![\"Irene](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/revistaidees.cat\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/Irene-Flunser-imatge-interior-nova-min.png?resize=1024%2C740&ssl=1\")
It is true that in February 1974, the military section of the American embassy sent the DIA \u201cinformation on a petition presented to the Government by 1,500 professionals in the armed forces two months earlier\u201d, but it did not include \u201cthe names of any of the signatories, and no efforts were made to identify them\u201d. The following month, Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott, who had arrived in Lisbon on 10 January, i.e. more than a year after the departure of his predecessor, Ridgway B. Knight, mentioned the \u201cofficers’ movement\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By attributing corporate objectives to the soldiers involved, he predicted that a \u201cbetter planned and less impetuous\u201d uprising than the one of 16 March could take place, [3]<\/a>3 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: an infantry regiment in the town of Caldas da Rainha mutinied and attempted to march on Lisbon on 16 March 1974, but the uprising was suppressed the same day.\n<\/span><\/span> but he believed that the leadership \u201cin the metropolis had been decapitated for the present\u201d. The ambassador added that some of those involved had been arrested \u201cby the hated DGS\u201d and that captain Carlos Fabi\u00e3o had denounced an attempted coup by the general Ka\u00falza de Arriaga. After the failed military coup in the town of Caldas da Rainha, and probably influenced by the optimism of the DGS, the CIA made the unfortunate forecast that no \u201cfurther attempt at insurrection\u201d would take place for some months. [4]<\/a>4 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, p. 20, 22-24.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the telegrams from John Morgan and American military espionage in Lisbon, in late March the CIA services in Western Europe began an in-depth analysis of Portugal entitled \u201cCracks in the Fa\u00e7ade\u201d. However, the document had yet to be completed on 25 April 1974.. [5]<\/a>5 \u2014 Antunes, J. F. (1991). Kennedy e Salazar, O Le\u00e3o e a Raposa. Lisbon: Difus\u00e3o Cultural, p. 106-108.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n When considering hypotheses that the regime may be overthrown by a communist action, the CIA analysts concluded that there was no reason for \u201calarm\u201d <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n A year and a half later, in October 1975, the director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (BIR) of the United States State Department, William Hyland, would testify before the Pike Commission in Washington about the CIA’s lack of foresight concerning the coup of 25 April 1974. Kissinger was outraged by Hyland’s testimony, and exclaimed: \u201cHow the hell were we supposed to know more than Caetano knew?\u201d He was reminded that the task of the CIA was precisely to predict coups d’\u00e9tat, and pointed out that the agency had not passed on any information about what was happening in Portugal between 16 March and 25 April 1974, because it had none to offer. [6]<\/a>6 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, p. 19-20.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n The Captains’ Movement which brought down the dictatorial and colonial Portuguese dictatorship achieved an overwhelming victory in Operation Historical Turn in just 19 hours, starting with the first radio broadcast at 10.55 pm on 24 April, and concluding at 6.00 pm on 25 April, when Marcelo Caetano resigned. The coup d’\u00e9tat came as a surprise to the Western intelligence services which had links to the DGS, from which they received information about the situation in Portugal, and they shared the political police force’s ignorance as a result. On the night of 24-25 April 1974, the United States was represented in Lisbon by the charg\u00e9 d’affaires Richard Post, who was standing in for the Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott, who was visiting the Lajes military base in the Azores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The telephone rang at Post’s house in the Restelo neighbourhood, where one of the guards, a former DGS agent, took the call in the garage and immediately alerted the American charge d’affaires on the intercom, crying \u201cDanger, danger\u201d. Post did not understand what he was saying, and his wife, who was half asleep, translated for him: \u201cAh, that’s the guard’s name!\u201d. Post hung up the telephone and the couple went back to sleep until \u201csix in the morning, when one of the military attach\u00e9s\u201d telephoned them \u201cto tell them there were tanks in the street and military music on the radio\u201d. [7]<\/a>7 \u2014 Antunes, J. F. (1992). Nixon e Caetano, p. 311, 349.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The charge d’affaires went to the United States Embassy, which at that time was located on Lisbon \u2018s Avenida Duque de Loul\u00e9. There he met CIA agent John Morgan, and the two exchanged information with American soldiers from the NATO base in Oeiras and with the United States Consul in Porto, Rush W. Taylor. The CIA misunderstood the initial information about \u201cthe events in Lisbon\u201d, because it believed that the MFA consisted of \u201csupporters of General Ant\u00f3nio de Sp\u00ednola, the Vice-Chief of the Defence Council of the Armed Forces who had been dismissed a month earlier\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After being woken up in the Azores by Richard Post, Ambassador Scott did not send a telegram \u2013 titled \u201cDisturbances in Portugal\u201d \u2013 until 9.50 on the morning of 25 April. At eleven o’clock, Washington was informed that there was \u201ctension, but also calm and a significant number of soldiers in the streets\u201d in Lisbon, but that it was unclear who was leading the \u201cdissidents\u201d. This \u201cfirst telegram to the State Department, at eleven o’clock in the morning of 25 April, showed\u201d the United States embassy’s complete ignorance concerning the identity of the leaders of the uprising [8]<\/a>8 \u2014 Antunes, J. F. (1992). Nixon e Caetano, p. 351-352.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The first telegram sent to Washington, at eleven o’clock in the morning of 25 April, showed the United States embassy’s complete ignorance concerning the identity of the leaders of the uprising<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n Between six and seven o’clock in the evening, when Marcelo Caetano surrendered in Largo do Carmo square, [9]<\/a>9 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: before resigning, the Prime Minister had taken refuge in the barracks of the Republican National Guard (GNR) located in this square in central Lisbon since the early hours of the morning.\n<\/span><\/span> there was a technical problem with the communications between the embassy and the world outside Portugal, and as such the diplomats in Lisbon sent two telegrams in which they asked Washington to call them \u201cimmediately\u201d. At around 7.30 pm, Post informed the State Department that the rebels’ broadcast had confirmed that the government had fallen, and announced that Marcelo Caetano had surrendered unconditionally to General Sp\u00ednola. He also informed the State Department of a \u201cserious incident\u201d near the DGS headquarters which took place at 8.10 pm on 25 April, in which shots were fired from the building, causing 4 deaths and 45 injuries. Post subsequently sent Washington the following telegram: \u201cWe assume that the question of recognition of the new regime by the United States will arise, and we request the appropriate instructions.\u201d [10]<\/a>10 \u2014 Antunes, J. F. (1986). Os Americanos e Portugal, p. 267.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n On the morning of 26 April, the CIA issued an initial memorandum, entitled \u201cCoup in Portugal\u201d, which it wrongly attributed to Sp\u00ednola, who was praised for having \u201cmasterfully organised and led\u201d the coup. It anticipated that the soldiers in the MFA would follow the policies advocated by Sp\u00ednola, and that the new government in Lisbon could also count on \u201cimproved relations with the rest of Europe and NATO\u201d. At the State Department, the analysis team studying Portugal, consisting of Wells Stabler, Ellwood Rabenold and others, prepared an initial report for Henry Kissinger, who sent a telegram to all his diplomatic representatives on 26 April in which he asked them not to discuss the events in Portugal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kissinger sent a telegram to the representative in Lisbon, ordering him not to make any comments on Portuguese colonial policy, in order to avoid giving the impression that the American administration was \u201cinvolved in Portugal’s internal political process\u201d. On 27 April, the Secretary of State gave instructions to avoid taking any action \u201cregarded as constituting ‘recognition’\u201d of the new regime, but, two days later, Paul J. Hare at the State Department announced \u201cthe continuation of relations\u201d between Portugal and the United States, which called for the \u201cright to self-determination\u201d of the \u201cAfrican territories\u201d. [11]<\/a>11 \u2014 Antunes, J. F. (1986). Os Americanos e Portugal, p. 298, 317-318.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n On 8 May 1974, the CIA issued a memorandum on Portugal, according to which soon after quickly seizing power on 25 April, the MFA had asked General Sp\u00ednola to lead the National Salvation Junta (JSN), made up of General Costa Gomes and five other senior officers. They had all been \u201cinvited to join after the revolt\u201d, although Sp\u00ednola and Costa Gomes may have had prior knowledge of it and preferred \u201cto remain in the background in order to be ready for another attempt in case this one failed\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Americans thought it was possible that \u201cthe young officers, acting on their own initiative\u201d, had asked Sp\u00ednola and Costa Gomes for their support at the end of the process. Whatever the case, at that time the MFA remained in the background, according to the CIA, which believed that General Sp\u00ednola was a very important figure. It stressed his commitment to \u201ca federation of Portugal and its overseas territories with considerable autonomy and equality to the individual components. Over time he would be willing to allow the territories \u2018self-determination\u2019 in deciding to remain in the federation\u201d. On the contrary, \u201csome of the coup members have adopted positions ranging from immediate grant of independence to intermediate measures leading to that end, such as immediate ceasefires followed by negotiations\u201d. [12]<\/a>12 \u2014 CIA Document Number CIA-RDP79T00975A00110001-6, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 8\/5\/74; CIA-RDP80B01495R000600050009-5 Office of the Director, Central Intelligence Interagency Memorandum, subject: Portugal, after the coup, May 1974, pp. 1-6.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Kissinger indicated not to make any comments on Portuguese colonial policy, to avoid giving the impression that the American administration was \u201cinvolved in Portugal’s internal political process\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n On 20 May 1974, the president of the Republic General Ant\u00f3nio de Sp\u00ednola met Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott for the second time, and assured him that the incoming Provisional Government would not include any communist or socialist ministers. However, two communists were indeed members of the first Government, led by Adelino da Palma Carlos: \u00c1lvaro Cunhal, the leader of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) as a minister without portfolio, and the trade unionist Avelino Gon\u00e7alves, as the Minister of Labour. Meanwhile, Scott categorically denied to Sp\u00ednola the rumours that \u201cthe CIA was conspiring with the members of the old DGS to organise a counter-coup\u201d by the extreme right in Portugal. [13]<\/a>13 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, p. 29-30, 64-65.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n However, Scott’s opinion was not the official position of American diplomacy or of Henry Kissinger, who at that time held the positions of Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to the President of the United States. Kissinger began to exaggerate the situation in Portugal, because he feared a \u201ccontagion\u201d arising from the success of the Portuguese Communists spreading to Italy, Spain or Greece, and in July 1974, he instructed Scott to put pressure on the Portuguese authorities, as \u201cthe United States was concerned about Portugal\u201d. As we shall see, the ambassador in Lisbon would be replaced shortly afterwards. [14]<\/a>14 \u2014 CIA Document Number CIA-RDP79T00975A027000010028-1.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Kissinger’s concern over Portugal became more acute after Sp\u00ednola’s resignation from the presidency of the Republic following the failed right-wing coup attempt of 28 September 1974. [15]<\/a>15 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: Sp\u00ednola resigned after his involvement in the unsuccessful demonstration by the \u201csilent majority\u201d on 28 September 1974.\n<\/span><\/span> When preparing for the meeting between the then president, Gerald Ford; the Portuguese head of state Costa Gomes and the minister M\u00e1rio Soares, who were visiting the United States in October, Kissinger suggested that the president publicly announce his \u201cserious concern about the growing influence of the left and the participation of the communists in Portugal\u201d. He also believed that the United States should \u201cemphasise the importance of Portugal remaining a member of the North Atlantic Alliance [NATO], as well as underlining that the extension of the agreement for the Lajes military base was of mutual interest\u201d. [16]<\/a>16 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, p. 45.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n On a visit to Washington on 18 October 1974, President Costa Gomes assured Ford and Kissinger that the \u201cPortuguese have a strong anti-communist feeling\u201d, and that the risk of a \u201cpredominantly communist government\u201d in Lisbon was therefore very low. The general recalled being stationed at the NATO base in Norfolk in 1956, where he was the only soldier to see the Atlantic Alliance’s nuclear plans against the Warsaw Pact countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kissinger’s concern over Portugal became more acute after Sp\u00ednola’s resignation from the presidency of the Republic following the failed coup attempt of 28 September 1974<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n While guaranteeing that the Government and the Portuguese armed forces wanted to establish a \u201cdemocratic regime, with freedom for all\u201d, Costa Gomes maintained that Portugal would fulfil its international commitments and remain loyal to NATO. Later, over lunch with Ford and Kissinger, the Secretary of State compared M\u00e1rio Soares to the Russian leader overthrown by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. \u201cYou’re a Kerensky\u201d, Kissinger said to Soares, claiming to believe in his sincerity, but considering him \u201cnaive\u201d. When M\u00e1rio Soares assured that he did not want to be a Kerensky, Kissinger replied: \u201cNeither did Kerensky\u201d. [17]<\/a>17 \u2014 Gomes, B. i Moreira de S\u00e1, T. (2008). Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Portuguesa. Alfragide: Dom Quixote, p. 91-101,\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n The United States ambassador in Lisbon, Stuart Nash Scott, received a telegram on 28 October 1974, which contained a secret message from Henry Kissinger to be read to Costa Gomes, who had already returned to Lisbon after his visit to the United States. In the message, which dealt with NATO’s nuclear secrets and the participation of the Portuguese military in meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), Kissinger expressed his concern that \u201csensitive documents that contained nuclear information would be put at risk, as a result of inadequate procedures on the part of the Portuguese Government\u201d. However, the Secretary of State added that he was sure that Costa Gomes would understand that the American administration would support \u201cthe proposal by the Secretary General, General Luns, for Portugal to withdraw from the NPG for the time being\u201d. [18]<\/a>18 \u2014 Gomes, B. i Moreira de S\u00e1, T. (2008). Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Portuguesa. Alfragide: Dom Quixote, p. 102-108\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n General Costa Gomes agreed to the withdrawal \u201cfor now, of Portugal from the NPG\u201d and \u201che perfectly understood the Secretary of State’s concerns about sensitive information\u201d, but he pointed out that the \u201cconcerns in Secretary of State Kissinger’s statement on the political situation in Portugal\u201d were exaggerated. He also pointed out that: \u201c\u00c1lvaro Cunhal [a long-standing leader of the Portuguese Communist Party] is a minister without portfolio, and therefore has no direct access to any secret document of the Portuguese Government\u201d. Costa Gomes said that as soon as the security system was deemed adequate, \u201cI would consider it offensive if Portugal were to continue to be denied access to NATO material\u201d. In a telegram dated 7 November 1974, Kissinger said he was happy with Costa Gomes\u2019 decision, which he described as \u201csensible\u201d and \u201cstatesmanlike\u201d, and \u201cthinking of the best interests\u201d of the Atlantic Alliance.[19]<\/a>19 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, pp. 69-71.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The American ambassador in Lisbon was replaced by Frank Carlucci in early 1975. The replacement was due to an investigation carried out by Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, in which Scott was criticised. As the new ambassador to the Portuguese capital, Kissinger appointed Carlucci, a former CIA agent and political adviser at the United States Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, where he had been involved in the country’s political destabilisation through his links with the governor, Carlos Lacerda, who had instigated the military coup against the government of Jo\u00e3o Goulart in 1964. [20]<\/a>20 \u2014 Casta\u00f1o, D. i Rezola, M. I. (2021). O Conselho da Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o 1975-1982. Uma Biografia. Lisbon: Edi\u00e7\u00f5es, p. 70, 74-77, 86-87.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The CIA’s involvement in Portugal understandably increased exponentially after 28 September 1974, as the Centre for National Security Studies (CESN) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces revealed in a report titled \u201cPossible CIA Activities in Portugal\u201d dated 12 March 1975, the day after Sp\u00ednola’s failed coup attempt [21]<\/a>21 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: on 11 March 1975, a regiment of paratroopers from the Tancos military base, supported by a group of right-wing and extreme right-wing civilians, attempted a coup d’\u00e9tat to reinstate Sp\u00ednola as President of the Republic. However, the coup failed within a few hours, and Sp\u00ednola fled to Spain.\n<\/span><\/span>The CIA itself knew that the United States was feared to be planning a military coup by extreme right-wingers in Portugal, while one of the heads of the DIA, General Samuel Wilson, said that the CIA’s activities in Chile affected how the United States gathered information on the MFA. [22]<\/a>22 \u2014 Document Number CIA-RDP79R01099A002000080002-6 Memorandum for the director, 13 December 1974.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Centre for National Security Studies’ report mentions Kissinger’s fear that the situation in Portugal would spread to Spain, France, Italy and Greece<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n When it received news of two visits to Portugal by CIA Deputy Director General Vernon Walters in May\u2013June and September 1974, the CESN realised that the Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott had been replaced by Carlucci due to a disagreement with Kissinger over the strength of communism in Portugal. It was also concerned about the new staff at the US Embassy, where the number of officials had increased significantly between June and December 1974, to 155 American and 102 Portuguese employees. The comparison between Chile and Portugal was linked to the attitude of Secretary of State Kissinger regarding the \u201cprecedents in the press\u201d in Chile. The CESN’s report also mentions Kissinger’s fear that the situation in Portugal would spread to Spain, France, Italy and Greece. [23]<\/a>23 \u2014 \u201cPoss\u00edveis actividades da CIA em Portugal,\u201d report by the Centro de Estudos de Seguran\u00e7a Nacional (CESN), 12 March 1975. PIDE\/DGS and LP Eradication Coordination Services, NT 837, CIA Proc 4\/75, pp. 1-10, 21-24.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n Expressing its concern about a possible foreign intervention in Portugal, the Revolutionary Council (CR), which was created after Sp\u00ednola’s coup attempt on 11 March, concluded on 3 April 1975 that it was necessary to \u201cmake efforts not to provoke actions that would lead to Portugal’s withdrawal\u201d from NATO. On 1 April, Carlucci sent a confidential telegram from Lisbon to the State Department, in which he strongly advised the Ford administration against taking tougher measures on Portugal which would prevent it from remaining in NATO. While the State Department defended this position, the Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger maintained the need to \u201cfind a symbolic way to isolate Portugal without excluding it\u201d from the Atlantic Alliance. [24]<\/a>24 \u2014 Gomes, B. i Moreira de S\u00e1, T. (2008). Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Portuguesa, p. 187-188.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, in Lisbon, Carlucci pointed out that the \u201cmoderates\u201d were \u201cdiscouraged, disunited and leaderless\u201d. Nevertheless, he noted that in Portugal there was \u201ca conservative population, the Church, a moderate military, a long pro-Western tradition and a pro-Western president, no matter how weak he may be\u201d. The ambassador in Lisbon therefore advised the West to \u201csupport the moderates, and not to abandon them\u201d, as, given the \u201cpsychological climate in the country, the strategy [of isolation] would only give the communists opportunities to exploit it\u201d. [25]<\/a>25 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, p. 75-76.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n Carlucci suggested to Ford and Kissinger that Portugal should not be expelled from the North Atlantic Treaty during the NATO summit due to take place in Brussels in May 1975. He also warned that the withdrawal of classified information from Portugal would mean \u201cweakening Costa Gomes\u201d and \u201cundermining the moderate wing within the armed forces\u201d. Ford and Kissinger did not follow Carlucci’s advice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the dictatorship of Salazar and Caetano, Portugal had been the only member of NATO that openly authorised the United States to use the Lajes military base for operations not directly related to the defence of the Atlantic Alliance. This authorisation was included in a secret clause in the agreement between the United States and Portugal on the United States’ use of the air base in the Azores, which had expired on 6 February 1974 and which had not yet been renewed on 25 April of that year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In mid-1975, at a time when Washington was requesting permission for its planes to pass through the Azores on their way to the Middle East and Southern Africa, Prime Minister Vasco Gon\u00e7alves told the United States that the secret clause had to be removed. On 30 May 1975, the Portuguese prime minister attended the NATO summit in Brussels, where he confirmed Portugal’s desire to remain a member of the Alliance. He also told President Ford that his country was not \u201ca Trojan horse in NATO\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Carlucci suggested to Ford and Kissinger that Portugal should not be expelled from the North Atlantic Treaty during the NATO summit in Brussels<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who was present at the summit, was in favour of the strategy of leaving Portugal, since he believed that the Portuguese Revolution would therefore act as a vaccine for the rest of Western Europe, and he disagreed with Carlucci. In a telephone call to Arthur Hartman, Kissinger said that it might even be good if the Communists made progress in Portugal, so that they could then be crushed, and the United States would then be willing to help the country. [26]<\/a>26 \u2014 Simas, N. (2008). Portugal Classificado. Documentos Secretos Norte-americanos 1974-1975. Lisbon: Aletheia Editores, 238-240, p. 101-102.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n The Socialist Party displayed its strength with a huge demonstration at Alameda Dom Afonso Henriques in Lisbon on 19 July, at which M\u00e1rio Soares called upon Vasco Gon\u00e7alves to resign. On the same day, Henry Kissinger sent a telegram to Carlucci expressing his belief that the moderate Portuguese parties and military should be supported with economic aid. He asked the ambassador in Lisbon to convey this position to Ernesto Melo Antunes, who was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, and would become the ideologue of the Group of Nine (Grupo dos Nove). [27]<\/a>27 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: the Group of Nine was made up of moderate MFA officers. They were the authors of a document that sought to clarify political and ideological positions among the military, and which ended up imposing their opinions on the more radical faction.\n<\/span><\/span> The United States Secretary of State warned that a turn to the left in Portuguese politics would make it \u201cvery difficult to obtain the support of public opinion and Congress to renew economic aid\u201d to the country. [28]<\/a>28 \u2014 Gomes, B.; Moreira de S\u00e1, T. (2008). Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Portuguesa, p. 235-236, 258-262.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n The hot August [29]<\/a>29 \u2014 Translator\u2019s note: a reference to the \u201cHot Summer\u201d, in which after the clearly leftward leaning V Provisional Government took office, a vast anti-communist popular mobilisation took place in central and northern Portugal, encouraged by moderate right-wing and far-right groups, which besieged, attacked and set fire to offices of the Portuguese Communist Party and other left-wing organisations, and brought Portugal to the brink of civil war.\n<\/span><\/span> was decisive in Portugal, and in particular because of the \u201cDocumento dos Nove\u201d (Document of the Nine), of which Melo Antunes was the main author. The document was completed on the 6 August, and the next day it was presented to the President of the Republic and published in the third edition of the Jornal Novo<\/em> newspaper, under the title \u201cMelo Antunes Document: the non-radical group proposes an alternative to the political crisis\u201d. The President of the Republic, Costa Gomes, swore in the fifth Provisional Government led by Vasco Gon\u00e7alves on 8 August.<\/p>\n\n\n\n M\u00e1rio Soares wrote an open letter to Costa Gomes, published in the same day’s edition of Jornal Novo<\/em>, in which he described the fifth provisional Government as an \u201cultra-minority, lacking any credibility\u201d. According to Frank Carlucci, \u201cthe letter from Soares, together with the \u2018Melo Antunes Document\u2019\u201d, showed that moderate civilians were joining the soldiers. Vernon Walters sent Kissinger a memorandum on the situation in Portugal on 30 August. Entitled \u201cPortugal: a step closer to civil war\u201d, the document reported that it was \u201calmost certain\u201d that the Group of Nine would \u201cset up its headquarters in the north, openly declare its intent to rid the government and the military of all Communists, demand the dismissal of the Revolutionary Council and the Gon\u00e7alves government, and launch a military operation toward Lisbon\u201d. [30]<\/a>30 \u2014 Gomes, B.; Moreira de S\u00e1, T. (2008). Carlucci vs. Kissinger: Os EUA e a Revolu\u00e7\u00e3o Portuguesa, p. 310.\n<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
The success of 25 April and surprise in the United States<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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The CIA memorandums<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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Portugal’s membership of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group is endangered<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The attitude of the CIA to Portugal and the ghost of Chile<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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Kissinger versus Carlucci and Portugal’s membership of NATO<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
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The road to 25 November 1975<\/h5>\n\n\n\n