China and the conflicts in the Middle East

The interest of the People’s Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa appears to be on the rise over the past decade. The data are revealing. Since the announcement in 2013 of China’s flagship overseas cooperation and investment programme, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) –also known as the Silk Road Initiative– economic relations between China and the Middle East have been going from strength to strength. China is already the largest trading partner of up to ten Arab countries and Iran, increasing trade with the region as a whole fivefold between 2004 and 2017 (exceeding USD 200 billion in value in recent years). The BRI is expected to boost these numbers even further, thanks to an estimated investment in participating countries of up to USD 10 trillion over the next decade [1]1 — For the most up-to-date data on trade and investment relations between China and MENA states, see ChinaMed (2021). ChinaMed Data. Available online. . This social and economic reality is accompanied by the creation of different institutionalised spaces for dialogue and cooperation, including the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (with its rounds of high-level ministerial meetings), the China-Gulf Cooperation Council Strategic Dialogue, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (with cross-regional participation), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (with up to ten members from the region).

One of the central elements characterising the regional order in the Middle East and North Africa is the persistence of a plurality of overlapping conflicts and threats to global peace and security, which undoubtedly manifest themselves in the economic realm. With trade and political relations between China and the region becoming increasingly intense, what is China’s attitude towards these conflicts? What is its level of interest and involvement? Are there any cross-cutting features that can be found in Beijing’s response to such threats to international peace and security?

Regional versus geopolitical conflicts

The first step in answering these questions is to examine the PRC’s approach to conflicts beyond its borders in general. Beijing usually differentiates between two types of international conflicts. First, there are geopolitical conflicts that directly and diametrically confront several of the international superpowers. This type of confrontation would have at its core a dispute linked to changes in the distribution of power at the global level whereby emerging powers would come into conflict with those in decline in order to propose a revision or refoundation of the current international order. Such conflicts may manifest themselves in various scenarios simultaneously, having effects on different regions of the globe and greatly affecting the overall stability of the entire international system. It would be the case of situations like the “Thucydides Trap” popularised by Graham Allison –which does predict a conflict between a declining United States and an emerging China– or situations described in International Relations with the concept of “systemic or hegemonic wars” coined by Robert Gilpin [2]2 — Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Gilpin, R. (1981) War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press. .

In contrast to the former, and much more relevant to this paper, China describes as regional conflicts those whose main actors are not the international superpowers and whose impact is not global. Intrastate civil conflicts would belong to this category: although they may eventually have extra-regional effects, they do not usually extend beyond the regional sphere. Regional conflicts do not respond to clashes of geopolitical interests between the parties. Nor do they respond to realistic justifications of the quest for survival through the accumulation of power resources in a context of inescapable natural competition. China’s conceptualisation of this type of conflict is anchored in an essentialist view of the actors involved and the incompatibility of interests that explain them. Ethnic, religious, sectarian, identity or cultural incompatibilities are regarded as the reasons for quarrels and violence. Thus, any political or socio-economic problems at the root of the conflict are often overlooked or dismissed as superficial or supervening, thus reducing their causes to clashes between primary identities, usually pointed to as the real root of antagonism. The struggle is not over territory, resources or power –instead, at the heart of the conflict, is a divergence over ways of being, a cultural clash between different socio-cultural groups.

On the basis of this conceptualisation of the problem, China understands that the solution lies in the search for harmony between actors, trying to overcome identity incompatibilities in the interests of stability and common progress. In this depoliticisation of the essence of the conflict, its resolution must go hand in hand with a gradual resolution of identity and cultural differences. And here the global superpowers have much to say. As we will see below, regional conflicts can and should be overcome by implementing agreements between the main power poles. It goes without saying that, if there is a common will between them, the choral capacity of the superpowers can compel the contenders to overcome their differences and put an end to the conflict.

The centrality of the non-interference principle

The first vector to pay attention to in order to understand China’s attitude to conflicts in the Middle East is its defence of the principle of non-interference.

China’s foreign policy to date has been partly shaped by what is known as the “theory of peaceful rise”. This theory would not only integrate a general principle of prudence whereby China would avoid direct confrontation with any other superpower in the international system. It would also include strict adherence to the principle of non-interference, especially in its political aspect. According to the official view, the People’s Republic should distance itself from the interventionist behaviour of the European colonial empires of the last two centuries and of the United States from 1945 onwards, of which it considers itself to be another victim. It thus continues to defend the principles of peaceful coexistence established at the 1955 Bandung Conference on the basis of a shared history of oppression between China and the countries of the Third World.

Thus, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Zhongnanhai –the People’s Republic’s presidency– repeatedly point out in their public interventions that the Middle Eastern states are traditional friends and allies who know better than anyone else the social, economic and political realities of their own region [3]3 — For a detailed analysis by the author of the narrative used by the top officials of the People’s Republic of China to refer to the Middle East and its political reality, see: Quero, J. (2017). “Chinese official geopolitical cartographies and discursive constructions of the Mediterranean: Discourse analysis of official narratives and comparison with the EU”. In: Ehteshami, A., Huber, D., and Parciello, C. (eds.) The Mediterranean Reset: Geopolitics in a New Age. Chichester: Global Policy, 60-82. . Any relationship with them must therefore be based on a shared desire to preserve state sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the defence of the national dignity of all and absolute respect for their social systems. In other words, China places at the heart of its relations with regional actors the common interest of rigorously respecting the principle of non-interference, in its view, as distinct from Western powers.

The principle of non-interference applies equally to China’s approach to conflicts in the region. Any efforts to work towards their resolution must be non-intrusive and respect the independence of those involved. Local or regional actors are the protagonists and, in his view, a principle of ownership should be respected whereby it is up to them to decide for themselves what are the optimal mechanisms for conflict resolution. This would not deny the potential of global superpowers to advance certain solutions that they consider to be the best. But, contrary to the champions of regime change, the mediating or peacemaking action of the superpowers should always go beyond the strict standard of non-interference and not exceed any limits imposed by the parties on the basis of their own sovereignty. The events that led to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, most notably, NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011 –the evacuation mission of almost 30,000 Chinese citizens and the material losses that ensued live on in the memories of many in Beijing– mark the rejection of superpower interventionism. Especially in cases where there is no broad consensus among them on what is appropriate to do.

China as a responsible superpower

The second vector explaining China’s attitude towards the various conflicts in the Middle East is its willingness to present itself to the world as a responsible superpower.

China’s foreign action is framed by a conception of the international system as a concert between the most powerful nations. Beijing’s reading of contemporary world reality is that it finds itself in a system characterised, in essence, by the privileged capacity and responsibility of the superpowers. It would find its maximum expression in the functioning of the United Nations Security Council where, apparently overcoming the principle of sovereign equality, the permanent members have privileges and servitudes when it comes to managing some of the central issues on the international agenda. The mechanisms of global governance would not be those of a democracy among equals. According to this vision, the world in 2021 would look more like 19th century Europe, where the concert that emerged from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 established the Metternich system based on the responsibility of the most powerful states to ensure peace and stability through a balance of power.

Thus, the People’s Republic sees the conflicts in the Middle East as an opportunity to present itself as a global power, committed to the maintenance of international peace and security. It also seeks recognition among what it sees as its peers: it claims equal status with the other superpowers if it shows itself to be an involved actor, with the capacity to manage and resolve conflicts on a par with, for example, the United States or France. It abhors the interventionism and unilateralism of the Western superpowers and, in the face of this, seeks to impose multilateralism among the most powerful in order not be sidelined in major decisions of global importance.

Such a claim is closely linked to the People’s Republic’s self-image and the official reading of its history. The so-called “century of humiliation”, from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the Communist Party’s victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang in the Civil War (1915-1949) and the momentous Japanese occupation during World War II, imbues China’s foreign policy with a spirit of vindication.

China’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear proliferation as a paradigmatic example

The development of an Iranian nuclear programme has been one of the central issues on the international agenda for the past two decades. The international community has understood as a potential threat to peace and security the nuclear proliferation in the Middle East that could break out in the event of Iran owning nuclear weapons. For the Chinese political leadership, as they have expressed on countless occasions since the start of the Lausanne talks in 2015, the main problem is the lack of mutual trust between the Islamic Republic on the one hand and the Western superpowers on the other. According to their view, Iran pursues such technology, feeling insecure in the face of a possible international intervention to put an end to the Islamic Republic’s regime; and the superpowers, led by the United States, are wary of the behaviour of an actor that challenges the global order and openly opposes Israel’s existence.

The solution from the Chinese point of view would therefore be twofold. On the one hand, emphasising the principles of peaceful coexistence, Iran should exercise its sovereign freedom and develop whatever technology it pleases as long as it does not pose a threat to others. This idea manifests itself in a staunch defence of Tehran’s right to develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes and a firm stance on safeguarding the obligations and rights under the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On the other hand, the global superpowers, in an exercise of responsibility, should take the lead in addressing the problem and seeking solutions. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015 between the P5+1 – the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus the European Union – and Iran would be the best example of what China would like to see as a model for resolving regional conflicts.

Since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, China has stressed the need for the superpowers to behave responsibly and respect the agreements reached. It has raised the need for Washington to return to the agreement reached, condemned its efforts to force the others to reopen the negotiations and refused to change the responsibilities of the jointly agreed parties. Thus, there is a repeated condemnation of US unilateralism, which is seen as harmful to the whole, contrary to chorally defined interests, and ultimately opposed to the fact that it is the concert of superpowers that makes collective decisions on the most important issues on the international agenda.

Final considerations: is this attitude sustainable?

Two questions remain open. The first is to what extent China’s attitude to conflicts in the region has anything to say about situations such as the current wars in Syria or Yemen. In general, China finds it very difficult to have a say when the reality of conflicts does not fit its analytical approach described here. This is especially the case when there are profound differences between the other global superpowers: in circumstances where the superpowers do not have compatible interests, it is impossible to articulate management mechanisms such as those proposed by China. This leaves only a retreat into the defence of state sovereignty of the parties, which does little to end the current armed conflicts. This forces Beijing on too many occasions into a silence that is uncomfortable for an actor that presents itself as a responsible global power.

• References

  1 —

  For the most up-to-date data on trade and investment relations between China and MENA states, see ChinaMed (2021). ChinaMed Data. Available online.

  2 —

  Allison, G. (2017) Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Gilpin, R. (1981) War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press.

  3 —

  For a detailed analysis by the author of the narrative used by the top officials of the People’s Republic of China to refer to the Middle East and its political reality, see: Quero, J. (2017). “Chinese official geopolitical cartographies and discursive constructions of the Mediterranean: Discourse analysis of official narratives and comparison with the EU”. In: Ehteshami, A., Huber, D., and Parciello, C. (eds.) The Mediterranean Reset: Geopolitics in a New Age. Chichester: Global Policy, 60-82.