Over the past few decades, fertility rates have declined dramatically across most regions of the world. In many high-income societies, and even some middle-income countries, the number of children per woman now hovers well below the replacement threshold of 2.1, a level at which population would decrease in the absence of migration. Rates in Southern Europe and East Asia, for instance, lie below 1.5 (with Spain\u2019s lingering between 1.2 and 1.1 in recent years); in South Korea, fertility has plunged to around 0.7, the lowest in the world. Even the United States, once considered an outlier because its fertility remained relatively high among wealthy nations, has seen rates decline to around 1.64. Yet, there is one remarkably persistent exception: Sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility rates remain around 4.6 children per woman, stands out in a global landscape otherwise marked by historically low levels of childbearing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This radical restructuring of fertility regimes poses serious questions for the future of societies worldwide. Low fertility accelerates population aging, strains welfare states, challenges pension systems, affects migration dynamics and can lead to labour shortages and economic slowdowns. The consequences of sustained low fertility reach beyond demographics: they affect intergenerational relations, reshape cultural expectations and demand new policy approaches. Furthermore, the existence of a persistent gap between what people state is their \u201cideal\u201d number of children and their \u201crealised\u201d fertility underscores the complexity of the phenomenon. Indeed, surveys consistently show that when asked directly, individuals around the world tend to express a desire for about two children on average. Yet these stated preferences are not translating into actual births.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although demographers, sociologists and economists have generated a rich array of explanations for long-term fertility declines \u2014from the rise in female education to the entrance of women into the labour force, from the growth of secularism to the expansion of individual autonomy\u2014 these frameworks struggle to account for the extraordinarily low fertility observed today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Below, I examine the global fertility decline from a comparative perspective and outline some unique regional differences. I refer to the key explanatory frameworks \u2014the New Home Economics, the gender equity hypothesis and the second demographic transition\u2014 and to the failure of pro-natalist policy attempts. Finally, I explain why moving beyond cost-based explanations alone and looking also into evolving preferences is essential for understanding and potentially addressing one of the central demographic challenges of our time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In most of the world, fertility rates have been falling for decades. In the mid-20th century, many regions had average fertility rates well above five children per woman. Today, these figures have declined dramatically, reaching levels that would have been unimaginable just a few generations ago. The global fertility decline unfolds differently in different regional and cultural contexts. European countries, once concerned about overcrowding, now worry about population decline. East Asian societies, celebrated for their postwar economic \u201cmiracles,\u201d now grapple with some of the lowest fertility rates on record, which impact on their growth rates. Even the United States, which for decades maintained near-replacement fertility, has dropped to historically low levels. Only Sub-Saharan Africa stands apart as a region where fertility remains high.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The question now is not merely how fertility fell, but why it has declined so far below replacement in many settings \u2014and what that implies for the future. Let me highlight some important regional differences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Japan, South Korea, Singapore and other East Asian countries display some of the lowest fertility rates in the world. The reasons for these exceptionally low levels are complex and interwoven. First, childbearing in these societies remains closely linked to marriage and out-of-wedlock births are rare and socially discouraged. Second, hyper-competition and hyper-investment in children\u2019s education and upbringing make having more than one child economically prohibitive. Third, conservative gender norms mean women are often expected to shoulder disproportionate household and caregiving responsibilities, even as they attain higher levels of education and aspire to rewarding careers. [1]<\/a>1 \u2014 Brinton, M. C.; Oh, E. (2019). \u201cBabies, Work, or Both? Highly Educated Women\u2019s Employment and Fertility in East Asia\u201d. American Journal of Sociology, no. 125, pp. 105-140.\n<\/span><\/span> Many highly educated women delay or forego marriage entirely to avoid entering marital arrangements that limit their career prospects and personal autonomy. Government attempts to encourage marriage or reduce the financial burden of childrearing have not substantially raised fertility. Without a deeper reconsideration of gender roles and the intense pressures around parenting, closing the gap between low realised fertility and the lingering ideal of having around two children remains challenging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Southern European countries like Italy, Spain and Greece have also had persistently low fertility rates since the 1990s. Labour market conditions and housing affordability are key culprits here. Repeated periods of high unemployment and a segmented labour market characterised by precarious contracts for younger cohorts discourage early family formation. [2]<\/a>2 \u2014 Adser\u00e0, A. (2005). \u201cVanishing Children: From High Unemployment to Low Fertility in Developed Countries\u201d. American Economic Review, no. 95, pp. 189-193.\n<\/span><\/span> [3]<\/a>3 \u2014 Adser\u00e0, A. (2011). \u201cWhere Are the Babies? Labor Market Conditions and Fertility in Europe\u201d. European Journal of Population, no. 27, pp. 1-32.\n<\/span><\/span> Women who take time off for childbearing risk substantial career penalties, both in terms of lower wages and lower employment \u2013 often termed the \u201cmotherhood penalty.\u201d In these dual labour markets, where stable careers are hard to secure, the perceived long-term cost of having children is substantial. Although many Southern European governments have enacted family policies, these are generally less generous than in Northern Europe. Smaller firms struggle to provide family-friendly arrangements and tight public budgets limit the scope of interventions. Cultural changes, including reduced religiosity and evolving perceptions of children\u2019s value, have also contributed in a very different manner in these countries. Over time, these factors reinforce very low fertility patterns that are proving resistant to policies aimed primarily at reducing direct costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even Nordic countries have not been immune to the recent decline in fertility. [4]<\/a>4 \u2014 Kulu, H.; Andersson, G. (2023). Fertility Decline and Family Policies in the Nordic Countries, Mimeo.\n<\/span><\/span> For decades, many observers pointed to the Nordic countries as a model of \u201cbest practices\u201d in encouraging higher fertility through generous welfare states, extensive childcare provision and progressive gender norms. Yet even here, fertility has declined in recent years. Scholars note that although Nordic policies reduce many financial and logistical hurdles, they cannot fully counteract broader shifts in values and lifestyles that deprioritise childbearing. This pattern emphasises the need for a more nuanced understanding of how couples weigh their preferences for children within an increasingly complex landscape of career aspirations, personal development and shifting societal norms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While most of the world grapples with ultra-low fertility, Sub-Saharan Africa still stands out for its fertility rates often above four children per woman. Higher desired fertility in these contexts reflects deeply ingrained cultural and religious norms that value large families. In many African contexts, children are seen as an asset, a source of old-age security, family labour and lineage continuation. The region also has lower levels of female education and greater economic uncertainty. Where educational attainment for women increases, fertility tends to decline, but many girls in Sub-Saharan Africa still leave school early due to economic constraints, early marriage or conflict-related disruptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Weak political institutions, instability and conflict reduce the effectiveness of family planning programmes and health services. In these environments, there is often little political will to promote family planning aggressively, as public opinion surveys reveal frequently stated preferences for large families. In some areas, conflicts hamper access to reproductive health services and displaced populations remain underserviced. These conditions create a context in which fertility rates have fallen more slowly and remains relatively high. [5]<\/a>5 \u2014 Adser\u00e0, A. (2020). \u201cInternational Political Economy and Future Fertility Trends\u201d. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, no. 18, pp. 27-32.\n<\/span><\/span> [6]<\/a>6 \u2014 Bongaarts, J. (2017). \u201cAfrica\u2019s Unique Fertility Transition\u201d. Population and Development Review, no. 43, pp. 39-58.\n<\/span><\/span> Political stability and improved governance could foster better education and health infrastructure, ultimately reducing fertility and shifting these countries closer to global trends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n