspective. Domestic divisions, and the partisan exploitation of sensitive issues such as migration or Spain’s North African territories, only increase the country’s vulnerability to external pressure and disinformation campaigns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nor can such a policy be exclusively bilateral. What is at stake in Ceuta also concerns the credibility of European border policy, migration policy and the EU’s neighbourhood policy. Border security, solidarity among member states, migration management and relations with countries of origin and transit are all part of the same strategic challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The response, however, should not be one of automatic militarisation. A grey-zone strategy may seek precisely to provoke disproportionate reactions that can then be exploited in the information and propaganda space. Turning a migration crisis into an image of military confrontation may ultimately reinforce the adversary’s narrative. Firmness should not be confused with the theatrical display of force. An effective response requires police, diplomatic, economic, informational and European instruments to be deployed in a coordinated manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The broader challenge is to understand that Ceuta is a point of contact between Europe and Africa, between migration and geopolitical competition, and between territorial sovereignty and economic interests. It is also an example of how contemporary borders can become spaces of strategic pressure without necessarily leading to conventional conflict. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, what has happened in Ceuta illustrates Europe’s need to adapt to a changing geopolitical reality\u2014a reality in which borders, migration, resources, information and diplomacy are increasingly becoming part of the same competitive space.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Photography: Sneakers with spikes on the soles and a metal hook, which undocumented migrants use to scale the fences in Ceuta and Melilla. Raymond Gelow. Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" What has happened in Ceuta in recent weeks cannot be understood simply as another episode in the migration crisis. The human and social dimension of the mass arrival of people is, of course, central. But limiting the analysis to border management would be a mistake. Ceuta has once again demonstrated the extent to which migration can be politically instrumentalised and how, in an increasingly complex international environment, tanks and formal declarations of war are no longer necessary to shift balances, reshape political agendas or test a state’s sovereignty. Before drawing geopolitical conclusions, however, it is important to distinguish between three\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":88733,"template":"","category_newspaper":[679],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-88750","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-679"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n