\u201cThere lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will shake the world.\u201d This quote, attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, captures that China is being seen as a potential great power for centuries. In recent decades, the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) has gained influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Militarily, the United States (US) is still far more powerful than China, but the PRC is catching up and has developed into the most capable Asian country. The military expenditure of the US might still be more than double that of China. 20 years ago, however, the ratio was 5:1 [1]<\/a>1 \u2014 SIPRI, \u201cSIPRI Military Expenditure Database\u201d. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economically, China\u2019s rise is even more impressive. In seventeen out of the last twenty years, the PRC has been the fastest growing of all major economies including the US, the European Union (EU), India, Russia, and Japan. Per capita, China\u2019s GDP is still below that of Russia and only a fraction of that generated in the US, Japan, and the EU [2]<\/a>2 \u2014 World Bank, “World Development Indicators”. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>. In its entirety, however, the PRC is predicted to become the largest economy in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In most parts of the developed world, China\u2019s rise to international power is perceived rather skeptical. Unfavorable views of the PRC outweigh positive ones by large margins in countries like Japan (86%), Sweden (85%), Australia (81%), South Korea (75%), Denmark (75%), United Kingdom (74%), the Netherlands (73%), the US (73%), Canada (73%), Germany (71%), Belgium (71%), France (70%), Spain (63%), and Italy (62%). Of these 14 countries, 78% have no or not much confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping and only 19% indicate some or a lot of confidence in China\u2019s leader [3]<\/a>3 \u2014 Laura Silver et al. (2020), \u201cUnfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries\u201d. Pew Research Center. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>. A more detailed analysis of public opinion across Europe has further uncovered that negative perceptions of the PRC are predominant in almost all European countries. When asked about specific policies, only trade with China is perceived positive while Chinese investments, China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese military capabilities, China\u2019s impact on the global environment and the country\u2019s effect on democracy in other states are all seen in a negative light in most if not all European countries [4]<\/a>4 \u2014 Richard Q. Turcs\u00e1nyi et al. (2020). European Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19. Differences and Common Ground across the Continent, Olomouc: Palacky University.\n<\/span><\/span>. In short, China\u2019s soft power continues to be low and people in Europe and beyond are skeptical when it comes to the country\u2019s growing global role.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China may not be the most influential country in the world (yet), but its growing influence is undeniable leaving the world with the question how <\/em>the awoken giant will shake the world. Is the skepticism of Europeans justified?<\/p>\n\n\n\n While China\u2019s foreign policy and its implications on global order are subject of extensive and rich scholarly analyses, the PRC\u2019s role in world affairs remains controversial. Descriptions of Chinese foreign policy range from \u201caggressive\u201d and \u201cassertive\u201d to \u201cconstructive\u201d and \u201ccooperative\u201d, or even \u201cresponsible\u201d [5]<\/a>5 \u2014 Aaron L. Friedberg, \u201cThe Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing\u2019s Assertiveness\u201d, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Alastair Iain Johnston, \u201cHow New and Assertive Is China\u2019s New Assertiveness?\u201d, International Security, 37: 4, 2013, p. 7-48; Camilla T.N. S\u00f8rensen, \u201cThat Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice\u201d, China Quarterly 239: 2019, p. 594-316; Feng Zhu i Peng Lu, \u201cBe Strong and Be Good. Continuity and Change in China\u2019s International Strategy under Xi Jinping\u201d, China Quarterly of Internaitonal Strategic Studies, 1: 1, 2015, p. 19-34.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For example, at the 2017 World Economic Forum China\u2019s President Xi Jinping captured the headlines with his commitment to multilateralism, international rules, liberal trade and investment: \u201cWe must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism. [\u2026] We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions. We should honor promises and abide by rules. One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit.\u201d [6]<\/a>6 \u2014 China\u2019s President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum in Davos “President Xi’s Speech to Davos in Full ” World Economic Forum. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Some Western observers celebrated Xi\u2019s statement as a signal that China had become the \u201cdefender of globalization\u201d [7]<\/a>7 \u2014 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, \u201cChina\u2019s Xi Jinping Seizes Davos Stage to Proclaim Himself Defender of Globalisation\u201d, The Telegraph. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span> and an advocate of the liberal economic order [8]<\/a>8 \u2014 Bessma Momani, \u201cXi Jinping\u2019s Davos Speech Showed the World Has Turned Upside Down\u201d, Newsweek, available online. Charles Riley, \u201cDavos Marks the Emergence of a Confident, Strong China\u201d, CNN, available online.\n<\/span><\/span>. Skeptics countered that Xi\u2019s words were merely lip-service. They pointed out that China remains one of the world\u2019s most protectionist economies in the world, committing itself only rhetorically to those aspects of the existing order from which it profits. [9]<\/a>9 \u2014 Thomas Kellogg, \u201cXi\u2019s Davos Speech: Is China the New Champion for the Liberal International Order?\u201d, The Diplomat, available online. The Economist, \u201cXi Jinping Portrays China as a Rock of Stability\u201d, available online.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This exemplarily reflects a broader discussion among scholars of International Relations (IR) that interpret China either as a revisionist or a status quo power in world affairs. To some, the PRC aims to fundamentally reshape the world along the lines of its own interests. To them, conflict with the West \u2013 the US in particular \u2013 is inevitable [10]<\/a>10 \u2014 John J. Mearsheimer, \u201cThe False Promise of International Institutions\u201d, International Security, 19: 3, 1994\/95, p. 5-49; John J. Mearsheimer, \u201cBound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order\u201d, International Security 43: 4, 2019, p. 7-50.\n<\/span><\/span>. To these scholars, international institutions can hardly \u201cbind\u201d China. Recent changes in relative power and the resultant opportunities are behind China\u2019s new assertiveness and Chinese attempts to reduce international institutions\u2019 constraints on its power [11]<\/a>11 \u2014 \u201cThe Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing\u2019s Assertiveness\u201d, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Aaron L. Friedberg, \u201cGlobalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy\u201d, Survival, 60: 1, 2018, p. 7-40; Aaron L. Friedberg, \u201cThe Signs Were There\u201d, Foreign Affairs, 97: 4, 2018, p. 186-188.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other observers counter that China has gradually integrated itself into the existing international institutions and has profited from the established order. In their view, China is seeking to gain more influence in existing institutions without questioning their liberal governance principles, and even enshrining the same principles in the institutions it has newly invented [12]<\/a>12 \u2014 Gilford John Ikenberry, \u201cThe Rise of China and the Future of the West\u201d, Foreign Affairs, 78: 1, 2008, pp. 23-37; Gilford John Ikenberry, \u201cWhy the Liberal World Order Will Survive\u201d, Ethics and International Affairs, 32: 1, 2018, p. 17-29; Gilford John Ikenberry i Darren J. Lim, China\u2019s Emerging Institutional Statecraft. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-hegemony, Washington DC: Brookings, 2017.\n<\/span><\/span>. The PRC may not be supportive to all international institutions and its underlying principles, but it generally supports the status quo. For example, China does not subscribe to the promotion of democracy or strives to shape international norms being neither a \u201cnorm taker\u201d nor a \u201cnorm breaker\u201d [13]<\/a>13 \u2014 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Alastair Iain Johnston, \u201cChina in a World of Orders,\u201d International Security, 44: 2, 2019, p. 9-60; Alastair Iain Johnston, \u201cThe Failures of the \u2018Failure of Engagement\u2019 with China\u201d, The Washington Quarterly, 42: 2, 2019, p. 99-114; Andrew J. Nathan, \u201cChina\u2019s Rise and International Regimes. Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?\u201d. A: Robert S. Ross i Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), China in the Era of Xi Jinping. Domestic and Froeign Policy Challenges, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016, p. 265-195.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The role of the People’s Republic of China in world affairs remains controversial. Descriptions of Chinese foreign policy range from \u201caggressive\u201d and \u201cassertive\u201d to \u201cconstructive\u201d and \u201ccooperative\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n A third group of researchers, finally, describes China as an entirely new type of power in global affairs. This argument departs from the observation that China is deeply rooted in a distinct culture and history [14]<\/a>14 \u2014 Christian A. Hess, \u201cKeeping the Past Alive. The Use of History in China\u2019s Foreign Relations\u201d. A: Shaun Breslin (ed.), Handbook of China\u2019s International Relations, Londres: Routledge, 2010, p. 47-54; Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire. China\u2019s History and Modern Foreign Relations, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010; Nele Noesselt, \u201cIs There a \u201cChinese School\u201d of IR?\u201d, GIGA Working Papers 188, Hamburg: GIGA, 2012; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World. The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, Nova York: The Penguin Press, 2009; Weiwei Zhang, La ola china. El ascenso de un estado civilizaci\u00f3n, China Intercontinental Press, 2017.\n<\/span><\/span>. For example, Qin Yaqing, emphasizes the importance of specific contexts and relations among actors in contrast to the West\u2019s focus on fixed rules. To him, not rules but relations shape China\u2019s international role [15]<\/a>15 \u2014 Yaqing Qin, \u201cChinese Culture and Its Implications for Foreign Policy-making\u201d, China International Studies 2011, p. 45-65; Yaqing Qin, \u201cRule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance\u201d, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4: 2, 2011, p. 117-145; Yaqing Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.\n<\/span><\/span> The philosopher Zhao Tingyang, in turn, draws on the classical philosophical concept of \u201ctianxia\u201d, translated as \u201call-under-the-heaven\u201d, to design a normative vision of how Chinese influence could create a new, more peaceful world [16]<\/a>16 \u2014 Tingyang Zhao, \u201cRethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept \u2018All-under-Heaven\u2019 (Tian-xia)\u201d, Social Identities 12: 1, 2006, p. 29-41; Tingyang Zhao, \u201cA Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)\u201d, Diogenes, 56: 2009, p. 5-18; Tingyang Zhao, \u201cThe Ontology of Coexistence. From Cogito to Facio\u201d, Diogenes, 57: 4, 2010, p. 27-36.\n<\/span><\/span>. How come scholars interpret China\u2019s influence on global affairs so differently?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n China\u2019s leaders claim that state sovereignty is at the core of the country\u2019s foreign policy and its vision for the future international order. In practice, however, the PRC\u2019s foreign policy is just as contradictory as the academic interpretations of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the conflict over territorial claims in the South China Sea, for example, the PRC has adopted an assertive approach, but coupled it with limited willingness to cooperate. On the one hand, the PRC ignores the jurisdiction of the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague [17]<\/a>17 \u2014 Tom Phillips, \u201cChina Attacks International Court After South China Sea Ruling\u201d, The Guardian. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>, and builds artificial atolls and stations military personnel and equipment on formerly uninhabited rocks [18]<\/a>18 \u2014 Enrico Fels i Truong-Minh Vu (eds.), Power Politics in Asia\u2019s Contested Waters. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, London: Springer, 2016; Minnie Chan, \u201cChina to Build Up Atoll in Contested South China Sea, Source Says\u201d, South China Morning Post. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>. On the other hand, China has agreed \u201cguidelines\u201d and signed a framework for a long-awaited code of conduct on the South China Sea dispute and has not rejected outright the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [19]<\/a>19 \u2014 Michael Martina, \u201cRPT-China, ASEAN Set \u2018Guidelines\u2019 on Sea Row, But No Deal Expected\u201d, Reuters, available online. Ching Chang, \u201cExamining the Flaws of a South China Sea Code of Conduct\u201d, The Diplomat, available online. BBC, \u201cChinese jets intercept US aircraft over East China Sea, US says\u201d, available online.\n<\/span><\/span>. In other regions, China\u2019s constructive engagement is clearer, such as its role in the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, the South Sudan Peace Process and the Iran nuclear deal, as well as the PRC\u2019s commitment and contributions to United Nations and other peacekeeping capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another example of contradictory foreign policy is the PRC\u2019s approach to the International Criminal Court (ICC). On the one hand, China has rejected the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction by failing to sign the court\u2019s Rome Statute. Nonetheless, this rejection of the ICC has not prevented China from agreeing to the jurisdiction of the court over Darfur, Sudan in 2005 and Libya in 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A similar contradiction is characteristic for China\u2019s approach to the Bretton Woods institutions. On the one hand, the PRC has acknowledged the status of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank by insisting on an increase in its voting power in these institutions. On the other hand, the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank \u2013 while adopting many of the World Bank\u2019s principles [20]<\/a>20 \u2014 Chris Humphrey, \u201cDevelopmental Revolution or Bretton Woods Revisited? The Prospects of the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank\u201d, ODI Working Paper 418, Londres: Overseas Development Institute, 2015; Natalie G. Lichtenstein, A Comparative Guide to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.\n<\/span><\/span> \u2013 has undermined the efficiency of the Bretton Woods institutions simply by offering a Chinese-dominated alternative [21]<\/a>21 \u2014 Simon Reich, \u201cChina\u2019s New Investment Bank Challenges US Influence on Global Economics\u201d, The Conversation. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hence, the lack of academic consensus on how to describe China\u2019s approach to the rules and institutions underlying the international order is the result not primarily of theoretical differences, but of contradictory Chinese foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As I explain in depth in a forthcoming book [22]<\/a>22 \u2014 Tim Nicholas R\u00fchlig, Understanding China\u2019s Foreign Policy Contradictions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.\n<\/span><\/span>, China\u2019s contradictory foreign policy and approach to the existing international order is largely a result of the country\u2019s domestic affairs and vulnerabilities. Since the revolution in 1949, the country is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At first, the CCP\u2019s legitimacy was based on Communist ideology. Since the country adopted its \u201creform and opening up\u201d policy since 1978, economic development and the resultant increase of prosperity and poverty reduction have replaced ideology as the main source of the CCP\u2019s legitimation. In recent years, however, growth rates are lower than in previous decade, referred to China as the \u201cnew normal\u201d. This makes the CCP leaders worry about regime stability. In reaction, the CCP is re-strengthening and fueling a third pillar of its legitimacy, namely national pride.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Strikingly, however, neither economic prosperity nor national pride as sources of legitimacy lead to clear-cut policy. While some seek to maintain economic growth by means of more protectionism, other Chinese leaders strive to uphold and contribute to an open international economy that has been conducive to Chinese development in the past. Similarly, national pride can either lead to aggressive nationalism or translate into a search for international reputation as a responsible great power that cherishes international institutions and reliability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These different interpretations of the CCP\u2019s main sources of legitimacy already point to the fact that China is less monolithic than it might seem to outsiders. While decision-making within the PRC appears like a black box that is difficult to understand from the outside, academic research convincingly demonstrates that the country\u2019s domestic and foreign policy decision-making is more fragmented and decentralized than one might think [23]<\/a>23 \u2014 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, \u201cNew Foreign Policy Actors in China\u201d, SIPRI Policy Paper 26, Stockholm, SIPRI, 2010; David Shambaugh (ed.), The Modern Chinese State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; David Shambaugh, \u201cChina\u2019s Long March to Global Power\u201d. A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 3-21; Suisheng Zhao, \u201cChina\u2019s Foreign Policy Making Process. Players and Institutions\u201d, A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 85-110.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hence, China\u2019s contradictory foreign policy is the result of internal affairs and vulnerabilities. Already in 2007, Susan Shirk has carved out how China\u2019s leaders fear popular unrest and public opinion contesting the survival of the regime [24]<\/a>24 \u2014 Susan Shirk (2007), China. Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press.\n<\/span><\/span>. Shirk convincingly argues that while policymakers in Western states only face the risk of losing power, party cadres and their families worry about their livelihoods or even their lives should the regime fall. More recently, Thomas Christensen has emphasized how a crude mix of nationalist confidence and a domestic sense of regime vulnerability is making Chinese foreign policy more complex and contradictory [25]<\/a>25 \u2014 Thomas J. Christensen, \u201cThe Advantages of an Assertive China. Responding to Beijing\u2019s Abrasive Diplomacy\u201d, Foreign Affairs, 90: 2, 2011, p. 54-67; Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge. Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, Nova York: W. W. Norton, 2015.\n<\/span><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China\u2019s contradictory foreign policy is the result of internal affairs and vulnerabilities; China is less monolithic than it might seem to outsiders<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n As a result, China strives to abandon clear-cut and legally binding rules to the greatest extent possible in order to remain flexible enough to react to domestic crises where they emerge. This is neither to say nor to rule out that the PRC will overturn existing rules and principles, but rather that its priority lies with domestic regime stability and not in the establishment of a new international order.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n China may not have an overarching vision of an alternative international order or a grand strategy underlying its foreign policy, but it is not without impact on the future international order. China is vulnerable but not weak. For the sake of its own flexibility, China questions universal definitions of core vocabulary of international relations ranging from the meaning of democracy to human right and free trade. The PRC further strives to make international law subject to interpretation of sovereign states weakening the legal binding of international rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short, China\u2019s rise to international power is not coming with an alternative order but it undermines the existing one. Since China\u2019s approach is largely driven by domestic vulnerabilities it is difficult for third countries, including the EU and its member states, to influence the course of the PRC.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u201cThere lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will shake the world.\u201d This quote, attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, captures that China is being seen as a potential great power for centuries. In recent decades, the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) has gained influence. Militarily, the United States (US) is still far more powerful than China, but the PRC is catching up and has developed into the most capable Asian country. The military expenditure of the US might still be more than double that of China. 20 years ago, however, the ratio was 5:1 . Economically,\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":42481,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[355],"tags":[],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-42051","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-la-xina-com-a-superpotencia-de-l-ordre-internacional-liberal-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nRevisionist, status quo, or a new type: what kind of power is China?<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
China\u2019s contradictory foreign policy<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Why is China\u2019s foreign policy contradictory?<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
How China\u2019s rise is changing the international order<\/h5>\n\n\n\n