The growing influence of the People’s Republic of China has been the subject of heated debate in academic and policy circles over the past three decades. Very often, this debate has been framed in antagonistic terms, pitting those who view this process with optimism and hope that it may lead to greater multipolarity against those who see in its accumulation of power not only a threat to the privileged position of some Western countries, but also an enormous danger to the international order as we know it. In such a polarized scenario in which strong pressures for change are involved, how can we understand the role of China? No one doubts that the Asian giant is the country that has accumulated the most influence over the years, and some forecasts indicate that it could replace the United States as the world’s leading economy as soon as 2028, almost two decades earlier than some studies predicted at the beginning of this century.
China has been steadily overtaking the great powers that for decades have led contemporary international relations and is now a well-established global superpower. It is, perhaps, a different superpower that does not fit the pattern of some of its predecessors, but it is not, however, a superpower under construction or in the making. Recognising this status and removing China from the list of historical anomalies is a first step and a necessary condition for understanding the country’s current reality as well as its interests, weaknesses, strengths and potential impact on today’s world and the world to come. On the basis of this recognition and in order to understand China today and in the coming years, the following paragraphs provide four complementary keys that highlight the moment of transition we are living through.
The irreversible and profound crisis of the international liberal order
For over twenty-five years we have been witnessing a deep and irreversible crisis of the liberal international order led by the United States for the past seven decades which, in the best-case scenario for those who defend it and benefit from it, may culminate in its transformation and renewal. Optimistically viewed, this order has been characterized by the sum of five major convictions. First, a strong preference for “openness”: trade and exchanges are not only perceived as two defining features of today’s global society, but also as two factors that promote economic development, peace and the advancement of democracy. Second, a strong commitment to a system of international relations based on the observance of and compliance with an evolving set of principles, norms and rules. Third, a widespread belief in the need to maintain a minimum level of security cooperation to ensure the survival of the actors and the system they comprise. Fourth, the belief that the current international order is flexible and open to reform, i.e., capable of adapting to the changing circumstances and demands of the international system that underlies it. Finally, a deep hope that this order embodies an idea of progress that contributes to the advancement of liberal democracy across the globe [1]1 — Ikenberry, G. John (2018), “The end of liberal international order?’”, International Affairs 94 (1), pp. 7-23. . On the other hand, from a less complacent or more critical perspective, this order can be better understood as an order which is “class-based, elitist hegemony – strongly imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions – in both US domestic and foreign relations”. From this point of view, taking a theoretical position close to those of Gramsci or Kautsky, the order is best understood as a “system of hierarchy and inequality” built on “racio-civilizational” discrimination [2]2 — Parmar, Inderjeet (2018), “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 94 (1), pp. 151-172. .
Whichever conception is chosen, it is indisputable that this order is undergoing a deep-rooted crisis that precedes and goes beyond the recent presidency of Donald J. Trump. Thus, largely driven by globalization, since the mid-1990s this order has been facing a double “crisis of transition”: a crisis of governance and authority and, in parallel, a crisis associated with its social purpose —in particular, its inability to maintain the international security community— [3]3 — Ikenberry, G. John, Op. cit. 2018. . Both crises have been aggravated in recent years by three challenges that make the inevitable transformation of the order even more acute. The first is the return of great powers to international politics over the past decade in an international context in which some of the competitors are autocratic regimes. The second refers to the changing nature of armed conflict, which requires a profound revision of the security institutions created over the last fifty years. Finally, the third is linked to the new demands for international cooperation arising from the transformation and rise of cybersecurity, climate change, technological diffusion, international terrorism, new forms of communication and interaction and, as we have painfully witnessed over the past year and a half, pandemics [4]4 — Friedman Lissner, Rebecca and Rapp-Hooper, Mira (2018), “The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order”, The Washington Quarterly, 41 (1), pp. 7-25. .
China must navigate this sea of uncertainty while deciding whether it wants to take the helm of the ship or it prefers to postpone this decision to a future moment when more favourable winds may blow
It is still too early to know how the liberal international order will evolve in the coming years and whether it will be able to survive the crisis, but quite a few authors have pointed to its more than likely replacement by a new order, and some have even urged its replacement in order to put an end to a pattern that perpetuates the privileged position of the powerful and the exploitation of those with fewer resources and opportunities. Like any other international actor, China must navigate this sea of uncertainty. Unlike many others, however, the Asian giant must do so while deciding whether it wants to take the helm of the ship or whether, on the contrary, it prefers to postpone this decision to a future moment when more favourable winds may blow.
The gradual loss of state power and the emergence of a more pluralistic world
A second key to understanding China’s present and future is that the ceding of power from states to other international actors (voluntary or not) and the resulting loss of their centrality in international relations is not only an irreversible process, but one that is advancing increasingly faster. The recent health and economic crisis linked to the Covid-19 pandemic has given rise to numerous academic analyses that warn of the return of geopolitics and power politics and, in parallel, of the rise of sovereignism, the strengthening of the most powerful states and the gradual weakening of democracy as the reference model of political organisation. It is very likely that some of these trends will survive the crisis and intensify in the coming years. However, we should be wary of illusions: the causes leading to the weakening of states have very deep roots and are here to stay, so their loss of power and centrality is merely a matter of time. This does not mean that in the medium or long term States will become irrelevant or that democracy will lose its capacity for persuasion and influence, but it is undeniable that we are moving towards a post-state world in which the states as a whole are condemned to cede power to other actors and in which the system made up of the former will have to cope with the emergence of other systems built around international organisations, especially large multinational companies.
Three factors have the most direct impact on the erosion of state power in the 21st century. First, the wave of globalization that began at the end of the 20th century and, more specifically, the emergence of information and communication technologies. This did not only change the way in which actors communicate and interact in their international relations, but has also transformed them thoroughly. Furthermore, the technological revolution has altered the classic relationship of each of the actors with technology itself. In the case of states, this has led to the loss of the monopoly they once enjoyed and, although some countries retain their capacity for leadership and influence in that sphere, they are increasingly few. As if this were not enough, they must share the technological podium with large companies that often pursue interests that may not only deviate from their own, but even go in the opposite direction.
Secondly, and to a large extent connected with the previous factor, the gradual loss of importance of territory as one of the main sources of power in international relations. During the last centuries the construction of political authorities involved the control of vast territories. This explains the process of the rise and fall of colonial empires and, more recently, the enshrinement of physical borders as consubstantial elements of statehood. Territory continues to be relevant because it is home to important resources – especially water, energy and mineral resources – and because it affects global transport, but today ownership or possession is no longer as important as an actor’s ability to easily access the benefits derived from territory. And everything suggests that this trend will intensify in the coming decades.
Thirdly and finally, the limitations of states as political organisations in responding to increasingly pressing challenges of a transnational nature. The Covid-19 pandemic that has made headlines over the past year has highlighted the shortcomings of countries in curbing its spread, but also in accessing vaccines which, except in rare cases, depend on the management of a very limited number of pharmaceutical companies. In a similar vein, the management of the more than 270 million migrants in the world, mostly for labour reasons, has highlighted the inadequacy of traditional state instruments to provide ethically acceptable, viable and sustainable responses over time. Just a few years ago it was estimated that this figure would not be reached until the middle of the 21st century, but the developments of the past decade have proved those forecasts wrong and, if the current rate of growth continues, by 2050 the number of migrants in the world will probably exceed 500 million [5]5 — International Organization for Migration (2019), World Migration Report 2020, Ginebra. Available online. . The increase in transnational organised crime and a “new” international terrorism with greater impact on the global media, greater mastery of new communication technologies and greater destructive capacity have also exposed the shortcomings of states, especially in the West. However, it is in the slowness, hesitation and lack of real commitment of states to face the climate emergency, the most important challenge facing the world today and to which we will refer below, that their inadequacy to articulate solutions to the main transnational challenges has been most clearly revealed.
There is no doubt that the Asian giant has done nothing but accumulate power in recent decades and has taken on a privileged position both within the group of states and in the wider universe of international players
Is China then the most powerful state in a group of countries that have less and less power in the world? Today’s China is fully aware of the loss of state power and the decline of the inter-state system, as well as the need to adjust both the design and the implementation of its current and future strategies to this new reality. There is no doubt that the Asian giant has done nothing but accumulate power in recent decades and has taken on a privileged position both within the group of states and in the wider universe of international players. This could lead one to mistakenly think that the country can look at these processes from a certain distance, with peace of mind, and that it can even emerge strengthened from them. This is not necessarily the case: on the one hand, the erosion of the position of some states forces China, like all other countries, to interact with other international actors of a non-state nature that respond to different logics, interests and frameworks for action, with many of which it has a lesser degree of familiarity; on the other hand, the weakening of the inter-state system as a whole in a context in which the country has positioned itself as a global superpower requires it to assume important responsibilities for the protection of that system, as well as to review in depth its preferences about the principles, rules and institutions that should govern international relations in the coming years.
The profound, global and transforming impact of the climate emergency
The term Anthropocene is increasingly used to describe the historical period from the middle of the 20th century to the present. This period is characterized by the synchronous and universal nature of a set of geological signals that include human population sprawl, the global production and use of highly polluting products such as plastic, and the conduct of nuclear and other human tests that result in the release and accumulation of man-made isotopes on the Earth’s surface. Whether one accepts this frame of reference or not, it is difficult to overstate the relevance of the climate emergency and its myriad implications on China’s role in the 21st century, international relations and, more broadly, life on the planet.
The 2018 special report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns of the danger of exceeding the average global temperature by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius before the middle of this century and urges a reduction of carbon emissions by almost 50% from 2017 levels by 2030, as well as reaching carbon neutrality by 2050. Failure to do so, it warns, could lead to such major changes as the end of ecosystems on 13% of the planet’s surface, the destruction of all coral reefs, and an increased likelihood of extreme heat waves in the tropics and severe storms in high-altitude areas, especially in East Asia and Northeast America [6]6 — Grup Intergovernamental d’Experts sobre el Canvi Climàtic (IPCC) (2018), Global Warming of 1.5ºC. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Available online. . These changes would in turn accelerate the melting of Arctic ice, increase the risks of droughts and floods, and reduce food production capacity in various regions of the world, thereby exacerbating the structural drivers of extreme poverty and causing environmentally motivated migration. If today the total number of climate refugees or migrants is estimated at around 20 million, this figure could reach 200 million in just three decades. All these alterations and others linked to climate change would also have an impact on global security, facilitating the spread of pandemics and intensifying international conflict, especially when linked to the dispute over natural and energy resources. In short, although asymmetrical and more intense for less developed or developing countries, it is undeniable that over the coming decades the perverse effects of the environmental deterioration of the planet will be profound, will be global in scope and will have an impact on all the issues on the international agenda.
To date, most of the steps taken by states and different international governmental organizations and forums have proven to be insufficient to face the challenges posed by the climate emergency. Nor does the initially ambitious Paris Agreement approved in 2016, to which 191 countries have already adhered, offer sufficient measures and guarantees to allow us to look to the future reassured that we have put the issue on track. As pointed out earlier, doubts about the adequacy of international institutions and, more broadly, of the principles and rules that articulate the current international order, are inevitable. Even more so after the experience of recent years, in which the refusal of the president of the United States – the most powerful country on the planet, but after all, a single state – to get involved in the fight against climate change has put multilateralism in check and has starkly reflected the fragility of the structures of global governance in this area.
In the last five years, China has undergone an important shift and, despite often presenting itself as a “defensive cooperating partner”, its attitude is closer to that of a less-than-enthusiastic leader, but committed nevertheless
Until very recently, China had kept a low profile in most of the negotiations on the climate emergency, aligning itself with the 130 countries of the G77 and emphasising its role as a superpower in the developing world. The country’s position was, from this perspective, an extension of its strategy of identification with the so-called global South and the promotion of South-South cooperation. In the last five years, however, China has undergone an important shift and, despite often presenting itself as a “defensive cooperating partner”, its attitude is closer to that of a less-than-enthusiastic leader, but committed nevertheless [7]7 — Eckersley, Robyn (2020), “Rethinking leadership: understanding the roles of the US and China in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement”, European Journal of International Relations 26 (4), 1178-1202. DOI. . The country’s need to maintain its high energy consumption to sustain its economic and industrial development and its still strong dependence on highly-polluting energy sources have contributed to this, together with the interests of the large Chinese energy companies, the differences between different governmental actors and the fear that this new attitude will negatively affect its fragile international image as a global superpower, both among developing and more developed countries. The latter have gradually accepted China’s greater role in the negotiations on the climate emergency, but many still do not recognise its leadership [8]8 — Hurrii, Karoliina (2020), “Rethinking climate leadership: Annex I countries’ expectations for China’s leadership role in the post-Paris UN climate negotiations”, Environmental Development 35, 100544. DOI. . Gaining new support without losing the support it already has is no small challenge for the Asian giant.
China is a pluralistic and transforming consolidated global superpower
The number of publications that have dealt with China’s enormous economic growth, its gradual accumulation of power and its enhanced role in international relations over the past three decades is huge. Its almost exponential growth is not only the result of genuine academic interest or the desire to better understand a country that, for many, is still shrouded in mystery. It is also – and perhaps above all – the expression of a deep concern about the loss of American supremacy and its implications for the international order. In many cases, it results from a desire to construct a narrative that presents China as an unreliable superpower, uncommitted to established principles and institutions and, behind a façade of ambiguity, a strong ambition for global domination. Projecting this image does not solve the growing number of criticisms and claims against the international order led by the United States, but it does succeed in instilling a feeling of suspicion towards China among broad sectors of the global society and, thus, slowing down the haste of those who are pushing for its transformation or replacement.
China is, in fact, a complex superpower that, by its own historical trajectory and will, does not conform to established patterns. Hence, exercises in linguistic-conceptual contortionism are not infrequent in order to find the precise term that reflects its singularity: from those who refer to it as “not your typical superpower” to those who describe it as a “fragile superpower”, to those who consider its consolidation as an inevitable historical fact or those who label it as an agile, dangerous, partial or reluctant superpower [9]9 — See Pye, Lucian W. (2016), “China: Not Your Typical Superpower”, Problems of Post-Communism, 43 (4), 3-15; Shirk, Susan L. (2008), China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Subramanian, Arvind (2011), “The Inevitable Superpower. Why the Rise of China is a Sure Thing”, Foreign Affairs 90 (5), 66-78; Shambaugh, David (2013), China Goes Global (The Partial Superpower), Oxford: Oxford University Press; Etzioni, Amitai (2017), “China – A Reluctant Superpower”, The Diplomat, November 6, available online. . Each of these formulations contains a part of truth, but also an important bias that, far from helping a greater and better understanding of the Chinese reality, adds confusion to the debate. China is a “complex risk society” in which, despite the growing concentration of power and Xi Jinping’s hyper-leadership, different levels of governance overlap and multiple actors coexist whose interests and perceptions do not always coincide. This last observation applies to the relations between the “families” or factions that make up the Chinese Communist Party, but also to the interactions between them and the People’s Liberation Army. It also applies to the links between the government authorities and the top managers of large Chinese companies, regardless of whether a significant percentage of the latter’s property is in the hands or under the control of the former. And it is, of course, to the tense relations between the party and the state on the one hand, and activists, political dissidents and ethnic minorities on the other. Although today’s China speaks with a strong voice, it is not a single one, nor is it surrounded by silence. The reality of the country is richer and more pluralistic and, in fact, it seems more appropriate to speak of today’s Chinas rather than of a single, monolithic China.
Although today’s China speaks with a strong voice, it is not a single one, nor is it surrounded by silence. The reality of the country is richer and more pluralistic and, in fact, it seems more appropriate to speak of today’s Chinas rather than of a single, monolithic China
China is also an internationally consolidated superpower undergoing a profound process of transformation. The implications of this process are not limited to the domestic sphere, but are also projected abroad. Thus, for example, there is no doubt that the “dual circulation strategy” included in the fourteenth five-year plan approved by the National People’s Congress this March for the period 2021-2025, which seeks to promote domestic demand (especially from private consumers) and the volume of exports in strategic sectors in parallel, will not only affect the country’s economic model, but also its main trading partners and international markets. In a similar direction, as the world’s leading energy consumer, China’s commitment to reducing its traditional dependence on coal and promoting renewable energy sources is set to redefine the role and power of the country’s large energy companies and, simultaneously, to alter the prices of some primary energy sources on a global scale.
These two illustrative examples in the economic and energy sectors are among the most visible, but the scope of China’s multidimensional transformation goes far beyond that. China’s present and future cannot be understood without paying attention to the important changes that are taking place in the film sector and, more broadly, in the cultural sector, the country’s political recentralisation, the redefinition of national identity around a reinforced nationalist sentiment, the growth of megacities, the redistribution of investments among the main capitals, the consolidation of increasingly influential and internationalised university and research systems, the sought-after alteration of demographic balances in regions where ethnic minorities live, the intensification of measures limiting freedom of expression and other fundamental rights, the blurring of the line between the prosecution of corruption and the limitation of the scope for action of critical or dissident voices, the promotion of a more assertive foreign policy at regional and global level, the incorporation of new profiles to the cadres of the Chinese Communist Party and the administration or the delicate but unstoppable reorganization of the relations between the State, the party and the army. The list is longer, so much so that it does not seem inappropriate to speak of a profound and wide-ranging process of mutation. In contrast to those voices that have pointed to the possibility of the country’s collapse in the short or medium term, however, a future in which the reshaping of the country and its growing accumulation of influence feed back and reinforce each other seems much more likely today.
In a context of transition, pinpointing China’s perceptions, interests and priorities is an almost impossible exercise. There are still many unanswered questions, and prejudices and/or lack of criticism tend to cloud our assessment. By adopting a cautious approach, this paper has sought to distance itself from any parti pris in order to identify some key elements that may help us to better understand the reality of a country that is a present, not a future superpower.
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References
1 —Ikenberry, G. John (2018), “The end of liberal international order?’”, International Affairs 94 (1), pp. 7-23.
2 —Parmar, Inderjeet (2018), “The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?”, International Affairs, 94 (1), pp. 151-172.
3 —Ikenberry, G. John, Op. cit. 2018.
4 —Friedman Lissner, Rebecca and Rapp-Hooper, Mira (2018), “The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order”, The Washington Quarterly, 41 (1), pp. 7-25.
5 —International Organization for Migration (2019), World Migration Report 2020, Ginebra. Available online.
6 —Grup Intergovernamental d’Experts sobre el Canvi Climàtic (IPCC) (2018), Global Warming of 1.5ºC. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty. Available online.
7 —Eckersley, Robyn (2020), “Rethinking leadership: understanding the roles of the US and China in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement”, European Journal of International Relations 26 (4), 1178-1202. DOI.
8 —Hurrii, Karoliina (2020), “Rethinking climate leadership: Annex I countries’ expectations for China’s leadership role in the post-Paris UN climate negotiations”, Environmental Development 35, 100544. DOI.
9 —See Pye, Lucian W. (2016), “China: Not Your Typical Superpower”, Problems of Post-Communism, 43 (4), 3-15; Shirk, Susan L. (2008), China: Fragile Superpower, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Subramanian, Arvind (2011), “The Inevitable Superpower. Why the Rise of China is a Sure Thing”, Foreign Affairs 90 (5), 66-78; Shambaugh, David (2013), China Goes Global (The Partial Superpower), Oxford: Oxford University Press; Etzioni, Amitai (2017), “China – A Reluctant Superpower”, The Diplomat, November 6, available online.
Pablo Pareja
Pablo Pareja Alcaraz is a Serra Hunter Professor of International Relations at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) and Academic Coordinator of the Erasmus Mundus Master’s in Public Policy at the Institut de Barcelona d'Estudis Internacinonals (IBEI). He holds a PhD in International Relations from UPF, a Master's in European Studies from the London School of Economics and a Master's in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. A member of the UPF Public Law and Public Relations Research Group, his main lines of research include the study of Chinese foreign policy, China's contribution to the construction and transformation of international and regional orders, and Asian international relations.
