“There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will shake the world.” This quote, attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte, captures that China is being seen as a potential great power for centuries. In recent decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has gained influence.

Militarily, the United States (US) is still far more powerful than China, but the PRC is catching up and has developed into the most capable Asian country. The military expenditure of the US might still be more than double that of China. 20 years ago, however, the ratio was 5:1 [1]1 — SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”. Available online. .

Economically, China’s rise is even more impressive. In seventeen out of the last twenty years, the PRC has been the fastest growing of all major economies including the US, the European Union (EU), India, Russia, and Japan. Per capita, China’s GDP is still below that of Russia and only a fraction of that generated in the US, Japan, and the EU [2]2 — World Bank, “World Development Indicators”. Available online. . In its entirety, however, the PRC is predicted to become the largest economy in the foreseeable future.

In most parts of the developed world, China’s rise to international power is perceived rather skeptical. Unfavorable views of the PRC outweigh positive ones by large margins in countries like Japan (86%), Sweden (85%), Australia (81%), South Korea (75%), Denmark (75%), United Kingdom (74%), the Netherlands (73%), the US (73%), Canada (73%), Germany (71%), Belgium (71%), France (70%), Spain (63%), and Italy (62%). Of these 14 countries, 78% have no or not much confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping and only 19% indicate some or a lot of confidence in China’s leader [3]3 — Laura Silver et al. (2020), “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”. Pew Research Center. Available online. . A more detailed analysis of public opinion across Europe has further uncovered that negative perceptions of the PRC are predominant in almost all European countries. When asked about specific policies, only trade with China is perceived positive while Chinese investments, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese military capabilities, China’s impact on the global environment and the country’s effect on democracy in other states are all seen in a negative light in most if not all European countries [4]4 — Richard Q. Turcsányi et al. (2020). European Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19. Differences and Common Ground across the Continent, Olomouc: Palacky University. . In short, China’s soft power continues to be low and people in Europe and beyond are skeptical when it comes to the country’s growing global role.

China may not be the most influential country in the world (yet), but its growing influence is undeniable leaving the world with the question how the awoken giant will shake the world. Is the skepticism of Europeans justified?

Revisionist, status quo, or a new type: what kind of power is China?

While China’s foreign policy and its implications on global order are subject of extensive and rich scholarly analyses, the PRC’s role in world affairs remains controversial. Descriptions of Chinese foreign policy range from “aggressive” and “assertive” to “constructive” and “cooperative”, or even “responsible” [5]5 — Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness”, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?”, International Security, 37: 4, 2013, p. 7-48; Camilla T.N. Sørensen, “That Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice”, China Quarterly 239: 2019, p. 594-316; Feng Zhu i Peng Lu, “Be Strong and Be Good. Continuity and Change in China’s International Strategy under Xi Jinping”, China Quarterly of Internaitonal Strategic Studies, 1: 1, 2015, p. 19-34. .

For example, at the 2017 World Economic Forum China’s President Xi Jinping captured the headlines with his commitment to multilateralism, international rules, liberal trade and investment: “We must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism. […] We should adhere to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions. We should honor promises and abide by rules. One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit.” [6]6 — China’s President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum in Davos “President Xi’s Speech to Davos in Full ” World Economic Forum. Available online. .

Some Western observers celebrated Xi’s statement as a signal that China had become the “defender of globalization” [7]7 — Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China’s Xi Jinping Seizes Davos Stage to Proclaim Himself Defender of Globalisation”, The Telegraph. Available online. and an advocate of the liberal economic order [8]8 — Bessma Momani, “Xi Jinping’s Davos Speech Showed the World Has Turned Upside Down”, Newsweek, available online. Charles Riley, “Davos Marks the Emergence of a Confident, Strong China”, CNN, available online. . Skeptics countered that Xi’s words were merely lip-service. They pointed out that China remains one of the world’s most protectionist economies in the world, committing itself only rhetorically to those aspects of the existing order from which it profits. [9]9 — Thomas Kellogg, “Xi’s Davos Speech: Is China the New Champion for the Liberal International Order?”, The Diplomat, available online. The Economist, “Xi Jinping Portrays China as a Rock of Stability”, available online. .

This exemplarily reflects a broader discussion among scholars of International Relations (IR) that interpret China either as a revisionist or a status quo power in world affairs. To some, the PRC aims to fundamentally reshape the world along the lines of its own interests. To them, conflict with the West – the US in particular – is inevitable [10]10 — John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, 19: 3, 1994/95, p. 5-49; John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, International Security 43: 4, 2019, p. 7-50. . To these scholars, international institutions can hardly “bind” China. Recent changes in relative power and the resultant opportunities are behind China’s new assertiveness and Chinese attempts to reduce international institutions’ constraints on its power [11]11 — “The Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness”, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”, Survival, 60: 1, 2018, p. 7-40; Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Signs Were There”, Foreign Affairs, 97: 4, 2018, p. 186-188. .

Other observers counter that China has gradually integrated itself into the existing international institutions and has profited from the established order. In their view, China is seeking to gain more influence in existing institutions without questioning their liberal governance principles, and even enshrining the same principles in the institutions it has newly invented [12]12 — Gilford John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”, Foreign Affairs, 78: 1, 2008, pp. 23-37; Gilford John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Ethics and International Affairs, 32: 1, 2018, p. 17-29; Gilford John Ikenberry i Darren J. Lim, China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-hegemony, Washington DC: Brookings, 2017. . The PRC may not be supportive to all international institutions and its underlying principles, but it generally supports the status quo. For example, China does not subscribe to the promotion of democracy or strives to shape international norms being neither a “norm taker” nor a “norm breaker” [13]13 — Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Alastair Iain Johnston, “China in a World of Orders,” International Security, 44: 2, 2019, p. 9-60; Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”, The Washington Quarterly, 42: 2, 2019, p. 99-114; Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Rise and International Regimes. Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?”. A: Robert S. Ross i Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), China in the Era of Xi Jinping. Domestic and Froeign Policy Challenges, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016, p. 265-195. .

China’s contradictory foreign policy

China’s leaders claim that state sovereignty is at the core of the country’s foreign policy and its vision for the future international order. In practice, however, the PRC’s foreign policy is just as contradictory as the academic interpretations of it.

In the conflict over territorial claims in the South China Sea, for example, the PRC has adopted an assertive approach, but coupled it with limited willingness to cooperate. On the one hand, the PRC ignores the jurisdiction of the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal in The Hague [17]17 — Tom Phillips, “China Attacks International Court After South China Sea Ruling”, The Guardian. Available online. , and builds artificial atolls and stations military personnel and equipment on formerly uninhabited rocks [18]18 — Enrico Fels i Truong-Minh Vu (eds.), Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, London: Springer, 2016; Minnie Chan, “China to Build Up Atoll in Contested South China Sea, Source Says”, South China Morning Post. Available online. . On the other hand, China has agreed “guidelines” and signed a framework for a long-awaited code of conduct on the South China Sea dispute and has not rejected outright the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [19]19 — Michael Martina, “RPT-China, ASEAN Set ‘Guidelines’ on Sea Row, But No Deal Expected”, Reuters, available online. Ching Chang, “Examining the Flaws of a South China Sea Code of Conduct”, The Diplomat, available online. BBC, “Chinese jets intercept US aircraft over East China Sea, US says”, available online. . In other regions, China’s constructive engagement is clearer, such as its role in the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan, the South Sudan Peace Process and the Iran nuclear deal, as well as the PRC’s commitment and contributions to United Nations and other peacekeeping capabilities.

Another example of contradictory foreign policy is the PRC’s approach to the International Criminal Court (ICC). On the one hand, China has rejected the ICC’s jurisdiction by failing to sign the court’s Rome Statute. Nonetheless, this rejection of the ICC has not prevented China from agreeing to the jurisdiction of the court over Darfur, Sudan in 2005 and Libya in 2011.

A similar contradiction is characteristic for China’s approach to the Bretton Woods institutions. On the one hand, the PRC has acknowledged the status of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank by insisting on an increase in its voting power in these institutions. On the other hand, the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – while adopting many of the World Bank’s principles [20]20 — Chris Humphrey, “Developmental Revolution or Bretton Woods Revisited? The Prospects of the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, ODI Working Paper 418, Londres: Overseas Development Institute, 2015; Natalie G. Lichtenstein, A Comparative Guide to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. – has undermined the efficiency of the Bretton Woods institutions simply by offering a Chinese-dominated alternative [21]21 — Simon Reich, “China’s New Investment Bank Challenges US Influence on Global Economics”, The Conversation. Available online. .

Hence, the lack of academic consensus on how to describe China’s approach to the rules and institutions underlying the international order is the result not primarily of theoretical differences, but of contradictory Chinese foreign policy.

Why is China’s foreign policy contradictory?

As I explain in depth in a forthcoming book [22]22 — Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Understanding China’s Foreign Policy Contradictions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. , China’s contradictory foreign policy and approach to the existing international order is largely a result of the country’s domestic affairs and vulnerabilities. Since the revolution in 1949, the country is governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At first, the CCP’s legitimacy was based on Communist ideology. Since the country adopted its “reform and opening up” policy since 1978, economic development and the resultant increase of prosperity and poverty reduction have replaced ideology as the main source of the CCP’s legitimation. In recent years, however, growth rates are lower than in previous decade, referred to China as the “new normal”. This makes the CCP leaders worry about regime stability. In reaction, the CCP is re-strengthening and fueling a third pillar of its legitimacy, namely national pride.

Strikingly, however, neither economic prosperity nor national pride as sources of legitimacy lead to clear-cut policy. While some seek to maintain economic growth by means of more protectionism, other Chinese leaders strive to uphold and contribute to an open international economy that has been conducive to Chinese development in the past. Similarly, national pride can either lead to aggressive nationalism or translate into a search for international reputation as a responsible great power that cherishes international institutions and reliability.

These different interpretations of the CCP’s main sources of legitimacy already point to the fact that China is less monolithic than it might seem to outsiders. While decision-making within the PRC appears like a black box that is difficult to understand from the outside, academic research convincingly demonstrates that the country’s domestic and foreign policy decision-making is more fragmented and decentralized than one might think [23]23 — Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China”, SIPRI Policy Paper 26, Stockholm, SIPRI, 2010; David Shambaugh (ed.), The Modern Chinese State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; David Shambaugh, “China’s Long March to Global Power”. A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 3-21; Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Foreign Policy Making Process. Players and Institutions”, A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 85-110. .

Hence, China’s contradictory foreign policy is the result of internal affairs and vulnerabilities. Already in 2007, Susan Shirk has carved out how China’s leaders fear popular unrest and public opinion contesting the survival of the regime [24]24 — Susan Shirk (2007), China. Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press. . Shirk convincingly argues that while policymakers in Western states only face the risk of losing power, party cadres and their families worry about their livelihoods or even their lives should the regime fall. More recently, Thomas Christensen has emphasized how a crude mix of nationalist confidence and a domestic sense of regime vulnerability is making Chinese foreign policy more complex and contradictory [25]25 — Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China. Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, 90: 2, 2011, p. 54-67; Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge. Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, Nova York: W. W. Norton, 2015. .

How China’s rise is changing the international order

China may not have an overarching vision of an alternative international order or a grand strategy underlying its foreign policy, but it is not without impact on the future international order. China is vulnerable but not weak. For the sake of its own flexibility, China questions universal definitions of core vocabulary of international relations ranging from the meaning of democracy to human right and free trade. The PRC further strives to make international law subject to interpretation of sovereign states weakening the legal binding of international rules.

In short, China’s rise to international power is not coming with an alternative order but it undermines the existing one. Since China’s approach is largely driven by domestic vulnerabilities it is difficult for third countries, including the EU and its member states, to influence the course of the PRC.

• References

  1 —

  SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”. Available online.

  2 —

  World Bank, “World Development Indicators”. Available online.

  3 —

  Laura Silver et al. (2020), “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”. Pew Research Center. Available online.

  4 —

  Richard Q. Turcsányi et al. (2020). European Public Opinion on China in the Age of COVID-19. Differences and Common Ground across the Continent, Olomouc: Palacky University.

  5 —

  Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness”, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?”, International Security, 37: 4, 2013, p. 7-48; Camilla T.N. Sørensen, “That Is Not Intervention; That Is Interference with Chinese Characteristics: New Concepts, Distinctions and Approaches Developing in the Chinese Debate and Foreign and Security Policy Practice”, China Quarterly 239: 2019, p. 594-316; Feng Zhu i Peng Lu, “Be Strong and Be Good. Continuity and Change in China’s International Strategy under Xi Jinping”, China Quarterly of Internaitonal Strategic Studies, 1: 1, 2015, p. 19-34.

  6 —

  China’s President Xi Jinping at the World Economic Forum in Davos “President Xi’s Speech to Davos in Full ” World Economic Forum. Available online.

  7 —

  Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China’s Xi Jinping Seizes Davos Stage to Proclaim Himself Defender of Globalisation”, The Telegraph. Available online.

  8 —

  Bessma Momani, “Xi Jinping’s Davos Speech Showed the World Has Turned Upside Down”, Newsweek, available online. Charles Riley, “Davos Marks the Emergence of a Confident, Strong China”, CNN, available online.

  9 —

  Thomas Kellogg, “Xi’s Davos Speech: Is China the New Champion for the Liberal International Order?”, The Diplomat, available online. The Economist, “Xi Jinping Portrays China as a Rock of Stability”, available online.

  10 —

  John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, 19: 3, 1994/95, p. 5-49; John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, International Security 43: 4, 2019, p. 7-50.

  11 —

  “The Sources of Chinese Conduct. Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness”, The Washington Quarterly, 37: 4, 2014, p. 133-150; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Globalisation and Chinese Grand Strategy”, Survival, 60: 1, 2018, p. 7-40; Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Signs Were There”, Foreign Affairs, 97: 4, 2018, p. 186-188.

  12 —

  Gilford John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”, Foreign Affairs, 78: 1, 2008, pp. 23-37; Gilford John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, Ethics and International Affairs, 32: 1, 2018, p. 17-29; Gilford John Ikenberry i Darren J. Lim, China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Prospects for Counter-hegemony, Washington DC: Brookings, 2017.

  13 —

  Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Alastair Iain Johnston, “China in a World of Orders,” International Security, 44: 2, 2019, p. 9-60; Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”, The Washington Quarterly, 42: 2, 2019, p. 99-114; Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Rise and International Regimes. Does China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?”. A: Robert S. Ross i Jo Inge Bekkevold (eds.), China in the Era of Xi Jinping. Domestic and Froeign Policy Challenges, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016, p. 265-195.

  14 —

  Christian A. Hess, “Keeping the Past Alive. The Use of History in China’s Foreign Relations”. A: Shaun Breslin (ed.), Handbook of China’s International Relations, Londres: Routledge, 2010, p. 47-54; Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire. China’s History and Modern Foreign Relations, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010; Nele Noesselt, “Is There a “Chinese School” of IR?”, GIGA Working Papers 188, Hamburg: GIGA, 2012; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World. The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, Nova York: The Penguin Press, 2009; Weiwei Zhang, La ola china. El ascenso de un estado civilización, China Intercontinental Press, 2017.

  15 —

  Yaqing Qin, “Chinese Culture and Its Implications for Foreign Policy-making”, China International Studies 2011, p. 45-65; Yaqing Qin, “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 4: 2, 2011, p. 117-145; Yaqing Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

  16 —

  Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia)”, Social Identities 12: 1, 2006, p. 29-41; Tingyang Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-under-heaven (Tian-xia)”, Diogenes, 56: 2009, p. 5-18; Tingyang Zhao, “The Ontology of Coexistence. From Cogito to Facio”, Diogenes, 57: 4, 2010, p. 27-36.

  17 —

  Tom Phillips, “China Attacks International Court After South China Sea Ruling”, The Guardian. Available online.

  18 —

  Enrico Fels i Truong-Minh Vu (eds.), Power Politics in Asia’s Contested Waters. Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, London: Springer, 2016; Minnie Chan, “China to Build Up Atoll in Contested South China Sea, Source Says”, South China Morning Post. Available online.

  19 —

  Michael Martina, “RPT-China, ASEAN Set ‘Guidelines’ on Sea Row, But No Deal Expected”, Reuters, available online. Ching Chang, “Examining the Flaws of a South China Sea Code of Conduct”, The Diplomat, available online. BBC, “Chinese jets intercept US aircraft over East China Sea, US says”, available online.

  20 —

  Chris Humphrey, “Developmental Revolution or Bretton Woods Revisited? The Prospects of the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”, ODI Working Paper 418, Londres: Overseas Development Institute, 2015; Natalie G. Lichtenstein, A Comparative Guide to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.

  21 —

  Simon Reich, “China’s New Investment Bank Challenges US Influence on Global Economics”, The Conversation. Available online.

  22 —

  Tim Nicholas Rühlig, Understanding China’s Foreign Policy Contradictions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

  23 —

  Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China”, SIPRI Policy Paper 26, Stockholm, SIPRI, 2010; David Shambaugh (ed.), The Modern Chinese State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; David Shambaugh, “China’s Long March to Global Power”. A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 3-21; Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Foreign Policy Making Process. Players and Institutions”, A: China & the World, David Shambaugh (ed.), Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp. 85-110.

  24 —

  Susan Shirk (2007), China. Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  25 —

  Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China. Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, 90: 2, 2011, p. 54-67; Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge. Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, Nova York: W. W. Norton, 2015.