Another Power: To Other Masculinities

Bertrand Russell used to say that the most fundamental matter in social sciences is power, in the same way that energy is fundamental to physics [1]1 — Russell, Bertrand (2004). Power: A New Social Analysis. London: Routledge. . However, the understanding of power is too often taken for granted and the truth is that it has often remained in the background in both philosophical and political debates, as well as being excessively linked to State theory and the study of its institutions. Thus, when thinking about power, political/legal theory and the social sciences have favoured an object, the State and its sovereignty, hiding the true diversity of the figures of power, and it is therefore in our interest to rethink it, now, by going beyond this totem and setting it aside.

Power: A Preliminary Debate

Despite the importance we give to the idea of power, it remains an unstable and often obscure concept—as Byung-Chul Han affirms—full of contradictory or irreconcilable notions that can lead us to theoretical chaos [2]2 — Byung-Chul Han (2018). What is Power? Cambridge: Polity. . However, the debate around power and its meaning should be prior to many other discussions. If we wish to interpret the dynamics of today’s world, it is both essential and urgent to critically analyse the different approaches towards and theories of power, as we attempt to reveal the nature of a concept that neither peaceful nor neutral. The ways and meanings by which we understand power and its deployment determine the framework of human relations, shape institutions, make sense of social processes and structure the world in which we live, enabling or limiting its transformation.

Power, Domination and Masculinity

If we focus on the fundamental contributions that the gender perspective and feminisms have made in regard to the analysis of power relations, we observe how they have enabled the deconstruction of a historical reality, centred on the interests and privileges of men and how they describe a version of power as domination-rooted in the asymmetries and effects of violence. Feminisms reveal this reality and denounce how men have concentrated power in a secular manner, endowing it with meaning while structurally discriminating, suppressing and excluding women.

An idea of power that stems from relations based on force and coercion, in which subjects impose themselves on each other, seeking submission and obedience, and that Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic develops as a metaphor through which to interpret the world and explain human nature. A world that evolves tailored to the desires of men, their strength and power, and which, in turn, is also captive to a very specific vision of what masculinity supposedly represents, a view that renders it hegemonic. A mystification of what it means to be a man and that is presented as an only, eternal and universal meaning. Furthermore, the consolidation of certain perspectives of power has evolved in parallel to a certain construct of masculinities. Thus, the classic conception of power, understood as domination, has remained inevitably linked to historical processes and stages “featuring” and monopolised by men, while also prioritising their heteronormative version. A masculinity that, as a social and political value, has permeated and shaped societies and their institutions. Power and masculinity have fed back into each other and forged a correspondence that links a particular imaginary of what it represents to be a man together with social structures that deploy a specific idea of power, both existing in an almost inseparable way.

As an example, the idea of nation as the possessor of sovereignty, based on a population of free men, from the beginning already excludes women; a nation that in its “desire” to be a state, of “state building” in the liberal era, also drives women away from power, deprives them of civil rights and prevents their active participation in public life. Or capitalist development, which neither recognises nor remunerates women’s work, nor the essential functions of care or reproduction as the basis for sustaining the economy, as Carole Pateman and other women authors masterfully describe [3]3 — Pateman, Carole (1988). The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity. . A complex network of power, the patriarchy, that places men in dominant roles and structurally subordinates and oppresses women, who are no less than half of humankind!

It is by basing ourselves on intersectional feminism that we can identify the different axes of inequalities and the intersecting power relations, thus providing a political and theoretical reflection on gender, social class, skin colour, cultural/national origin or sexual orientation. From this perspective, and following the criticism against hegemonic masculinity, we realise that not only women suffer its effects and consequences, but that those who represent a dissident form of masculinity are also affected by heteronormative impositions. Thus, origin, social class and/or sexual orientation render many men powerless subjects, at risk of exclusion or discrimination and subject to domination and subordination.

That leaves hegemonic masculinity, as expressed by Michael Kimmel, as the only successful way of being a man [4]4 — Kimmel, Michael (1997). “Masculinity as homophobia: Fear, shame and silence in the construction of gender identity”, in M. M. Gergen & S. N. Davis (eds.), Toward a New Psychology of Gender. Taylor & Frances/Routledge, p. 223–242. . A success that patriarchy projects on those who meet the criteria of being considered “real men” and who behave as such, under established views of sex, gender and desire. Men who have and crave for power, who are legitimised by the system to occupy its central position and who present themselves as both the masters and subjects of universality.

The fallacies and constrictions of real men are, however, an obvious limitation of freedoms, of individual autonomy and of the desires that drive life. Subversive masculinity breaks away from the disciplinary conformity of this notion to reconfigure other power relations, thus subverting masculinities of domination and allowing other dissident forms to proliferate.

Although it is true that, as the criticism of hegemonic masculinity advances, many men feel dissatisfied or uncomfortable with the attitudes and actions that are expected of them, it is also true that many men find it difficult to break free of the roles and stereotypes of hegemonic masculinity, as in those who benefit from its advantages and privileges. How difficult it is to give up privileges! Sometimes, according to Jablonka, defending gender justice as a man is to fight against oneself [5]5 — Jablonka, Ivan (2019). Des hommes justes: Du patriarcat aux nouvelles masculinités. Paris: Seuil. . Many others are also incapable of taking on certain roles, such as those related to care and historically feminised activities. And in the most worrying aspect, we also see how many men do not stop using violence to maintain their status or to impose themselves in their relationships with women. One simply has to take a look at the dramatic statistics on male-inflicted gender-based violence and sexual violence around the world.

However, masculinity should not be linked to violence, privilege or heteronormativity, nor should the concept of power be linked to domination. Power and masculinity are a social construct, an elaborate story full of intentions, of the legitimation of an established order, at the service of specific interests and beneficiaries.

The Man-Masculinity pairing, like the concept of power, is a product of society, not a biological decision. Dismantling the system that associates one and the other allows us to visualise the patriarchal structures and their functioning. The challenge consists of decoding the relation between which power and which masculinity, analysing their meanings and symbolisms from a critical perspective, altering the social order of gender, and questioning the model that supports “being men” by means of an ideological structure that translates into unequal power relations.

The Transformation of Notions of Power

In order to pave the way and explore the changes that can enable a critical redefinition and conception of a just and legitimate form of power (if this is even possible now), in this text I interrelate some of the perspectives of reflection and analysis on the phenomenon of power that based on feminisms [6]6 — See the article by Maria de la Fuente that systematises the feminist reflection on power during the last few decades: “Ideas de poder en la teoría feminista” (Ideas of power in feminist theory), Revista Española de Ciencia Política, no. 39, 1990, p. 173–193. , yet not exclusively, are oriented towards this purpose and are in dialogue with each other. Thus, in the following I briefly develop: the theoretical distinctions between power as a resource or power as a relation; the distinctions between power over and power to, which has been developed by various women authors, including Amy Allen; the crucial contributions of Hannah Arendt, which challenge the dominant version of power to return it to its origin (the word); Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach; and, finally, the reconfiguration of power that emanates from the ethics of care.

Power as a Resource or Power as a Relation?

From the classic perspective, power is thought of as a resource. A good that some possess, that one has or does not have. This perspective implies understanding the dynamics of power as a zero-sum game: if you have power, the other does not have it and, conversely, if the relations of force are reversed, power is lost and is taken control of by others: certain individuals, certain groups or social classes, specific elites, or institutions and the state. A definition of power that is inevitably influenced by the ability to impose unwanted behaviours, limits and obedience on others. The fundamental concern regarding this conception is very often focused on the ways in which power is obtained and on how it is maintained or consolidated afterwards. The first wave of liberal feminism was based on this idea of power, as a good that had to be redistributed equally between women and men in order to reverse its unequal and unfair distribution. If the new masculinities were to participate in this new order, they would have to admit to losing power in order to enable its “redistribution” towards “women”. Hence the legitimation of positive discrimination or “affirmative action” policies, which are meant to allow women access to equal opportunities and positions of power that they had been deprived of or banned from until then.

If, on the other hand, we understand power as the effect of a relation, it cannot be possessed or maintained, but is the consequence of a bond that is created in a given situation. Power flows and springs from multiple social interactions and relations, in line with what Foucault expressed. If power is not something stable and there is no situation in which domination is maintained forever, it is susceptible to transformation. The importance of this view is that it allows us to interpret power as an opportunity to manoeuvre and change the dynamics of an unfair or unequal relationship. Power as a relation makes it possible to act and obtain results that are different from those of the statu quo due to a fair or reasonable exchange, or by going beyond imposition or domination, to open the way to acceptance, affinity, consensus and compromise.

Power over or Power to (Empowerment)

We can also attempt to analyse power based on a typology that distinguishes between power over and power to, and which several authors have expanded upon. Let’s take a look.

Power over represents the most classic view of power and consists of the ability of an individual or a group to impose or limit the options of another by virtue of a set of structural, economic, cultural, social and/or institutional factors. This type of power is usually based on force, coercion, domination and/or control of certain resources. But most of the time power over is imposed by means of fear and the threat of the use of force, or by controlling the flow of resources we need to survive: money, food, medical care, or even by controlling more subtle resources such as information, approval or love. We are so used to this notion of power, so steeped in its language and its implicit threats, that we often only become aware of its operation when we witness its most extreme manifestations. Power over is based on the belief that power is a finite resource that some individuals or groups possess, and therefore implies that some people can have it and others cannot. Male domination over women or over non-heteronormative masculinity can be considered a form of power over [7]7 — Allen, Amy (1999). The Power of Feminist Theory. Boulder: Westview Press. .

Power to is, instead, the ability and freedom of an individual person to achieve a goal or series of goals, sometimes despite their subordinate status [8]8 — De la Fuente, M. (2005) “Ideas de poder en la teoría feminista” (Ideas of power in feminist theory), Revista Española de Ciencia Política, no. 39, 1990, p. 173–193. . It is the ability to do, to create, to develop in the world and facilitate the existence of others by means of one’s own existence. It implies the empowerment of subjects so that, based on their autonomy, they can act and cooperate in a non-coercive way towards transforming their reality and that of others, renouncing the will to dominate. Power to allows us to explore the category of empowerment, which is the process by which seemingly powerless subjects can develop their own capacities and thus have/acquire a power that stems from existence itself. Power as the ability to transform oneself and what surrounds us, escaping the radical dualism between the powerful and the disempowered [9]9 — Wartenberg, Thomas E. (1990). The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. . This category allows us to understand how the subjects of subordinate groups retain the power to act despite their subordination. It is a notion of power that does not have distributive features (it is not a zero-sum game, where some must lose in order for others to win), and it does not have to imply conflictual effects.

Hannah Arendt’s view of power

Hannah Arendt, one of the most influential liberal philosophers of the 20th century, raises the need to rethink the world and the nature of power. Following the devastation of the Second World War and the horrors of the Holocaust, Arendt asks: how can Humanity carry on after what took place at Auschwitz? Can we continue to think in the same way after Nazism and the application of an industrial rationality at the service of extermination? “Even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination,” Arendt would later say [10]10 — Arendt, Hannah (1968). Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt. .

And, indeed, for Arendt this illumination comes to pass by laying the foundations of a disruptive distinction between power and violence. Breaking the “painful” perspective of the dominant political way of thinking, which understands power as the effectiveness of imposing the will of some over that of others, and in which it is not possible to differentiate between power and violence. A power that, based on from Hobbes’ Leviathan—and which liberalism confirms—is conceived of as institutionalised violence in order to protect us from a state of war, and which Max Weber also legitimised at the beginning of the 20th century as a means of limiting violence in the democratic State [11]11 — For Webber, the State is any coercive political association with a permanent organisation (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) in which its administrative / bureaucratic apparatus manages to successfully maintain its claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force as a means to enforce order. . But for Arendt, to speak of power in these terms is not to speak of power, but of violence and, as such, it must be identified and disassociated. Thus, with the dissolution of this nexus, the German thinker intends to dismiss the idea that domination constitutes the central problem of political affairs. On the contrary, the view of power that should be “useful” to us should be based on the principle of non-domination. Arendt therefore aspires to the idea that the central aspect of politics should be the creation of spaces where people can express themselves through words and actions. A return to the agora of the polis of ancient Greece, which was the appropriate and original space for politics and power [12]12 — Arendt, Hannah (1954). “What is Authority?” Available online. , to the place where human relationships and the exchange of ideas take place. In this way, the most interesting political action is that which does not submit uncritically to the assimilation of power, but rather that which defends the revolutionary tradition of those who participate in it: political action corresponds to those who are genuinely involved in the life of the community, deploying its capacities, expressing its vision of the world and reaching agreements that enable action and consensual decisions. The power of politics is what individuals say and do in the agora and in the public sphere, deploying its potential [13]13 — For Hannah Arendt, an active life supposes that “through action and speech, people show who they are, actively reveal their identity . . . Power is what maintains the existence of the public sphere, the potential space for the appearance of people who act and speak . . . Power is only real when word and deed have not been separated. When words are not empty and facts are not brutal . . . words are for discovering realities, and actions are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.” Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. .

Power, then, corresponds to the human ability to act in concert in a given group or community. Authority becomes the power exercised by a few who acknowledge those who are asked to obey, and whose obedience does not require fear or coercion. Force and violence are only put into practice when authority fails.

Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach

Picking up Arendt’s thread, Nussbaum considers that the most important aspect of a power which can be “useful” to us is that, as people, we are capable of thinking, doing, creating and/or transforming reality. A strength we call agency. A capacity that allows us to break free of the contexts of oppression and domination through a power to resist, rebel and develop. For Nussbaum, the interaction of a given context with our basic capabilities gives rise to combined capabilities through which transformation is possible [16]16 — Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. .

Thus, the capabilities approach, developed together with Amartya Sen, recognises the value of several factors: 1) the importance of a person’s real freedoms; 2) the differences, virtues and abilities of each person when transforming resources into valuable activities; 3) the multivarious nature of actions that lead to happiness; 4) a balance of material and non-material factors in evaluating human well-being; and 5) the importance and concern for how opportunities are distributed within society [17]17 — Sen, Amartya (1993). “Capability and Well-Being”, in The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press. . All these factors have been fundamental in the progression of human development indices, which go beyond indicators that only measure economic growth, such as GDP.

The capabilities approach makes personal and collective empowerment possible, articulating a process through which oppressed groups develop the ability to increase their self-confidence and inner strength, identifying the factors that determine their position and challenging them in order to activate change on a social, political, economic, cultural or sexual level.

Power Based on the Ethics of Care

The ethics of care developed by authors such as Carol Gilligan and Nancy Harstock, based on women’s experiences with reproduction and on the revaluation of feminised practices such as caring for the family, represents an alternative logic to the dominant ethics of capitalism and materialism. An ethics that incorporates the female experience of care and, more specifically, of motherhood into the public sphere. A series of functions and responsibilities without which society cannot sustain itself, going beyond the strictly personal, family or private space to incorporate the value of care as a universal value that permeates the entire range of social and political relations.

The ethics of care forces us to rethink power, integrating a new dimension: power as a social relation that allows us to prepare and empower the people we care for to participate in society and/or live a dignified life. A care that transforms into power when practiced with a feeling of responsibility, respect and empowerment towards the community of which we are a part of. An ethics of responsibility that constitutes alternative forms of leadership, not only in the political sphere, but also in the social and economic sphere. In this way introducing into the public sphere forms of power and leadership linked to consensus, the empowerment of third parties and the practice of empathy or other elements that were considered virtues only in the private sphere. The ethics of care applied to the notion of leadership and power gives meaning to public responsibilities and guides them towards trust and the common good, both essential characteristics of a recognised and legitimate authority.

Abolish Power as Domination and Displace Hegemonic Masculinities

To speak of power and masculinities today means leaving behind the old hegemonic conceptions and their consequences—seeing as we already know where they lead us—in order to open up and offer alternatives that guide us towards more desirable horizons. The challenge is to learn to disengage collectively from the attributes and issues that have defined people’s views of power and hegemonic masculinities, so they do not lead us to repeat the same mistakes, injustices or inequalities.

While the notion of power as domination is still in force, and essential to be able to describe and denounce realities full of oppression, the set of critical perspectives offered in this text, along many others that have not been included, help us to displace and isolate this view that is no longer “useful” to us, and to work towards a new perspective in order to transform power into something desirable or at least reasonable, if that is even possible. In this sense, it helps to think of power as the result of a relationship that is not immutable, one that we can change and subvert in order to turn it around; and to also understand that, if we seriously aspire to emancipate ourselves, we should not aspire to simply redistribute power, but on the contrary, to abolish it, especially when it implies domination. The only notion of power that interests us is one that empowers us and opens up a world of possibilities that break away from hegemonic logic and destabilise classical power structures. A power to that empowers us to speak and express ourselves collectively, to take action and create our own conditions of well-being and progress, just as Hannah Arendt said. Or power as a capacity for agency, to end domination and unleash our potentialities. Or power understood as a responsibility and care towards others and the community that embraces us, and which becomes a shared ethics for a world worth living.

• References

  1 —

  Russell, Bertrand (2004). Power: A New Social Analysis. London: Routledge.

  2 —

  Byung-Chul Han (2018). What is Power? Cambridge: Polity.

  3 —

  Pateman, Carole (1988). The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity.

  4 —

  Kimmel, Michael (1997). “Masculinity as homophobia: Fear, shame and silence in the construction of gender identity”, in M. M. Gergen & S. N. Davis (eds.), Toward a New Psychology of Gender. Taylor & Frances/Routledge, p. 223–242.

  5 —

  Jablonka, Ivan (2019). Des hommes justes: Du patriarcat aux nouvelles masculinités. Paris: Seuil.

  6 —

  See the article by Maria de la Fuente that systematises the feminist reflection on power during the last few decades: “Ideas de poder en la teoría feminista” (Ideas of power in feminist theory), Revista Española de Ciencia Política, no. 39, 1990, p. 173–193.

  7 —

  Allen, Amy (1999). The Power of Feminist Theory. Boulder: Westview Press.

  8 —

  De la Fuente, M. (2005) “Ideas de poder en la teoría feminista” (Ideas of power in feminist theory), Revista Española de Ciencia Política, no. 39, 1990, p. 173–193.

  9 —

  Wartenberg, Thomas E. (1990). The Forms of Power: From Domination to Transformation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

  10 —

  Arendt, Hannah (1968). Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt.

  11 —

  For Webber, the State is any coercive political association with a permanent organisation (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) in which its administrative / bureaucratic apparatus manages to successfully maintain its claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force as a means to enforce order.

  12 —

  Arendt, Hannah (1954). “What is Authority?” Available online.

  13 —

  For Hannah Arendt, an active life supposes that “through action and speech, people show who they are, actively reveal their identity . . . Power is what maintains the existence of the public sphere, the potential space for the appearance of people who act and speak . . . Power is only real when word and deed have not been separated. When words are not empty and facts are not brutal . . . words are for discovering realities, and actions are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities.” Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  14 —

  Arendt, Hannah (1970). On Violence. San Diego: Harvest Books.

  15 —

  Arendt, Hannah (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  16 —

  Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

  17 —

  Sen, Amartya (1993). “Capability and Well-Being”, in The Quality of Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  18 —

  Jablonka, Ivan (2019). Des hommes justes: Du patriarcat aux nouvelles masculinités. Paris: Seuil.