\nOnly 8% of the world\u2019s population lives in a \u201cfull democracy\u201d: a political system that protects citizens\u2019 civil and political rights and maintains a competitive system of elections <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\nThe second point we will explore is the prognosis for democracy in our continent in general and Spain in particular. And the third point will not address democracy\u2019s quantity but its quality and nature. Because, over a period of several decades, a silent revolution has taken place in the world\u2019s most stable democracies: we can no longer talk only of a competition between forces on the left and forces on the right; there are other players, such as the populisms, that have gained weight. And, together with the populisms, the traditional representation assigned to left-wing and right-wing parties has changed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
The health of democracy<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
According to the V-DEM Institute, [3]<\/a>3 \u2014 V-Dem Institute (2023). Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Available on-line.\n<\/span><\/span> which is perhaps the most cited and most influential institute for critical assessment of the state of democracy in the world, 72% of the world\u2019s population currently lives in an autocracy. This is tiny compared to 1789, when 100% of the planet was in the hands of despots, enlightened or otherwise. But if we look back only a decade, the rise of dictatorial regimes is spectacular. In 2012, only 46% of the world\u2019s population was governed by tyrants. Since the upheavals of the Great Recession, a sinister shadow has moved across the globe, curtailing individual freedoms and undermining electoral competition in favour of the rulers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In fact, this is the usual way in which \u201cdemocracies die\u201d. [4]<\/a>4 \u2014 Levitsky, S.; Ziblatt, D. (2019). How democracies die. Crown.\n<\/span><\/span> While in the second half of the 20th century, it was typical for democracies to collapse under coups d\u2019\u00e9tat, with the military leaving the barracks to occupy the Congress and the Presidential Palace, now the norm is the so-called self-coup<\/em> by which democratically elected rulers perpetuate themselves in power through gradual \u2013 although sometimes abrupt \u2013 control of all State apparatuses. From Nicaragua and Venezuela to Russia or India, this is the usual procedure by which presidents accumulate excessive power. Sometimes, this autocratisation process does not come to fruition and, at a certain point, power is transferred to the opposition. We have just seen this in Poland. And, at a less developed stage, this is what happened with Biden\u2019s victory over Trump. Despite the erosion of the world\u2019s oldest democracy during Trump\u2019s presidency, and the undoubtedly worrying assault on Capitol Hill, it managed to survive the rule of a decidedly populist president. At least, it withstood the first encounter. If Trump can run in November and wins another term, then the situation may be different. However, for the moment, American democracy is not dead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the overall picture is not so rosy. The level of democracy for the average citizen around the world has fallen to levels comparable with those of 1986. The erosion of democracy has been particularly severe in certain regions, such as Asia-Pacific, where it has receded to 1978 levels. In fact, the decline of democracy is picking up speed in all parts of the world. Since 1994, experts have documented a substantial reduction in the civil liberties and political rights of one third of the planet\u2019s population. [5]<\/a>5 \u2014 Boese, V. A.; Lindberg, S. I.; L\u00fchrmann, A. (2021). \u201cWaves of autocratization and democratization: a rejoinder\u201d. Democratization, vol. 28, no. 6, p. 1202-1210.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\nGlobally, since 1994, there has been a substantial reduction in the civil liberties and political rights of a third of the planet\u2019s population<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\nSome authors say that we cannot yet speak of an autocratising wave [6]<\/a>6 \u2014 Skaaning, S. E. (2020). \u201cWaves of autocratization and democratization: a critical note on conceptualization and measurement\u201d. Democratization, vol. 27, no. 8, p. 1533-1542.\n<\/span><\/span> and the very concept of wave is debatable, since autocratisation, as a general term, provides an umbrella for very different phenomena. [7]<\/a>7 \u2014 Tomini, L. (2021). \u201cDon\u2019t think of a wave! A research note about the current autocratization debate\u201d. Democratization, vol. 28, no. 6, p. 1191-1201.\n<\/span><\/span> Putin\u2019s repression of the opposition is different from Duterte\u2019s violation of human rights in the Philippines, Bolsonaro\u2019s abuses in Brazil or Modi\u2019s in India, or Orb\u00e1n\u2019s actions in Hungary or the loss of democratic quality in the United States under Trump.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
In all these countries, the pendulum has swung towards a reduction of freedoms. However, while in some cases we can talk of harsh autocracies, in others, such as the USA, what has deteriorated is the media environment and public debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If we look at the state of democratic deterioration in the world in detail, we can see some worrying trends. First, government repression of civil society organisations has been increasing during these years, and now affects 37 countries. Since the NGOs play a crucial role in fostering public engagement and defending human rights, their repression has a two-fold negative impact on the health of democracy: it erodes the options of both today\u2019s and tomorrow\u2019s democratic opposition and discourages new generations from connecting with the values of free regimes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second, another basic pillar of democracy, freedom of expression, is losing ground in 35 countries. This again represents a significant increase compared with a decade ago, when this phenomenon was only seen in 7 countries. This decline is important because it undermines an essential aspect of democracies: societies\u2019 ability to openly and freely discuss the issues that concern them. It is interesting to see the difference between the decline of democracy in the 1930s and today. While then what was endangered was freedom of association, with the banning of political parties, today\u2019s democracies suffer more from the loss of freedom of expression.<\/p>\n\n\n
\nMarine Le Pen, cheered by the public gathered in Le D\u00f4me hall at a Front National rally. Marseille, France, April 19, 2017. Photo: Jordi Borr\u00e0s<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is compounded by the third aspect: the increased government censorship of the media. In the last 10 years, experts warn that this aspect has worsened in no fewer than 47 countries. Limiting the independence of the media, and their ability to report impartially, inevitably erodes democratic regimes. As has also been pointed out on several occasions, one of the variables that correlates most with the absence of political corruption in a country is freedom of the press, understood as independence from the pressure exerted by governments (or other organised groups). Truth is the first victim in the war against democracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The overall result is worrying. The fact that 72% of the world\u2019s population, that is, 5.7 billion people, lived in autocracies in 2022 is a shocking statistic. For the first time in more than two decades, we have more countries in the most sinister category of political regimes (the so-called closed autocracies<\/em>) than in the most agreeable category (the liberal democracies). This raises crucial questions about the balance of power in the long run in the world. The pessimists are quick to draw parallels with the inter-war period in the 20th century, as we have now reached a record that has not been seen since then: the fact that the closed autocracies control approximately one third of world GDP. To put it another way: the dictatorships\u2019 economic power is not as strong as that of the powers that made up the German-Japanese-Italian axis, and its satellites such as Franco\u2019s Spain. The optimists counter, perhaps with more faith and hope than data and theories, that today\u2019s dictatorships, in spite of their economic power, are unable to project an alternative model for living that could appeal to young people, intellectuals and other members of the social \u201cavant-garde\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\nLimiting the independence of the media and their ability to report impartially inevitably erodes democratic regimes<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
\nUnlike what happened in the 1930s, when hordes of enthusiasts joined fascist or communist movements, or even in the 1960s and 1970s, when many were also drawn into subversive guerrilla movements, today\u2019s dictatorships have been unable to recreate a similar utopia. There are no great opinion leaders or great artists or great schools of thought that are successfully advocating, in Western societies, the development model of Russia, Saudi Arabia or China.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n
The future of democracy<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
However, it may be only a matter of time. Although it is still the subject of fierce debate, political scientists point to a \u201cdemocratic disconnect\u201d among the new generations in Europe and North America. [8]<\/a>8 \u2014 Foa, R. S.; Mounk, I. (2016). \u201cThe Danger of Deconsolidation: The democratic disconnect\u201d. Journal of Democracy, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 5. Available online.\n<\/span><\/span> In particular, millennials have become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system and are more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives, especially if the community\u2019s welfare is in danger. One example would be the docility with which the citizens of the world\u2019s most advanced democracies accepted the curtailments of freedoms during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is also a contrary view. [9]<\/a>9 \u2014 Voeten, E. (2016). \u201cAre people really turning away from democracy?\u201d. Available online at SSRN.\n<\/span><\/span> The fact that the millennials are slightly more sympathetic towards non-democratic forms of government in their countries could be an age effect rather than a cohort effect. That is, because they are young and not because that they are young at this particular time. Generally speaking, millennials do not differ much in their views of political systems from the young people of the mid-1990s and, if we analyse the trust in actual democratic institutions, the pattern that emerges is exactly the opposite: in the United States, more people from older generations have lost faith in the Congress and the executive than the millennials. In Western Europe, the data are not so categorical but one conclusion is starting to emerge from the heated academic debate: citizens\u2019 levels of trust in democratic institutions varies considerably from one year to the next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One recent study has debunked the myth that higher levels of democracy should have a strong positive effect on public support for democracy as a political system in a country. [10]<\/a>10 \u2014 Claassen, C. (2020). \u201cIn the mood for democracy? Democratic support as thermostatic opinion\u201d. American Political Science Review, vol. 114, no. 1, p. 36-53.\n<\/span><\/span> This study shows what could be termed a thermostatic effect<\/em>, according to which changes in the objective levels of democracy in a country are associated with opposite public reactions: increases in democracy weaken, not strengthen, the population\u2019s democratic sentiment, while decreases in the levels of democracy strengthen citizens\u2019 democratic sentiment. And, crucially, it is democracy\u2019s counterweights (such as a strong judiciary and greater protection of individual rights against power) that have most impact on the population\u2019s democratic spirit. While improvements in democracy\u2019s electoral aspects (such as greater efficiency in counting election results) have virtually no effect on public sentiment, increases in judicial safeguards against public powers significantly undermine public support for democracy. In general, the image of the democratic citizen that emerges from this study is that of a more fickle and intolerant person than has traditionally been suggested in the literature.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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