Secondly, most citizens had never voted before, due to nearly five decades of authoritarian rule (1926-74) and a first semi-democratic experience (1910-1926) characterised by restrictive voting rights, especially for women. In 1973, a poll conducted for the first edition of the weekly newspaper Expresso <\/em>reported that 63% of Portuguese adults had never voted. In fact, while the electorate in the 1973 elections (the last to be conducted under the dictatorship) was roughly 2 million citizens, in 1975 more than 6 million citizens were granted voting rights. In addition, in the mid-1970s, one in every four Portuguese citizens could not read nor write \u2013 a panorama that raised fears of lack of political sophistication and vulnerability to demagogy and propaganda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1973, a poll conducted for the first edition of the weekly newspaper Expresso <\/em>reported that 63% of Portuguese adults had never voted. In the mid-1970s one in every four Portuguese citizens could not read nor write<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n Thirdly, the election occurred amidst profound political instability, turmoil and sporadic violence between supporters and opponents of revolutionary ideals. The left-wing sectors of the military who toppled the regime sought to institutionalise their power by transforming the MFA (Armed Forces Movement<\/em>) into a relevant political force whose influence grew after 11 March 1975, when an aborted right-wing coup strengthened military and civilian left-wing forces, particularly the PCP. These events aggravated the crisis that had emerged since 1974, marked by a struggle between the PCP and the PS and the parties to their right who advocated the dissolution of political-military structures and the institutionalisation of liberal democracy.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n Lastly, the untested electoral system implemented in 1975 added uncertainty to the equation. The choice of a proportional representation system with closed and blocked lists, several small electoral districts and the D\u2019Hondt formula was seen as a good compromise by the political forces involved in the electoral system design process, but the fact is that none of them had perfect knowledge of their electoral potential and the extent to which it could be impaired or boosted by the electoral rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite all these challenges, the 1975 elections witnessed an unprecedented voter turnout (about 92 percent), fuelled by a fervent desire for active participation in national politics after decades of authoritarianism. While spontaneous popular mobilisation provides part of the explanation for such unprecedented participation, other aspects, such as the active involvement of both political parties and the military in mobilising and influencing choices deserve attention too. Another particularly interesting result of these elections was the fact that both the PS and the PPD emerged as the top vote winners, while the PCP, considered a strong opponent due to its level of territorial penetration and its control over co-operatives and collective farms in the south, obtained modest electoral support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 1975 elections witnessed an unprecedented voter turnout, about 92 percent, fuelled by a fervent desire for active participation after decades of authoritarianism<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n This article describes how both political parties and the military conducted campaigns to mobilise citizens to vote and influence their voting behaviour in this context of uncertainty. We start by describing the campaigns by the political parties, focussing on their general strategy, campaign intensity and main slogans and messages. The discussion turns to the Cultural Dynamisation Campaigns (Campanhas de Dinamiza\u00e7\u00e3o Cultural<\/em>) spearheaded by the MFA, underscoring both the breadth of territorial outreach and the conveyed message. The article concludes with an analysis of the impacts of such endeavours.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n As mentioned above, uncertainty regarding the electoral potential of the main parties marked the entire period before the April 1975 elections. Indeed, the polls carried out in 1974 showed high percentages of undecided voters (50-70 percent), and the poll published in Spain on the eve of the election (pointing to a victory for the PS, placing the PPD in second place, and the PCP in a shocking third position), still reported more than 70 percent of undecided. [2]<\/a>2 \u2014 Lisi, M.; Freire, A. (2015). \u201cOs anos de transi\u00e7\u00e3o: as elei\u00e7\u00f5es para a Assembleia Constituinte\u201d. A: Lisi, M. (ed.). As Elei\u00e7\u00f5es Legislativas no Portugal Democr\u00e1tico (1975-2015). Lisbon: Assembleia da Rep\u00fablica, p. 45-63.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n This panorama made parties restless in terms of their campaign efforts, albeit relevant variations in terms of professionalisation and intensity can be observed. [3]<\/a>3 \u2014 Santana Pereira, J.; Ribeiro, V. (2021). \u201cDo princ\u00edpio da incerteza \u00e0 vit\u00f3ria dos moderados: as campanhas dos partidos para as elei\u00e7\u00f5es fundadoras de 25 de abril de 1975\u201d. A: Raimundo, F.; Cancela, J. (ed.). As Elei\u00e7\u00f5es de 1975: Elei\u00e7\u00f5es Fundadoras da Democracia Portuguesa. Lisboa: Assembleia da Rep\u00fablica, p. 129-151.\n<\/span><\/span> The PS campaign was deemed the most professional with the most money involved. By contrast, PPD members carried out a campaign marked by decentralisation (and some lack of coordination), partly due to the illness of its leader, Francisco S\u00e1 Carneiro. As expected, PCP\u2019s mobilisation efforts were notable: the party organised 3,041 rallies and electoral sessions, being the most active party and one of the few (along with MDP, PPD, PPM and PS) that carried out such activities in all the electoral districts of Portugal. In contrast to this, the CDS largely carried out a media campaign. In fact, the party relied heavily on radio and television campaigning to the detriment of rallies and clarification sessions, which were deemed risky, as it was one of the main victims of the excesses of far-left militants. [4]<\/a>4 \u2014 Paris, A.; Marchi, R.; Raimundo, F. (2019). Breve Hist\u00f3ria do CDS-Partido Popular. Lisbon: P\u00fablico\/100 Folhas.\n<\/span><\/span> As for the remaining parties, which would prove to be considerably less relevant in electoral terms, there was a dramatically diverse panorama in terms of actions, resources and campaign finances. [5]<\/a>5 \u2014 Santana Pereira, J.; Ribeiro, V. (2021). \u201cDo princ\u00edpio da incerteza \u00e0 vit\u00f3ria dos moderados: as campanhas dos partidos para as elei\u00e7\u00f5es fundadoras de 25 de abril de 1975\u201d.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n The words most often used by the PCP were democracy, economy, people and freedom, in the case of the other seven far-left parties, the most common words stemmed from the Marxist lexicon: bourgeoisie, people, struggle and revolution<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n It must be said that, besides persuasion, voter mobilisation was an important element for most political forces involved in the campaign \u2013 but not for everyone. In fact, parties who were not running in the election, such as Reorganized Movement of the Party of the Proletariat<\/em> (MRPP; suspended by the Revolution Council due to activities deemed antidemocratic) or the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat<\/em> (PRP), campaigned for abstention, positioning themselves against these \u201cbourgeois elections<\/em>\u201d. [8]<\/a>8 \u2014 Santana Pereira, J.; Ribeiro, V. (2021). \u201cDo princ\u00edpio da incerteza \u00e0 vit\u00f3ria dos moderados: as campanhas dos partidos para as elei\u00e7\u00f5es fundadoras de 25 de abril de 1975\u201d.\n<\/span><\/span> In turn, as we will see in the next section, the MFA\u2019s 5th Division also presented blank voting as a valid option.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n In 1975, the military had two primary concerns regarding these first democratic elections in the country. Firstly, they believed that Portuguese citizens were unprepared for participation in the elections, lacking awareness of the brutality of the authoritarian regime and its impact on the country\u2019s poor economic performance. Secondly, they feared that citizens in many local and rural areas would be swayed by local figures towards right-wing parties, which could pave the way for a potential return to right-wing authoritarianism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To address these concerns, the military initiated a campaign aimed at enlightening the population. Dubbed the Cultural Dynamisation and Civic Action Campaign, this effort was run from a new division established by the MFA within the armed forces, known as the 5th Division. It focused on communication, public relations and psychological action, being the ideological, propagandistic, sociological analysis and cultural dynamisation arm of the military. The 5th Division controlled several newsrooms (especially after 11 March, 1975), such as the public TV broadcaster RTP, the radio stations Emissora Nacional and R\u00e1dio Clube Portugu\u00eas<\/em>, and the newspapers Di\u00e1rio de Not\u00edcias<\/em> and O S\u00e9culo<\/em>. Interestingly, it was said to be more at the service of the PCP\u2019s and Prime Minister Vasco Gon\u00e7alves\u2019s interests than those of the Revolution Council itself. Although it was accused of such left-wing bias, researchers have not substantiated formal connections between the main members of the 5th Division and the PCP. [9]<\/a>9 \u2014 See:\n\nRibeiro, V. (2014). \u201cOs primeiros passos da comunica\u00e7\u00e3o pol\u00edtica democr\u00e1tica em Portugal: a 5\u00aa Divis\u00e3o do MFA como motor da propaganda revolucion\u00e1ria no PREC\u201d. Hist\u00f3ria. Revista da FLUC Porto, vol. VI, no. 4, p. 79-91\n\n \n\nVeiga, I. (2014). \u201cA 5\u00aa Divis\u00e3o do Estado-Maior-General das For\u00e7as Armadas no processo revolucion\u00e1rio portugu\u00eas. Modelos, apoios e antagonismos\u201d. Ler Hist\u00f3ria 67, p. 155-168. Available online.\n\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n In turn, the political component aligned with the directive issued by the General Staff of the Armed Forces in October 1974, emphasising political engagement and public discussion on the nation\u2019s future paths, guided by the MFA programme. [11]<\/a>11 \u2014 Begonha, M. (2015). 5\u00aa Divis\u00e3o MFA. Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o e Cultura. Lisbon: Edi\u00e7\u00f5es Colibri.\n<\/span><\/span> During the press conference in which the campaigns were introduced, the need to adopt an \u201cantifascist outlook\u201d was openly stated, and throughout the campaigns, there was continual talk about the benefits of building a \u201csocialist society\u201d. There are numerous examples of their intention to go beyond mobilisation and influence people\u2019s voting behaviour. For instance, a statement made in one of the public sessions organised in the north in January 1975:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLet everyone listen to all the parties. Those who cannot read can ask others to read their manifestoes for them, because, obviously, if this Revolution is made for the people, it seems incomprehensible that the people would vote for parties that do not defend their interests. People need to be attentive; they must not allow themselves to be deceived again. Employers must not manipulate or force their employees to vote for a certain party, nor threaten them with dismissal if they do not do this or that. The Portuguese are not reactionary [conservative]. The Portuguese must use their heads, they must think, they must see what is most convenient for them. Therefore, they cannot follow the conversations, neither of the rich, nor of those who clearly see that if the will of the people is clearly expressed, they may lose the privileges they have accumulated over all these years. This Revolution is to end privileges. It is to restore to the people their freedoms, it is to offer the people their dignity as men\u2026\u201d [12]<\/a>12 \u2014 Authors\u2019 translation. A: Begonha, M. (2015). 5\u00aa Divis\u00e3o MFA. Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o e Cultura, p. 26.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n The content of these public sessions was variable, but there are many such examples among the 2,500 sessions held between 1974 and 1975 across Portugal, including the Azores and Madeira.<\/p>\n\n\n In the previous sections, we show how intense the campaign activities carried out both by political parties and the military were. However, what impact did they actually have? Regarding parties\u2019 activities, in founding elections such as those held on 25 April 1975 in Portugal, effects such as persuasion, conversion and impact on the perception of the status quo (the so-called cognitive effects) are considered particularly likely. Most of the parties that were running for elections had been created and legalised very recently, so, with the probable exception of the PCP, party identities and political attitudes towards the actors of the new regime were not sufficiently crystallised. Mobilisation was also central for most parties, in a context of enormous uncertainty about their relative weight in electoral terms. [14]<\/a>14 \u2014 See:\n\nSantana Pereira, J.; Ribeiro, V. (2021). \u201cDo princ\u00edpio da incerteza \u00e0 vit\u00f3ria dos moderados: as campanhas dos partidos para as elei\u00e7\u00f5es fundadoras de 25 de abril de 1975\u201d\n\n \n\nLisi, M., & Freire, A. (2015). \u201cOs anos de transi\u00e7\u00e3o: as elei\u00e7\u00f5es para a Assembleia Constituinte\u201d.\n\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Mobilisation efforts apparently worked well. Indeed, these founding elections were characterised by extremely high levels of participation (more than 90 percent of the registered citizens voted). This can be clearly understood as both a victory for the mobilisation strategy adopted by some political forces and simultaneously as unequivocal popular support for the tool of free elections as a way of legitimising political power. [15]<\/a>15 \u2014 Lisi, M.; Freire, A. (2015). \u201cOs anos de transi\u00e7\u00e3o: as elei\u00e7\u00f5es para a Assembleia Constituinte\u201d.\n<\/span><\/span> In terms of voter choice, after a campaign in which moderate and revolutionary alternatives to achieving the ultimate objective of \u201csocialism\u201d were the main competitors, the election results demonstrated that voters positioned themselves mostly on the side of the moderates, the proponents of a western liberal democracy (PS, PPD and CDS, which won about 72 percent of the votes). Interestingly, the PCP\u2019s advantage provided by seniority, organisational structure, militant framework and mobilisation capacity [16]<\/a>16 \u2014 See, for instance, Lisi, M. (2007). \u201cO PCP e o processo de mobiliza\u00e7\u00e3o entre 1974 e 1976\u201d. An\u00e1lise Social, vol. XLII, no. 182, p. 181-205.\n<\/span><\/span> vis-\u00e0-vis the other parties did not translate into an electoral victory \u2013 indeed, the party only won about 12.5 percent of the vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The election results demonstrated that voters positioned themselves mostly on the side of the moderates, the proponents of a western liberal democracy; the PCP\u2019s mobilisation capacity did not translate into an electoral victory <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n What about the impact of the campaign activities carried out by the military? Some scholars contend that the MFA failed to influence the election outcome [17]<\/a>17 \u2014 Goldey, D. B. (1983). \u201cElections and the Consolidation of Portuguese Democracy: 1974-1983\u201d. Electoral Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 229-40.\n<\/span><\/span> However, recent research provides a contrasting view. Through an analysis of campaign records, a mild yet notable impact was indeed observed. [18]<\/a>18 \u2014 Raimundo, F. et al. (2021). \u201cCombater o obscurantismo, mobilizar para o voto. As campanhas de Dinamiza\u00e7\u00e3o Cultural e as elei\u00e7\u00f5es de 1975\u201d. A: Raimundo F., Cancela J. (ed.). As Elei\u00e7\u00f5es de 1975: Elei\u00e7\u00f5es Fundadoras da Democracia Portuguesa. Lisbon: Assembleia da Rep\u00fablica, p. 129-151.\n<\/span><\/span> . Firstly, in low-density areas targeted by the military, turnout increased by up to two percent compared to areas without campaigns. While this effect was not observed in high-density areas, it remains significant given the military\u2019s focused endeavours. Secondly, this study unveiled a one percent increase in blank votes in areas where military campaigns took place, contributing directly to ongoing debates in the literature on the military\u2019s influence on voter behaviour.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n Lastly, of particular interest is the finding that left-wing parties benefited from these campaigns, with a five percent increase in votes for these parties in areas where sessions were held. The surprising aspect lies not in the left-wing parties benefiting from the campaigns, but rather in the lack of impact on the PCP. The party that most notably benefited from these endeavours was the PS, which saw a four percent increase in votes. Indeed, it is not impossible that people perceived the idea of the benefits of a \u201csocialist society\u201d as a call to vote for the PS.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" On 25 April 1975, Portugal witnessed a historic turning point as it conducted its inaugural elections under universal suffrage. The electorate participated in selecting the Constituent Assembly, entrusted solely with the drafting of a new democratic constitution. These elections \u2013 often described as founding elections \u2013 served as the cornerstone of Portuguese democracy, yielding outcomes that defied expectations, maybe due in part to the strategies employed during the campaign. Mobilising voters and influencing their choices presented unique challenges during this pivotal period. Firstly, most political parties running in the election had only recently emerged, lacking solid grassroots support. Except for\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":68,"featured_media":72735,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[607],"tags":[],"segment":[],"subject":[],"class_list":["post-72748","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dossier-la-revolucio-dels-clavells-perspectives-i-llegats-en"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n
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Talking about politics under a revolution? Parties\u2019 campaign efforts in 1975<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
![\"Imatge](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Imatge-1-1.jpg?resize=876%2C597&ssl=1\")
But what were these parties saying? To start with, the idea of defending freedom was, interestingly, an element distinguishing the PS and other moderate forces from the other political parties. The PS used the slogan Construir um Pa\u00eds Livre<\/em> (Building a Free Country) and promoted the motto socialism yes, dictatorship no<\/em>, aiming at benefitting from the anti-communist sentiment arising in some segments of Portuguese society. The PPD highlighted on its posters that it was Em Luta Por um Portugal Livre <\/em>(Fighting for a Free Portugal). With regard to the CDS, in a TV campaign ad Adelino Amaro da Costa presented his party as a defender of a \u201cfree and fair society (\u2026) for each and every Portuguese person<\/em>\u201d . [6]<\/a>6 \u2014 Authors\u2019 translation. See Lisi, M.; Freire, A. (2015). \u201cOs anos de transi\u00e7\u00e3o: as elei\u00e7\u00f5es para a Assembleia Constituinte\u201d.\n<\/span><\/span> Combating accusations of totalitarian impulses from the moderate parties, the PCP also appealed to the value of freedom (D\u00e1 Mais For\u00e7a \u00e0 Tua Liberdade<\/em>; Give More Strength to your Freedom) and adopted more neutral messages than the other far-left parties. This trend is reflected, for example, in the terms used during the official electoral campaign period: while the four words most often used by the PCP were democracy, economy, people and freedom, in the case of the other seven far-left parties, the most common words stemmed from the Marxist lexicon (bourgeoisie, people, struggle, workers, capitalism, nationalisation, revolution, class). [7]<\/a>7 \u2014 Santana Pereira, J.; Ribeiro, V. (2021). \u201cDo princ\u00edpio da incerteza \u00e0 vit\u00f3ria dos moderados: as campanhas dos partidos para as elei\u00e7\u00f5es fundadoras de 25 de abril de 1975\u201d. See also Gaspar, J.; Vitorino, N. (1976). As Elei\u00e7\u00f5es de 25 de Abril: Geografia e Imagem dos Partidos. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
Unconventional military intervention: mobilising and influencing voters against right-wing influence<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
![\"Imatge](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Imatge-2.jpg?resize=550%2C546&ssl=1\")
The Cultural Dynamisation efforts began months before the April 1975 election campaign but gained significant momentum during the electoral period, particularly concerning voter registration and mobilisation. It encompassed both cultural and political components, which were intertwined and challenging to disentangle. Anthropologist Vespeira de Almeida\u2019s pioneering work provides valuable insights into the campaign\u2019s cultural dimension. [10]<\/a>10 \u2014 Almeida, S. V. (2007). A ruralidade no processo de transi\u00e7\u00e3o para a democracia em Portugal. Campanhas de Dinamiza\u00e7\u00e3o Cultural e Ac\u00e7\u00e3o C\u00edvica no Movimento das For\u00e7as Armadas (1974-75). PhD Thesis in Anthropology, ISCTE-IUL, Lisbon.\n<\/span><\/span> Between October 1974 and March 11, 1975, the campaigns were itinerant, with the military not staying long in the parishes they visited. Initially, the focus was on prospectively analysing areas with the greatest needs and favourable reactions from the population. Following March 11, 1975, the military adopted cultural activities such as cinema, theatre and music to provoke discussions on social realities and improve basic infrastructures nationwide. They collaborated with artists from the left-wing political spectrum and specialists in relevant fields to achieve these objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
![\"Filipa](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Filipa-Raimundo-i-Jose-Santana.png?resize=1024%2C614&ssl=1\")
As time passed, and the fear of being unable to influence voting behaviour grew, the military also ended up advocating blank voting. This is clear from an example in a press release, in which they openly say that \u201cblank voting is not a crime, nor a betrayal; by doing so, we are making a choice, freely expressing what we think and feel, fulfilling our duty as patriots without violating our conscience or turning that weapon against ourselves. [13]<\/a>13 \u2014 Authors\u2019 translation of the statement from the 5th Military Division of the MFA cited in Abreu, D. (1975). Elei\u00e7\u00f5es em Abril: Di\u00e1rio de Campanha. Lisbon: Liber, pp. 402-403.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\nImpacts: turnout, electoral support for moderates, blank voting<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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