For at least two decades, much of the academic literature in International Relations has been devoted to a detailed analysis of developments in the dynamics of structural change and power transition. Today, no one doubts China’s emergence as a major power. It is an established fact. Undoubtedly, the resilience demonstrated by the Asian giant in the face of the international financial crisis, first, and the COVID-19 health crisis, later, has convinced both enthusiasts and sceptics. This indisputable reality has been the fundamental driver –albeit not the only one– behind more diffuse and gradual alterations in what we have come to call the international liberal order.
What do we mean by the international liberal order?
We know that the concept of international order has to do with more than just a particular allocation of resources among the great powers. It is also the result of a normative and institutional construction based on specific ideas about –to put it plainly– how the world should work. Contestation over the principles, norms and rules that underpin this order is “itself one of the driving forces behind the evolution of international society” and “defines the shape and strength (or weakness) of international society during any given era” [1]1 — Buzan, B. (2010) China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 3: 6. .
The power–order dialectic is thus defined as a constitutive relationship. It is not surprising that the observation of considerable changes at the material/structural level pushes us to pay attention to the way in which the future “order” will be affected. History warns us that the US–China redistribution of power in the 21st century has, and will have, an impact of as yet undetermined dimensions on the international liberal order as we know it today.
The current international liberal order rests on at least three pillars that were established in the aftermath of World War II, consolidated over more than 40 years of Cold War and definitively triumphed as the dominant discourse and practice with the end of the Cold War. The first pillar is liberal ideology, which stresses the universality of democratic values and norms. The second pillar is multilateralism, which emphasises international cooperation and the management of global affairs through multilateral institutions (economic and commercial openness, security cooperation, etc.). The third pillar is a group of advocates with common goals and a shared commitment to preserve these liberal values, norms, principles and institutions. To a large extent, this “Western” international liberal order was initially promoted, and has later been cemented, by US leadership.
History warns us that the US – China redistribution of power in the 21st century has, and will have, an impact of as yet undetermined dimensions on the international liberal order as we know it today
Thus, the post-war liberal order ushered in, first of all, an extraordinary era of economic and social progress and growing interdependence. But, at the same time, it set the conditions for the emergence of global challenges of unprecedented complexity over the years. This ultimately affected the ability of international institutions to respond to these new challenges. Liberal multilateralism seemed unable to find a solution to global problems such as environmental protection, the reduction of inequalities generated by trade, the globalised economy and finance and their recurring crises, or human security. In addition to that, another process was underway: the transition of power between the US and China, which was about to become unstoppable.
The international liberal order in crisis
In 2018, 43 leading US International Relations scholars signed a public statement of urgent support for the international liberal order [2]2 — “Why We Should Preserve International Institutions and Order”. New York Times, July 23, 2018. Vid. Qingming H. (2021) The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. Journal of China Polítical Science. 26 : 1–26. . The idealism of the manifesto exasperated many other scholars, and academic debates were more than heated that year. The fundamental criticisms of the idealised version of the international liberal order highlighted its chronic problems: the contradictions between proclaimed liberal values and observed illiberal behaviour, the inability to reform its institutional pillars to accommodate the diverse group of emerging powers and to provide solutions to old and new global problems, and the tensions between advocates and detractors of this order.
The manifesto therefore came into being against a backdrop of a crisis of authority of the liberal order, aggravated by the already visible consequences of Donald Trump’s election as president. The US administration was showing no rhetorical or practical signs of adhering to the liberal identity and was jeopardising multilateralism, one of its cornerstones. The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, UNESCO, the UN Global Compact on Migration and Refugees, cancelled the Iranian Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, defected from the UN Human Rights Council, cut funding to the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees, suspended its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, announced its withdrawal from the WHO – in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic – and threatened to leave the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and NATO, among others. In short, a “doctrine of abandonment” combined with the “America first” slogan. Alarm bells started to ring: some specialists began to speak openly of a “post-American” order and, as a result, the international liberal order was deemed to have entered its greatest crisis in history.
Undoubtedly, the US withdrawal from liberal regimes and institutions is crucial to explain its current crisis, regardless of the fact that the liberal order, with its development and transformation, may be more permanent than the hegemonic power that created it. Its renunciation, not only of leadership, but even of participation in global politics and economics seriously affects the maintenance of the liberal order as we know it. The challenges the international liberal order faces, however, are more profound than simply the US abandoning it, which, on the other hand, the new Biden administration seems more than determined to reverse.
Other material and ideological forces are currently shaking its pillars. First, the entrenchment of authoritarianism and autocracy. Democracy is weakening because of the general decline of political and civil liberties around the world. The successful Chinese model seems to undermine the popularity of liberalism. Advocates of traditional democracy are barely able to maintain standards, and the promising evolution of such countries as Turkey and Myanmar has recently taken a turn for the worse. Autocratic countries, led by Russia, have taken advantage of the system’s failure, promoting disinformation campaigns, exhibiting aggressive or downright interventionist international behaviour, and forging cultural and financial ties with far-right parties in third countries. Second, the exacerbation of nationalism and populism also contributes to damaging the reputation and authority of international institutions that strengthen multilateralism and liberal globalisation. The rise of nationalism pushes states to make decisions that are more aligned with their national interests, both from a material and ideological perspective. The European Union (EU), for example, is grappling with post-Brexit, the rise of extremist or anti-establishment parties, the migration and refugee crises, the consolidation of populist leaders in several member states, and the difficulties of arbitrating agile decision-making mechanisms and, at long last, implementing a common foreign and security policy [3]3 — Creutz, K. et al. (2019) The changing global order and its implications for the EU. FIIA Report 59. . Finally, the economic and social consequences of the pandemic are still unpredictable, but the omens for the Western world, and thus for the maintenance of the current liberal order, are not cause for optimism.
The health crisis seems to be precipitating and further highlighting the weaknesses of multilateralism: the myth of the universal liberal order, forged in Western solidarity, has been discredited during the pandemic
The health crisis seems to be precipitating and further highlighting the weaknesses of multilateralism. There can be no doubt that the competition between the retreating world leader –the US– the quintessential liberal political and economic integration organisation –the EU– and the emerging revisionist power –China– has also intensified. The myth of the universal liberal order, forged in Western solidarity, has been discredited during the pandemic. This might open avenues to exploit the internal division and fragmentation among its main guarantors and give China the possibility to extend its influence in a more assertive and decisive manner [4]4 — Qingming, H. op. cit. .
China: The beginning of the challenge to the international liberal order (in crisis)
China’s traditional strategy has been to present itself to the world as a power in “peaceful rise” – a two-pronged rise. On the one hand, the emerging power accommodated itself to the rules and structures of the liberal order and, in return, expected the rest of the actors to gradually incorporate some changes in the rules of the game derived from the variations in the distribution of international power and influence. China presented itself as a “reformist revisionist” power with a moderate profile. However, it never hid its rejection of some of the primary institutions of international society. It recognises, for example, sovereignty, non-intervention, diplomacy, the market, multilateralism, while it has traditionally resisted liberal political institutions such as democracy, human rights or environmental values. These resistances and the discursive emphasis on the contradictions of the dominant Western order foreshadowed that China might take a decisive step towards the establishment of an alternative political–economic order of a hybrid nature.
However, over the past few decades, China showed no sign of being willing to assume the counter-hegemonic leading role that increasingly corresponded to it as a result of its obvious rise in the international power hierarchy. Until Donald Trump’s accession to the White House first and the emergence of COVID-19 later, China merely demanded, on the one hand, greater participation in the rules of the game governing the liberal order and, on the other, it encouraged new multilateral organisations [5]5 — García Segura, C. (2017) Westfalia, worldfalia, eastfalia. El impacto de las transformaciones de la estructura de poder interestatal en el orden internacional. REDI. 69 (2):45-70. . In this respect, China has essentially invested significant resources over the past decade in building alternative international institutions, regional fora, security organisations and infrastructure investment projects. This helped to diversify its options while maximising its participation in the liberal order, and China reaped the rewards accordingly.
However, its foreign policy has progressively intensified and become more visible, focusing on building dense networks and presenting new, appealing options. Its extensive offer of goods and services, free from political conditions, has become increasingly valued. For the past ten years, the idea of a “community of shared destiny for humanity” promising to build an open, inclusive and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity has been based on respect for all political systems, without attempting to transform them, as the engine of a shared future for mankind. China’s attempt to reshape the world order, however, according to Xi, seeks first and foremost to promote its national interest and to position China at the forefront of global competition.
China’s greater integration into the market and the liberal order contributes to promote an alternative model based on authoritarian control, combining it with liberal elements such as trade promotion and cooperation
In short, even before the arrival of the global pandemic, China’s greater integration into the liberal order and, above all, the market, was de facto contributing to the promotion of an alternative model that affirms authoritarian control, combining it with liberal elements such as trade promotion, cooperation and support for multilateralism. While China and the US are deeply rooted in the current international order, their models are increasingly different, and this is leading to the reorganisation of the positions of different actors in the international order. If so, the Western-dominated model will have to face internal division and fragmentation. The idea of a multiplex international order with co-existing/competing political–economic models was beginning to take shape before the advent of COVID-19.
Towards an alternative Chinese order in the post-pandemic era?
The global pandemic has contributed to systematising pre-existing power relations, exacerbating the rivalry between China and the US and raising concerns about the emergence of a new Cold War [6]6 — Layne, C. (2020) Preventing the China-U.S. Cold War from Turning Hot. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 13(3):343–385. . Since COVID-19 reached the Western world, the anguish of the US and its traditional allies and the lack of coordination and effectiveness of multilateral institutions in the face of the global threat contrasted with the successful containment of the virus and Chinese “generosity”. The Asian giant boldly adapted and reshaped its narrative about the origins of the virus, exhibited internationally the brutal efficiency of its authoritarian model to contain it, and launched a global health aid campaign, with special attention to African, Asian and Latin American countries. China resolutely presented a global initiative to attract more support for its model and proclaimed itself as the global leader in the response to COVID-19, following a new US defection. The more the US administration faltered and the more the Europeans blamed their lack of engagement in the handling of the pandemic, the more Chinese “mask diplomacy” intensified globally by exporting medical equipment, expertise and accumulated experience [7]7 — Suisheng Z. (2021) Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Global Leadership in the Context of COVID-19: Implications for the US-led World Order and Liberal Globalization. Journal of Contemporary China. 30: 233-248. . China was winning the battle, at least from a pre-training point of view [8]8 — Rudd, K. (2020) The Coming Post-COVID Anarchy The Pandemic Bodes Ill for Both American and Chinese Power and for the Global Order. Foreign Affairs. .
This has led some scholars to argue that in the post-pandemic world, an authoritarian sub-order will emerge, driven by increasing proactivity on the part of China, taking advantage of the ambiguity of the climate of opinion in the face of the uncertainty generated by the pandemic. This would not imply the end of the existing liberal order, but rather the coexistence of two increasingly differentiated orders. From this perspective, China is constructing a new narrative based on a changing strategic diplomacy, which has evolved from discretion and moderation to the proactivity and assertiveness of recent times [9]9 — Chang, YY. (2020) The Post-Pandemic World: between Constitutionalized and Authoritarian Orders: China’s Narrative-Power Play in the Pandemic Era. Journal of China Political Science. 26:27–65. .
China’s own experts believe that the economic and technological rivalry between the US and China will intensify in the current decade [10]10 — Minghao Z. (2019) Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 12(3):371–394. . China is no longer likely to be as patient in claiming greater power and representation in the multilateral institutions of the liberal order and will not seek their acquiescence over its alternative multilateral institutions. Its assertiveness will increase and, if others retreat, so will their leadership capacity.
On the economic and financial front, the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2014 reveal the tensions between the socialising effects of the international liberal order and the increasing externalisation of China’s own model of a non-liberal, state-led political economy with new norms and standards that may ultimately be contributing to the establishment of a future Chinese area of influence.
In this state of affairs, the strategic competition between the US and China will be inevitable. But this rivalry will have more to do with the digital dimension and technological advances of the last decade than with traditional, more geopolitical security concerns. The development of digital technology has created new ways of protecting national security, accumulating national wealth and gaining international support. Cybersecurity is becoming the core of state security and the share of the digital economy in the GDP of major powers is growing rapidly.
Liberal democracies focus their attention not only on technological development but also on its impact on civil rights and liberties. In contrast, the Chinese regime has come to view the development of artificial intelligence (AI) as a national strategy with the clear goal of making the country a leading power in the industry. Thanks to its unique socio-political environment and huge domestic internet market, the Chinese government has access to unlimited data that are strategic resources to train and improve algorithms and improve its software.
In the context of the current power transition, the technological and ideological “Artificial Intelligence race” between China and the US would be akin to the arms and nuclear race during the Cold War
Unlike Western democratic societies, for China the key barrier to AI advancement lies in technological rather than legal constraints. Automating decision-making without human intervention is unleashing the potential of China’s sophisticated digital surveillance network, substantially increasing the state’s power and capacity for control and ensuring continuity for the current regime. But China’s strategy goes beyond its borders. It aims to boost China’s economic growth, enhance its global status and demonstrate the superiority of its authoritarian ideological values. In the context of the current power transition, the (technological and ideological) “Artificial Intelligence race” between China and the US would be akin to the arms and nuclear race between the USSR and the US during the Cold War [11]11 — Jinghan, Z. (2020) Artificial intelligence and China’s authoritarian governance. International Affairs 96 (6):1441–1459. .
To sum up, the emerging international order may be heading towards an “uneasy peace”, a more unstable scenario that will reveal the darker side of globalisation, increased competition between the US and China for international prestige and leadership, and technological decoupling between countries [12]12 — Yan, X. (2020) Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13 (3):313–341. . However, we must bear in mind that China remains as yet perhaps too fragile a power, with insufficient resources to lead a crusade against liberal democracies and overtake the US as a global leader in the provision of global public goods. All options are open. The liberal order may be heading towards a new post-hegemonic multilateralism in a context of multipolarity or, conversely, a deeper transformation might be underway whereby the increasingly evident effects of a bipolar power structure may lead to more jockeying for global leadership between the two superpowers with competing ideas, principles and norms, resulting in two alternative international orders in the 21st century.
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References
1 —Buzan, B. (2010) China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 3: 6.
2 —“Why We Should Preserve International Institutions and Order”. New York Times, July 23, 2018. Vid. Qingming H. (2021) The Pandemic and the Transformation of Liberal International Order. Journal of China Polítical Science. 26 : 1–26.
3 —Creutz, K. et al. (2019) The changing global order and its implications for the EU. FIIA Report 59.
4 —Qingming, H. op. cit.
5 —García Segura, C. (2017) Westfalia, worldfalia, eastfalia. El impacto de las transformaciones de la estructura de poder interestatal en el orden internacional. REDI. 69 (2):45-70.
6 —Layne, C. (2020) Preventing the China-U.S. Cold War from Turning Hot. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 13(3):343–385.
7 —Suisheng Z. (2021) Rhetoric and Reality of China’s Global Leadership in the Context of COVID-19: Implications for the US-led World Order and Liberal Globalization. Journal of Contemporary China. 30: 233-248.
8 —Rudd, K. (2020) The Coming Post-COVID Anarchy The Pandemic Bodes Ill for Both American and Chinese Power and for the Global Order. Foreign Affairs.
9 —Chang, YY. (2020) The Post-Pandemic World: between Constitutionalized and Authoritarian Orders: China’s Narrative-Power Play in the Pandemic Era. Journal of China Political Science. 26:27–65.
10 —Minghao Z. (2019) Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 12(3):371–394.
11 —Jinghan, Z. (2020) Artificial intelligence and China’s authoritarian governance. International Affairs 96 (6):1441–1459.
12 —Yan, X. (2020) Bipolar Rivalry in the Early Digital Age, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 13 (3):313–341.
Leire Moure
Leire Moure is an Associate Professor of Public International Law and International Relations in the Department of Public Law, Historical and Legal Sciences and Political Thought at the University of the Basque Country / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea. She holds a PhD in Political Science and Sociology with a specialization in International Studies from the UPV / EHU. Her lines of research focus on the theory of international relations, the transformations of the international system and the role of communication in international relations. She is the author of the book China on the International Stage: A Multidisciplinary Approach (2013).
