Europe wants to act as a global power, but it still faces a fundamental question: how can shared interests be translated into common decisions? Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, doubts about the United States\u2019 commitment to European security, and competition with China are forcing the European Union to strengthen its strategic autonomy. However, parties that challenge European integration and call for decision-making powers to be returned to national capitals are gaining support, while mainstream parties are struggling to respond to growing social instability. This division benefits both the powers seeking to limit Europe\u2019s influence and the political forces that turn insecurity and fear into arguments against cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Security, technology, energy and trade all require coordination that enables member states to negotiate from a stronger position and reduce their vulnerability to decisions made by other powers. However, elections over the coming months could deepen these divisions and undermine the Union\u2019s ability to defend its interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
France will be one of the key countries shaping this process. The 2027 presidential election could alter the European balance of power if a nationalist and Eurosceptic candidate comes to power, with consequences for defence, migration, support for Ukraine and the EU budget. France\u2019s leadership in building agreements with Germany has been instrumental in advancing European integration, but both countries now face difficulties that constrain their ability to lead. Germany has endured years of economic stagnation and industrial problems, while France is experiencing a prolonged political crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Macron is entering the final stretch of his term in a weakened position, leading a minority government in a fragmented parliamentary system since the dissolution of the National Assembly in June 2024. This weakness limits Paris\u2019s room for manoeuvre in building domestic consensus and pursuing ambitious commitments at the European level. Without a Franco-German axis capable of driving initiatives forward and bringing the other member states on board, agreeing on a shared political and budgetary strategy will become more difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The EU\u2019s financing needs are growing at a time when decisions must also be taken with increasing urgency. The Union needs to invest in defence, the energy transition, digitalisation, research and industry to reduce its dependencies and safeguard its competitiveness. However, member states have unequal fiscal capacities: those with greater budgetary room can mobilise more resources, while others risk falling behind. If this gap widens, it could also increase economic disparities between countries and distort competitive conditions within the single market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Yet the issue is not just how much is spent, but also which priorities guide that spending. Growing insecurity may shift resources towards defence and competitiveness at the expense of welfare, cohesion and the green transition. At the same time, governments that favour limiting common spending may use this pressure to curb the EU budget and strengthen national control over resources. The response to new threats must not undermine the policies that help maintain citizens\u2019 trust in the European project.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Eastern enlargement makes this situation even more complex. Bringing in new members has an obvious political dimension, particularly in the face of Russian pressure, but it also requires a review of the institutions, decision-making rules and allocation of resources. A larger Union can carry greater international weight, provided it has mechanisms that enable it to act effectively and reconcile the interests of current members with those of future partners. Without changes to its institutional arrangements, enlargement could slow down decision-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, negotiations on the 2028\u20132034 multiannual financial framework will test the Union\u2019s resolve to turn its ambitions into shared commitments. The European Commission\u2019s initial proposal, presented in July 2025, amounted to nearly \u20ac2 trillion. It included a European Competitiveness Fund worth \u20ac409 billion and allocated \u20ac200 billion to external action, including up to \u20ac100 billion in support for Ukraine. By contrast, the draft presented by the Irish Presidency on 10 October puts the budget at \u20ac1.62 trillion in 2025 prices, around \u20ac141 billion less than the initial proposal. It retains national allocations for cohesion and agriculture but proposes cuts in areas such as competitiveness, research and defence. Although this is not yet a final agreement, the gap between the two positions highlights the difficulties involved in financing Europe\u2019s new priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Against this backdrop, cohesion policy must not become the adjustment variable used to finance Europe\u2019s new ambitions. If these priorities are funded at its expense, the consequences will go beyond a change in the allocation of funds: they will also weaken the perception that European integration creates opportunities for citizens, regardless of where they live. If member states want a Europe with strategic capacity, they will have to explain how they intend to pay for it: through their own resources, common financing for European public goods, or a combination of approaches that does not shift the cost of new priorities onto cohesion policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The budget debate will also determine who gets to decide how resources are allocated and used. Proposals to simplify the management of funds and give national governments greater flexibility, such as national partnership plans, raise questions about the role of the regions. Simplifying procedures may be necessary, but it should not lead to decision-making becoming more centralised at the national level or reduce the involvement of local authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Regions have a better understanding of their territories\u2019 needs and can adapt European policies to very different circumstances. A rural area affected by depopulation, an industrial region undergoing transformation and a metropolitan area facing housing problems all require different responses. Ignoring this diversity would mean losing valuable knowledge and the capacity to act effectively. Therefore, if cohesion is to remain a central EU policy, regional authorities must be able to participate effectively in the design, governance and implementation of programmes, with clearly defined responsibilities and a role that goes beyond consultation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, Europe does not need all its members to think alike; it needs them to reach agreements when fundamental interests are at stake. The next political cycle could redefine Europe\u2019s role in an increasingly competitive world, but leadership will not be measured solely by its ability to defend itself or influence international decisions. It will also depend on whether the Union can preserve solidarity between its territories and offer opportunities to its citizens. The challenge, therefore, is to achieve greater autonomy without sacrificing cohesion, and to demonstrate that wielding greater influence on the international stage does not mean abandoning the principles that give the European project its purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Photography: Produced in-house, IA generated.<\/sub><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Europe wants to act as a global power, but it still faces a fundamental question: how can shared interests be translated into common decisions? Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine, doubts about the United States\u2019 commitment to European security, and competition with China are forcing the European Union to strengthen its strategic autonomy. However, parties that challenge European integration and call for decision-making powers to be returned to national capitals are gaining support, while mainstream parties are struggling to respond to growing social instability. This division benefits both the powers seeking to limit Europe\u2019s influence and the political forces that turn insecurity\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":88970,"template":"","category_newspaper":[679],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-89027","newspaper","type-newspaper","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category_newspaper-679"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n