For much of the past few decades, countries such as Canada and the European states have enjoyed a degree of geopolitical comfort. The existence of a relatively stable international order, multilateral institutions capable of managing conflicts and, above all, the security guarantee provided by the United States allowed them to focus on prosperity, cooperation and the defence of their interests without having to treat power as a permanent existential concern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That world is changing. The war in Ukraine, the rivalry between the United States and China, the weaponisation of economic and technological dependencies, and growing competition for strategic resources are bringing back to the international system a logic of power that for years had seemed partly obsolete. The rules still exist, but their ability to constrain states increasingly depends on the mechanisms available to enforce them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is in this context that the rapprochement between Canada and the European Union takes on particular significance. The proposal to move towards a closer relationship, promoted by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, may at first glance seem like a new expression of transatlantic cooperation. But it raises a much broader question: what can middle powers do when the world is reorganising itself around the great powers?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The answer that is beginning to take shape is simple to formulate, although much harder to put into practice: organise among themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At first glance, Canada and Europe have little in common beyond their political values and their place in the transatlantic space. Yet it is precisely these differences that can become a source of complementarity. Each primarily has what the other lacks. Canada offers energy, critical minerals, natural resources, technological capabilities and a privileged position in the Arctic. Europe offers markets, industry, capital, research and regulatory capacity that enables it to shape global standards. Both also share a commitment to liberal democracy, multilateralism and predictable international rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The point, therefore, is not simply to pool resources, but to turn them into decision-making capacity. An economy can be highly open and yet vulnerable if it is excessively dependent on a single supplier, technology or market. Interdependence is not necessarily a vulnerability; it becomes one when there are no alternatives. Talking about autonomy, therefore, does not mean aspiring to self-sufficiency, but having enough options to be able to choose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This logic helps explain why the relationship between Canada and the European Union is beginning to extend well beyond trade. Cooperation in security and defence, the defence industry, critical minerals, energy, space and strategic technologies points towards a relationship in which each side can strengthen the capabilities of the other. Canada’s participation in the European SAFE programme is a significant example of this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the real significance of this rapprochement lies in what it could represent beyond the bilateral relationship. If the great powers once again concentrate an increasing share of the capacity to shape and enforce the rules of the system, middle powers face two possibilities. They can accept that their room for manoeuvre depends on the decisions of the most powerful actors. Or they can seek to collectively expand that room for manoeuvre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What is interesting is that the second option does not require the creation of a new bloc. If the problem is the concentration of power, the answer can hardly be to reproduce it on a smaller scale. What is needed is sufficient cooperation to act together where interests coincide, without turning that cooperation into another rigid structure of confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This opens the door to a more flexible model based on networks and variable geometries. Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand could participate in such a network in specific areas, whether technology, energy, defence, supply-chain security or standard-setting. In a less bipolar world, power can increasingly be exercised through overlapping relationships and flexible coalitions rather than permanent blocs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Europe has, in this respect, particularly relevant experience. The European Union was born from the idea that different countries could transform their individual resources into greater collective capacity through institutions, rules and interdependence. The current paradox is that defending this model in a more competitive world requires capabilities that were considered less necessary for a long time: industrial, energy, technological and military capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The question, then, is how to turn shared values into the capacity to act without renouncing the principles on which they are based. This also forces us to reconsider what we mean by the West. Canada and Europe remain allies of the United States and share fundamental values and interests with Washington. But this does not mean that they must always depend on the same options. Greater European and Canadian capacity need not be an alternative to the United States; it can instead be a way of expanding the options available when interests do not fully coincide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And perhaps this is the key to the whole process. Autonomy is not about being able to do everything alone, but about not having to depend on someone else to decide for you. A middle power will never have the resources of a superpower, but several middle powers can pool enough resources to significantly expand their collective room for manoeuvre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The potential alliance between Canada and the European Union is, in this sense, an experiment of considerable significance. Not only because it could strengthen two economies and two democratic societies in the face of a more uncertain international environment, but also because it could offer a model for how middle powers can act in a system dominated by much larger actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In a world that is once again asking who has enough power to shape the rules, Canada and Europe can show that those who do not aspire to dominate the system can, through cooperation, acquire enough capacity to determine their own choices. Perhaps this is the real power of middle powers: not to become great powers, but to ensure that the world does not have to be organised exclusively around them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Photography: Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney addresses the plenary session of the European Parliament, 17 September 2026. Alexis Haulot. Wikimedia Commons \u00a9 European Union.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" For much of the past few decades, countries such as Canada and the European states have enjoyed a degree of geopolitical comfort. The existence of a relatively stable international order, multilateral institutions capable of managing conflicts and, above all, the security guarantee provided by the United States allowed them to focus on prosperity, cooperation and the defence of their interests without having to treat power as a permanent existential concern. That world is changing. The war in Ukraine, the rivalry between the United States and China, the weaponisation of economic and technological dependencies, and growing competition for strategic resources are\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":88857,"template":"","category_newspaper":[679],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-88870","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-679"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n